Exploring Transnational Communities in the Philippines: An Introduction

VIRGINIA A. MIRALAO

When the Philippine Migration Research Network (PMRN) thought of commissioning back in 2003, some studies to look at the foreign residents in the country and mounting a conference on “Transnational Communities in the Philippines” the year after, not a few colleagues were puzzled by the choice of topic and were not too enthused about the activity. The feeling was that the topic was giving too much space to the storyline or the narrative of foreigners coming to visit and/or live in the Philippines, whereas there has been no let-up since the 1970s in the tens of thousands of Filipinos leaving the country each year to work and/or live abroad. It is this massive outflow of Filipinos and its negative connotations and consequences for the country (i.e., of poverty driving Filipinos to other lands; the “brain drain” ensuing from this outflow and leaving the Philippines with a shortage of skills for national development; and the “social costs” of the outflow leading to the break-up of families and undermining the social fabric) that have captured and pre-occupied the public mind.

Hence, even as the numbers of foreign nationals/visitors coming to the Philippines have been increasing since the 1990s, Filipinos generally have had little appreciation of this emerging phenomenon. Other than the fact that the outmigration of Filipinos far out-number the influx of foreigners coming to the country, the tendency of Filipinos to brush aside the entry of foreigners owes likewise to a natural negative reaction towards strangers/foreigners, and reinforced earlier by anti-colonial/anti-foreign sentiments directed at Spain and the Americans
(and to some extent also the Chinese) who were viewed as exploiting Filipinos and taking over the country’s resources, industries and wealth. This distrust of foreigners and a generalized fear of a “foreign invasion” thus also prevented Filipinos from appreciating more fully the increasing entry of foreigners to the country, and indeed, the changing nature of population movements worldwide in the last two to three decades.

In just the last few years since PMRN’s 2004 Conference on Transnational Communities in the Philippines however, public views and attitudes towards migration processes in the country appear to be changing. One notes that not too long ago, the OFWs (overseas Filipino workers) or OCWs (overseas contract workers) phenomenon was, to most Filipinos, a source of national shame as this reinforced the image of the Philippines as a poor Third World country incapable of generating jobs and containing the outmigration of its citizens. Today, however, this discourse on “national shame” is receding. Increasingly, discussions on the country’s OCWs are focusing more on the monies they remit to family and home and which in the aggregate, have been found to be far more substantial than the monies accruing to the country from donor assistance or ODA (official development assistance). Not a few analysts also attribute in no small measure, the country’s substantial and sustained economic gains since 2001 to the contributions made by OCWs to education and housing investments, building up the country’s foreign reserves, increasing foreign investor confidence, and contributing to the country’s macroeconomic stability at present.

Parallel changes appear likewise to be occurring in local views regarding the entry of foreign nationals on Philippine soil. Compared to earlier years, Filipinos are becoming more conscious of and interested in the presence of foreigners in their midst and are generally more accepting (if not welcoming) of foreign presence. This is true of whether one is speaking of local reactions to the recent influx of South Koreans to the Philippines; or to the newer waves of Chinese and Indian migrations to the country; or to foreign students enrolling in Philippine schools and universities; or to just plain tourists or visitors from other lands. Hardly does one hear of Filipinos, whether in city centers or other parts of the country, expressing resentment or fear of foreigners, or speaking negatively of the coming of foreigners to the country today.
GLOBALIZATION AND TRANSNATIONALISM

One can trace the aforementioned changes in public views and attitudes towards migrations to the ever-changing historical contexts of much of social phenomena—population movements and migrations included. As is well known, the close of the last century ushered in new sweeping and powerful forces of social change—now referred to as 21st century globalization—which are radically transforming the context and character of social life, relations and processes. With regard to migrations in particular, the ease in travel and the advances in ICTs engendered by globalization have increased tremendously the volume of people moving within, between and across countries in recent years. In addition to magnitude or volume, 21st century globalization has also increased the diversity of people in international or cross-border migrations to include not only the richer and the elite classes and the more male travelers/migrants of earlier periods, but ordinary people and the working classes, and increasingly more women among the ranks of migrants. Given the much increased volume and diversity of population movements, nearly all countries of the world today are involved in cross-border migration processes either as places of origin or destination or both, or as transit places of migrants.

In turn, the “globalized” context of today’s population movements has given rise to new sets of social issues and challenges for individual countries and the world at large—forcing changes in the way we view or look at contemporary migration phenomena. In the literature, there is an ongoing rethinking of the largely economic assumptions of earlier migration theories. For years, economists, sociologists and development experts have linked outmigration to foreign lands (or emigration) to the lack of prosperity (and peace and development) in one’s native soil. But new data suggest that in today’s globalized world, expanding economies do not necessarily stem migration streams and that development may, by raising incomes, also increase the numbers of people who can gain employable skills and afford to migrate. Some analysts now argue that respectable rates of economic growth or socioeconomic improvements in so-called “sender countries” like Brazil and Mexico (and even the Philippines) will not necessarily stop the outflow of citizens (Millman 2006). There is emerging consensus that today’s global migrations require a re-examination of the inter-relationship between population movements on the one hand, and socioeconomic development and political and cultural processes on the other; and of
the development impact or implications of migrations not only on sending countries, but on both sending and receiving countries and on humanity as a whole.

In demographic studies too, (which have inordinately focused on falling births and declining population growth rates in the past), we note a renewed interest in global migration flows and the role played by the uneven pace of demographic transitions across countries and the world’s regions in crossborder movements. Now that birth rates have been falling worldwide, more and more countries have to deal with the challenge posed by declining (rather than growing) populations. Highly developed countries therefore, as Japan, Canada and most of Europe where fertility rates have dropped well below replacement levels are expected to continue drawing foreign workers to fill up the labor shortages created by their declining and aging populations. On the other hand, Third World “sender countries” like the Philippines which continue to reproduce at or above replacement level are predicted to experience an increase in the demand for their overseas workers. Already, one sees the impact of these global migrations which are being driven by demographic imbalances across the world in the liberalization of immigration policies and laws in some developed countries (e.g., as the U.S. and Italy), and in the promotion of retirement villages and facilities in the non-Western world (as Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines) for the retiring and elderly population of the developed world.

Finally, (and consistent with, as mentioned earlier, the waning of the “national shame” discourse on Filipino migrations), there is increasing agreement that the concepts of “nation-states” and “national cultures” are no longer as useful in analyzing/addressing social and intellectual issues arising from today’s global flows. The constant movement of not just goods, capital and services, but of people and ideas across the globe has engendered new forms of social arrangements and organizations and social/self identities that transcend national cultures and nation-states. A concept that has since emerged to capture the changed nature of today’s crossborder movements and outcomes is that of “transnationalism.”

Expounding on the use of “transnationalism” in 1996, Hirano (1996) drew attention to definable differences between today’s migrants and their counterparts of earlier periods. Hirano first notes that yesterday’s migrants could not easily move back and forth across oceans and
continents and hence, became, de facto, emigrants of their countries of origin (or immigrants in their places of destination). In contrast, today’s global migrants are not necessarily lifetime migrants; they move across national borders with return tickets in hand, or if with one-way tickets only, they can easily earn the money for return visits or to go home.

Second, Hirano notes that earlier migrants did (or were expected to do) their best to become assimilated in their host/receiving countries, considering their intention to settle in their new place. In contrast, there is much less pressure for today’s migrants to assimilate in their places of destination: they can just learn enough of the receiving country’s language and culture or adjust enough to carry on with their businesses and tasks. This state of affairs has found support in the rise of an ethos of pluralism or multiculturalism in many countries, and which allow migrants to practice their cultures and retain their identities, even as they adjust to and coexist with people of different nationalities and ethnicities in their host countries.

Third, Hirano further argues that today’s border-crossers have created new “transnational spaces” for their various economic, socio-cultural, family, religious and political relations and activities. Social relations between or among countries are no longer confined to, or dominated by those established or carried out by nation-states and by government institutions and functionaries. Migrants from various places and at various levels (i.e., local or subnational, regional and global) connect and interact directly with one another or mingle together via new structures, associations or businesses that have sprung up in the wake of globalization and which help sustain the transnational links of migrants and their communities.

Writing a few years later, Kastoryano (2000) also considers today’s population movements as comprising forms of post-colonial and post-national phenomena. She speaks of “transnational communities and identities” constituted by migrants and which are delinked from country territories and sustained by structures and networks outside those of nation-states. In transnational communities, the basis of organization derives from the migrants’ common experience in crossborder movements and from their affiliation and/ or identification with several groups spanning their countries of origin and destination or inter-regional and global spaces. To illustrate, Kastoryano cites the case of Europe’s immigrant workers from various countries in Africa, Asia and the Middle East who now constitute several transnational networks that
draw attention to their collective identity and shared causes as immigrant workers and settlers of the Old World.

In sum, today’s migrants appear less constrained by notions of “national enclosures” and “ethnic/national cultures.” They are involved with and participate in various transnational activities facilitated by emerging constellations and networks of people, technologies, businesses, associations, churches and other institutions that promote a host of connections and linkages (e.g., joint ventures, trade, return visits, exchanges) across places and countries. Today’s migrants thus, are also more international or “transnational” in behavior and outlook – they move globally, maintain working, living and family arrangements in more than one country, and are concerned with navigating their way from one culture/country to other cultures and countries. Given their multiple involvements with groups, communities and networks across the globe, today’s migrants have many more ways of constructing their social identities, of which their nationality or ethnicity is but an aspect of their construal of the self.

TRANSNATIONAL COMMUNITIES IN THE PHILIPPINES

It was against this background of changing global conditions that PMRN first convened two related fora on Transnational Communities in the Philippines in 2000. Some of the papers presented at these fora appear in The Philippines as Home: Settlers and Sojourners in the Country edited by Maruja M.B. Asis and published by PMRN in 2001.

The Philippines being a country of emigration, the intent of the 2000 fora as Asis states in her introduction to the volume, was to broaden the discussion on migration issues by looking into the Philippines as host country to foreigners who have come to settle on its shores. Anticipating moreover, increases in population mobility and cultural diversity as a result of globalization, the fora also meant to explore how the Philippines would deal with related social issues (e.g., as ethnic and crosscultural relations, immigration policies and regulations, citizenship laws and so forth) arising from global influences and crossborder migrations.

Given the limited number of foreigners and foreign communities in the Philippines, papers in the fora understandably dealt with the Chinese Filipinos and Indian Filipinos who have had a longer history of coming to the Philippines. (Accounts date Chinese entry to the Philippines to pre-Hispanic times while Indian migration to the country
began only over a century ago when the American colonial period ushered in opportunities for Indians to expand their businesses to Manila.) The papers provide ethnohistorical accounts of the Chinese and Indian settlements in the country and the economic and socio-cultural roles that they have played in national and provincial life at various periods in Philippine history. But it is perhaps in the papers’ treatment of the social identities and communities of the Chinese and Indian immigrants and their adjustment to Philippine life that one recognizes certain “transnational” features and practices among these two foreign resident populations of the country.

Richard Chu’s (2001) paper in the volume, explores the complexity and multiplicity of the identities of the ethnic Chinese in Philippine society. He argues that Chinese immigrants appropriated localized and/or transnationalized identities when dealing with the country’s rulers of the day. During the Spanish period, many of them became hispanized, marrying their wives and baptizing their children in (Catholic) church rites even as they continued to honor the rights of the wives and children they left behind in China, leaving the latter portions of their wealth and inheritances in their wills and testaments. At the time of the Philippine Revolution however, the ethnic Chinese had become politically Filipinized, with not a few of them becoming leading members and staunch supporters of the Revolution. But throughout the various periods of Philippine history, Chu writes that the Chinese immigrants in the country lived and acted out their cultural heritage and “Chineseness”— maintained and kept alive by their family and business ties in China and continuing visits to their home villages in the mainland.

In another paper on the Chinese immigrants in the volume, Chen Yande (2001) traces the growth of the Chinese Filipino community in Cebu City which has the second largest Chinese resident population in the Philippines next to Metro Manila. The center of trading activities in the Visayas, Cebu was a natural destination of foreign traders, but primarily of the Chinese who, over time, have continued to migrate to the city from the mainland (with only a temporary lull in this migration stream between 1950 to 1975). Yande credits much of Cebu’s economic growth and success not only to the hard work and entrepreneurship of its Chinese resident population but significantly also to the active role they played in linking China and its numerous trade and business opportunities with Cebu, their host city in the Philippines.
From both Yande’s and Chu’s accounts, one notes that despite their long years of stay in the country and their adaptation to and integration with Philippine social life, the Chinese Filipinos are not entirely separable from their Chinese origins and homeland. In a sense, they have maintained their uniqueness by being “transnational,” keeping the connections and linkages that they have forged between their or their forebears’ country of origin (China) and their new country of residence (Philippines).

Interestingly in just the few years since the presentation of Chu’s and Yande’s papers, there are indications that ongoing globalization influences continue to impinge on the evolution of the Chinese Filipinos’ social identities, while also broadening and strengthening their earlier transnational links and connections with China and other overseas Chinese elsewhere in Asia and the world. Today, Chinese Filipinos are increasingly referred to as Tsinoy’s highlighting the blending of their Chinese (Chinoy) ancestry and their being Filipinos (Pinoy). Hardly is the term Tsinoy now associated with the minority status (whether numerical or social) of Chinese Filipinos, as it is with their unique ethnicity and acceptability in mainstream Philippine society.

Globalization appears to have eased or aided the mainstreaming of Chinese Filipinos by reinvigorating the Tsinoy’s engagement with China. In recent years, Philippine newspapers have been full of accounts of how the country’s taipans (Chinese Filipino business tycoons) have begun to expand and operate their businesses transnationally or globally – investing and establishing new business enterprises in China (and other places) and also bringing in or creating new businesses from China to the Philippines. Recent years have likewise witnessed the arrival of a newer wave of Chinese migration to the Philippines prompted by changing global and national conditions both in China and the Philippines. In a recent paper, Ang See (2005) notes that the older wave of Chinese migrants to the Philippines (jiuqiao) left China then owing to China’s backwardness, while the new wave of Chinese immigrants (xinqiao) are leaving China today despite China’s increasing development and modernity. Today’s xinqiao include traders and business people that the Chinese have been historically known for, and other migrants as those wishing to learn English in the Philippines (in the hope of landing more lucrative jobs upon their return to China), and still others hoping to circumvent China’s one-child policy. The latter would then return to China with two children while acquiring the higher
status and privileges accorded to overseas Chinese (huaqiao). All these illustrate how global forces have animated the centuries-old Philippine-bound Chinese migration stream, increasing the numbers of Chinese immigration (legal and illegal) to the Philippines once again, and promoting new transnational businesses, engagements and networking practices between Chinese Filipinos and their roots and origins in China and other overseas Chinese communities in the world.

 Appearing in the same volume as Chu’s and Yande’s papers, Anita Raina Thapan’s (2001) account of the Sindhi Hindus, one of two Indian communities that have migrated to the Philippines, shows how differently the Sindhis have constituted their identity and adapted to Philippine society from the Chinese Filipinos. Like their Punjabi countrymen (the other Indian immigrant group to the Philippines), Sindhis began coming to the Philippines at the turn of the 20th century. During the partition of British India in 1947 however, they lost their homeland, Sindh, to Pakistan. No longer having a geographical place to call home in modern India, most Sindhis have established residences in various parts of the world. The Sindhi community in Manila constitutes one of several Sindhi communities that have settled in countries as diverse as Barbados, Ghana, Nigeria, Morocco, Spain, Paraguay, Indonesia, Japan, Thailand and Singapore.

 Unlike the Chinese Filipinos or Tsinoys, Sindhis Filipinos have not integrated into Philippine life and remain very much apart from Filipinos and even their Punjabi counterparts in the country. Their identity or sense of community as Sindhi remains ascendant and emanates primarily from their common historical experience as a people, their migratory background and their common trades and occupations (as generally successful merchants and businessmen). In Manila, the Sindhis continue to maintain their separate identity by having minimal relations with Filipinos (only as called for by their business transactions); living in the same villages or neighborhoods; attending to their own religious rituals; and marrying endogamously or only among their kind. Thapan writes that Sindhi Filipinos look for spouses for their children from among their own community in the country or from the small remaining Sindhi populations in Pune or Bombay in India, or from Sindhi communities in other countries around the world. Because of intercountry marriages and their intercountry movements, the Sindhis in the Philippines are of different nationalities (with not a few having taken on Filipino nationality or citizenship). In
this sense, the Sindhi community appears so much more a social transnational construction, delinked from any given country or territorial space.

Thapan goes on to describe how the loosening of import and export controls in the Philippines in the 1980s led to the emergence of a very wealthy class of Sindhi Filipinos. She notes that more recent economic liberalization policies and globalization processes will likely enliven further the transnational ties among Sindhi multinational firms and the Sindhi Filipinos’ trade and kinship networks in the region (Manila, Singapore, Jakarta and Hong Kong) as well as in Pune and Bombay and other places in the world.

The present volume hopes to add to our knowledge of foreign resident populations in the Philippines by presenting new research papers supported by PMRN on the South Korean, Vietnamese and Japanese communities that have formed in the Philippines. Three of these papers—those of Virginia A. Miralao, Lorna P. Makil and Kanako Kutsumi—focus on the South Koreans who comprise the most recent and visible group of foreign entrants or migrants to the Philippines.

Miralao’s paper looks into the nature of this Philippine-bound migration from South Korea, and into the factors and developments in both South Korea and the Philippines that have given rise to this migration stream. Makil’s paper examines how South Koreans have settled in Dumaguete City in the Visayas, why they are going there and how they are adjusting to local life. Kutsumi’s paper on the other hand, analyses the formation and growth of various types of Korean associations (i.e., business and chambers of commerce, students’, women’s, church and media groups and organizations) in the Philippines; and the role of these associations in maintaining the South Koreans’ social identity and easing their adjustment in Philippine society and their relationships with Filipinos.

Together, the three papers reveal how the current wave of Korean migration to the country is very much the product of globalization. Like the new Chinese migrants to the country or the xinqiao, who Ang See (2006) says are leaving China even as China is now fast developing and modernizing, Korean migration to the Philippines is also being driven by South Korea’s increasing prosperity. Koreans are coming to the Philippines to establish/expand their businesses, learn English, enroll in university, or set-up churches, services and other facilities to
cater to the Korean communities that have sprouted in different places of the country.

Most Koreans who come to the Philippines are temporary migrants and have no intention of staying in the country permanently. But the movement of Koreans to the Philippines and back to Korea now appears a well established migration system. It is supported by a dense network of transnational linkages (i.e., of travel, school, business and trade operations, church and missionary activities, and other family and personal contacts) and one can expect this migration system to continue well into the future.

Finally, unlike the Chinese Filipinos or the Tsinoy who have integrated into Philippine life while retaining their “Chineseness,” Koreans in the Philippines are more likely to maintain their “separation” from Philippine society. In this respect, they resemble more the Sindhi Filipinos who have kept their personal relationships with Filipinos at a minimum, though they have long been living in the Philippines. Like the Sindhi Filipinos therefore, one does not see the Koreans in the Philippines assimilating or integrating with the host country, but their continuing presence will likely add to the multiethnic character of Philippine society.

Oscar and Susan Evangelista’s contribution in this volume focuses on yet another kind of foreign migration to the Philippines—that of the Vietnamese refugee population who fled their country at the end of the Vietnam War in 1975 and found themselves in the Philippines. The Evangelistas’ paper recounts in particular the story of those Vietnamese who were first settled in a refugee camp in Puerto Princesa, Palawan under the sponsorship of the UN High Commission on Refugees and Philippine authorities. The refugee camp was meant to house only temporarily the refugees while awaiting their resettlement to the U.S. or another country in the developed world. But years later, several remained in Palawan’s refugee processing center as they had not been resettled to a third country and neither did they want to be repatriated to Vietnam. Hence, with assistance primarily from the Philippines Catholic Church, the Vietnamese refugees soon transformed their camp into a distinctly Vietnamese village or community that came to be called Vietville.

Vietville has since developed into “an economically viable sub-unit of Palawan society,” with the refugees and their families carving for
themselves a niche in the local economy. They produce and sell pho (Vietnamese noodles) and French bread and they engage in such trades as dressmaking and hair styling, which the Evangelistas report always have many customers. Vietville has also become one of Palawan’s tourist attractions but because a number of Vietville’s residents have now ventured out and integrated with Filipinos outside their village or camp, good Vietnamese eateries/ restaurants can be found not only in Vietville but in other places in Puerto Princesa.

The status of the Vietnamese refugees in Palawan remains unsettled although there is a pending bill in the Philippines House of Representatives to grant them permanent residence in the country. Continuing questions on the legality of their status have prevented them from visiting their hometowns and relatives in Vietnam even as many of them express a desire to do so. It is not unlikely however, that they would be able to do this in the future and establish their own transnational linkages between Vietnam and Palawan.

It may interest readers to know that the Vietnamese refugees are not the first foreign refugee population hosted by the Philippines. In a paper appearing in the earlier cited PMRN publication edited by Asis, Poliva Ilieva (2001) writes that the Philippines played host to a refugee population of more than 5500 people, mostly Russians, fleeing China upon the country’s communist takeover in 1948. Still reeling from the destruction of its economy during World War II and dealing with the many concerns of a newly independent state, the Philippines through its representative to the UN, Carlos P. Romulo, and then President Elpidio Quirino, nonetheless acceded to a request by the UN International Refugee Organization (IRO) to provide temporary accommodation to these politically displaced persons from China. Tubabao Island in Guiuan, Samar was transformed into a refugee camp by the IRO and the Philippine government for these political émigrés, where they continued to stay until 1953 when they were resettled to other countries. Ilieva’s account of life at the Tubabao refugee camp includes descriptions of the generally pleasant contacts and exchanges not only between the Philippine authorities and the Russian refugees but between the latter and the local population in Guiuan.

Completing the accounts of foreign nationals in the Philippines in this volume is Arnold Molina Azurin’s paper on Japanese migrants and settlers in the Philippines. Azurin’s paper draws from several existing literature on the Japanese communities that have formed in the
Cordilleras and the Baguio-Benguet area in Northern Philippines; in the Bicol Region and Iloilo in Central Philippines; and in Davao in Southern Philippines. Tracing the beginnings of Japanese-Filipino exchanges and contacts to very early periods, Azurin’s paper reminds us that population movements have been happening throughout much of human history. In pre-colonial times, he writes that various groups from the Japanese archipelago used to move to the Nanyo region or the southlands including the Philippines. There being no central states at that time, these movements of course did not require visas or travel documents and neither were they known as crossborder migrations. Various people and groups from Japan sailed southward and relocated themselves among the coastal and nearby communities in the Philippines, assimilating and intermarrying with natives. Since their moves simply constituted a resettlement and an integration with native society, ethnic distinctions between the migrants and the natives were of no or little consequence.

The beginning of the American colonial period saw the coming of more Japanese to the Philippines. The country’s expanding colonial economy attracted many Japanese who were eager to escape Japan’s own bleak economic conditions in the 1900s, and who were hopeful about improving their lot by coming to the Philippines. It is interesting to note that questions about the social identities and ethnicities of these Japanese émigrés began to emerge at this time. For the most part, the Japanese émigrés were perceived as coming from the “lower class,” comprising as they did of farmers, laborers, workers and prostitutes and also many Okinawans who similarly ranked at the bottom of Japan’s social hierarchy. To Filipino nationalists and the Philippine State concerned with forging a “Filipino identity” on the other hand, the Japanese expatriates and their families comprised an ethnic minority in Philippine national life.

It was unfortunate that the Japanese communities that were well on their way to integrating with Philippine society were overtaken by Japan’s imperialist war in Asia. This caught the émigrés in between the institutions of their homeland (the Japanese government and Japan’s Imperial Army) on one side, and the Philippine Government and their host country on the other. For fear of being suspected as collaborating and sympathizing with the Japanese soldiers during the war, the Japanese émigrés and their descendants (many from marriages with Filipinos) suppressed their Japanese origins and identity, mixing and
blending inconspicuously with Filipinos in their localities. This denial of their national lineage and identity went on even through the post-war years, considering the strong anti-Japanese feelings generated by the war. As late as 1988, Azurin notes that a survey undertaken among the Japanese-Filipinos in Davao showed only 10 percent admitting their Japanese roots and origins while 57 percent identified themselves as Filipinos and the remaining were “not clear” as to their nationalities.

There are signs that post colonial Philippines and today’s globalizing environment will be increasingly accepting of Japanese Filipinos. In a recent publication commemorating the hundredth year of the arrival of Japanese workers on the Benguet Road, Patricia Okubo Afable (2004) pays a long overdue tribute to her forebears whose contributions to the history and development of the Cordilleras had to be hidden from the public for a long time owing to the traumas caused by the war. Japanese-Filipino associations are beginning to thrive once more, and several members of their communities have revisited their families and villages in Japan. It is not altogether far-fetched that sometime soon, Japanese-Filipinos will play an important role in establishing those transnational linkages and support for business, trade and service exchanges between Japan and the Philippines, including the provision of caregiving services for Japan’s aging population.

At this point, a word must be said about the Indonesians who similarly have formed their own communities in Mindanao. No new research has been done by PMRN on this topic, although a few earlier studies suggest that the Indonesian migrants in Mindanao may likewise emerge as important transnational nexuses in coming years. Given the proximity of Mindanao’s coasts with some of the islands of Indonesia and Malaysia, it is not surprising that household surveys conducted by the National Statistics Office should reveal not an inconsiderable presence of foreign nationalities in some regions of Mindanao.

A dissertation research undertaken by Tan-Cullamar in 1989 looked more closely into the migration and presence of Indonesians in Mindanao. Tan-Cullamar’s research dates the start of Indonesian migration to Mindanao in the early 1900s when several of Indonesia’s outlying islands began experiencing mounting population pressures on existing resources. This prompted local populations to move to neighboring places including the Balut and Saranggani Islands of Davao del Sur which have since served as entry points for Indonesian flows into Mindanao. Other than geographic proximity, sociocultural
similarities, ethnolinguistic linkages, family and social networks on either side of the migration system served to reinforce and sustain the development of Indonesian transnational communities in Mindanao. Tan-Cullamar notes that Indonesians living in Mindanao are conscious of their Indonesian origin and ethnicity and continue to maintain sentimental and material links with Indonesia and the islands from where they came. Tan-Cullamar’s study focused on the Sangirs (originally coming from the Sangir Archipelago) who have settled in Balut and Sarangani Islands, but the greater numbers of Indonesian immigrant populations in Mindanao (conservatively estimated in 1989 at 10,000) are to be found in South Cotabato and other places in Davao.

In a related work, Indonesian scholar, Riwanto Tirtosudarmo (2003) looked into the transnational community of the Florenese who have settled in Nunukan in Kalimantan, Indonesia. Originally from East Flores in Eastern Indonesia, the Florenese began migrating to Sabah, Malaysia in the 1950s in search of work and livelihood. On their journey to Sabah, they stopped and stayed in Nunukan, Kalimantan which has since served as their transit place prior to entering Tawau in Sabah. Global economic forces in later years including the establishment of the Brunei Darussalam-Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines East Asia Growth Area (or BIMP-EAGA) in 1994 rekindled traditional/historical crossborder migration streams in the region (including Filipinos going to Indonesia and Malaysia and vice versa), and increased specifically labor migration into Sabah which exhibits the highest level of economic development in BIMP-EAGA. Recent news reports from the Philippines also attest to increasing levels of economic transactions and activity in the region with several Filipino Muslim traders and workers maintaining residences and communities across borders within BIMP-EAGA. The impetus given by the BIMP-EAGA initiative has made travel and exchanges among the region’s border societies/communities easy and lucrative. There are no visa requirements and travel taxes are kept to a minimum (P200.00). Fast passenger ships, which have replaced the wooden hull boats of old, now regularly ply the Zamboanga-Sandakan, Malaysia route and Tawi-tawi to Sandakan route (Arceo-Dumlao 2007). The impact of BIMP-EAGA therefore on crossborder migrations in Southern Philippines and the development of foreign resident communities in Mindanao bears watching.

Finally, the remaining contributions in this volume call attention to some of the policy issues and challenges that today’s global flows
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and transnationalism are presenting to the Philippine Government. As mentioned earlier, the increased incidence and diversity of contemporary migrations require a rethinking of the rationale behind state policies on crossborder movements, national security, nationality and identity, and citizenship. The first of these is Benjamin V. Cariño’s paper assessing the implementation of two then newly enacted laws affecting overseas Filipinos who arguably are among the world’s first groups of transnationals: the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003 and the Absentee Voting Act also of 2003.

Cariño’s paper reveals how the Philippine government is searching for ways to continue recognizing and bestowing on overseas Filipinos the same sociopolitical rights and privileges as their fellow Filipinos who have remained in the Philippines, considering that they (Filipinos overseas) are now also bound up with the rules and sociopolitical life of their countries of destination and residence. Although earlier notions of nationality and citizenship (i.e., of pledging allegiance and loyalty to only one country) are loosening up and changing, Cariño’s paper demonstrates the difficulties in changing mindsets and paradigms about these. He notes for instance, that the 2003 Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act avoids using the term “dual citizenship” even as the intent of the law is precisely to grant Filipinos who have since acquired citizenship in another country, the privilege of participating fully in the political, economic and social life of their homeland. Likewise, although the 2003 Absentee Voting Act seeks to extend the right to vote to Filipinos who are temporarily abroad at the time of elections, the law also requires them to sign an affidavit attesting to their intention to return home. Together with administrative and bureaucratic problems that tend to accompany the initial enforcement of new legislations, the foregoing ambiguities and “hesitancies” in the citizenship retention and absentee voting laws also constitute barriers to their implementation.

In his reaction to the Cariño paper, Filomeno V. Aguilar Jr. discusses the Philippine state’s interest in the passage of both the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act and the Absentee Voting Act. Aguilar argues that to the Philippine State, the law on citizenship retention (or dual citizenship) is a powerful instrument for attracting investments or capital flows from Filipino emigrants. The law seems to target in particular the wealthy Filipinos who have settled in the U.S. and who also are interested in regaining their entitlements as Filipino citizens.
(e.g., as voting and owning properties and enterprises in the Philippines). The Absentee Voting Act on the other hand, is seen by the state as a means for changing the outcome of Philippine elections based on the assumption that overseas Filipinos would vote differently and more intelligently than local Filipinos, since they have had the benefit of being exposed to more modern cultures and economies. Unlike the Citizenship Retention Act, the Absentee Voting Act has for its target, the temporary OCWs whose numbers hold the potential of significantly influencing election outcomes.

The final contribution that similarly enunciates a policy response is the keynote speech prepared by then Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Honorable Delia Domingo Albert, for PMRN's 2004 Conference on Transnational Communities in the Philippines, and delivered for her by then Foreign Affairs Undersecretary, Sonia Brady. In her speech, Secretary Albert commends PMRN and UNESCO (which has lent its support to the Network's migration research) for convening the conference, and acknowledges the growing influx of foreign nationals into the Philippines. She mentions that while this is a welcome development, there is also an increasing need for the Philippines to police its borders and uphold its national security and sovereignty in light of the international terrorism and drug, arms and human trafficking spawned by globalization. Nevertheless, Secretary Albert recognizes the importance of crafting strategic and proactive policies to allow the Philippines to use to its advantage the opportunities for economic, political and sociocultural advancement that foreign presence and transnational communities offer to the Philippines. She notes that the country will benefit from continuing research that PMRN and others will be doing in this area.

Three years after Secretary Albert's speech, we observe new policy and program developments that aim to respond to the increasing entry of foreign nationals to the Philippines. Recent news accounts for example indicate measures being undertaken by the Bureau of Immigration to modernize and improve the efficiency of its operations and cut the bureaucratic red tape associated with the issuance of permanent resident visitor visas to the Philippines. These changes are expected to benefit expatriate workers in the country and their families, foreign students and foreign nationals who wish to retire in the country and make the Philippines their second home. Considering that the Philippines expects other countries to be hospitable and protective of
the scores of Filipino migrants found in many countries of the world, it is a fitting gesture for the Philippines to accord the same welcome and courtesy to other nationalities and ethnicities coming to the country to work, visit, study or stay.

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Yande, Chen
Almost all the fora on migration in the Philippines in the last two decades or so focused on the well-established movement of Filipinos overseas. Given the longstanding problems of the Philippine economy—chronic unemployment, persistent poverty and other sociopolitical instabilities—most Filipinos could not imagine the Philippines ever becoming a place of destination for other peoples and nationalities. Even in terms of tourism, the Philippines remained a laggard at the height of the Asian economic boom in the early and mid-1990s when most of its neighbors in ASEAN and the wider (Asian) region experienced unprecedented growths in their tourism industries. Beginning with an outdated international airport and poor infrastructure facilities, crimes in the streets and other peace and order and security problems, it is quite clear why the Philippines has not been able to attract as many tourists as its neighbors.

National and economic problems have made Filipinos not too conscious and appreciative of foreign peoples in their midst. Except perhaps for the overseas Chinese and Indians and a few Westerners married to Filipinos who have come to settle here, Filipinos tend to dismiss the entry of foreign nationals into the country as inconsequential, believing the country possesses none of the pull-factors of migration or the power to attract foreigners to its shores.

But recent studies point to some perceptible influx of foreign nationals into the country, albeit less than consistently, given interruptions in foreign arrivals due to the economic woes caused by
the 1997 Asian financial crisis (Tigno 2001) and by the SARS and bird-flu outbreaks. This paper focuses on one of these foreign national immigration streams—specifically, that of South Koreans (heretofore referred to simply as Koreans) coming to the Philippines and whose presence has become increasingly visible and felt in several neighborhoods within Metropolitan Manila as well as in other cities in the country as Tarlac, Baguio, Dumaguete, and Cebu.

It should be noted here at the outset that most Filipinos find the entry of Koreans to the country some kind of oddity since this goes against the usual migration pattern of people moving from poorer places and countries and going to richer and more developed ones. This paper thus seeks to understand this emerging wave of Korean migration to the Philippines by examining its nature and magnitude, its causes and history as well as its repercussions and implications on Philippine-Korean relations.

In view of the incompleteness of statistical information on the influx of Koreans to the country and the limited number of studies on the topic, as well as the difficulties in interviewing Koreans in the country due to differences in our languages, the paper remains exploratory. It relies primarily on a review of existing documents and studies of Korean-Philippine contacts and relations; an examination of various trade, socioeconomic and immigration statistics collected by different departments, bureaus and agencies in the Philippines; and on a limited number of key-informant interviews with knowledgeable Koreans and Filipinos. It is hoped that the paper provides a basis for further work and for more systematic studies on Korean migration to the Philippines.

**THE GROWTH OF KOREAN VISITS AND MIGRATION TO THE PHILIPPINES**

Various statistics indicate that Korean migration to the Philippines is a new phenomenon that began only in the 1990s. The most direct evidence of this may be seen in the increased incidence of air travel between Seoul and Manila. Today, there are three daily return flights between Seoul and Manila, one each via Korean Air, Asiana Airlines, and Philippine Airlines. In addition, Philippine Airlines also has direct daily flights between Seoul and Cebu, whereas on Mondays and Fridays, Korean Air fields a second additional flight between Seoul and Manila. In 1990, daily return flights between Manila and Seoul were fewer.
Consequently, data on Korean Visitor Arrivals in the Philippines and compiled by the Department of Tourism show these to have jumped from a mere 26,000 arrivals in 1992 to as much as 303,867 arrivals in 2003 (roughly representing more than a 10-fold increase over a decade). The data in Table 1 show some interruptions/ decreases during the 1997 to 2000 period following the aftermath of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, but in what otherwise seems to be a long-term rise in Korean visitor arrivals. Beginning 2000, the number of arrivals has consistently increased, rising by almost 75 percent in the last four-year period from 2000 to 2003. It is also worth noting that Korean arrivals have been using all international ports of entry to come to the Philippines including those outside of Manila and Cebu, as Subic, Davao, Zamboanga, Laoag and Batangas. Korean arrivals now account for some 15 percent of the foreign arrivals in the country, up from only 6 percent in 1999.

Likewise, statistics on the Alien Employment Permits issued by the Department of Labor’s Bureau of Local Employment (also in Table 1) show Korean nationals with these permits to have risen from 128 in 1992 to 1881 in 2002 (or almost a 15-fold increase during this 10-year period).

Table 1. Data on the number of Korean visitor arrivals to the Philippines (from the Department of Tourism) and on the number of Koreans issued Alien Employment Permits in the Philippines (from the Department of Labor) by year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. of Korean Visitor Arrivals</th>
<th>No. of Koreans with Alien Employment Permits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>303,867</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>288,468</td>
<td>1,881</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>207,957</td>
<td>901</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>174,966</td>
<td>703</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>133,068</td>
<td>599</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>180,000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>26,000</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Available statistics from the Office of Student Services of the Commission on Higher Education similarly reveal significant increases in the number of Korean youth/ nationals who have sought admission to Philippine institutions of higher learning. The number of Korean students in Philippine colleges and universities rose from 676 in
Academic Year 1998-1999 to 1069 in AY 2002-2003. Korean students account for the largest number (22.3%) of foreign students who have enrolled in Philippine colleges and universities between AY 1998-1999 to AY 2002-2003 (see Table 2).

Table 2: Foreign Students in the Philippines by Selected Country of Nationality, AY 1998-1999 to AY 2002–2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>World Region</th>
<th>Academic Year (AY)</th>
<th>% TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>98-99</td>
<td>99-00</td>
<td>00-01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>676</td>
<td>558</td>
<td>394</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>860</td>
<td>764</td>
<td>452</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>575</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>3,293</td>
<td>2,452</td>
<td>2,087</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Office of Student Services, Commission on Higher Education

Finally, data from the Bureau of Immigration on the number of student visas that the Bureau has issued to Korean nationals lend further support to the increasing entry of Koreans to the Philippines. Between 2001 to 2003, Table 3 shows uptrends in the number of Korean students who requested and were granted an extension of their student visas, and in the number of them who formalized the conversion of their tourist visas to student visas upon their arrival in the Philippines. Data on new Korean arrivals already with student visas issued by the Philippine Embassy in Seoul however, has been going down (i.e., from 197 in 2001 to only 43 in 2003), suggesting that Koreans are encouraged to just come to the country as tourists and convert their status to students in Manila itself.
Even as various statistics point to an increasing presence of Koreans in the Philippines, the country still has no good estimate of the number of Korean nationals living within its borders. In part this owes to certain inefficiencies in the Philippine statistical system. Data on foreign nationals with resident visas are not quickly available from the Bureau of Immigration for example, and hence have not been incorporated in this paper. Too, the situation reflects the low priority that policy-makers and population experts have placed on new and varying types of population movements. Philippine social and population policy thrusts have been fixated with simply addressing issues bearing on the country’s higher than replacement-level birth rates and the employment of Filipinos overseas. Policy discussions and initiatives are yet to be made on the increased variety of population movements in the Philippines or affecting the country and spawned by current-day globalization processes.

Table 3. Data from the Bureau of Immigration on the number of Student Visas issued to Korean nationals by Year and by Manner of obtaining these visas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month/ Year</th>
<th>Student Visas</th>
<th>Tourist Visas Converted to Student Visas</th>
<th>Arriving with Student Visas Issued in Korea</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>December 2001</td>
<td>979</td>
<td>683</td>
<td>197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2002</td>
<td>909</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2002</td>
<td>867</td>
<td>608</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2003</td>
<td>682</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2003</td>
<td>604</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

But the work of Ms. Kanako Kutsumi, a Japanese scholar who has pioneered research on the Koreans in the Philippines, offers some estimates of the magnitude of Korean migration to the Philippines. In a paper in this volume, Kutsumi (2004) uses data that she obtained from the Annual Report of Statistics on Immigration and Emigration Control of the South Korean Ministry of Justice in Seoul. These are presented in Table 4 which reveal only 4,036 Korean immigrants to the Philippines in 1985; 106,519 in 1995; 149,722 in 1997; and declining after, but to a still substantial 110,535 in 1999 at the time of the Asian currency crisis.
Table 4. Data on the Number of Korean Immigrants to the Philippines (South Korean Ministry of Justice) and on the Number of Korean Stayers in the Philippines (South Korean Embassy, Manila) by Year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. of Korean Immigrants</th>
<th>No. of Korean Stayers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001 (Jan.)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>24,618</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>110,535</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>149,722</td>
<td>8,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>106,519</td>
<td>9,708</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5,038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>4,036</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Kutsumi further notes that Korean stayers in the Philippines who have registered with the South Korean Embassy in Manila numbered only 5,038 in 1992 but this number rose to 9,708 in 1995 and to as many as 24,618 in 2001. Given these and other figures from various sources, some reports have asserted that there are more Koreans living in the Philippines than the estimated 30,000 to 33,000 Filipinos working and/or living in Korea (Office of the Press Secretary 2003).

**THE DRIVERS OF KOREAN MIGRATION TO THE PHILIPPINES**

Today’s influx of Koreans to the Philippines represents a new wave or development in Korea’s migration history. In an overview paper on Korea’s diaspora, Yoon (2004) dates the beginning of Korean migration to other countries to the mid-19th century. The first wave of Korean out migration was from this period up to 1910 “…when farmers and laborers emigrated to China, Russia and Hawaii to escape famine, poverty and the oppression by the ruling class.” The second period from 1910 to 1945 witnessed the Japan-bound migration of Korean farmers and laborers who were deprived of land and jobs and who “…moved to Japan to fill labor shortages created by Japan’s wartime conditions.” Yoon reckons the third period to cover the years 1945 to 1962 when “…students, war orphans, children of mixed parentage, and wives of US military servicemen migrated to the United States for the purpose of study abroad, adoption and family reunion.” The fourth period is from 1962 onwards when Koreans began to leave as contract workers to Latin America, Western Europe, the Middle East and North America. This was in response to the emigration policy adopted by
South Korea in 1962 which encouraged Koreans to work and live overseas to relieve local population pressures and secure foreign exchange through the remittances of overseas Koreans. The liberalization of US immigration policy in 1965 further drew large numbers of Korean immigrants to the US in search of better economic and educational opportunities.

By the late 1980s however, Korean immigration to other countries began to decline as the number of return migrants began to increase in response to the rapid improvements in South Korea’s economic conditions and standards of living. Citing 2001 statistics, Yoon writes that some 5.6 million Koreans (or the equivalent of close to 12% of Korea’s national population) live in 151 different countries in the world today. Overseas Koreans are regionally concentrated in the U.S. (2.1 million), China (1.88 million), Japan (640 thousand) and the CIS (or the Commonwealth of Independent States composed of Russia and other former Soviet Republics with 540 thousand). Using South Korean statistics as well, Kutsumi (2004) notes that the Philippines ranks 10th as the country of destination of Korean immigrants.

Occurring in the late 1980s and gaining momentum only in the 1990s or after Korea’s attainment of economic modernization, this paper argues that today’s influx of Koreans to the Philippines represents a break from the earlier Korean diasporas that were driven by political oppression and persecutions and/or by economic hardships and difficulties. In contrast, the present migration of Koreans to the Philippines is being driven more by Korea’s increasing prosperity.

Most analysts agree that Korea best exemplifies the East/Southeast Asian NIC, attaining industrialized status in barely two decades, the shortest time in history. Park (1998) writes that until the early 1960s, Korea was considered one of the poorest countries in the region and the world. But embarking on full-scale modernization through an export-led strategy, Korea successfully transformed itself from a basically agrarian society in the 1960s to a rapidly industrializing one in the 1980s when its economy grew at a high 9.3 percent per annum. By 1991, Korea’s per capita GNP reached $6,055 and by 1996, it gained membership to the select Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and is now classified as a high income industrialized country by international financial institutions.

Consequently, Korea’s trade and investment transactions with other countries also grew significantly over the period. In an article focusing
specifically on Korean and Philippine economic cooperation, Kim (1998) documents how bilateral trade between the two countries grew in value from US$396 million in 1981 to US$2.1 billion in 1995. Korea’s direct investments in the Philippines also rose in the mid-1980s as Korean companies transferred their production facilities to foreign countries like the Philippines due in part to the increasing cost of Korean labor and the appreciation of the Korean won. The number of Korean investment projects in the Philippines grew from only one in 1987 to 166 in 1994 with a corresponding dramatic rise in the value of investment from US$0.55 million in 1987 to US$4.5 million in 1994.

In turn, the advance of Korean companies in the Philippines and intensified economic cooperation between the two countries triggered today’s wave of Korean migration to the Philippines, led by Korean company personnel and businessmen (Kutsumi 2004). The website of the Korean Community in the Philippines states that a large number of the Korean residents in Parañaque and Las Piñas in Metro Manila consists of those working with Korean companies in the Cavite EPZA, and their families. Relatedly, a Korean civil engineer of Hanjin Heavy Industries and Construction, one of the companies that handles the construction of Manila’s LRT project shares that there also has been the movement of individual (vs. company-affiliated) Korean businessmen to the Philippines. These include businessmen who have brought outdated Korean technologies/ machineries for use in manufacturing industries that they have set up in the Philippines.

The coming of Korean students, the second group of Korean arrivals in the Philippines, has also been occasioned by South Korea’s increasing prosperity. According to a Korean informant who regularly comes to Manila to visit his child who is studying here and his wife who has come to accompany their child here, Korea’s astounding economic progress has not only raised family incomes but has expanded the ranks of the Korean middle class who can now afford to send children and family members to learn English or to go to university in the Philippines. As in the Philippines, education is highly valued in Korea as is proficiency in English which Koreans consider the universal language of globalization. The Korean students interviewed for this paper mention that learning English is for them a “must do” since applying for a job in Korea requires them to take the TOEIC (Test of English for International Communication). Pay/salary levels in Korea are determined in part by the TOEIC scores of employees.
Developments in Korea therefore, have created a demand for learning English and for higher education which evidently are being met by the Philippines at present. While Korea’s richer families have been availing themselves of the English language classes and university education offered by the U.S. and other Western countries, the availability of similar services in the Philippines at much lower costs and the proximity of the country to Korea have given Korea’s middle-income families access to overseas language learning and education, formerly enjoyed only by Korea’s richer classes.

But the proximity and lower cost of studying in the Philippines do not appear to be the only reasons why the Philippines has been witnessing an influx of Korean students. Many Koreans consider the Philippines as a good place to learn English and to pursue a university education. When asked how they came to choose the Philippines for learning English, our Korean informants say that for them, the Philippines is the best country to learn English as a second language. They add that many Koreans have been coming to the Philippines in previous years precisely to learn English. On their return, they continue to recommend the country to fellow-students and schoolmates or to friends and colleagues at work. One Korean student in fact says that in Korea, when one visits local websites for English language schools and facilities, Philippine-based ones are invariably mentioned/ found in these.

Not a few older Koreans too, have this memory of the Philippines as being more developed than Korea in the 1960s (when the Philippines ranked as the second most developed country in the region, next to Japan) and as having universities that trained students from foreign countries. The reputation of the Philippines as having quality schools and universities seems to have persisted among older Koreans and this partly accounts for the steady entry of Korean students to Philippine universities. It may also be the case however, that entry to Korea’s top universities (Seoul National University, Korea University and Yonsei University) may be more strict and competitive, and hence some Korean students may find it easier to gain entry to Philippine schools and universities. Nonetheless, the Korean civil engineer expatriate with Hanjin company who has been joined in the Philippines by his two sons, one studying at the University of the Philippines-Diliman, and the other at the De La Salle University in Manila, is pleased with the quality of education his sons are getting in the Philippines, saying he finds this
perhaps better than, or at least equal to, the quality of university education in Korea.

Other than the perceived quality of Philippine education and English language learning from the Korean's point of view, the country's warmer clime and vacation resorts serve as added attractions for Korean students to come to the Philippines. Those coming for English language lessons usually come during their summer and winter months. Some students in Korean universities use their summer vacations to learn English in the Philippines while at the same time vacationing in the country's known resorts in Laguna, Cebu, Bohol, Batangas and so forth. Their winter break provides them another opportunity to come to the Philippines to continue with their English lessons, while escaping Korea's cold winter and again enjoying a trip to a resort or the beach. Many of the Korean English language students in the Philippines are repeat travelers—the short distance between Seoul and Manila (some four hours away) allowing them the luxury to make the trip to the Philippines in the summer and winter or at other times they find convenient.

Closely following the entry of Korean businessmen, students and their family members to the Philippines, has been the establishment of ethnically Korean facilities and services other than the more ubiquitous Korean restaurants. Among these are groceries, barbershops, beer houses and KTV bars, internet cafes, travel and tour companies and Korean churches and places of worship. The establishment of all these stores and services that cater exclusively to Koreans has swelled further the ranks of Koreans coming to the Philippines at present.

Because many Filipinos are baffled by the increasing presence of Korean churches in the country, a word should perhaps be said about the coming of Korean missionaries to the Philippines. Contrary to the suspicion that they are here to “convert” Filipinos, one of our Korean resident informants mentions that Korean Christians take their religion and mission seriously. Due to the increasing numbers of Koreans in the Philippines, Korean churches feel a need to come and provide for the spiritual needs of their countrymen in the Philippines (in probably much the same way that El Shaddai, Jesus Is Lord Movement and Iglesia ni Kristo have established services for Filipino migrant workers in various countries abroad). Our Korean informant adds that in the course of their stay in the Philippines, some Korean missions may engage in
charity work with poor Filipinos (a situation that is noted also in Lorna Makil’s paper in this volume).

Owing to their sizable numbers and following known patterns of migrant adaptation and settlement, there are now identifiable areas of Korean residential concentration in the country—variously consisting of rows of buildings or rows of houses, or streets or pockets of Korean living quarters within neighborhoods and villages. These are to be found in Metropolitan Manila and other cities where Korean nationals have settled. A typical example is BF Homes in Quezon City which in the last 5 to 7 years has seen an influx of Korean residents, consisting mostly of young Korean students but with also a number of business people, and Korean pastors and their families and children. After watching the World Cup on TV with fellow Koreans in the neighborhood, one Korean English student estimated that there must be at least some 300 Korean students like himself living in BF Homes. Not surprisingly therefore, Korean services and facilities have followed in the wake of the residential concentration of Koreans in the area: on the 1 to 1.5 km. main road leading to BF Homes, one can find over 20 establishments offering a full range of services for Koreans, from medium-sized language schools to smaller language centers, two churches, a dental clinic, travel and tour operators, a Korean clothes and accessories store, an exercise and fitness center, a KTV bar, and several Internet cafes and Korean restaurants and groceries.

In the study of ethnic/race relations, the residential concentration of ethnic groups is a repeated pattern among sojourners and migrants which allow them to continue speaking their own language and reproducing their own national/ethnic and cultural selves and to otherwise build their own community in the host country. The researches of Polo (1998) and Kutsumi (2004) as well as the website of Koreans in the Philippines in fact, provide descriptions or accounts of the formation of various Korean associations and groups in the Philippines which invariably lend Korean migrants a sense of belonging and security, help them adjust/adopt to the Philippines and enable them to maintain their national identity. The establishment of distinctly Korean neighborhoods and places and the formation of Korean community groups and associations in the Philippines in themselves testify to a growing Korean migrant settlement in the country today.
IS IT A DIASPORA?

Despite the evidence of the Koreans’ growing presence in the Philippines, many observers are uneasy about calling today’s influx of Koreans to the country a “diaspora.” That this is so is understandable, considering that the word diaspora construes different images and evokes different meanings to different people. Some still associate the term with biblical accounts of the scattering of the Jews and hence consider diasporas to comprise of “forced migrations” or of people being driven out of their homelands. To many too, diasporas involve large-scale population movements (i.e., as that of whole nations or tribes as the Jews), whereas smaller-sized population movements would not qualify as diasporas.

The usage and meaning of the word, however, has evolved over time to accommodate the increased incidence and changing nature of latter-day population movements. Many forms of so-called “modern-day diasporas” no longer involve the forced migrations or the uprooting of people but consist of autonomous movements made by individuals and/or their families; and neither do present-day diasporas necessarily entail the movement of large numbers of people. Clearly, changing historical circumstances have altered the causes and nature of population movements and with these, also the usage and meaning of the term “diaspora.”

At present and from the perspective of the Koreans, the influx of their fellow nationals to the Philippines forms part of the bigger Korean diaspora that has seen the outflow of over 5 million Koreans to different places/countries in the world. From the perspective of this paper likewise, the Philippine-bound Korean migration may be considered a diaspora for a number of reasons. One, Korean nationals in the country now account for one of the single largest groups of foreigners living in the Philippines after only some 10–12 years since the start of the current wave of Philippine-bound Korean migration. Thus, while in absolute terms, the number of Koreans in the country may not be very huge, the rapid or sudden growth of Korean presence has startled and taken many Filipinos by surprise.

Second, the Philippine-bound Korean migration appears to have developed into a “migration system” whereby two places or countries, Korea and the Philippines are now linked not only by diplomatic agreements and trade and investment flows, but by the movement or
flows and counterflows of people (primarily of Koreans to the Philippines, but also of Filipino workers to Korea). In brief, the inflow of Koreans to the Philippines now has the characteristics of an established migration stream arising from emergent needs and demands in Korea for education and English learning which are being met by (or served in) the Philippines. The migration stream has further been supported by the establishment of various networks of information and communication, travel, business and social institutions and establishments that promote the Philippines as a place of destination for Koreans, facilitate travel and visits to the country, and assist Koreans during their stay in the Philippines. Consequently, even as Koreans coming to the Philippines stay only temporarily, the flow of Koreans to the Philippines itself appears well-established and may be expected to continue well into the future.

While the Philippine-bound Korean migration stream appears well-recognized on the Korean side, this remains under-appreciated by Filipinos for reasons already mentioned in the paper. By not giving it the attention it deserves, however, the Philippines may be losing out on the new socioeconomic opportunities being opened by the Korean diaspora reaching its shores. Believing that the Philippines is not a likely place of migrant destination, the country’s bureaucracy has been ill-prepared for the Korean in-flow phenomenon. Maintaining records on foreign residents is not a priority of the Philippine Bureau of Immigration and related agencies and offices, and neither is improving the system for issuing resident visa extensions and other kinds of permits/registrations for aliens. (Some Korean residents in the country relate enduring inefficiencies and confusions in government offices they have had to deal with.) Likewise, given criticisms on the deterioration of the state of Philippine education, it is understandable why Philippine embassies abroad are not staffed to promote Philippine education (as they are for promoting Filipino labor overseas), and have not been proactive in accommodating requests for student visas. Schools, colleges and universities in the Philippines too, have not taken stock of their capability to respond to an internationalizing student body and therefore do not have effective foreign student offices and other programs to assist, familiarize and integrate foreign students in the country. There are many ways in which the Philippines can probably rectify its immigration and educational services to cater to this new demand and need. By doing these, they may yet help the Philippines regain its earlier reputation as an educational center in the region.
IMPLICATIONS ON PHILIPPINE-KOREAN RELATIONS

Finally, the ongoing flow of Koreans to the Philippines presents a new opportunity for the maturing of Korean-Philippine relations, beyond formal diplomatic and state-to-state ties and economic cooperation activities, to the level of more interpersonal relationships between Koreans and Filipinos and which may lead to a deeper kind of intercultural knowledge and appreciation between the two peoples. The progress of the two countries’ state-to-state relations and economic cooperation is well documented in existing work (see the Korea-Philippines Conference Papers and Proceedings edited by Polo 1998), but the increased occasions for interpersonal contacts triggered by today’s influx of Koreans to the Philippines invite new work and research by sociologists, psychologists and other social scientists.

It should be noted that similar occasions for personal contacts between the two nationalities in much earlier periods came with the transfer of Korean wives to the Philippines in the 1960s to join their Filipino husbands who had fought in the Korean war; and the mass Han-Filipino weddings sponsored by Korea’s Unification Church in the late 1980s through the mid 1990s. But these involved far more limited numbers when compared to the inter-people contacts being generated by today’s Korean migration to the Philippines. Among Filipinos moreover, the Han-Filipino marriages under the Unification Church sparked more controversy and animosity than harmony in Philippine-Korean relations.

Although the Philippines and Korea have been long-time allies in the Cold War and share the same commitment to democratic values and to market-oriented economies and have other parallels in their national histories, some references have been made to underlying differences in the culture, psychology and temperament of Filipinos and Koreans. In his remarks at the 1998 Conference on Philippines-South Korea Relations, Suh Yong-Hyung, Minister Counselor of South Korea’s Embassy in Manila, makes mention of how Korea’s colonial and war-time experiences may have developed traits of “militant aggressiveness, regimental rigidity and hastiness” among Koreans, whereas Filipinos seem to exhibit more “friendliness, flexibility and open-mindedness.” Hence, even as the new Korean migration will increase interpersonal contacts with Filipinos (i.e., with Filipino tutors, teachers, class/ schoolmates, landlords, business associates, etc.), this is not entirely without the potential for conflict. But given the increasing
value placed on pluralism or multiculturalism in today’s globalizing societies, Koreans and Filipinos alike may find it more comfortable to be just themselves, appreciate their differences and co-exist.

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South Koreans in Dumaguete: A Preliminary Study

LORNA P. MAKIL

I returned to retire in my hometown, Dumaguete City in September 2002, after an absence of 22 years. Among the changes that I immediately noticed was the visible presence of South Koreans, mostly students, in the population. The friends I would ask about my observation would reply in jest, “Oh, you mean the Korean invasion!”

It is timely that the opportunity to carry out this exploratory study of the South Koreans in Dumaguete has come my way through this project of the Philippine Migration Research Network. The exercise allows me not only to know more about them but may also contribute towards our understanding of foreign migratory in-flows to the Philippines.

This paper presents a preliminary description of the South Korean nationals in this small Central Visayas City: who they are, what they are doing, and how they find their life here.

Data for this paper were collected through key informants and participant observation. I spoke with a number of Korean students, Korean missionaries, Filipino teachers of Korean students, Filipinos working with the Korean missionaries, Filipino landlords of Korean boarders/tenants, and Filipinos who have Korean neighbors.

I visited a school, which was put up by a Korean missionary, and I also attended a Korean church and participated in both the Cebuano congregation and Korean congregation.
I spoke with school registrars to gather data on their Korean students.

I also visited the Dumaguete offices of the Bureau of Immigration, Tourism, National Statistics Office, and Department of Labor and Employment to try and gather statistics on foreign nationals in the city. Their work is independent of each other, and the specific groups that they deal with gave me different figures, but it is quite clear from these figures that the Korean presence in Dumaguete is still very small and that the “Korean invasion” is mostly imagined.

DUMAGUETE CITY

Dumaguete, the capital of Negros Oriental, lies at the mouth of Tañon Strait that separates Negros Island from Cebu Island. Situated at the southeastern part of Negros Oriental, Dumaguete is mostly rolling country with low lands along the shoreline.

Dumaguete began as a coastal community of fishermen and farmers before the Spaniards organized it into a pueblo (parish town) in 1590. Its coastal location attracted Moro raiders from the south which, one legend claims, gave rise to its name based on the Cebuano word dagit (“to snatch”). When the Augustinians finished building their church and convento in 1624 they included a stone watchtower and belfry to provide an early warning system against the dreaded Moro vintas approaching the town.

Under Spanish rule, the town developed and prospered, making it the largest pueblo in the province in 1850 with 896 houses and an estimated 5,300 people. Forty years later, Dean C. Worcester, a member of the second Dr. J.B. Steere expedition to the Philippine Islands which visited Dumaguete in 1890 wrote: “Dumaguete proved to be a typical Visayan town of the better class. Chinese merchants kept its shops. The population, numbering perhaps 8000 souls, was composed chiefly of natives, with comparatively few mestizos and still fewer Spaniards. The soil near the town was fertile, and the people seemed prosperous...The public buildings were more than ordinarily imposing.”

Dumaguete today is known as a city with a warm atmosphere, earning for it the distinction of being the “city of gentle people.” As TV host Susan Medina Calo wrote a few years ago in one of her travel articles, “The pleasures of Dumaguete are gentle, simple, quiet. It is a city to rest and refresh the soul in. It is a civilized city.”
With a land area of 3,551 hectares, Dumaguete has 22 barangays and 8 poblacion barangays. It was granted a charter in 1948 and became a first class city in 1982.

Dumaguete has a population of 102,265. It has the second largest port in Central Visayas, next to Cebu, and has three piers. Air Philippines and Cebu Pacific serve Dumaguete with daily flights to and from Manila. Some 16 banks and 6 rural banks are found in the city.

Dumaguete is a university town. It is home to Silliman University, founded in 1901 as the first private American Protestant university in the country. It has three other universities: St. Paul’s University, a Roman Catholic school founded in 1904; Foundation University, founded in 1949 by former U.P. president Vicente Sinco; and Negros Oriental State University, formerly Central Visayas State Polytechnic College, which started as the Negros Oriental Trade School in 1927. Colegio de Sta. Catalina de Alejandria (1955), Science and Technology Institute (1989), Asian Institute of Science and Technology (1995), AMA Computer College (2000) and the Korean-affiliated Presbyterian Theological College (1997) are the other educational establishments. These institutions give rise to a student atmosphere that best characterizes the city. The Dumaguete population consists mainly of professionals, business people (stores, restaurants, hotels) and students.

Dumaguete has many places of worship. For Roman Catholics, there are the Dumaguete Cathedral and the Redemptorist Church, with a church each for the Roman Catholic Chinese and Protestant Chinese. Dumaguete Protestants go to the Silliman University Church, Dumaguete United Church of Christ in the Philippines (UCCP), Dumaguete Christian Church and a few other smaller churches, including two or three Baptist churches. The other churches are for Seventh Day Adventists, Iglesia ni Cristo and Mormons. The most recent additions to places of worship are Korean Presbyterian churches.

Dumaguete has attracted and lured strangers to stay. In fact, another explanation of Dumaguete’s name comes from the Cebuano word “dumaguit” (power to attract). Filipinos, Asians, Europeans and Americans have come, and some of them have made Dumaguete their home.

**Foreign nationals in Dumaguete City**

Figures released by the Dumaguete Immigration Field Office for non-immigrants (temporary visitors, seamen, students, pre-arranged...
employees, treaty traders, etc.) for the year 2004 show as many as 27 different foreign national groups in the city (Table 1). The South Koreans had the most number of persons representing 25 percent, followed closely by Americans (24 percent) of the total number of non-immigrants.

Table 1. Number of Aliens by Nationality for Year 2000 in Dumaguete City

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>American</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>Iraqi</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australian</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>Irish</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austrian</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Italian</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahamanian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgian</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Jordanian</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>Korean</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>New Zealander</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>Norwegian</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Singaporean</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Danish</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Spaniard</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Sri Lankan</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Swedish</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finnish</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Swiss</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Taiwanese</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>Thai</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Turkish</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesian</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>727</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iranian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Bureau of Immigration
Dumaguete Immigration Field Office

Table 2 presents the total number of registered aliens in Dumaguete City for the year 2000. They were led by Americans (29 percent), Chinese (13 percent), and South Koreans (11 percent).

South Koreans in Dumaguete City

South Korean students

They are easily recognizable from the rest of the population by their slant eyes and apapangigon (square jaw) features, with a number of them sporting dyed brownish hair. They are perceived to have fairer skin than the Dumaguete Chinese. And they are usually seen in pairs or small groups of fellow South Koreans, talking to each other in their language.
Table 2. Number of Non-Immigrants by Nationality for Year 2004 in Dumaguete City

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>American</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>Iranian</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australian</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Irish</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austrian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Italian</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgian</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Jordanian</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Korean</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Norwegian</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Sri Lankan</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Swedish</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finnish</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Swiss</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Taiwanese</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Thai</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Turkish</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesian</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>323</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Bureau of Immigration
Dumaguete Immigration Field Office

Most of the Korean students study at Silliman University, having heard of the university from Koreans who studied here before, including the pastors of their churches. They claim that they were attracted to Silliman University due to its having a Christian tradition with high academic standards and the chance to improve their English.

During the first semester 2003–2004, there were 52 college level Korean students enrolled at the University, making up 56 percent of its foreign student college enrollees (Table 3). (This enrollment saw an increase from the 33 Korean college students who studied at Silliman University in the first semester 1998–1999.)

Table 4 shows the various college programs at Silliman University that proved attractive to South Korean students for the first semester 2003–2004. Most of them were in the Social Work program, which allows them to go home to Korea for their one-semester internship.

Silliman University also had some 14 younger Koreans—children of missionary families—who were enrolled in the Silliman University High School, Elementary School and Early Childhood Center.

Besides Silliman University, two other Dumaguete schools had Korean students. St. Paul’s University High School had two female
Korean enrollees, and the Korean-owned Presbyterian Theological College (PTC) enrolled two male and four female Koreans.

Table 3. Foreign Students (College) by Nationality and Sex at Silliman University, Dumaguete City-First Semester 2003-2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>American</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgian</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesian</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordanian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Korean</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swiss</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thai</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SU Registrar’s Office

Table 4. Number of Korean Students by Sex and Course in Silliman University, Dumaguete City, First Semester 2003-2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Course</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AB (Anthro, English, History, Socio, Speech &amp; Theatre)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BBA Management</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B Music</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B Theology</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BS Inf. Tech.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BS Med. Tech.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BS Nursing</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BS Phy. Therapy</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BS SocialWork</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MA (Divinity, Music, Soc. Work)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special (English Language)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SU Registrar’s Office
Exploring Transnational Communities in the Philippines

Special Students of English Language

Silliman University offers an English Language Training Program, which consists of (1) the English Orientation Program (EOP) and (2) the Special English Program (SEP).8

Before the EOP was institutionalized in 1992, English tutorials were provided by individual teachers on a personal basis to interested foreign students, including those from South Korea. Government requirements for undergraduate foreign students originating from countries where English is not spoken widely include their enrollment in a one-semester EOP before they are allowed to enroll in a regular course or program of study. EOP is given as a non-credit course, and each class is limited to 15 students to allow for maximum interactive instruction, described as a program “where a Korean student learns to open his/ her mouth and speak English.”

During the March 2004 commencement program, eight Korean students were awarded their college degrees (Table 5).9

The second component of the English Language Training Program is the Special English Program (SEP), offered to tourists and Korean students who come in groups of 30 for short term English instruction emphasizing speaking skills. This is offered either on a three, six, eight week or longer period depending on the needs and skills of the learners. The university has entered into a special arrangement with some Korean universities to send their students to Dumaguete for the SEP. In January-March 2004, Silliman University received two batches of Korean students, 30 students in each batch, from Hannam University in Daejeon, Korea to enroll in the three-week SEP. As one of their group chaperones10 explained, the students in Hannam are conservative and nationalistic; hence, they are sent out to experience other cultures even as they also improve their English through special instruction.

Also in the first quarter of 2004, Silliman University received another group of 15 Korean students from Chonbuk National University for SEP. Their training went for eight weeks.11

Life in Dumaguete for Korean students

Most of the Korean students stay with or near other Koreans in apartments and rooms for rent. Their Filipino landlords, a number of whom are teachers, are generally satisfied with them (“they pay their rent on time”), but complain about the noise that they make when
Table 5. Number of Korean Students who Graduated in March 2004 by Degree Program, Silliman University, Dumaguete City

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree</th>
<th>Number of Graduates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AB</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSMedical Technology</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BS Social Work</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B Business Admin.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MS Social Work</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masters-Divinity</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SU Registrar’s Office

they are with their friends. Landlords seem to prefer female boarders or tenants because they are “less noisy.”

Some of the Korean students believe that they are charged higher rent than other non-Korean tenants. Many of them come from urban communities in Korea and are affluent by Filipino standards. They own motorbikes, the latest cell phone models, and other gadgets popular with students.

Since they stay with or near fellow Koreans, there is little opportunity for interaction with Filipino neighbors. For many, interaction with their landlords is on a purely business level.

On the other hand, Korean students observe that their Filipino neighbors do not appear to be interested in them. Their interaction with non-Koreans is limited to classmates and teachers inside the classroom. Outside the classroom, they are in the company of fellow Koreans. They study their lessons together in the Library, attend church together, visit with each other, and go to their favorite hangouts in town together.

The Korean students who are enrolled in Social Work and Music tend to be more integrated with their Filipino teachers and classmates. They find their teachers “helpful and like a parent,” and their classmates “friendly and accommodating.” Indeed, some of the Korean student respondents described their Filipino friends as “the kindest in the world” but with tendencies of “being lazy,” compared to hardworking Koreans. Their Filipino friends are seen as “not aggressive and not ambitious.”
The close interaction of Korean students to the exclusion of forming friendships with their Filipino classmates presents a limiting factor in their learning English. Some of the Korean respondents thought that “there are too many Koreans” at Silliman University.

South Korean Missionaries

• Presbyterianism in Korea\textsuperscript{12}

The presence of South Korean missionaries in Dumaguete is closely tied up with the zeal with which many Koreans embraced Presbyterianism when it was first introduced to their country in 1884 by American missionaries.

Korea had passed through the bitter experience of Chinese, Russian and Japanese overlordship. Her people were desirous to modernize like China and Japan had done. Modernization would prevent them from becoming victims forever to similar political take-overs. They noted that the Japanese had modernized by adopting Western technology and rejecting Western culture. China, on the other hand, had adopted both Western technology and culture (although the Confucians rejected Western culture). The Koreans believed that the Bible held “the secrets of the West” and that the English language was the key to the world. Thus, Presbyterianism which represented what was desirable became deeply rooted in Korean society, with emphasis on education, medicine and Protestantism “for the soul.”

One other attraction of Presbyterianism to Koreans was its close convergence with the traditional hierarchy of Korean social roles, which placed importance on the political leaders, the educational leaders (the yangban or scholars), and the religious leaders. The missionary’s status under the new religion had a high prestige.

In 1984 South Korean Christians celebrated the Centennial of Protestantism in their country. This was marked by a heightened revival of their faith, motivating them to further mission outreach. Some 40 percent of the South Korean population are Biblical Christians today, and they bring to their places of work their Christian ethics which, they believe, helped make their country develop and attain economic success, based on the idea of “redemption and lift.” They believe in performing excellent work for the God of Excellence. In keeping with their mission goals, they have provided a large church in Seoul for Filipino overseas workers.\textsuperscript{13}
• Korean Protestant Churches in Dumaguete

The Dumaguete City Planning and Development Office which requires only a building permit to put up a new church, lists five Korean churches within the Dumaguete community. Two of these churches have a congregation of Koreans in addition to their Visayan (Cebuano) congregation. While the Korean pastors have learned the local language, Filipino pastors are on their staff for the Visayan congregation. All of the churches follow the evangelical Christian tradition.

One of the main churches is the Dumaguete Union Presbyterian Church (DUCP). It has set up three branch churches/missions within the city proper, and six churches in the adjacent towns outside Dumaguete. The churches are attractive and comfortable structures, built on spacious grounds, displaying a look of simple affluence.

Church services are marked by charismatic and ecstatic worship and evangelistic preaching. The sound that the worshippers make may annoy some of their Filipino neighbors living near the church, with their use of amplified guitar or organ accompaniment to their singing, forceful preaching and a part in the worship service where they pray aloud together, their prayer of commitment. Indeed, they are perceived as being “too noisy” by their neighbors.

Filipino membership consists mainly of people from the lower economic classes and includes those who have become unhappy with their own Protestant churches and left to join the Korean churches. The churches also attract young people with their activities, but they do not seem to be winning Roman Catholics to their fold because of their aggressive preaching critical of Roman Catholic beliefs and practices.

The Korean churches in Dumaguete are known to be generous with gifts and other assistance for their members, something that may be viewed by outsiders as a “gimmick” to attract people. For the Korean pastors, however, who feel a language gap with their Cebuano-speaking members, these are “love gifts” that demonstrate the pastors’ sincerity in their mission work.14

• Korean church-related schools

There are two Korean-owned schools in the Dumaguete area. One is the Presbyterian Theological College, and the other is the Dumaguete Presbyterian School.
The Presbyterian Theological College (PTC) is affiliated with the Korean-owned Dumaguete Union Presbyterian Church and was founded by the Korean pastor seven years ago in a quiet rural barangay of Dumaguete City. With the Korean pastor as President and a Filipino pastor as Academic President, the school, which was granted recognition in 2002 by the Commission on Higher Education, offers the AB Theology, major in Pastoral Ministry course. The school graduated three students in March 2004. It grants student scholarships and other benefits. Students are recruited from high school graduates in the rural communities of the Negros Oriental province and the adjacent province, Negros Occidental. Members of two major religious groups in the country, however -- Jehovah's Witness and Iglesia ni Cristo -- are not qualified to enroll at PTC.

PTC, located in a spacious and shady area walled in by a high concrete fence, has good learning facilities. The campus is dominated by a fine churchbuilding and another concrete structure named So-Jeung Hall that houses male and female dormitories on the third floor, and offices and classrooms on the first and second floors. Some three other smaller buildings of wood and bamboo are used as additional classrooms, the school library, and student center.

PTC had a total enrolment in 2003-2004 of 30 students, six of whom were Koreans. A small class for high school freshmen and a class for preschool children were opened at the start of the school year, preparatory to expanding the school’s offerings to a complete high school and basic education program.15

One other church, the Dumaguete Mission Church that started in 1989, also put up the Dumaguete Presbyterian School that offers preschool up to sixth grade education. Located in a poor area of families of laborers and wage earners, and their many small children, the church occupies the second storey of its building, with classrooms and offices in the first floor. The school is furnished well, with ceiling fans and comfortable school desks and tables in the classrooms. It has nine teachers, including the Filipino pastor, and a school principal who is a retired public school Superintendent. Non-church members can also send their children to the school. The school charges tuition payable in easy installments. The largest class is the pre-school level where as many as 200 children enrolled last year, and the smallest class is sixth grade with 15–20 students.
Missionary Families

South Korean families began to appear in Dumaguete in the early 1990s. Previous to this, some Korean pastors enrolled at Silliman Divinity School for graduate studies. The University entered into a consortium arrangement with the John Calvin Theological Seminary in Seoul, which allowed Korean pastors to study at Silliman and for members of the Silliman Divinity faculty to teach at the Seminary in Seoul. This arrangement lasted for a few years.

A rough estimate of the number of missionary families in Dumaguete today is 12 families—with 12 husbands, 11 wives, 10 children below ten years old and another 10 above ten years old—a total of 43 individuals. (Some of the children are included in the previous count of students enrolled at Silliman University.)

Adjustment to Dumaguete life

For some of the Korean missionary families, the pastor-husbands may have come ahead to Dumaguete as students. When the decision was made in their home churches to assign them to the Philippines, their wives may have come with some reluctance, but as one Korean pastor explained, “In Korean church, the pastor’s wife has to go with the husband.”

Language, of course, was the main difficulty met by the South Korean newcomers. Very often, only the male head had some knowledge of English. When the missionaries were new in the community, there were very few of them, and the Korean wives felt isolated and longed for home. They only had their little children for company. But as these little children grew up and began to attend school, they learned both English and local Cebuano. They opened doors for their parents to some communication and interaction with other Filipino mothers and teachers.

The presence of housemaids also presented a problem to the Korean wives who were used to doing everything in Korea. Their language gap complicated their interaction with each other, such as in the preparation of meals.

Many of the missionaries are used to urban ways in Korea. Dumaguete with its semi-urban life, especially in the 1990s, presented some situations that confounded them. As one Korean narrated, “My maid and I, we went to market to buy food. Oh, I felt confused...meat
hanging (from hooks), fish on table, many flies...” She further explained that coming from a big city in Korea, she was used to buying food packaged cleanly and neatly in the grocery stores. Another informant, a pastor who has lived in Dumaguete for 10 years, opined that most of his fellow Koreans find the place “too quiet and somewhat boring.” Unlike Cebu City in the next island, which is more developed, Dumaguete has no specialty establishments and organizations for Koreans, except their churches.17

In the work place, some adjustments continue to be made by the Korean pastors. They know that the Filipino “yes” does not always mean this and is actually a “no.” They also understand that “Filipino time” allows for a latitude of lateness, and that Filipinos seem to enjoy holding “long discussions” before an issue is resolved. They think that the discussions become prolonged because the opinions of the older ones in the group are not always honored and respected. They believe that the old have the wisdom and experience behind their words, and this can facilitate decision-making.

The language problem and the formality which marks Korean personality do not lead to easy friendship with Filipino neighbors who observe that “the Koreans like to keep to themselves.” The Korean families meet regularly in church and celebrate common church activities as Parent’s Day, Children’s Day, Thanksgiving and Christmas. They do not observe the folk festivals that enrich Korean culture at home.

At this time, the Korean families do not look forward to residing permanently in Dumaguete. They believe they are here for a mission and will serve their churches as long as they are needed. But South Korea is their home. One family has seen the children graduate, who are now working in Korea while the parents are still in Dumaguete City.

**South Korean Tourists**

Tourists make up the third group of South Koreans who come to Dumaguete. Table 6 which presents the number of tourist arrivals in the city in year 2003 shows the Koreans constituting the third largest group, although not even 50 percent of the American and Japanese arrivals. Korean tourists come for the diving spots in the province.
Korean tourism to the country, like other touring foreign nationals, has been erratic and influenced by certain events in the area. The year 2002, for example, saw a drop in the number of foreign tourists due to the kidnappings by the Abu-Sayaf bandits in the South (Table 7).

**Table 6. Tourists Arrivals in Dumaguete City Year 2003**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
<td>2,889</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>2,715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>909</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>635</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>United Kingdom (England)</td>
<td>371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Balikbayans</td>
<td>289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Holland</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Scandinavia</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*</td>
<td>Others</td>
<td>742</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>11,169</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Dumaguete City Tourism Office
### Table 7. Tourists Arrivals in Dumaguete City Years 1998 to 2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1998</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>558</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>469</td>
<td>573</td>
<td>487</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>443</td>
<td>346</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>312</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>210</td>
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<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>429</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>65</td>
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<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1,616</td>
<td>1,297</td>
<td>841</td>
<td>561</td>
<td>541</td>
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<tr>
<td>Holland</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>2,983</td>
<td>4,351</td>
<td>3,008</td>
<td>3,663</td>
<td>2,554</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>389</td>
<td>378</td>
<td>424</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>121</td>
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<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>2,502</td>
<td>2,340</td>
<td>2,527</td>
<td>2,682</td>
<td>2,040</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other Countries</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>763</td>
<td>411</td>
<td>459</td>
<td>249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Tourists</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Total)</td>
<td>10,659</td>
<td>12,333</td>
<td>10,167</td>
<td>10,410</td>
<td>7,824</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Tourists</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Total)</td>
<td>53,946</td>
<td>58,593</td>
<td>87,074</td>
<td>93,558</td>
<td>113,485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balikbayans</td>
<td>904</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRAND TOTAL</td>
<td>65,509</td>
<td>71,179</td>
<td>97,546</td>
<td>104,198</td>
<td>121,466</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Dumaguete City Tourism Office
CONCLUSIONS

What will be the future of the South Korean presence in a small Philippine city as Dumaguete? Will it add a sense of globalization in Dumaguete? What influence does the Korean presence have for the community? Will interaction between Koreans and Dumagueteanos become closer than it is today?

The preliminary description suggests a few emerging patterns that characterize the encounter between this group of East Asians and Filipinos.

Through the churches that they have established, the Korean missionaries bestow help on their financially poor Filipino members. Membership in the relatively affluent churches is morale-boosting and bring to the Filipino members spiritual and economic hope. Access to education in the church-sponsored pre- and elementary schools for their small children and the availability of scholarships in the Korean-owned college are undreamed of privileges for the poor.

On the other hand, the above arrangements make the rest of the observant populace who are not Korean church members perceive the Korean pastors as somewhat “devious” in their ways of winning more members to their churches. Is it possible that as this trend of thinking continues, the sociological principle that “the arena of competition affects the structure of group relations” will operate in the community? How will it affect the mission work of the Korean missionaries? And how will it affect Korean-Filipino relations in Dumaguete?

Although overt signs of these negative reactions are not yet present, Dumaguete residents who care, express their feelings of vague unease about the Koreans in the community. The comfortable life of the Korean pastors, living in better homes and driving their own cars, contradicts the image of the poor and sacrificing Protestant pastor. (In earlier years when nationalistic feelings were not as strong among Filipinos as they are today, American missionaries were not resented for their better economic status. Of course it was also a common perception, therefore an expectation, that westerners, especially Americans, were always “rich” whereas Asians were not often as lucky.) The Koreans in Dumaguete are considered by the populace as well-to-do. This image is strengthened by the student and tourist groups from Korea who come to Dumaguete.
As long as the Koreans remain a closed group and limit their social interaction to their own kind, these perceptions of them will hold. Only once did Korean students don their national costume and play musical instruments in a street parade in Dumaguete. In a place where higher education pervades and information dissemination becomes more meaningful, there is little sign that the Koreans who live here want to show more of their own culture to their host community.

From all indications, the Korean students will continue to come to Dumaguete where the cost of living and education is less expensive, to learn English which they will take back for better-paying jobs at home, and to help them compete better on the international stage. The Korean ministers, keeping true to their faith, will maintain their churches and continue to reach a segment of the Dumaguete community needing them, thereby fulfilling their high sense of Christian mission in the world.

Studies of non-immigrant groups show that these groups in general are not interested in building relations with others in the community. This appears to be true of the South Koreans in Dumaguete. They are friends and strangers, to the Filipinos who live in the same city.

NOTES


2 Ibid., p. 6. The present watch tower is not the original one and was built nearly a century later.

3 Ibid., p. 8.


6 May 1, 2000 Census, National Statistics Office.

7 A few South Koreans enrolled at Silliman University in the 1950s,
like Mr. Kim Dong Yang who first heard of the school from Filipino soldiers serving in the Korean war. He graduated in 1957 with a degree of Bachelor of Science in Chemistry and became successful in the photo industry in his country. Mr. Kim returned to Dumaguete in 1977 to receive an Outstanding Sillimanian award from his alma mater.

Based on an interview with Dr. Imelda Y. Flores, Program Coordinator.

Silliman University has graduated a total of 24 South Korean students since 1999, eleven of whom earned their degrees in Social Work.

Dr. Sang-Tae Kim, Director of Center for International Relations and Professor, Department of Politics, Communication and International Studies, Hannam University. English is used only in English courses, but students in Information Technology need to know the language. Students sign up for the Special English Program (SEP) anytime; thus, the groups which come to Dumaguete are a mixture of freshmen, sophomores, juniors and seniors. They enroll in SEP either during their Christmas break (December-February) or summer break (June-August). Hannam University and the students share travel and accommodation expenses.

Silliman University and Chonbuk National University also signed a Memorandum of Agreement for an Exchange Student Program. The program will benefit three selected students each from Silliman University and Chonbuk University for one year.

I am indebted to Dr. T. Valentino Sitoy, historian and theological scholar, and former Dean of Silliman University Divinity School, for this background on Presbyterianism in Korea which he shared in an interview on 5 February 2004.

As explained by Sister Bing Zubiri, pastor of Bread of Life Church, which sent a group of young people to Korea this summer to interact with Korean evangelical Christians and visit their churches.

As explained by Filipino pastor Bing Zubiri of Bread of Life.

I am grateful to the Rev. Joel Tabada, Academic President of the Presbyterian Theological College, for arranging my visit to the school and interview.

Based on a rough count by a female Korean informant who is a pastor’s daughter and studies at Silliman University.

About three years ago, a Korean businessman set up a small Korean restaurant to cater to Korean tourists and students, but he had to close his business when it did not make good.
Koreans in the Philippines: A Study of the Formation of their Social Organization

KANAKO KUTSUMI

Koreans in the Philippines have formed a Korean community to uphold their roots and their pride as Koreans.

I will pay attention to their associations as social organizations derived from a community in this research. South Koreans in the Philippines have formed various associations so that they may cope with many problems and explore the ways of coexistence with Filipinos and other foreigners. The activities of these associations have helped South Koreans solve their problems in cooperation with each other. Thus they have been able to live as Koreans in the Philippines.

According to R.M. MacIver (1975) when a certain area has people who share some social features, such as social similarities, common social ideas, customs, tradition, common feelings, etc., it is called a community. ‘Associations’ are groups, which are artificially organized so that people may do some activities on the basis of the same aim.

This paper will view associations as groups formed in a community and consider what role the associations have played for South Koreans living as foreigners in the Philippines.

This paper is based on my fieldwork in the Philippines in July 2001 and from January to February 2003. First, I’d like to mention the background and the features of South Korean immigration into the Philippines, the process of the formation of South Korean associations, and the activities of the United Korean Community Association Inc. (UKCA), the largest Korean association in the Philippines.
THE BACKGROUND AND FEATURES OF KOREAN IMMIGRATION INTO THE PHILIPPINES

About 5,650,000 South Koreans overseas are living in 151 countries as of 2001. The total population of South Korea is about 46,858,000 as of 1999 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Emigration Division 2001).

The Philippines ranks 10th among countries hosting South Koreans, the largest number in Southeast Asia (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2001).

Based on the Annual Report of Statistics on Immigration and Emigration Control of the South Korean Ministry of Justice, the number of Korean immigrants to the Philippines increased since 1985 but in 1999 the number decreased a little (Table 1).

Table 1. Korean Immigrants to the Philippines

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>4,036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>106,519</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>149,722</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>110,535</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2 shows the number of those who have stayed long (the number registered in the Embassy of the Republic of Korea in the Philippines). The number continues increasing year by year.

Table 2. Registered South Korean Immigrants in the Philippines

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>5,038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>9,708</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>8,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999 January</td>
<td>10,137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2001</td>
<td>24,618</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of the 24,618 registered South Koreans in the Philippines in January 2001, 12,388 are males and 12,230 are females. There is a difference of only 158 persons in the number of males and females. In terms of occupation held by the Koreans, Table 3 describes the various
occupational groups. The number of female office workers is larger than that of male office workers (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Emigration Division 2001: 91).

Table 3. Occupation of Registered South Koreans in the Philippines

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Self-managed business</td>
<td>7,365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student</td>
<td>7,218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housewife</td>
<td>2,589</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office worker</td>
<td>1,274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representatives</td>
<td>1,125</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

But the Koreans who have been staying long in the Philippines say that there are 30,000 Koreans staying in the country now.

In summary, (1) the number of Koreans who have settled down in the Philippines is increasing each year, (2) the number of those who are in their prime is large, (3) most of those who are staying for a short time are tourists, and most of those who are staying for a long time are those in self-managed business, students, wives, and company representatives, and (4) there is little difference in the number of males and females among those who are staying long.

HISTORY OF KOREAN INFLOW INTO THE PHILIPPINES AND THE FORMATION OF THEIR SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

The first term (from the 8th century till about the end of Second World War: from Korean inflow to the settlement of the first generation)

Korean inflow to the Philippines began in the 8th century. It is said that a military general called Chan Bogo expanded trade to China, Japan and Southeast Asia, and then entered the Philippines for the first time.

After about a thousand years, three Koreans including Father Kim Dae Gun came to the Philippines. They started from Seoul for Macao in December 1836, but a riot broke out among the Portuguese and Chinese who had settled in Macao. To escape from the riot, they took refuge in the Philippines via Macao in 1837.

They returned to Macao after staying several months in the Philippines, but after two years, another riot broke out, and they had to take refuge again in the Philippines. It is said that they lived in a
monastery in Lolomboy near the Manila metropolitan area (Korean Catholic Churches in the Philippines 1996:30). It became the foundation of the Korean Catholic community in the Philippines after one hundred and fifty years. 

About one hundred years passed since Father Kim Dae Gun came to the Philippines. It is said that several Koreans from Wiju of Pyeongan-bu-lgdo in North Korea went to China by land in order to sell ginseng and arrived in the Philippines via Vietnam in 1935 or there about. They were the first Korean generation in the Philippines.

Japan governed both the Philippines and Korea during World War II. Many Koreans arrived in the Philippines as soldiers under the Japanese Army. While under the command of Japanese officers and soldiers, Korean soldiers committed a lot of atrocities against Filipinos and hence were not at all liked. Under these circumstances, three Koreans from Wiju who wanted to live in the Philippines permanently decided to marry poor Filipino women who were peddling at the roadside. One of them, Mr. Pak Yun Hwa established the Korean Association Philippines Inc., the largest Korean organization in the Philippines in 1969. He became its first President. 

The second term (from 1945 till the 1970s: participation of Philippine armies in the Korean War and international marriage)

The second term is the time when the foundation of the diplomatic relations between the Philippines and South Korea was laid. The Philippines had concluded diplomatic relations earlier with the United States, Taiwan, Britain, France, and then with South Korea in March 1949. The following year, on 15 June 1950, the Korean War broke out (Polo 1999:170). About 7,200 Philippine officers, soldiers, and engineers were sent to the Korean Peninsula as part of UN Forces. While Philippine troops were in South Korea for about five years, some married South Korean women. In the 1960s about 30 households began to move to the Philippines (Kim 1979).

Moreover, in both countries, consulates were set up in 1954, and embassies in 1958. Furthermore, personnel of Asian Development Bank and World Health Organization, the Christian missionaries, and students studying abroad came to the Philippines.

In those days, the important thing to South Koreans in the Philippines was to promote their friendship. There were four activities
at that time. First, as explained in the first term, the Korean Association Philippines, Inc. was formed in 1969 (it was renamed the United Korean Community Association Inc. in 2001).

Second, when many Korean families settled down in the Philippines, their children’s education became important. In order to foster patriotism, the Korean Community School was opened in Manila on 15 August 1970. The school is for children in kindergarten to high school level. They have classes every Saturday (Korean Community School 2000).

Third, the Korean women who married Filipinos formed the Mothers Association in 1975.

Fourth, the networks of religion were formed. The Manila Korean Union Church, a Protestant ecumenical church, was founded in Manila in 1974. In 1979, a Korean priest who was studying in the Philippines said masses for the representatives of business companies and several students studying in the Philippines (Korean Catholic Churches in the Philippines 1996). Thus the Christian networks based on churches were formed.

Various Korean events were systematized when the Mothers Association was formed and Korean Christians gathered together and talked with each other. They began to work to promote friendship, although there were only a few participants.

In 1959, the Philippine Expeditionary Forces to Korea (PEFTOK) was formed by the former Philippine soldiers who took part in the Korean War, and its activities continue until now.  

The third term (in the 1980s: the increase in the number of Korean businessmen by the advance of Korean companies)

The feature of the third term was the increase in the number of Korean businessmen who managed small or medium-sized companies. In the 1980s, the economic conditions of South Korea significantly changed. Labor-intensive industries began relocating their companies overseas because of many problems in South Korea, such as the rise of wages, the shortage of laborers, the rise of the US dollar-Korean won exchange rate. The Philippines has been promoting an introduction of foreign capital policy since the 1970s, an export-processing zone was built, and measures of treating foreign companies favorably were taken. The people and the capital of South Korea began to move at the same
time. It was the time when push and pull factors surfaced (Kutsumi 2002). Beginning the second half of the 1980s, the number of managers of small and medium-sized, or big enterprises and their families increased rapidly.

Moreover, a big religious activity transpired in a Korean Catholic Church. A commemorative ceremony for the 150th anniversary of Father Kim Dae Gun’s martyrdom was held by about 110 believers in 1986, and they built Father Kim Dae Gun’s bronze statue with the aid of a Korean cardinal and a Philippine bishop in Lolomboy. It was raised as a church belonging to the Manila parish in 1989, and named St. Kim Dae Gun Andrew Parish (Korean Catholic Churches in the Philippines 1996:44, 57). The church has about 500 believers as of February 2003.

The South Korean Protestant Missionary Association was also formed in 1986. Data as of 1999 show that 371 missionaries who belonged to the association were dispatched from 47 Protestant missionary associations in South Korea. A total of 932 people, including missionaries’ families, and 561 others live in Quezon City, Rizal, Angeles, and so on, and many theological colleges, and universities which missionaries are managing have been founded (Korean Missionary Association in the Philippines 1999:XX).

The fourth term (in the 1990s: the start of big projects by large enterprises and the birth of various associations)

The features of the fourth term saw Koreans often gathered together, to reconfirm their identity in the Philippines and unite themselves against various problems. In order to unite themselves, various associations were formed. Moreover, the managers not only of small and medium-sized businesses but also of big enterprises entered the Philippines.

The Overseas Korean Traders Association was established by the managers of trade businesses in March 1991. The Mothers Association, which was formed in 1975 by Korean women halted its activities for some time, but in 1994 it was revived as the Korean Women’s Association in the Philippines and has become a venue for forming friendships among the wives of representatives, housewives and so on.

In 1995, the Korean Restaurant Association was formed by those who managed eating-and-drinking business, accommodation business, groceries, etc. In the same year, all the former Presidents, together with
businessmen launched the Korean Chamber of Commerce Philippines Inc. The Branch Office Association, the branch office of business companies, aviation business, banks, etc. was formed in 1996; in 1997 the following associations were also formed: Construction Association by construction companies, and Korean Students Association by the students studying in the Philippines whose number had been increasing every year.3

Furthermore, the period was also the time when various print media for Koreans appeared. Daily information in their native language became indispensable for South Koreans who have settled down in the Philippines. Examples of these Korean news publications are the Weekly Korea Post (first published in September 1993), the Manila Seoul Weekly (August 1994), the News Gate (1995), the Korean News Focus Weekly Magazine and the Weekly Manila (both in 2000). They were distributed for free once a week by Korean sponsors who managed their own businesses.4

The fifth term (since 2000: the period of the formation of Korean networks with Filipinos)

The fifth term can be called the start of Korean cooperative activities with Filipinos and foreigners in the Philippines, and of Korean positive contribution to Philippine society. Though there were some differences in the circumstances of the founding of these associations, they had the common purpose of carrying out the activities which contributed to Filipinos and Philippine society.

The fifth term is much different from the first term to the fourth term when systematic activities by Koreans had been done, but now Koreans began (and have continued) their contributions to the Philippine society. Moreover, for Korean children’s education, it is the time when schools have successively been founded so that South Koreans may establish their identity as Koreans.

On the other hand, the complicated problems which were not in the early stages of the formation of the Korean community in the Philippines surfaced following five crises. I’d like to describe how the five crises have been solved in cooperation with Filipinos and other nationalities.

First, many South Koreans who lost their jobs under the influence of the Asian currency crisis in 1997 came to the Philippines. In the
Philippines, the number of those who began self-managed business without acquiring a working visa increased. In order to solve the problem, the Merchant Association was formed in July 2001 (it was renamed the Financial Expert Union Association in 2002). Its members have been busy with activities that help in getting a working visa, and coping with many problems in starting companies.  

Second, the number of South Korean tourists in the Philippines has been increasing since the second half of the 1990s. South Korean tourist guides came to stay over a long period of time, but since they guided without having a working visa, regulations were strengthened by the Philippine Immigration Office. In order to solve the problem, the Travel Company Association in the Philippines was formed in June 2001. In June 2002, the staff of the Department of Tourism and the Bureau of Immigration in the Philippines deliberated on the problem, and it was decided that a special seminar be held for Korean tourist guides in the Department of Tourism. Koreans who obtained a guide license were formally given a special working permit visa for a year.

Third, the Chamber of Commerce formed the Joint Foreign Chamber of Commerce in the Philippines with the United States, Australia, Japan, Spain, Taiwan, etc. in 2001. They have meetings to discuss the maintenance of infrastructure, controlling air pollution, and so on. Through their meetings, they do not only broadly obtain the opportunities for business, but manage crises in cooperation with foreign businessmen.

Fourth, a Presidential Statute, Article 156 promulgated on 12 December 2002 by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo prohibited the importation of used cars and used accessories which affected Korean managers and thousands of Philippine employees. The South Korean Used Automobile Import Association was formed, and a direct appeal to President Macapagal-Arroyo was made to revise the law. It also resulted in a large-scale demonstration by about 1,000 Philippine employees (Manila Seoul Weekly, 1 February 2003).

Fifth, the number of Koreans who wanted short linguistic training increased. Language schools which Koreans managed were also set up one after another. However, the number of students who were learning in the language schools without having any Special Study Permit (SPP) visa also increased. The staff of the Philippine Bureau of Immigration exposed them, and repatriated them by force to their native countries.
The Koreans who managed linguistic schools formed the Linguistic School Association in the Philippines. When the schools were formally approved, the procedure of issuing SSP was made easier for students.

As mentioned above, when crises arose, South Koreans through their associations carried out activities, sometimes through trial and error, to get Koreans out of trouble in cooperation with the Philippine authorities.

On the other hand, volunteer activities for Filipinos have been done actively. For example, I'd like to cite four of them.

First, the Overseas Korean Traders Association established a scholarship committee, and scholarships have been offered to the students of the University of the Philippines and public high schools since 2001 (Manila Seoul Weekly, 16 April 2004: www.manilaseoul.com). The members of the association have been working hard so that Filipinos may have a good image of South Koreans in the Philippines.

Second, in February 2001, the Korea-Philippines Friendship Hospital, which has an obstetrics and gynecology department and a pediatrics department, was built by the members of the Korean Investors Association Cavite, a group of Korean businessmen in the Cavite economic zone.

Third, the House of Sarang (love), was founded by Korean businessmen, men of religion, and others in gratitude to Philippine soldiers who had fought in the Korean War. It is an institution where boys from six to 13 years old who lived as street children can enter.8

Fourth, Christians are actively doing service activities. Every Sunday afternoon, the members of Joyful Church give hamburgers and juice to the street children who are living in the area between Baclaran and Luneta Park, worship God, and pray with about 200 persons. Korean Christians of other churches and students studying in the Philippines participate in the activity as volunteers.9 Moreover, its president (in fiscal year 2003-2004) and eager Christians have built a village for lepers.10

The mutual cultural exchange between the Philippines and South Korea is likewise being promoted. The Filipino-Korean Cultural Foundation, Inc. was founded in 2000 and its president has long associations with the members of the PEFTOK formed by former Philippine soldiers in 1959.
Moreover, the Kor-Phil Family Association Inc. for mixed-culture families who are rapidly increasing in number was formed in 2002 in cooperation with the President of the Foundation. It has about a hundred members as of February 2003. Korean teachers who are proficient in English and Tagalog give a series of lectures on Hungul every Saturday. Members of Korean Women’s Association approve of the Association, and every year, hold traditional events peculiar to South Korea, such as New Year of the lunar calendar, Chusok at the time of the All Souls’ Day of the lunar calendar, etc., so that South Koreans in the Philippines may understand Korean culture. They want their children to be able to speak Korean fluently and write it well and also want them to have identity as South Koreans by understanding South Korean culture.  

As mentioned above, South Koreans in the Philippines have felt the necessity of associating with and being friendly with Filipinos and have been doing various activities of their own in Philippine society since 2000. Through associations, South Koreans have been on good terms with Filipinos. Thus, Korean life has been safeguarded by the associations formed for Koreans’ sake.

**THE ORGANIZATIONS AND THE FEATURES OF UNITED KOREAN COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION, INC.**

Next, let us consider Korean networks in the Philippines through the United Korean Community Association Inc. (UKCA), the base of the Korean community.

The UKCA was established in 1969, and the 15th president succeeded this post in 2004. It has headquarters in Makati City which is the business center of the Manila metropolitan area.

The aims of UKCA are to show South Koreans’ pride and contribute to the development of their homeland by strengthening South Korean friendship and fellowship in the Philippines, by promoting their welfare, and by living with Filipinos harmoniously. It supports South Korean physical training, environment, culture and education so that they can have their identity and pride and love for their race (Korean Bulletin, January and February, 2001:3).

The organization of UKCA consists of (1) the board of executives, (2) the board of directors, (3) the board of advisers, (4) the presidents of seven branches of UKCA of local cities (Bataan, Angeles, Subic, Baguio, Boracay, Cebu, and Davao) which are managed independently,
and (5) the representatives of eleven branches in Metropolitan Manila where many South Koreans live (Manila, Parañaque, Pasay, Pasig, Quezon, Makati, Mandaluyong, Antipolo and Rizal, Cavite, Laguna and Batangas). They have about 50 members.

The term of the managing staff is two years. It is constituted of president, vice-presidents, inspectors specializing in accounts, and the chiefs of the bureaus which take charge of general affairs, public relations, etc. In fiscal year 2003-2004, a female vice-president was elected for the first time in UKCA. Moreover, the chief of the social welfare bureau is also newly-elected, and the plan of organizing volunteer activities for Filipinos is being considered.

People elected as the directors of the board are as follows: the presidents of the local UKCA which have 100 or more regular members, president, three representatives of all the past presidents, the representatives of the Philippine branches of Korean Sports Association, of Korean Women’s Association, of branch business company association, of investment association, of international organizations, of Protestant Missionary Association, of the chamber of commerce, of traders association, of financial (merchant) association, of travel company association, and of Korean Students Association, and five members who are chosen by recommendation of 30 or more regular members as recommendation directors.

Its president recommends some persons as advisers, and directors choose several advisers from them. The advisers have duties as consultants. The Ambassador of the Republic of Korea in the Philippines, the vice-governor and the director of the Asian Development Bank, the chief executive of the Boy Scouts, and some of the past presidents have become advisers.

As subsidiary organizations of UKCA, there are South Korean schools and the Philippine branches of South Korean Sports Association. The articles of South Korean schools can be revised after the directors of South Korean schools have proposed them, the directors of UKCA have considered and discussed them, and the members of a general meeting have approved them.

Membership fee is Php1,000 a year. There are about 1,000 households (when one household is considered to have four persons, there are about 4,000 members). The number of persons working for business companies is 10 percent, of persons managing business
companies, 20 percent, of self-employed persons, 40 percent, of missionaries, 10 percent, and of students, 20 percent. As for age groups, the number of babies less than twelve months old to their 20s is 30 percent, from their 30s to their 50s, 60 percent, and the number of elderly people (the oldest are in their seventies), 10 percent.

Activities of UKCA can roughly be divided into five types: (1) life consultations in the Philippines, applying for visas for working or studying and consultations about preventing crimes, (2) holding events so that South Koreans may be friendly, (3) promoting friendship among foreigners in the Philippines, (4) activities profitable for Filipinos and Philippine society, and (5) forming networks with Koreans living all over the world. Concrete examples of each type of activity will be given next.

In February 2002, UKCA tied up with the Philippine Bureau of Immigration about a visa memorandum (MOU), and UKCA was able to facilitate the granting of 9G working visas to Koreans. Until then, it usually took six months for Koreans to be granted working visas, but now they can get them within only forty to sixty days. Moreover, ‘fund-raising for Korean development’ was established in 2001 to improve Koreans’ welfare. Contributions are collected at any time. UKCA leased an office for 34 years, but in 2003, it was able to purchase an office in Makati City through these contributions.

Filipino-Korean Cultural Exchange Festival Night is held every two years. It is the biggest Korean event in Manila. The 11th Festival was held in 2002. About 3,500 Filipinos and South Koreans gathered at the Ninoy Aquino Stadium. Filipino and South Korean singers were invited. Philippine employees of South Korean companies participated, and songs and dances were performed. Exchange through sports is also held, and the 17th Korean athletic meet was held in 2004.

The Federation of Foreign Associations in the Philippines, Inc. was formed among the presidents of communities of about 12 nations, such as Americans, Spaniards, Japanese, and others who live in the Philippines. It meets periodically to discuss the protection of rights and measures to ensure the safety of foreigners who live in the Philippines and to exchange information with one another. For example, at the meeting in October 2002, the lawyers of an immigration office were also invited and a seminar was held about foreigners’ visa problems (Korean Bulletin, winter issue, 2002:25).
Some activities that benefited Filipinos include a big clean-up activity of the Manila Bay in March 2003 and a blood letting campaign that will provide blood free of charge to Koreans and Filipinos during emergencies. Installing garbage cans in Makati City was also among the planned activities. The members of PEFTOK set up a memorial tower at Yuruton in Gyeonggi-do in South Korea for the Philippine soldiers who were killed in the War. When the members of Yuruton Commemoration Association, all of whom are Filipinos, held a commemorative ceremony in South Korea on 23 April 2001, the executives of UKCA were present. Thus, the historical relation between the Philippines and South Korea was strengthened, and the next generation of Koreans has succeeded to it.

Finally, Koreans living in foreign countries have been making an effort to unify the Korean Peninsula. There is a Philippine branch in the Southeast Asia branches of Democratic Peace Unification Consultation Association. Some of the past presidents are the members. They have been endeavoring to unify both South and North Korea with Koreans in foreign countries. In addition, the members of UKCA financially helped the victims of the Great Hanshin Earthquake in Japan in January 1995, and of the flood damage in South Korea in September 2002.

Thus, the members of UKCA have helped not only South Koreans but foreigners. They have made friends with foreigners, and cooperated with them. So South Koreans live friendly lives in the Philippines.

**CONCLUSION**

In this paper I have mentioned how South Koreans have coped with many problems, solved them, and adapted themselves to a different culture in the host society by the activities of their associations, a kind of social organization.

By their associations, South Koreans have formed networks with each other and helped one another in their community. On the other hand, they have been doing a lot of volunteer activities for Filipinos and Philippine society, and have associated on friendly terms with them in order to show that South Koreans are good friends of Filipinos.

Both in foreign affairs and in private sectors, South Koreans have cooperated with each other, and have associated with people of various ethnic communities, such as Chinese abroad, Americans, Japanese,
Australians, and others in the Philippines, and have been trying to coexist with them. South Koreans have also been doing activities that seek to improve Filipinos' lives. Through these activities, South Koreans seek to make their life safe too.

Moreover, by the activities of their associations, they have kept their identity as South Koreans in the Philippines, and have overcome crises, and the next generation has succeeded to their patriotism and pride as South Koreans.

Most of the South Koreans I interviewed had lived in South Korea in their youth. Most of them were born in the 1930s to the 1970s. It was the time of military dictatorship in South Korea. In those days, education on the basis of Confucianism was observed eagerly there. It was also the time when the values of paternalism, males working on production labor, and females working on reproduction labor had a great influence on their families and jobs.

South Koreans who grew up in the cultural background of Confucianism came to the Philippines with a culture very much different from theirs. Their ideal, their consciousness of masculinity and femininity has been changing little by little in the Philippines.

By crossing geographical borders, they have realized that the knowledge or information they acquired before coming to the Philippines was different. They have come to reconsider their racial consciousness and the traditions of their family, and have rethought their self-recognition.

By adapting to Philippine culture and by associating with various ethnic groups, they have begun to have new self-recognition and to live a new way of life, not holding one racial trait taught in the country where they were born and raised, and not seeing things from only one viewpoint.

In a foreign country as the Philippines, the Korean individual way of living has been changing. The change in their consciousness is also seen. In the Korean community in the Philippines, the management committee of each association is led by males, but in the United Korean Community Association Inc., female executives have come to be appointed.

By the activities of associations in the Philippines, a new gender consciousness has been created in the South Korean community. This
new notions about gender which are contrary to Korean traditional beliefs were formed in the Philippines.

The year 2004 is the 55th anniversary of diplomatic relations between South Korea and the Philippines. South Koreans have been able to coexist with Filipinos and other foreigners in the Philippines through their activities. It can be called a model for attaining coexistence with foreigners.

NOTES
1 Based on an interview with the President of the Filipino-Korean Cultural Foundation, Inc. in July 2001 and in June 2003.
2 The same as above (1).
3 Based on interviews with the members of each Korean association in the Philippines in July 2001.
4 Based on interviews with the staff of each Korean ethnic media in the Philippines in July 2001.
5 Based on an interview with the President of the Merchant Association in the Philippines in July 2001.
6 Based on an interview with the President of the Travel Company Association in the Philippines in July 2001.
7 Based on an interview with the President of the Korean Chamber of Commerce Philippines, Inc. in July 2001.
8 Based on an interview with a sister of the House of Sarang in January 2003.
9 Based on interviews with members in January 2003.
10 Based on interviews with the President of UKCA in January 2003.
11 Based on an interview with the President of Kor-Phil Family Association Inc. in January and February 2003.
12 Based on interviews with the staff of UKCA in July 2001 and January 2003.

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The Vietnamese people won their war against the colonizing western powers—first the French and then the Americans—rather abruptly with the liberation of Saigon and the reunification of the country in 1975.¹ For many Vietnamese, however, the struggle was not yet over: Because they were closely associated with the Americans, or for other, sometimes more personal reasons, thousands of Vietnamese fled the country in the next few years. Many of these people packed their families and belongings into small, often rather decrepit, boats, and set off into the sea.

The Republic of the Philippines lies directly east of Vietnam, a straight shot across the South China Sea. The island province of Palawan juts westward from the main islands of the Philippines, and thus was the first landfall, and first asylum, for many “boat people.” The United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) set up a first asylum camp in Palawan, and kept it open for twenty years. For many refugees this was a stop off point on the way to the U.S. or other resettlement countries, but for many others, the Philippines became home. Therefore when the UNHCR closed the camp in 1996, how to deal with the Vietnamese community became an issue for the people of the Philippines.

This paper deals with the very unique situation of the Vietnamese refugee community of Palawan, initially under international auspices but then as an economically viable sub-unit of Palawan society. It traces the history of the first asylum UNHCR camp to its closing and the
subsequent involvement of the Philippine government and church, in their efforts to integrate the Vietnamese into the greater Philippine society. It considers the sociocultural and economic life of the camp, the steps by which the subsequent Vietville was organized, various aspects of life in Vietville, the question of Vietnamese integration into the mainstream of Philippine life, and legal support for this integration. It is based on documentary sources as well as extensive interviews with government, church, and nongovernment organization (NGO) people associated with the camp, and with resettled refugees still living in Puerto Princesa, Palawan.

During the years of American involvement in Vietnam, the Philippines, as a close ally of the U.S., sent a small contingent of engineers and other technical workers to Vietnam. Some of the members of this unit, known as Philcag, married Vietnamese and fathered children during the war years. With the final communist victory in Saigon on 30 April 1975, the Philippine government set about evacuating Philcag families, loading Vietnamese wives and children into Philippine navy boats for repatriation. These people were the first “displaced persons” absorbed by the Philippines in the aftermath of the war. They were assisted by the Catholic Church, first through CARITAS and then the National Secretariat for Social Action (NASSA), which is the social action arm of the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines (CBCP). The Center for Assistance to Displaced Persons (CADP) was set up later, again by the CBCP, for the express purpose of assisting refugees from Vietnam.

Thus some mechanisms for dealing with Vietnamese refugees had already been set up ahead of the influx of “boat people” who were to arrive in the Philippines shortly after the war ended. However this first group—Vietnamese wives and children of Filipinos—were of different legal status, having at least some claim to Philippine citizenship, and thus continued to be treated differently, as a unique group.

Months after the war ended in June of 1975, refugees began to fan out from Vietnam in small wooden boats, often of questionable seaworthiness. It is thought that between one and two million Vietnamese left their homeland in this manner, either because they had worked with the American military or because they were of an ethnic group co-opted by the Americans, or because they were of Chinese origin or committed capitalists. By some estimates up to half of these people died at sea, either at the hands of pirates or due to thirst, starvation, or
drowning. Boats ran into storms, capsized, got lost, fell apart—although one former boat person told the researchers that if all went well, it could be a fairly pleasant four day journey; you could sit, he said, on deck, drinking coffee and enjoying the sea. However another younger man, who had traveled as a boy of ten, said that his father had speculated that their chances of living through the journey were about one to ten. But he had wanted to go anyway.

At that point the law of the sea provided that ships that picked up or rescued people in distress at sea were obliged to take responsibility for those people. Many Vietnamese were picked up by ships from a variety of nations, so that they found themselves taking side trips to Taiwan or South Korea before they were delivered back to Southeast Asia. The United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) had by then set up camps for the Vietnamese in two locations in the Philippines (Palawan and Bataan), in Hong Kong, and in other nations. Initially these camps were set up with the idea of processing refugees for resettlement in third countries (they were in fact called Refugee Processing Centers). The understanding was that most of these refugees would be resettled in the U.S. and had to be “trained” first, especially in language. But some other nations which had rescued refugees at sea did later accept them and provided some language training in the camps as well.

The UNHCR Philippine First Asylum Camp (PFAC) in Palawan was built on a stretch of land adjacent to the Puerto Princesa City Airport, and to the base of the Western Command (Westcom) Armed Forces of the Philippines. The camp was under the military supervision of Wescom, although UNHCR oversaw most of the elements of daily life. They provided the shelters, daily food allowances, health services, etc. UNHCR worked in conjunction with other groups, such as Holy Trinity College, to provide education at various levels from pre-school, elementary, to high school and adult literacy. Not surprisingly, the focus was on English language skills. UNHCR also had a “van” service—actually, says one informant, a dump truck—that made trips to various municipalities in Palawan to pick up refugees whose landing had been reported by municipal officials. Refugees picked up by Philippine navy boats or ships from third countries were taken directly to Puerto Princesa.

Structures in the camp were basic, and uniform, perhaps giving the camp a monotonous appearance. One interviewee said he and his
father were very discouraged when they first saw the new home they had taken such risks to reach. Nevertheless, most refugees adjusted well to life at camp: they were safe, they had food to eat, and they had new and interesting challenges to meet. When things settled down, the camp became a community—if not exactly like a Vietnamese village, perhaps like a cross between that and a Filipino village.

At its height there were 8,000 refugees in the camp, so naturally it developed into an economic community. First off, of course, the refugees would want to provide themselves with “proper” Vietnamese food—so soon they began making noodles, and their special kind of Vietnamese pâtis, and the still locally-famous French bread. As refugees were allowed to go in and out of the camp, it was easy enough to buy any missing ingredients from the market. As evening settled over the camp each night, the streets suddenly hosted tables and small stalls, selling noodles and other Vietnamese specialties. There were also some food stalls, close to the gates, that were opened during the day as well and were the favorites of the local tricycle drivers. Filipino-Vietnamese Rene Sabio learned the secrets of making French bread from a Vietnamese baker, and went on to be the camp baker for some three years, until he put up his own stall selling French bread just outside the camp. His Vietnamese mother, who was commissioned by the Pho restaurant in Manila to open a branch in Puerto Princesa, eventually joined her son in selling noodles as well as Vietnamese sandwiches. The local branch of Pho, making use of Vietnamese staff from the camp, became very popular with the citizens of Puerto Princesa, and with tourists as well: it eventually made its way into tour itineraries and guide books. (The restaurant still exists, long after the camp has been closed, and it still welcomes tourists, although it is no longer the only good Vietnamese restaurant in town.)

Some of the women refugees quickly went into dressmaking, and others into hair styling—two businesses for which there are always customers. Teachers working in the camp patronized these businesses, as well as the noodle and bread shops. (Filipino teachers, enticed by the relatively good pay for work in the camp, came from other parts of the Philippines to work in Palawan. Many stayed even after the camp was closed.)

There were also goldsmiths selling jewelry. It has been said that some refugees came with gold bullion, and put this to good use by becoming petty entrepreneurs. Buying and selling was brisk inside the
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Refugees also sometimes sold or traded some of their food rations, although this was not approved by the administration. Most of the people in camp spent at least part of the day in classes, notably English class. English was taught in cultural context—i.e., refugees learned how to ask prices for goods that they might need, how to enroll their children in school, and later, how to call the school to report a child’s illness, how to open a bank account, what to do if a bank teller or store keeper handed them incorrect change. Refugees also had to learn about different types of clothes—the types of women’s underwear used in the west, for instance, or the types of clothing children need during cold weather.

The camp was opened for twenty years. During that time many refugees were resettled in third countries, notably the U.S., Australia, and Canada. In the late 1980s the UNHCR made attempts to come to a final settlement for the Vietnamese, withdrawing the refugee classification and making regulations against enlarging the camps. This particular rule became a problem in Palawan when a fire destroyed some of the living quarters, which could then not be replaced. But the number of refugees had dropped anyway.

Eventually the camps all over Southeast Asia were to be closed and the remaining refugees repatriated. However during the presidency of Corazon Aquino (1986–1992) no forced repatriation was carried out in the Philippines. But under the subsequent Ramos presidency, the pressure increased. The refugees appealed for help to CADP, and thus the issue went to the very top of the church, through the Catholic Bishops Conference. On 12 February 1996, Bishop Ramon C. Arguelles, then Chair of the Episcopal Commission for the Pastoral Care of Migrants (ECMI), and heading the CADP, got a call from Westcom saying that repatriation was imminent. This led to intensive dialoguing between President Ramos and the bishops, and the latter were assured that there would be no force used against the refugees. Nevertheless on February 14, Valentine’s Day, a group of Vietnamese refugees were forcibly repatriated from the camp in Palawan to Vietnam. Teachers recall this incident with a great deal of emotion, saying the refugees formed a circle with men in the center and women and children on the outside, thinking the military would not use force against the outer ring. When this strategy failed, they pleaded with their teachers and media representatives to help them, but nothing could be done. However,
news clips of the incident were seen all over the Philippines with the evening news, and the refugees gained a great deal of sympathy.

Thus although the Ramos government was at pains to explain to the UNHCR in Geneva why the Philippines was unable to carry out the same sort of violent repatriation which was done in other locations, the Church had marshaled strong enough public opinion to make such a move untenable. The UNHCR then asked the Church if it could afford to take over the support of the camp, but the Church opted instead to work on a plan of progressive self-reliance for the refugees. With seed money amounting to US$1.3 million provided by Vietnamese Americans, CADP undertook to build a new Vietnamese Village, called Vietville, on the northern outskirts of the city, in the Sta. Lourdes/ Honda Bay area. The camp was finally closed and the remaining Vietnamese moved into Vietville and began working for their own economic sustenance.

The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) with the ECMI of the CBCP, and CADP, signed amidst fanfare in Malacañang on 17 July 1996, was a landmark in finding a solution to the Remaining Vietnamese Nationals (RVN) problem. Three basic policies to govern the MOU were enunciated:

1. The Philippine Government was to promote the policy of voluntary repatriation to be implemented with due respect for the RVN’s human dignity and human rights;
2. Representations were to be made with the US Government for the final solution to the Orderly Departure Program; and
3. Care and Maintenance of all RVNs, to be provided by the Church, was to assume the principle of progressive self-reliance and self-management.

The implementation of the MOU was to be undertaken by the GRP through the Department of Social Welfare and Development, and the CADP. The rules called for assisting “the RVNs to gain access to education, skills training, livelihood project and other employment opportunities that will help them achieve an acceptable level of productivity and self reliance.” It spelled out the roles and responsibilities of the Philippine Government through its various agencies, and the CBCP, with the latter assuming the cost of effective administration of the RVNs. The CADP was given the task of relocating
the RVNs from the PFAC (Philippine First Asylum Camp) to a new site, thus leading to the birth of Vietville.

It was Bishop Arguelles who secured $1.3 million, which was used to build Vietville, from Vietnamese in the United States.\(^12\) The first plan was to put up several Vietnamese centers all over the country, but because of the offer of Mayor Edward Hagedorn for a land in Sta. Lourdes, and perhaps because most of the refugees were already in Palawan, a singular Vietnamese village was put up in Puerto Princesa.

The Catholic Church through the CADP was then assigned to (1) "coordinate with the NGAs, LGUs, NGOs and international agencies in helping the RVNs in gaining access to education, skills training, livelihood projects and other employment opportunities;" (2) provide "for the care and maintenance of all RVNs under the principle of progressive self-reliance, while assuming responsibility for the administrative cost essential for the effective administration of the RVNs" (italics ours); (3) undertake "the relocation of the RVNs from the PFAC to a new site... (and provide) support services to housing and other support services."\(^13\)

It was thus the CADP that built and managed Vietville.

Aside from the $1.3 million, other funds came in which the CADP used, among others, to help fund business enterprises of the needy Vietnamese to help them start out a business. The Chair of the CADP was the Mother Directress of the Daughters of Charity. Bishops Arguelles and Pedro Arigo of the Palawan Vicariate were Board Members together with Sister Maura and others. Sister Pascal Le Thi Trieu was the administrator.

The briefing on Vietville obtained on-site in Sta. Lourdes contains the following Vision-Mission Statement:

The remaining Vietnamese Nationals’ very existence, embodied with the Viet Village community, is a reminder to the world of the Philippines’ great gift—returning human dignity to the unfortunate boat people so that they might be able to rebuild a decent life that has been lost through endless hardships and traumas.

The community leaders envision the Viet Village:

1. As a symbol of unselfish brotherhood and cooperation between Vietnamese and Filipinos, determined to become an integral asset to the city of Puerto Princesa, in its efforts of building a
community strengthened in solidarity, rich and unique in blended cultural endowments, seeking to live in harmony with Filipino neighbors, while adapting a pro-environment and community tourism approach to its development.

2. As a home to all the Remaining Vietnamese Nationals who are guided to become law abiding, productive, self-reliant and entrepreneurial individuals and have a deep sense of gratitude for the dignity redeemed on the land of the Philippines.

When Vietville was first set up, it housed approximately 150 families. It provided its residents with a simple but congenial and healthy lifestyle: there was a park and children’s playground, with various pieces of play equipment, a Catholic chapel, and a Buddhist shrine and temple. A Vietnamese woman ran a small nursery school, so that children could have their earliest education in Vietnamese. Economic endeavors included a bakery for French bread, a noodle factory, fish sauce or patis making, and eventually meat packing. Some residents worked in the on-site restaurant, as cooks, waiters and waitresses, etc. The restaurant sometimes put on cultural shows, featuring singing and dancing, mainly for tourists. (Vietville is about a kilometer north of the entrance to Honda Bay and is also along the north road to Sabang and the underground river, and is thus a natural stop for tourists coming home from the river or enjoying the beaches in the bay.)

For governance, an Executive Committee ran the affairs of Vietville, headed by an elected Executive Director and eleven (11) appointed Directors. The Executive Director was the liaison with the Government officials of Palawan, and with the RVNs living outside Vietville.¹⁴

But the community could not, of course, employ all its residents, and did not provide education beyond preschool. So residents did participate in the greater community, going to town to go to market or to look for other forms of livelihood, to engage in buy-and-sell, etc. The young children went to the public schools in nearby Tagburos, where they generally learned to speak Filipino rather quickly. Older children went further to high school, the more prosperous going to Holy Trinity. Some went on to college in Holy Trinity or in Palawan State University, or enrolled in some of the more specialized computer schools.

The major difficulty of living in Vietville is its distance from the city and the fact that there is very little transportation going to town. Partly for this reason, residents gradually drifted off, moving into Puerto
Princesa, or even to other parts of the Philippines and setting up their business concerns. At present only about 50 families are still living in the village.

Vietnamese festivals and religious holidays are celebrated in Vietville, but there are now a few other centers of Vietnamese convergence around the city. There are many restaurants, mostly Chao Long houses—Rene’s Saigon is probably the most popular as a gathering place. There is a vegetarian Vietnamese restaurant set up in close relationship with the Buddhist group of Suma Ching Hai, a living Chinese woman who visited the camp on at least one occasion and actually helped some Vietnamese Buddhists find resettlement in the U.S. (Vietville’s Mr. Lam estimates that about one third of the refugees are Buddhist, and another third are Catholics.) There are also several Vietnamese boutiques and stores in which Vietnamese goods are sold.

The younger Vietnamese, especially those outside the camp, naturally come into contact with Filipinos. Many can speak Filipino—the really young ones almost as well as they can speak Vietnamese. There is some agreement that the two cultures, both Southeast Asian, are much the same. Nevertheless there has not been a great deal of intermarriage and many seem to think that bridging the divide—mostly linguistic, apparently—might be too difficult. It would be natural, of course, for the Vietnamese to want to preserve their culture outside Vietnam, and especially to raise Vietnamese speaking children. One interviewee did say that his father is married to a Filipina (although his mother is still alive in Vietnam), and he didn’t think the cultures were too different, but his nieces and nephews were definitely Filipino. They ate both Vietnamese and Filipino foods, but spoke Filipino—as they were usually with their mother.

The people of Palawan have been most welcoming of this group and seem to consider them a permanent part of the community. On 12 March 1996, in a meeting convened for the purpose, a declaration of support for the efforts of the Catholic Church in addressing the problems of the Vietnamese Asylum seekers was unanimously approved and signed by Mayor Edward Hagedorn, officials of government agencies on the provincial and city levels, and representatives of non-government organizations. As the move for giving permanent residency to the Vietnamese refugees gained grounds, the Sangguniang Panlungsod (City Council) passed Resolution no.770–98 on 12 February 1998, strongly endorsing to President Fidel Ramos the granting of permanent
residence to the remaining Vietnamese nationals in Puerto Princesa, citing the support that Puerto Princesa had been giving to the programs of the CADP.

Even the resolutions, however, make it clear that a permanent solution should be found. The status given the Vietnamese was conceived of as temporary from the start, and while they are certainly an economically viable and self-supporting group, they are essentially here on an extra-legal basis. They have no passports and therefore cannot travel outside the country. (And by this time many are anxious to go back to visit relatives in Vietnam.) And because they are neither citizens nor permanent residents, they are barred from taking government board exams for the various professions. Some colleges will not grant them diplomas. These limitations put a ceiling on their economic mobility, and because they are a particularly energetic and hard working group, they do feel the limitations.

The original MOU, of July 1996, assumed that many Vietnamese would be settling in third countries, and that some would take up voluntary repatriation. The option was also opened to apply for Permanent Residency (although one informant says that this option was actually only opened to the initial group of Philcag people—i.e., wives and children of Filipinos.)\(^17\) It was hoped that one or the other option would be taken up by all remaining refugees by the end of 1999.

The deadline lapsed on the date specified, that is, 31 December 1999, but was extended to 15 May 2000. A midst fears of the RVNs that they would be forced to leave the country, the representatives of the Department of Justice and the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation came to Puerto Princesa in April 2001, and through Atty. Tomas Syquia, reiterated that forced repatriation was not the Government policy.\(^18\) Instead, the committee came to confer with the RVNs on problems with their applications based on existing laws, and recommended that these problems be brought to the attention of Congressman Roilo Golez for appropriate action on the bill he filed granting permanent residence to the RVNs.\(^19\) A similar bill was filed in the Senate by Senator Aquilino Pimentel Jr. However, the 11th Congress did not act on the bills. It was left to Congressman Abraham Kahlil Mitra to re-introduce a House Bill in 2002 under the 12th Congress.

In his explanatory note, Congressman Mitra lauded the RVNs as “self-reliant, law-abiding, and civic oriented earning the respect of the
community,” yet pointed out concerns because they “have no firm protection from our laws and are therefore vulnerable to manipulation, harassment, abuse and may be subject to deportation.” He then sought the granting of permanent residence to qualified Vietnamese Refugees and asylum seekers consistent with the adherence of the Philippine Government to the principles of human rights.

Congressman Mitra then authored House Resolution no. 782 “directing the House of Representatives through its appropriate committees, to conduct an immediate study on the status of the remaining (RVN’s)” and to determine appropriate remedies.

As debated upon and approved, Mitra’s House Bill, this time co-authored by 14 other congresspersons, was approved as House Bill no. 5970.

The House Bill known as “The Social Integration Act of 2003 for the Remaining Vietnamese Nationals,” grants permanent residence to Vietnamese nationals who arrived in the Philippines before 30th June 1996 as asylum seekers, upon compliance with the following requirements:

1. Filing of application/registration form; complete fingerprint card; Police and National Bureau of Investigation clearances; proof of identity; affidavit of good moral character from two Filipino citizens; proof of financial capacity; history of stay in the Philippines; residential address for the last five years; and four passport size pictures;

2. Payment of the following integration fees to the Bureau of Immigration: one time application fee of P10,000; and for married RVN, a single payment of P5,000 for the Vietnamese spouse and P3,000 for each biological child below 18 years of age;

3. Submission of medical certificate from a Government Hospital stating the applicant, his spouse and/or children (if any) are not users of prohibited drugs; and

4. Upon compliance with the requirements, the Bureau of Immigration shall issue an Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) and an Immigration Certificate of Registration (ICR) to the applicant.

However, before the bill could be passed by the Senate, some new ideas emerged, and a group of Vietnamese lawyers from third countries (notably Australia and the United States) came to visit the Philippines.
and suggested to the RVNs that perhaps becoming permanent residents of the Philippines—or apparently even having that option—might block opportunities for settlement in third countries. Some of these “third country” Vietnamese went as well to the CBCP to intercede, asking that the bill be dropped. Bishop Arguelles of the CBCP, the man most closely associated with the church’s attempts to aid the Vietnamese and with the building of Vietville, stands firmly in his belief that the permanent residency option is the only viable one for Vietnamese still living in the Philippines, as it is at this point necessary for them to have legal status and the full rights that this would ensure. It may be true that opting for permanent residency in the Philippines would make it more difficult for an individual to be accepted in a third country. It is not at all clear that having the opportunity available would have a negative effect on anyone who does not take up the opportunity, except that the passage of the bill may result in totally illegal status for those who don’t take advantage of the offer. But there have been no threats of any forcible expulsion.

But the community has been split and the bill has been dropped. The process will have to begin again under the next congress if there is further agitation for it. At this point it seems that most Vietnamese still dream of resettlement in one of the “rich” countries of the world, whether or not this dream is realistic. In all likelihood the situation will drift on for a few more years, as Vietnamese disperse over a wider area, but they will probably retain their extralegal status and presence in Puerto Princesa for the foreseeable future.

From the very beginning of the Vietnamese odyssey in Palawan and the Philippines, the Catholic Church, through the CBCP, has been involved. Early on they worked within the structure of the UNHCR camp system. When the UNHCR stopped the refugee program, and adopted a repatriation policy, the Church stepped in and convinced the National Government to implement only voluntary repatriation. The establishment of Vietville and the program to give the Vietnamese refugees opportunities to improve their economic and social standings, opened the way for local integration. Rapport between the Vietnamese community and the people of Palawan went on smoothly, both economically and socially. The Chao Long houses and Vietnamese French bread have become a part of life in Puerto Princesa, and symbolize the coexistence between the two communities. However, the pervasive dream of resettlement in one of the Western countries has stymied
moves to give them permanent residence. The Philippine Government and the people of Puerto Princesa, and Palawan in general, have provided the means for the Vietnamese to stay on. The final decision rests with the Vietnamese community.

NOTES


2 Interview with Rene Sabio, of Filipino-Vietnamese parentage, in his restaurant, “Rene’s Saigon.”

3 Open Letter of Bishop Ramon Arguelles to the Remaining Vietnamese Sisters and Brothers, 14 December 2003.

4 Interview with Nguyen Lan Lam, Current Assistant Administrator of Vietville.

5 Interview with Nguyen Ngoc Hung.

6 Interview with Commodore Constancio T. Velasco, former Assistant Director of PFAC.

7 Interview with Ruby Diao, formerly a teacher in camp.

8 Interview with Nguyen Ngoc Hung.

9 A former teacher in the camp, who prefers to remain anonymous.

10 The details of these negotiations are found in the open letter of Bishop Ramon Arguelles to the Remaining Vietnamese Sisters and Brothers, 14 December 2003.

11 Ruby Diao, former teacher.

12 Interview with Bishop Pedro Arigo, Vicariate of Puerto Princesa.

13 Memorandum of Understanding ..., 17 July 1996.

14 The position of Executive Director was held by Che Nat Giao from the inception of Vietville until his resignation and disbandment of the Committee in late 2003. Vietville is now run directly by CADP.

15 Because of the extra legal status of the refugees, they did not have to report annually to the Immigration Office. As a means of following up their whereabouts, those putting up business concerns were issued certifications by the Immigration Office attesting to
their being residents of the city. These certifications were then brought to the City Licensing Office for the appropriate business permit.

16 Interview with Nguyen Ngoc Hung. Another informant had a brother married to a Filipina. Records of the City Registrar for the calendar years 2000-2003 had only three Filipino-Vietnamese marriages.

17 Interview with Rene Sabio.


20 Open Letter of Bishop Arguelles.

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7. _____, Bill no. 5271, Introduced by Representative Abraham Kahlil Mitra, Explanatory Note.

8. _____, An Act Granting Permanent Residence Status to the Remaining Vietnamese Nationals (RVN) through a Social Integration Program.


Interviews


Books, Periodicals


The Japanese in our Midst:  
An Exploratory Analysis of the Experiences of Japanese Migrants/ Settlers in the Philippines  

ARNOLD MOLINA AZURIN

INTRODUCTION

The numerous studies on the migration of Japanese farmers, laborers and professionals into the Philippines by Filipino, Japanese and American scholars, focus on the experiences of the diverse groups of Japanese immigrants who were induced during the American colonial regime to come to the Philippines and make a living in the then-expanding Philippine economy. Many of these migrant workers were deployed in such pioneering activities as road-building in the Cordillera, vegetable farming around Baguio and Benguet, and plantation-type production of hemp (abaca fiber) in Davao and Bicol, with others coming as retail shop-keepers and prostitutes. Eventually their presence became dominant in commercial fishing, from Lingayen Gulf in Pangasinan to Davao Gulf and Palawan’s rich fishing grounds. By the onset of the Commonwealth era (mid-1930s) they began to pose stiff competition against Chinese artisans and traders in some small-scale industries as well as in retail marketing networks.

The export of Japanese labor was also pushed at the same time to the United States, Mexico, Peru, Canada and Hawaii, according to Luisa Mabunay (1979), but in this westerly spread, the Japanese government “was only indirectly involved.” In contrast, the “overseas colonization” of the Philippines or Nanyo (southlands) was inspired in part by the “expansionist discourses within Japan,” says Cynthia Luz Rivera (n.d.), adding that the “unabated influx of Japanese nationals speaks of this
systematic and effective campaign to join the colonization exodus to Davao.” Lydia Yu-Jose’s book Japan Views the Philippines (1992) cites several opinions from various Japanese advocates of this southward expansionism, although some opinion makers in Japan limited the goal to exporting labor and capital, minus the covetous wish for a subsequent territorial annexation (which was certainly the dream of the expansionist sect of Japan’s military establishment).

This particular focus among previous and current researches on the politico-economic dimension of the Japanese migration to the Philippines is probably inevitable in the context of the considerable tension subsequently engendered in local host communities. And more so because of that period’s volatile contentions among Philippine Commonwealth officials and business interests vis-à-vis the key power players in Japan and the United States immediately preceding the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. I can make an educated guess that even the Filipino literary imagination today, were it to be regarded as a reflection of folk reminiscence and social history, still bears some wartime pains and passions—such as reflected in the comfort women issue.

Up to this day, according to the research of Shun Ohno (1992), the Japanese-Filipinos in Davao who are descendants of the prewar expatriate workers mostly from Okinawa have been squeezed by the twin tragedies of being ostracized by native Filipinos till now, and of having been dispossessed of their farm lots by the Philippine government (and by some local guerrilla officers) on suspicion of having sympathized or collaborated with the Japanese Imperial Army. Despite the fact that they were just young children during the war years, these descendants from mixed marriages of Okinawan-Japanese males and local women still bear the onus of identification with the invading army of more than half a century ago.

Aggravating their current dehumanized squalor is the longtime agony of having been neglected by the Japanese government that has regarded them as Filipinos—until they can prove otherwise through valid documents presumably left behind by their Japanese parents who were ordered to be repatriated to Japan right after the war. What further complicates their sordid condition is the fact that most of them are advanced in age and have assumed Filipino-sounding names and the surnames of their adoptive families who hid them in hill communities (precisely to camouflage their Japanese lineage soon after the death or forced repatriation of their Japanese fathers).
Thus the crucial issue to be settled by the Japanese government, with the assistance of the local government unit, is whether their nationality is Filipino or Nihonjin. What is clear is that they are either war orphans or victims of postwar traumas, theirs and those of others. What is not clear is how to restore their self-consciousness after having assumed camouflaged identities. Although they are basically the bearers of a mixed or hyphenated political identity—Japanese-Filipinos—according to some researchers like Ohno, who has been trying to persuade some Japanese government officials to help in ameliorating their plight as victims of that war launched by Japan in 1941, when they were just pre-adolescent children.

Another question that seems to remain intriguing to nationalist historians is the real extent of plain economic refugees among those migrant workers compared to those who might have come instead as vanguards and spies of Japan’s empire-building strategy in the name of Greater Asia Co-prosperity Sphere.

Yet another contention for researchers to shed light on is whether today’s “Japanese-Filipinos” or the descendants of those prewar migrants may be regarded eventually as an ethnic group in the context of a majority-minority dichotomy in Filipino identity.

Josefa Saniel (n.d.) had suggested this category in an essay published in 1966 by Asian Studies but she carefully circumscribed this ethnic tag “Japanese Minority” by a specific period “before Pearl Harbor” and a particular place “in Davao.” Obviously she had not meant it to be a universalized ethnic identity—much less as a current identification of a social class in the manner used by Ohno.

Incidentally, such a personal and group label may acquire more currency in the years ahead as the children from the mixed marriages of Filipina japayukis and Japanese males finally come of age to decide to emigrate to the Philippines or to other countries—when their crossbreeding and cross-cultural provenance shall be more prominent both in their features and travel documents.

This prospect quite stunned me when in December 1996 I was surrounded by a big crowd of such couples and preschool mestizo children in a departure lounge at the Narita Airport in Tokyo, all eagerly awaiting to set foot in Philippine soil. Curious and having some time to kill, I went to another departure lounge, only to witness the same scene of milling Japanese-Filipino couples with their toddlers in tow. Rather,
were they Filipino-Japanese? Indeed I asked a few couples what was their preferred label for their mestizo children. “Pareho lang naman yan [It’s all the same]” was the casual response of the Filipina mothers, reinforced by the nods and smiles of the Japanese fathers.

I have revived this happy interlude at the Narita Airport to show the stark contrast with the embittered mixed-up self-identities or ambiguity in nationality of the remaining war orphans and abandoned children of Davaokuo, as the Japanese colony of migrant workers used to be known with pride before the war. In March 1988, through the prodding of Ohno, the Japanese Ministry of Welfare and the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs finally conducted its first survey of Japanese-Filipinos who either lost their parents during the war or got separated from their Japanese fathers by the forced repatriation at war’s end. Ohno provides a summary of that long-overdue survey: “Regarding the question on nationality, 10 percent answered ‘Japanese’, 57 percent answered ‘Filipino’ and 44 percent answered ‘not clear’. The official documents attesting [to] their Japanese nationality got lost during their escape from the U.S. forces or they could not decipher their fathers’ names written in Chinese characters or that they have no knowledge about their fathers’ permanent whereabouts in Japan.”

This self-valuation among the so-called Japanese-Filipinos (the offspring of intermarriages) reveals more of the chances of assimilation in the local community or a deliberate submergence of one genetic-cultural base of identity in favor of the other source of self-ascription, given the pressured circumstances they have been going through since the war ended. Only ten percent regarded themselves as “Japanese” while fifty-seven percent considered themselves “Filipinos,” and forty-four percent were ambiguous about their self-ascribed nationality. Under the coercive conditions posed by the postwar anti-Japanese sentiments in Davao, it is small wonder that the majority of this Japanese-Filipino generation either regarded themselves as Filipinos or “not clear” about the status of their nationality or ethnopolitical affiliation. Interestingly, even a relatively more relaxed postwar situation such as that milieu experienced by the remaining Japanese residents in Iloilo also resulted in a laidback attitude or low profile for the prewar members of the Iloilo Japanese Association, and those who had graduated from the former Iloilo Japanese School. Of these Japanese residents in postwar Iloilo, Mabunay (1979) gives a succinct overview: “There seems to be a relatively low awareness of common attribute, much less of a common
frame, among the Japanese and Japanese-Filipinos, in the area. Apart from recent isolated occasions for the gathering and acquaintance of some of these residents, initiated by the Iloilo-Kai and the organization of Japanese war veterans, the Japanese population in Iloilo is geographically and socially dispersed."

In sum, those few remaining Japanese migrants’ children (the *nisei* generation) are already in their twilight years and their grandchildren living in the Philippines have mostly chosen to identify themselves as Filipinos.

It is not difficult to comprehend such pro-assimilation traits among *émigrés* or their children, both in the psychological and behavioral realm, especially if a researcher reckons with the cramped demographic setup of Japan coupled with its societal disequilibrium fomented by warlords through several centuries. Japan has long been known as *dura virum nutrix* (*a hard nurse of men*), so notes Wendell Capili in his Master’s thesis at the University of Cambridge. “Due to the open and shifting hierarchy in Japan... ultimately, wealth, not blood, was the greater recipient of position [of privilege]; and wealth could be created by (war-making) skill or fraud. It was a situation where money and contracts, not blood and status, ruled,” Capili asserts. And then, with direct reference to the dire situation in the early 1900s among the common folk in Japan, he suggests that “Japanese emigrants decided to establish settlements in Davao because...[by his own sweat] a person can move up fairly quickly, certainly within a lifetime.”

**MIGRATION’S DEEPER TIMELINE**

The sociopolitical scenario just cited could be the same historic setup and worldview that had impelled various groups from the Japanese archipelago to migrate or resettle in the *Nanyo* region since five centuries back or even much earlier. In other words, this adjacent vast area had long been a natural refuge for those raiding bands dislodged from their lairs in Japan, including samurais whose lord had lost his castle to a rival army. Too, *Nanyo* beckoned to the traders’ sailboats because of the safe harbors and coastal settlements ever in wait for exotic commodities, and because of the ready availability of raw materials and foodstuff to refit the ship or refresh the crew’s provisions for the next long voyage. This region, evidently underpopulated more than half a millennium back was even more congenial to Japan’s landless farmers than to any group of migrants.
Hence, at this juncture of the exploration, this paper detours from the narrative of events in the past hundred years to acquire a broader vista of migration in this maritime zone through the vantage point of anthropology, ethnohistory and archaeology.

Such an expansion of the analytical lens is meant not only to open new opportunities for research but also to incorporate the fresh findings from the field which otherwise yet are cast off to the margins in social science. More important, a deeper timeline of migration and settlement building can launch for the present generation of researchers a more dynamic view of the long period of cultural and genetic transactions, that is, long before ethnic identities were made rigid in accordance with the self-assumed mandate of kingdom builders and dynastic shoguns.

To be sure, this trail of exploration will not attempt to present a complete scenario of interisland voyaging and settlement building. Rather, it shall point out certain traces that may lead other researchers to delve into. It shall as well underscore possible significant connections of isolated evidence of early interaction and reciprocity—which eventually may lead us to a better appreciation of deep-set commonalities or inter-ethnic bonds that, in turn, may provide the cultural seedbed for mutual tolerance among today’s migrant groups and multicultural societies.

Luzon Island was among the early multicultural habitations in the Nanyo region, and not only the “innumerable Chinese of all kinds” were busy trading at the seaports, according to a letter of Friar Juan Cobo written on 13 July 1589. Among other traders were “Portuguese, Italians, Greeks, natives of Crete and of the Canary Islands, Indians from Mexico, Negroes from Guinea…also Moors from Africa.”

“There are Japanese and Javanese and Bengalis and a great number of people from all other islands,” Fr. Cobo wrote. But his next observation is even more pertinent than his litany of diverse races to my present hypothesis of ancient admixtures of peoples and cultures in this maritime zone. He said, “We find all sorts of blood mixtures in this land for the people blend with one another.”

Apparently, Fr. Cobo was making his memoirs based in Manila with all its cosmopolitan penchant for coexistence and cultural concourse. Although eight years earlier, in northern Luzon which faced Okinawa and Japan, the event narrated later by Aduarte was about a sea battle between a Spanish fleet and a Japanese convoy. The Japanese were
“desiring to have control of the region because of the abundance of products...lacking in Japan,” says Felix Keesing (The Ethnohistory of Northern Luzon), summarizing Aduarte’s account.

From the Spanish viewpoint and motivation to dominate the region, those Japanese vessels were “prowling along the coast and pillaging it,” in the words of the Spaniard Aduarte. However, without the same self-interest in the conquest, Keesing sums up the relevant chronicles of the period to emphasize this fact: “The Cagayan groups living near the coast were already accustomed to dealings with outsiders. The river mouth had apparently long served as a sheltering and trading port for both Chinese and Japanese vessels...”

Such long-time practice of homeporting along the coast of northern Luzon by various Japanese vessels also occurred along the opposite coast facing the South China Sea. The first Spanish expeditionary fleet led by Capitan Juan de Salcedo witnessed a well-established “Port of Japon” in what is now Agoo town in La Union. It was inevitable for the Spanish colonizers to view the Japanese presence in the late 1500s with alarm and enmity.

One Spanish document of that period, according to Keesing, had analyzed the Japanese intent in northern Luzon as “an attempt to impose political and commercial advantage”—which of course ran counter to the Spanish goal of conquest and colonization of the area. The Japanese had long regarded Nanyo as their southern gateway to China, Siam, India, and Java. Or, the southern backwaters, that is, from the vantage point of the Japanese pirates called wako who used the coves and islets of northern Luzon as their hideout while waiting for the traders’ sailboats to approach these ambush points.

Some scholars who have written on the precolonial presence of these wako sea marauders consider them as the first Japanese to have come in contact with the native inhabitants or proto-Filipinos. Such is a limited view based on sparse documentation and inadequate interpretation. Some Spanish chroniclers who had early contacts with the highland tribesmen in northern Luzon (like the Apayao and Isneg as well as those Ifugao overlooking Cagayan Valley) recorded certain folk recollection of having Japanese ancestors; at least a part of their genealogy was exogamous. Keesing casts doubt on this assertion but concludes nevertheless that “sporadic unions did occur with Chinese and Japanese shipmen and settlers, especially along the coasts.” But again, “sporadic”
is just another modifier expressing no more than an opinion. No doubt, a more systematic way to confirm or cast off the notion of Japanese lineage among some native northerners is to study the genetic code of concerned folk and match them with the genetic code of southerners in Japan such as those from Okinawa and Kyushu, which are closer to northern Luzon than Hokkaido—although geographic distance may not matter much in this analysis of gene pools.

About half a millennium ago there might have been more solid evidence of this cultural and genetic intercourse among Ilocanos and Cagayanons with the Japanese migrants or settlers in precolonial times. The writings of Fray Colin give us a good clue: “Persons familiar with the provinces of Ilocos and Cagayan testify that tombs have been found thereabouts of people of greater stature than the Filipinos, with their arms and jewels from China or Japan, who, presumably at the scent of gold, conquered and settled in those parts.”

There is another piece of folk memory gathered by a Japanese migrant in the early 1900s. Kanegae Seitaro’s reconstruction of this folk reminiscence was incorporated with his personal observations of the cultural scene around Baguio. Yu-Jose summarizes in her book Japan Views the Philippines Kanegae’s recollection “that in Baguio, there was a legend about the descendants of the Heike clan who, according to the story, drifted to the sea after they were defeated by the Minamotos in the Battle of Genpei, finally settling in Baguio. He found it significant that many Filipinos in Baguio had Japanese-sounding names like Aquino, Quirino, Togo, and Toda. He also observed that some old tribes in Baguio had kept as family heirlooms swords and armors used by the samurai.”

“Japanese influence could also be seen, he proudly observed, in the daily life of the Igorots: the Japanese container tarai called by exactly the same name by the natives; the fruit kaki, which had retained its Japanese name; the thatched-roof houses and the sunken hearth; the rice terraces; their skill at wood carving; and their version of the creation, which is similar to the Japanese belief that they are direct descendants of the Sun Goddess. Lastly, he observed that the Igorots and Japanese shared similar physical attributes, such as short legs, and moral traits, such as bravery and courtesy…”

Whether to agree or disagree as regard Kanage’s synthesis, I am in no position to claim either at this point. A deeper or extensive research...
is called for. But as to the story of the Heike clan that settled in Baguio, the other occasion it was recounted was at a formal lecture of the Japanese Consul Kaneko Toyoji before Filipino students in 1935. It seems to me more than a legend. So I reread my copy of Sources of Japanese Tradition Volume 1 (1964) to find out when the Minamotos reigned in Japan and defeated their enemy clan, the Heike. The dynastic list indicates the year as the twelfth century. If my reading were correct, it was still that period when feudal lords made a career of wars and plunder and no one had yet emerged as the unifier of Japan—an unstable situation that drove vanquished clans to exile in other lands, such as Nanyo presumably, which the Chinese chroniclers called “Luzon.” But even much earlier, from the middle of 700 A.D. till 900 A.D. the so-called “barbarians” whose ancestral homelands straddled the northeastern areas of Japan were being subjugated or evicted by the warriors of the Yamato Kingdom. The “barbarians” were actually tribal peoples called emishi whose language and custom differed from the imperial armies which hired other tribal armies to aid in the ethnic cleansing against the emishi. In his book Hired Swords (1992), Karl Friday noted that since 737 A.D., the “violent confrontations against the emishi became more frequent as the court’s objective shifted from simple absorption to military conquest and subjugation.” It is a matter of speculation at this point that the unsubjugated emishi crossed the sea to Nanyo. More research is needed.

There are new archaeological studies unfolding the ancient links between Luzon and Japan. Etsuko Rodriguez, in a lecture before the Archaeology Studies Program, University of the Philippines, retraced one link through the trade of unglazed jars or stoneware. National Museum archaeologist Eusebio Dizon has been pursuing the possible common provenance of the remnants of the stonewalled fortifications called idyang in Batanes and those similar stonewalled defense structures in Okinawa. Perhaps a researcher can enlighten us on the comparative history of the kimono and the kimon, which are both ornate formal costume for women Filipino and Japanese, respectively. What I can shed light on based on a study trip to Okinawa, Kyushu and Osaka, is that the so-called dragon kiln of Vigan (northern Philippines) used in baking the unglazed burnay jars is exactly of the same structure and dimension as those in Okinawa to the last detail, including the holes on each side to allow potters to determine the heat inside or the extent of baking. In an islet off Kyushu called Nokonoshima, a ruin of a dragon kiln shows only a slight variation. What this archaeological specimen
suggests to researchers is a commonality in ceramic industry in the past deserving of a deeper or earnest investigation.

In Okinawa, the writers and researchers I met consider themselves belonging more to the Austronesian world than to mainland Japan. The Okinawans also have women celebrants during their spiritual healing rituals similar to rituals practised in the Philippine Archipelago. And their dishes are closely related in taste and appearance to Ilocano or Filipino cuisine. Their ceremonial sash is made of a locally woven fabric that, at first glance, I thought to have been an Ilocano abel—a coarse cotton with grid patterns of bright colors.

At the Okinawa Prefectural Museum, there was a traditional wooden house structure displayed in the garden. My initial impression upon seeing it was that it was a replica of an Igorot house. But the caption described it as a typical Okinawan house of premodern period. When I was invited by the Philippine honorary consul based in Okinawa (married to a Filipino doctor who used to work in the U.S. military base in the island), she opened the pages of some old books to show me how the Okinawan villages had appeared to the first European explorers and artists. I mistook them for Ilocano villages ensconced in hills and woodlands. Others looked more like Igorot villages because the thatched roofs were more steep. So, right there and then, I speculated that if a cultural geographer were to study the commonalities of Okinawa and northern Luzon, it would be a fertile exploration of kindred beliefs, artifacts, legends and so on. Some archeologists are already gathering the material evidence of the cultural kinship in this island world of East Asia. Arts and crafts ethnographer Norma Respicio has ventured since a decade ago in the comparative study of traditional weaves in Okinawa and the Philippines.

But what has such an array of recollections and comparisons, whether from written chronicles or old oral accounts, have to do with migration or resettlement of Japanese into Nanyo or the Philippines?

The significance of this explanatory analysis may lie in establishing some neglected points of investigation and in determining new clues to stimulate upcoming researchers. For instance, how to evaluate the process of migration across regions with ill-defined borders in comparison with transborder movement of people already bearing visas? Next, how much of a Japanese is an Okinawan migrant to Davao? The question is more vital now than before World War II because social researchers have already bared that there was a psychological and
cultural divide between an Okinawan and a Japanese mainland, say, from Honshu, even as both tried their luck as prewar migrant laborers in the Philippines. Ohno’s study of the Davaokuo community shows that the Okinawan settler was regarded as a subordinate class of Nihonjin (Japanese) in that era.

Furthermore, through an anthropological prism, migration or the transborder movement of people such as that of the Heike clan (cited here just for the sake of having a showcase) when visas were not needed because borders were not so defined and guarded may be better appreciated as simple relocalization, or better yet, resettlement. A daptive mechanisms in the people’s survival kit would be relatively non-coercive, and invariably, their interaction with neighboring communities would be more reciprocal than not. Hence, ethnic distinctions might steadily melt away into shared legacies with vague origins. But again if the new settlers were surrounded by headhunters relentlessly going after their skulls, then they would resettle elsewhere, if they survived a massacre. In short, such a resettlement scheme or seeking new sanctuaries would not lead to a replacement of the native or indigenous inhabitants. Rather, it would likely result in intermingling of cultural traits and mutual accommodation, if not assimilation.

Concerning the necessary distinction between migration of distinct race groups and the dispersal of culture: Precisely because their epic narrators ignore this distinction, Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines have funny tales of prehistoric migration of their mythical progenitors replacing the aboriginals. One migration story in Thailand is that the Thai ancestors made a long trek from the Altai Mountains of China. Since there is no convincing explanation, it would seem that this tale is merely based on the letters “tai” in Altai. But many Thai scholars today trace their origins to the Dai people, so how does “Altai” figure in this puzzle of primordial migrants? One Malaysian version of their ancestors’ migration is that Saribas in Sumatra was the point of origin. This effectively casts off the indigenous orang asli as apart from Malay ancestry. Likewise, Filipinos presume their ancestral lineage as traceable to Indonesian migrants, then to Malay migrants, but the aboriginal Ayta is not a part of their family tree. In contrast, some Igorots believe they partly descended from Japanese migrants. The single-origin migration hypothesis of the Thais, the Malays, etc. is actually a reflection of the politicized notion of belonging to a single pure race that replaced the indigenous inhabitants, which is more impossible than any myth. It is
actually a case of mistaking the encompassing cultural forest for the
various family trees. Such migration tales are reinforced by colonial-
era concepts of racial superiority of dominant groups who discriminate
against other ethnic communities—and such mythologized racist
“migration” is to be expelled from the purview of this essay.

Highly relevant to such unilinear and monocultural migration of
primordial ancestors is the usually ignored fact that the widespread of
cultural influences and practices does not necessarily involve a big
number of migrating people. Only a few agents may suffice to effect
the cultural transactions—via trade, religious conversion plus occasional
intermarriages. This process is often historically realized not through
the replacement or displacement of the native inhabitants by a wave of
migrants but through an initial exchange of goodwill plus some ritual
goods—and made easier and more felicitous if the native chiefs accepted
the visiting bearers of the new cultural package as members of the ruling
clans, through the expediency of blood compact and similar rites.

After the cultural detour from the main sociopolitical issues
surrounding the experiences of Japanese settlers and migrants in the
Philippines, it is urgent to take note of two insights arising from some
studies done on the Japanese migrants in Baguio, Davao and Iloilo:

1. Accelerated migration of people across well-defined territorial
limits may in the short term lead to the formation of exclusive
colonies so as to sustain the cultural, psychological and genealogical
links with the home country. But in the long run, directly depending
on the twists and turns of sociopolitical events, the immigrants may
slide toward assimilation within the larger society. This
ethnopolitical switch in orientation and self-esteem usually
heightens with succeeding generations of the migrants’ offspring.

2. In a very specific frame, current researchers may cautiously proceed
with more sensitivity in regarding the Okinawan immigrant as one
and the same as the Japanese immigrant coming from Japan’s
cosmopolitan mainland. The Okinawan then migrating to Davao
in the first and second decades of the 1900s had a different ethnic
makeup and self-valuation from the mainland Japanese, especially
the professionals in corporate offices established in Davao.

VARIOUS PLACES, DIVERSE FATES

Most researchers in this specific field (and period) of emigration-
centered modus operandi in easing sociopolitical distress in Japan are
in agreement that the migrant laborers originating in Okinawa
comprised the largest bloc of expatriates who responded to the recruiters’ call to seek new roots in Davao’s abaca plantation then being developed by erstwhile American soldiers and pioneer firms. But on account of their marginal ethnic status under the emergent social hierarchy in Japan largely based on new wealth and good connections with or access to the power pyramid, those lowly Okinawan émigrés were discriminated persistently by the Japanese who emigrated from the “mainland.” Such derogatory prejudice heaped on the marginalized farmers by the presumably true-blue Nihonjin from Japan’s cosmopolitan areas were consistently experienced by the former, whether way before, during, or right after WW II. In fact, from Ohno’s research findings, up to this day their descendants are still suffering from this ethnicity-based debasement of their sociopolitical status or group identity, on top of the ostracism directed at them by Davao’s postwar populace.

This class discrimination and disharmony rooted in racial inequity have been vividly documented by the various researches (done by Hayase Shinzo, Yu-Jose, among others) that have dug up the chronicles, official memoranda, and memoirs of the protagonists and victims. For instance, the analysis of Cynthia Luz Rivera on the categories of women immigrants reflect a similar downward social valuation. On top of the ladder were the mainstream women who were located within the corporate and government infrastructure of Davaokuo originated from the Japanese mainland, and constituted the majority of the population of housewives, professional women, nurses, teachers... (then came) the marginal women who were engaged in small business or worked in retail trade and service establishments (such as those) store clerks, maids, barbers, beauticians, dressmakers, embroiders, waitresses, and prostitutes, and (followed by) the unclassified women, the majority of Okinawan origin and workers in plantations."

So persist is the inequity and injustice to this day. More than half a century after the dissolution of the Davaokuo Japanese colonization project utilizing the migration of workers (mostly Okinawans) as its motive power, the descendants of those migrants have yet to receive any relief or restitution as war victims or orphans. Could this stark case of neglect be another form of ethnic discrimination or deprivation?

Future researchers, I do hope, may enlighten us whether it is or it isn’t so. Meanwhile the ethnic discrimination suffered by the Okinawan migrant/settlers has been vividly and painfully memorialized in some
Okinawan museums and shrines dedicated to the remembrance of the exploitation and oppression suffered by the victims and their orphans, aggravated by the racist barbarity of imperialist lust for conquest and cultural dominance. At the Peace Museum in Okinawa, what is mainly on display are the diaries, letters and personal documents of the Okinawa émigrés attesting to the brutality of the invasion and occupation of the Nanyo region carried out by the Japanese imperial army. One wall exhibit gives the pride of place to an enhanced reproduction of a soldier’s oath to the Emperor to never surrender, followed by torn-out pages of war diaries and letters detailing the sacrifices and agonies imposed upon the fighting force, including some of those pre-war Okinawan migrants who were impelled to abandon their families and farms to support Japan’s aggressive annexation of the Philippines and most of Southeast Asia.

Another memorial hall devoted (at the time I visited it in January 1997) to invigorating the memory and sentiment of the present and future generations concerning the dehumanizing violence of that war was the Sakima Museum, an art-oriented institution. The floor-to-ceiling murals were entirely graphic renditions of the violent madness and treachery unleashed by the Japanese imperial army against hapless Okinawan civilians then hiding in caves and woodlands. One grim portrayal showed some soldiers bayoneting the children and shooting the elderly while other soldiers were grabbing the remaining food provisions secretly stored in the cavernous hideout.

To me, this public memorialization of such acts of cruelty has been auspicious because it confirms the hindsight of various scholars regarding the fact that the victims of Japan’s empire-building misadventure includes the Okinawans, this marginalized sub-species of Japanese-ness. This painful irony has also been enshrined in a gigantic boulder perched on a concrete pedestal in the well-landscaped park around the Peace Museum. On one face of the rough-hewn rock is engraved the name DAVAO, all caps but austere, perfect for its purpose as a huge gravestone. The inscription at the base of this memorial reminds the visitor about those numerous pre-war Okinawan migrants who had resettled in once peaceful Davaokuo but whose lives were sacrificed in pursuit of the imperialist drive to dominate the resources and cultures across the Asian region.

Why were they induced to migrate and re-establish their roots in far-flung southern Philippines by building a pioneers’ colony—with
the coordination of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs—but only
to be treated at wartime as sacrificial pawns? Hayase’s overview
included in the book The Philippines Under Japan (1999) provides a basic
motif embedded on ethnic divide and denigration: “Before the war the
Okinawa-born Japanese were known as otro Japon or “other Japanese.”
One of the reasons for the use of such a term was that the Okinawa-
born Japanese tended to intermarry with Filipinas, including the Bagobo
women, more than the mainland Japanese. Marrying a Filipina was, in
Davao Japanese society, considered humiliating. The mestizos born of
such marriages, were discriminated against from the day they were
born...”

Could this not be another way of saying that from the day they
were born they were distinctly destined by the racism and imperialism
of that period to be the Chosen Ones to serve as cannon fodder, food
providers, and human shields for an advancing and then retreating
army?

Yet it should be noted that at the onset of the Japanese invasion,
the Japanese-Okinawans, known to be a congenial, if not a timid group,
took the lead in persecuting their Filipino neighbors who refused to
bow or follow orders of the advancing army. The sudden shift in attitude
and behavior among the otro Japon is traced by Hayase’s analysis to the
desire of the pre-war underdog “to prove themselves (as equals, not
the otro) by behaving in such a way as not to shame or encumber the
Japanese community in any way,” more so, at the time of ascendance
of the conquering spirit impelling the Banzai of Japanese-imperialist
forces across Asia. There is a tragic irony in this experience of the
Okinawan émigrés in Davaokuo in swiftly calibrating their identity and
collective vested interest to suit the demands of the then advancing
army made up of their own compatriots. They could have assumed a
more humanitarian role of maintaining the bridge to a more cordial
relationship between the Filipino communities and the Japanese
occupation forces, thus concludes Hayase.

But which, in my view, is highly speculative and very unlikely to
have been elicited by the circumstances as a real option at that time—
because in the volatile sociodynamics of a war regime, with its daily
life-and-death confrontations, the old sense of mutuality in the
community would soon be ruptured by the constant suspicion and fear,
followed by acts of opportunism and treachery, if only to save one’s
skin or put a morsel of food in one’s belly.
Besides, it is highly plausible as it was then imperative that the wartime transformation of the otro Japon, from meekness to arrogance, was a consequence, direct or indirect, of the steady stimulation and pressure aimed at this group by the dominant Japanese who had been pressing these underclass migrants to become “fine citizens” of the expanding imperial dominion. Documentation for this process of a probable sociopolitical conditioning is sufficiently gleaned and scrutinized by Yu-Jose upon which further research can be pursued, particularly on the issue of whether the well-coordinated emigration to southern Philippines and the emergence of Davaokuo was a pre-conceived strategy aligned with the preparations for Japanese invasion and annexation of the Nanyo region. From my own vantage point, it does appear to be a unique project, very different from the other sites and sociodynamics of Japanese migration/ relocation into the Philippines. In such other places (and in various epochs) that had served as magnets for adventurous Japanese émigrés there had been no deliberate attempt to create such a tightly knit colony as Davaokuo that eventually served as the hub of economic dominance and political influences within a vast area. Theodore Friend’s book Between Two Empires (1969) provides relevant insights into the social engineering that had formed Davao as a ready staging post for the Japanese expansionist strategy.

In contrast, during the Spanish colonial regime, there was a limited enclave for Japanese migrants who either sought work in Manila or sanctuary from the deadly persecution against Christian converts waged by Hideyoshi in the 1600s. Plaza Dilao which was adjacent to the Ermita area had been reserved for the Japanese settlers. It was vigilantly supervised by the Spanish authorities precisely because they were suspicious of Hideyoshi’s expansionist ambitions, including those of the succeeding shogunates. A century later, the remnants of this Japanese community were observed by a European visitor to Manila to be already straining on the leash, as it were, under the watchful guardianship of the Spaniards. As cited by Mabunay quoting from Le Gentil’s A Voyage to the Indian Seas, “there were sixty or seventy mestizo Japanese Christians who demanded repatriation to Japan and left the same year.”

Mabunay’s insight that such a “departure seems to signify the end of the Japanese immigrant colony in the Philippines” may not be accurate, flawed as it is by having constricted her vista only to Manila.
The migration of Japanese across several centuries had been taking place elsewhere around northern Luzon where they had even established a distinct gateway called “Port of Japon” by the Spaniards during their first expedition in the 1570s to the Ilocos and Cagayan regions. The overview of Josefa Saniel expressed in her book Japan and the Philippines (1963) may be more instructive to future researchers in the sense that it highlights instead the process of assimilation as the plausible fate experienced by earlier Japanese migrants, and refugees from the internal wars in Japan. “Likewise assimilated were a few Japanese castaways who drifted to the Philippines at various times between 1660 and 1830…,” Saniel asserts. This is congruent with Keesing’s ethnohistorical hindsight on northern Luzon to the effect that intermarriages with the natives did occur “involving Japanese shipmen and settlers,” especially along the coasts. It is the practice of intermarriages with natives linked to the process of assimilation that can really explain why certain tribal groups in Luzon trace certain roots of their family trees to Japanese ancestors—for there was a long time when Japanese migration to the Philippines required no documents whatsoever and the settlers usually melted away into the landscape and native lifestyle.

CONCLUDING RETROSPECTS AND RESEARCH PROSPECTS

This paper’s overview has deliberately stretched the timeline of Japanese migration/resettlement into Nanyo (southern archipelago) farther back to at least five or six centuries. The first reason for doing so is to expand the vista of future researchers in this field. Another is to eschew the intense “spotlighting” of previous and current researches on the sociopolitical milieu of the 19th century when the annexation of Nanyo was not only talked about by the Japanese intellectuals and politicians but was also being regarded by a sector of the Japanese military echelon as a logical step along with the Japanese armed incursions in continental Asia, such as in Korea, Taiwan, and China. The analytical context for this issue of southward expansionist urge may as well consider the letter sent by Hideyoshi Toyotomi to the Spanish colonial authorities back in the 1600s whereby he demanded the recognition of Japanese suzerainty over the Nanyo region. Such official expression of intent in taking possession of, or governing, the area should clarify the context of the abiding animosity between the Japanese naval and trading fleets and the Spanish armada. Certain historical studies, while constricting the view of Japanese emigration to the Philippines only to that epoch when Spanish dominion was
starting to collapse in Las Islas Filipinas up to the Pacific War, quite easily reflect the prejudice and vested interest of the Spanish conquistadors and chroniclers whenever they call the Japanese arrivals as “pirates.” Likewise when they overfocus on the wako interlopers who were the distinct seafaring bands then engaged in preying on traders’ sailboats and coastal settlements.

In contrast to such jaundiced viewpoint, William Henry Scott’s historical book Barangay (1994) tries to highlight some necessary distinction when he looks back, for example, to that “instance when a Dominican friar was captured by Japanese ‘pirates’ upon returning from Manila.” By enclosing the derogatory tag in quotation marks, he disinfects his own hindsight against the self-serving Spanish label and worldview vis-à-vis rival fleets that had already established settlements and homeports for their ships in northern Luzon prior to the Spanish colonization. Indeed as cited earlier, the first exploratory voyage of the Spanish conquistadors in the late 1500s around Northern Luzon, led by Capitan Juan de Salcedo, duly noted that the coast of Agoo (in present-day La Union province) had been established distinctly as a “Port of Japon.”

While historians have habitually given this documented fact a mere passing glance, current researchers may do better by delving into the semiotic significance of such a “Port of Japon” especially in the context of premodern-era migration of the Japanese into the Philippines. After all, Colin, the friar and an early observer of the initial Spanish entradas underscored the presence of old tombs whose grave goods and furnishings for the Afterlife were believed to have come from Japan or China—if the natives’ belief and reminiscence were given some credence. Moreover, I have mentioned in my own book Reinventing the Filipino Sense of Being and Becoming (1995) certain accounts of an Italian merchant, Francesco Carletti, who sailed from Manila to Japan in the late 1500s. While still in Manila, he wrote: “All the other things not produced in these islands are brought in from abroad. From Japan comes flour, which is used in making the bread consumed by the Spaniards, and many other goods brought in for sale by the Japanese ships.”

Upon arriving at a Japanese port, Carletti also recounted: “The next day, before we could land, police officials come on board by order of the Governor of that place to search among (the effects of) all sailors, passengers and merchants for certain earthenware commonly imported from the Philippines and elsewhere in these parts, and which, by the
laws of Japan, everyone is obliged under pain of death to declare because the Emperor of Japan wishes to buy them all for himself...because they have the property of preserving from decay for one, ten and even twenty years the leaves of a plant called cia.”

Aside from giving us a glimpse of the regular trade and passenger travel connection between the Philippines and Japan at the time Spanish colonizers were just establishing a foothold in Luzon, Carletti’s recollection is relevant as well to the insights of Saniel and Keesing cited earlier concerning the fact that through these seafaring and merchant fleets, some Japanese castaways and migrants had resettled along Luzon’s coast, intermarrying with the natives or sinking their roots in underpopulated villages. Today’s readers who are familiar with the terrain and water way system would find it highly plausible that it did not take more than a day for those migrants to trek from the coast to the midlands; and another day, after a restful layover, was all it took to reach the highlands inhabited by the Igorots. Hence my educated guess is that the Japanese traders and settlers of old and bound for northern Luzon had been going up and down the Ilocos-Cordillera region even before the first Spanish expeditionary force made its first sighting of the Archipelago. That is why in all likelihood a Port of Japon was a well-established infrastructure more than five centuries ago—to serve as the gateway for the Japanese migratory penetration across northern Luzon, from the riverine settlements and all the way to those villages in the higher range. And this overview regarding this Japanese presence up to the hinterlands makes it all the more understandable why the San Agustin friar, Angel Perez could confidently make an intimate comparison concerning the burial rites of the highland natives, with the Japanese funerary method as his intrinsic point of reference, as if to imply the prevailing presence of the Japanese in Igorotland. In his book Igorots, he observed: “A mong these Igorots, the same as with the Japanese, there are two methods of burying their dead: interring and cremating, though this is never complete. The most common way is the former, identical to that of the Japanese, even to the size of the coffins and other details, although Igorots do not deposit the piece of umbilical cord which the Japanese so carefully preserve.” He wrote this interfaced view way before the 1903 batch of Japanese workers arrived in Benguet to augment the road-building laborers in charge of carving the zig-zag Kennon Road.

Apropos of Perez’s detailed observation, I shall now use this basic symbol or representation of kinship to stress a central point: there is an
umbilical cord interlinking the natives of Luzon and the old-time undocumented Japanese migrants and settlers—particularly if the process of such migration is reckoned in terms of a half-millennium, at least, although it could have started in trickles some centuries before the 1500s, as indicated by the Heike clan’s presumed resettling in the Cordilleras. Even certain strands of folkloric memory among Igorot tribes reinforce the plausibility of this account, along with certain artifactual evidence.

Thus it cannot be overemphasized that such an island-hopping migration (across Kyushu Island and the Ryukus island group and Batanes) since earlier epochs has inevitably led to the intermingling of the genetic and cultural determinants mainly through crossbreeding and partly through sustained adaptive mechanisms of relocalization. In short, after that long stretch of genealogical and cultural intercourse, the resulting dynamic is assimilation, if not intercultural confluence—as in the manner of distant rivulets quietly merging into the mainstream.

Embedded in this virgin cultural terrain in research are fertile commonalities and ancestral memories demanding the analytical savvy of new researchers in ethnoarchaeology, linguistics, genetics, cultural geography and the general field of cultural studies. And not to forget the prospects of applied research as exemplified by the study of Bronwen Piludin Sagayo focused on how the Japanese descendents in Benguet were able to organize themselves into a network of vegetable-growing neighborhoods; and with the facilitating effort of a Japanese religious sister, Theresa Unno, these farmers were able to improve their lives via mutual help and a development funding assistance extended by the Japanese government.

No doubt there remains questions and contentions that historians can still grapple with. For one, why has the post-war Japanese government consigned those descendants of the otro Japon in Davakuo to oblivion and degradation for more than four decades after the rise and fall of the racist, imperialist war-making mindset?

How did it ever come about that the radical consciousness of leading Katipuneros (1890s) could express the hope of securing Japanese help in the fight for liberation from Spanish colonial rule? How politically viable was this response of the Katipunan leadership to the realpolitik then creeping across the region, as characterized by Josefa Saniel as “a fusion of Japanese expansionist interests and Filipino nationalist desires”? 
My own favorite puzzle since I have relatives working in Japan and who are descended from the mixed marriage of a half-Japanese mother and a Filipino father: Are these Japanese-Filipino OFWs regarded as belonging to an ethnic minority within the Nihonjin society? And as a collorary, with the current interest of mestizo Hapon families in organizing locally based “Japanese-Filipino” associations (some of which are undertaking nursery schools for the third or fourth generation), is there an emerging trend to revitalize a Japanese-Filipino ethnicity within a transborder, multicultural and fluid society at large?

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Yu-Jose, Lydia N.  
BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES

The Philippines is a major source country of international migrants. In recent decades, the process of Filipino emigration to various countries in the world has intensified both for permanent immigrants and temporary migrant workers. Since the 1960s, the more or less permanent immigration flows especially to such countries as the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand have been very prominent. To the United States alone, the number of Filipino immigrants averaged close to 70,000 annually in the last decade. As argued elsewhere, the United States is a special case as a country of destination of Filipinos owing to its long colonial ties with the Philippines which has produced, among others, a pervasive Americanization of Philippine culture as well as strong economic, political and military connections between the two countries (Cariño 1987).

A more recent development in Philippine international migration patterns is the increasing prominence as well of the flow of temporary migrant workers with the Gulf region and other countries in Asia as major host countries. Each year, more than half a million Filipinos leave the country for overseas work. Such a phenomenon has, in fact, been officially recognized and, to some extent, encouraged both as an employment and development policy of the government. This is evident in the mandate of the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA)
which is charged with the task of processing several hundred thousand applicants for overseas work every year. Indeed, the labor migration industry is a major income earner for the country through earnings repatriated by overseas Filipino workers (see Tigno 2001). It is also viewed as a "safety valve" in coping with the country's massive unemployment problem.

It has been estimated that there were 7.4 million Filipinos overseas in 2001 (see Table 1), and the size of the Filipino community abroad is expected to grow even further in the years to come in the light of the increasing unemployment problem in the country. Except for brief periods in the 1970s and the early 1990s, the country has had a stagnant and, at times, declining economy, a fact that can only trigger emigration in the future. This state of affairs becomes even more alarming when viewed in the context of the country's high population growth rate of 2.3 percent. Indeed, international migration has historically been a common response of Filipinos to various social and economic problems.

Table 1. Stock Estimates of Overseas Filipino Workers, December 2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>41,904</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia (East and South)</td>
<td>1,257,658</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia (West)</td>
<td>1,358,203</td>
<td>18.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>776,332</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Americas/ Trust Territories</td>
<td>3,426,983</td>
<td>46.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>286,545</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sea-based (total)</td>
<td>255,269</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Total</td>
<td>7,402,894</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At the same time, the increasing pattern of international migration flows from the Philippines has obvious implications not only for the migrants themselves but for the country as a whole. It is noteworthy that while international migration as a whole has been a major policy concern in the Philippines, numerous policy issues that have surfaced have not been adequately addressed in the past. Much of this inaction can be attributed to the dearth of relevant research on policy issues related to international migration.

More recently, however, two landmark laws were passed by the Philippine Congress: the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003 (Annex A), and the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003.
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(Annex B). Both laws are aimed at addressing longstanding concerns of the rapidly growing number of overseas Filipinos as a whole. Having been hailed as “modern-day heroes” by no less than President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, the passage of the two laws is also viewed as a recognition of the important contribution of overseas Filipinos to the country’s economy.

It is important to note, however, that the issues and problems involved in the passage of the two landmark policies vary. In fact, two different segments of the Filipino community abroad are benefited by the two policies. As its title implies, the absentee voting law pertains to the exercise of a fundamental, political and civil right by overseas Filipinos: the right to vote. The passage of the law is actually a fulfillment of an explicit provision of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which mandates Congress to provide “a system for absentee voting for qualified Filipinos overseas.” As will be noted below, the law benefits mainly the temporary migrant workers (at least for the 2004 elections) because of the residency requirement and other stipulations of the law.

On the other hand, the intended beneficiaries of the citizenship retention and reacquisition law constitute another group of Filipinos living abroad, i.e., those who have acquired citizenship in another country. Beyond the immediate objective of the policy, however, the law may have lasting implications on the country’s drive towards economic maturity. Filipinos abroad who reacquire citizenship in the Philippines also reacquire political, economic and civil rights in the country.

In the sections that follow, an initial assessment of the two landmark laws will be done in sequence. Since the two laws are just in the early stages of implementation, analysis of impact and long-term consequences will obviously not be possible at this time. The focus of the paper will mainly be on the issues that had to be addressed, the considerations that had to be taken into account in the formulation of the two policies especially as they affect the individual citizen, and the problems that are or may be encountered in their implementation. Especially in respect to the citizenship retention and reacquisition law, the embedded concerns and anxieties, as well as the possible implications of the policy on the relationships between the countries involved will likewise be highlighted.
THE CITIZENSHIP RETENTION AND REACQUISITION LAW

The Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003 avoids making reference to “dual citizens” but seems to implicitly recognize the incidence of dual citizenship. The underlying policy declaration of the law is that “all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of the Act” (see Section 2). As previously observed, those who reacquire Philippine citizenship shall also reacquire and enjoy civil and political rights. The exception to this policy is that those seeking public office shall “make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath” (Section 5). This particular provision of the law clearly implies that a person naturalized elsewhere and reacquires Philippine citizenship could retain his/ her foreign citizenship for as long as he/ she does not seek public office. By the operation of this Act, therefore, there could be technically and effectively “dual citizens” within the ranks of overseas Filipinos.

The incidence of dual citizenship

The incidence of dual citizenship is largely the result of the failure of countries in the world to develop a universal rule on nationality and citizenship. States have more or less been unfettered in formulating their own criteria and standards of citizenship. Various countries, in other words, define or confer citizenship to individuals based on different criteria.

In general, countries define citizenship based on one’s descent, place of birth, marriage, and/or naturalization. In short, a person may obtain citizenship in a given country for one or more of the following reasons (Wales 2001):

a. That person is born on a territory belonging to, or claimed by that country (often referred to as the principle or doctrine of jus soli—Latin for “law of the soil”);

b. One or both of his/ her parents are citizens of that country (often referred to as the principle or doctrine of jus sanguinis—Latin for “law of the blood”);

c. Marriage to a citizen of that country; and

d. Citizenship by going through that country’s legal process of naturalization.
The incidence of dual citizenship results from the interplay of the above reasons and criteria (Spiro 1997). In particular, dual citizenship could be acquired in at least two basic ways. The first is when persons are naturalized in a host country at the same time that their country of origin refuses to release them or, at the very least, continues to recognize them as citizens, demanding in some cases their perpetual allegiance. Especially in the past, such a situation could result in international frictions between host countries and states of origin, and could potentially complicate bilateral relationships in that it gives rise to the possibility of expatriation. It is for this reason that some countries require naturalizing individuals to rid themselves of the continuing claims of their country of origin. In many cases, however, the naturalizing individual is given the option to maintain dual citizenship.

Another cause of dual citizenship is the interplay of the rules or doctrines of jus soli and jus sanguinis. As the magnitude of international migration increased, many countries broadened the definition of citizenship to include not only those born within their borders, but also those born in other countries to citizen parents. Children in such cases would enjoy citizenship by both the rules of jus soli and jus sanguinis, as is often true of children born to immigrant parents in the United States. It is noteworthy, however, that in many instances, the countries involved required natural-born nationals to elect between nationalities upon majority or else implied election on the basis of the length of residence of the individual in the country.

Rationale and basis

It is, in part, in the context of these considerations that the citizenship retention and reacquisition law was passed by the Philippine Congress. In essence, the law amends Commonwealth Act 63, the 67-year old law on Philippine citizenship which provides that Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of another country automatically lose their citizenship. The new law would allow Filipinos naturalized in other countries to retain or reacquire their native citizenship.

It should be noted at the outset that the Constitutional basis of the new law was questioned in the beginning by a number of scholars and legislators, citing an apparent prohibition in the Philippine Constitution that “dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law” (Article 5, Section 7). Philippine legislators have apparently resolved the issue by making a fine distinction between
“citizenship” and “allegiance,” although arguably citizenship should imply allegiance. It has also been noted that an oath of allegiance in the host country is not necessarily binding to the country of origin. As will be discussed below, this fine distinction could be problematic for host countries which demand renunciation of allegiance to the country of origin from naturalizing citizens.

The reasons cited to allow Filipinos living abroad to reacquire citizenship are many. For the individual citizen, the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship could result in increased mobility, improved economic opportunities, and reacquisition of civil and political rights in their country of origin. It has also been observed that states which demand duties and responsibilities on the part of their citizens also often extended them protection and, in cases of international conflicts, alternate nationalities could be used against one another (Spiro 1997). More importantly, the citizenship retention policy will have important implications for the welfare and development of the country as a whole. In the sections that follow, the justifications for the policy will be discussed focusing, in particular, on the issues that have been raised prior to its approval. In prospect, attention will also be given to the problems that may be encountered in the implementation of the new policy.

a. Allegiance to the homeland

Many observers point out that Filipinos really never cease to think of themselves as Filipinos. These observers argue that while Filipinos abroad had renounced their Filipino citizenship, such a renunciation is by artifact of law and not by choice. Indeed, evidence of their continued allegiance to the Philippines can be seen in the fact that Filipinos maintain significant links with their homeland. A study of Filipino immigrants in Honolulu revealed that almost three-quarters of the households surveyed regularly sent substantial remittances to relatives in the Philippines (Cariño et al. 1990). In absolute terms, remittance flows from temporary migrant workers are even more substantial averaging close to 5 percent of the country’s Gross National Product (GNP).

A gauge of the strength of their ties with their home country can also be seen in plans on whether or not to obtain citizenship in the host country and in their intentions to return permanently to the Philippines. In a similar survey of Filipino immigrant households in the United
States, about a third of the respondents had no plans of acquiring U.S. citizenship. However, citizenship plans do not necessarily indicate that the immigrants had no intention of returning permanently to the Philippines. In the same survey, close to 40 percent of the respondents expressed intention to someday return to the Philippines. Another evidence of strong ties with their homeland is the fact that temporary visits to the Philippines for vacations and holidays, as well as frequent communications with relatives back home were also very common among the same survey respondents (Cariño et al. 1990).

From a legal standpoint, the views of a legal counsel strengthen the case for the continuing allegiance of overseas Filipinos to their homeland. In a paper written for Global Filipinos, Atty. Al Agra observed that “domicile at birth or domicile at origin remains as the domicile of a person until that is abandoned by the acquisition of another domicile.” He further noted that “absence from one’s domicile of birth/origin, no matter how long, will not mean abandonment or acquisition of another domicile for as long as intent to return to one’s domicile of birth/origin is established. Evidences of intention to return include, among others, ownership or renting of property in the Philippines, operation of business in the country, holding of an insurance or memorial plan, as well as having retirement and burial plans in the Philippines.

b. Economic gains

Another major argument for the citizenship retention policy for Filipinos living abroad is economic in nature, and obviously stems from an “instrumentalist” perspective: it will attract investments and partly reverse the capital flight that goes with international population movements. Beyond voting and political rights, the main intent of the new law is to grant overseas Filipinos the right and privilege to engage in business, invest in various economic enterprises, practice their professions in the Philippines, as well as own portions of land and other properties.

In other words, the citizenship retention policy is designed to mobilize the resources of Filipinos who have lost their citizenship but who, because of their presumed continued allegiance to the Philippines, are willing to contribute such resources towards the rehabilitation and development of their homeland. Such an argument is not without basis. Quite a few Filipinos living abroad, for example, have taken advantage
of incentives provided by the Philippine government (e.g., through the Balik Scientist Program) to practice their professions (and, in the process, commit some of their resources) for brief periods in the country. As also observed in a previous study (Caces 1985), immigrants had repatriated their earnings not only for consumption purposes but for small scale capital investments.

Elsewhere, it has been reported that vastly successful Indian scientists and entrepreneurs in Silicon Valley and other business centers in the U.S. have gone back or have remitted financial resources to India to invest in similar businesses. Although the numbers would most probably be smaller, one might surmise that out of the several million Filipinos now residing abroad, there are quite a few who have become professionally successful and have accumulated savings that can be usefully devoted to productive investments in the Philippines.

c. Brain drain reversal

One of the possible consequences of international migration on the sending country is the so-called brain drain: the immigration of persons with professional and technical qualifications. Data show that Filipino immigration to other countries favors the well-trained and the skilled, and this is especially evident in migration flows to the United States. Literally thousands of engineers, scientists (to include social scientists), physicians and surgeons troop to the U.S. yearly.

A similar pattern is evident in Filipino migration flows to such countries as Canada, Australia and, to a lesser extent, New Zealand. Although there are substantial remittance flows, it is argued that these are not sufficient to compensate for the real socioeconomic loss of human resource potentials embodied in Filipinos living abroad. The receiving countries, it is pointed out, reap the benefits from the investments in human capital made by the Philippines.

Many scholars have observed that the departure of professionals constitutes a loss of valuable resources to the sending country. In particular, the departure of the economically active and productive segment of the population reduces a country’s ability to produce and, hence, reduces income. Often this argument is made in the context of the “world system” theory which, as a derivative of Marxist theory, views international migration as a movement of labor from peripheral to core nations caused by the advanced capitalist economies’ search for cheap labor and their desire to perpetuate political and economic
dependency relationships (Portes and Bach 1980). It is, of course, noteworthy that other scholars have expressed a contrary view, i.e., the movement of labor to more advanced economies does not constitute a brain drain, but is more a reflection of labor “oversupply” in the sending country. Indeed, evidence has shown that major source countries of migrant labor are often characterized by economies that have weak labor absorptive capacity (Pernia 1976).

At any rate, scholars and policy-makers alike have noted that the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by Filipino immigrants is one way of reversing the brain drain that has plagued the Philippines for decades. It is pointed out that because of the citizenship retention law, it is more likely that Filipino immigrants will return to the Philippines to work, even for brief periods, if not to retire as they get older. Reacquisition of Filipino citizenship would remove barriers to entry into the Philippine labor force.

Since presumably the immigrants will return to their homeland with more education and training, and are more productive, the country would benefit by way of recouping some of its investments in human capital. It is noted, moreover, that the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by overseas Filipinos living abroad would not necessarily exacerbate the unemployment problem in that more productive human beings would raise the productivity of people around them which, in turn, could lead to expanding markets. On balance, therefore, return migration would enhance, rather than retard, the country’s efforts towards economic maturity and development.

Issues and problems

The implementation of the citizenship retention policy may encounter some problems in practice and in prospect, both in terms of the relationships among the countries involved, and among groups in Philippine society. Some of the important issues will be discussed briefly.

a. Citizenship and allegiance

As previously mentioned, the new law would allow Filipinos naturalized elsewhere to retain or reacquire their Filipino citizenship. The fundamental basis of the law appears to be the fine distinction between “citizenship” and “allegiance” since dual allegiance is otherwise prohibited under the provisions of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution. The reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by natural-born Filipinos is accomplished upon subscription to an oath of allegiance to the Republic.

Simple as it may sound, the reacquisition of Filipino citizenship may not be problem-free for some Filipino-Americans. As observed by Philippine Star columnist Federico Pascual, “the problem here lies not in the Philippine law, but in corresponding citizenship laws hosting Filipino immigrants. It could happen, on a case to case basis, that some countries may not look kindly on dual citizenship” (Philippine Star 26 August 2003). In other words, for some countries in the world allegiance appears to be a precondition for citizenship.

The United States, which hosts the largest population of Filipino immigrants in the world, is a major case in point. As noted by Pascual, Filipinos and other nationalities take an oath of allegiance at the end of the naturalization process in the United States. Such an oath explicitly requires the naturalizing individual to “absolutely and entirely renounce and adjure all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty, to whom or which I have heretofore been subject or citizen.” The critical issue of course is whether a Filipino, naturalized as a United States citizen, would retain such citizenship when he takes a similar oath of allegiance to the Philippines in the process of reacquiring Filipino citizenship.

The implicit expectation, it seems, is that the United States, although not endorsing dual citizenship, would look upon dual citizens with tolerance. As pointed out by Spiro (1998), voting in a foreign election no longer results in the loss of U.S. citizenship. It is important to note that in the context of globalization and the increasing economic interdependence among countries in the world, there is an increasing number of states hosting immigrant populations which have a more liberal and tolerant view on dual citizenship. South Africa, for instance, allows specifically other nationals to acquire South African citizenship without renouncing their original citizenship. The Philippines, of course, joins many countries in other parts of the world that are willing to accept the retention of nationality, even in the face of naturalization in another country. In the past decade, for instance, such countries as Ecuador, Colombia, the Dominican Republic and, more recently, Mexico— the major source countries for large immigrant groups in the United States— have allowed their nationals to become citizens elsewhere without losing their original nationality and citizenship. Some countries in Asia,
notably South Korea and India, have expressed support for the same idea (Fritz 1998).

b. Dual citizenship and international relations

Related to the citizenship and allegiance issue, the very incidence of dual citizenship has, especially in the past, often not been conducive to cordial international relations among nations. Evidence of attachment to another country is often a justification for termination of citizenship for most regimes. Indeed, states have historically viewed dual citizenship with disfavor (Spiro 1997). In general, countries in the past had been very conservative in their conception of the citizen's relationship to the state. On one hand, dual citizens represented a constant source of international tension when one country attempted to protect its citizen from maltreatment or exploitation at the hands of another country claiming the same citizen as its own. On the other, the presumed divided loyalties of individuals of dual nationality represented a serious threat to the polity in times of international conflicts. The reason for this is that in a world of relatively hostile states, dual citizenship could run counter to the interests of sovereign countries. Thus, it is not surprising that for most countries in the world, dual citizenship was, for a long time, almost completely untenable.

During the Cold War, for instance, the United States effectively rendered dual citizenship completely untenable under statutes setting grounds for expatriation which included, among others, forfeiture of citizenship for an individual voting in another country—a standard which, until recently, has been consistently sustained by the U.S. courts. Dual citizenship, in other words, has been viewed as antithetical to the sovereign interests of states. The difficulties posed by the recognition of dual citizenship status were too high a price for its acceptance. It is for this reason that for a time dual citizenship had been untenable in most countries (Spiro 2001).

Times have change, however, and recent years have witnessed a softening of countries' positions on dual citizenship. In general, objections to dual citizenship proposals have waned. In a shrinking world and increasing economic and political interdependence among states, the risks associated with dual citizenship have become less threatening. Scholars and policymakers alike now increasingly view dual citizenship as benefiting the individual and the country as a whole. For the individual, dual citizenship could result in increased mobility
and economic opportunities. For the country as a whole, dual citizenship could result in increased investments and possible reversal of the brain drain phenomenon.

c. Possible opposition from within

As the more relaxed posture of states results in increased dual national populations, however, this new approach would face new important tests. The increasing magnitude of dual national populations would undoubtedly provoke opposition drawing upon notions of national loyalty and national allegiance which still resonate in some countries. In the view of Edwards (2000), for example, “holders of dual nationality cheat the faithful citizens of what they ought to be able to expect from their fellow citizens: mutual fidelity. Those who hold dual nationality or dual citizenship owe allegiance to more than one nation. What do they do when the two countries differ on foreign policy or go to war?”

It is probably not likely that the Philippines would be involved in an international conflict in the near future, especially with countries hosting large populations of Filipino immigrants. At the same time, it is probably not improbable that opposition to the concept of dual citizenship could emerge from within the ranks of Filipinos. Filipino communities abroad are known to be characterized by increasing diversity and change, not only in terms of socioeconomic and demographic characteristics, but probably in terms of varying loyalties to their homeland (Cariño et al. 1990).

It is not likely that all Filipinos living abroad would have the kind of deep allegiance to their country. For this segment of the Filipino community, the citizenship retention law may only be a means for economic exploitation and economic advantage. Moreover, there could be large segments of the resident population in the Philippines who would invoke national loyalty and commitment and would remain opposed to the idea of dual citizenship for Filipinos living abroad. In the words of Spiro (1997), “. . .a surge in the number of dual nationals will no doubt provoke opposition drawing upon notions of national loyalty and exclusive allegiance that may still resonate if only from the strength of their historical pedigree.”

But these postures are diminishing. Some scholars feel that they should command little force today in the context of increasing globalization and economic interdependence among states (Spiro 1998, Initial Assessment of the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act and the Absentee Voting Act: Policy Issues and Problems 119
Fritz 1998). Indeed, in a shrinking world, the benefits of exclusive attachment to a particular country could dwindle and multiple nationalities would come to more resemble the multiple economic, political and social linkages among nations. In the words of one writer, “dual nationality suffers from long-standing disfavor, dictated once, but no longer, by the realities of the old international system. Co-nationality, by contrast, may become a defining feature of a new global dynamic” (Spiro 2001).

d. The need for bilateral action

Finally, the issues and problems discussed above suggest that the citizenship retention policy could not just be a unilateral action and decision of either the host country or of the country of origin. The joint action and cooperation between the country of origin and the host society may be the most effective mechanism for ensuring the welfare and protection of dual citizens. Indeed, the repercussions and consequences of dual citizenship cannot be the sole responsibility of either country. Such a responsibility is best shared by the countries involved under mutually agreed terms and conditions acceptable to the international community.

THE ABSENTEE VOTING LAW

The Absentee Voting Act of 2003, otherwise referred to as the absentee voting law, is a long delayed response to what probably was the most active and widely-participated worldwide campaign by overseas Filipinos for their right of suffrage. As noted earlier, the passage of the law is actually a fulfillment of an explicit provision of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which mandates the Philippine Congress “to provide a system of absentee voting for qualified Filipinos overseas.”

Numerous lobby groups in various countries in the world were formed to assist in the campaign, resulting in the subsequent formation of the International Coalition for Overseas Filipinos’ Voting Rights (ICOFVR). Assisting and working along with the groups overseas were a few Philippine-based nongovernment organizations (NGOs) and private individuals. Beyond invoking the fundamental right of all Filipinos of suffrage regardless of location, the concerted lobby for the passage of the absentee voting law emphasized two familiar themes discussed earlier: a) the continued allegiance of overseas Filipinos to
their homeland, and b) the economic value of overseas Filipinos. It is noteworthy that in the context of the economic value argument, some segments of the Filipino community abroad had threatened to withhold remittances to the country unless the proposed legislation on absentee voting was acted upon with dispatch. The threat is probably misplaced in that fundamental rights must be accorded to citizens regardless of economic value.

**Major features**

As previously mentioned, the new law aims to provide a system of honest and orderly absentee voting that upholds the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot, as well as to ensure equal opportunity to all qualified Filipinos abroad in the exercise of this fundamental right. The main features of the law are briefly discussed in the sections that follow. It is important to note at the outset that these features, along with a number of conditions set forth in the law, had influenced to a large extent the initial response of overseas Filipinos to the absentee voting law.

a. First of all, the law provides for a process and period of voter registration and application to vote in absentia. For unregistered Filipino voters abroad, registration and application to vote in absentia should be done in person with the representative of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) at the Philippine embassies, consulates or other foreign service establishments that have jurisdiction over the locality where the prospective voter temporarily resides. For the May 2004 elections, the law stipulates that all applications be filed with the (COMELEC) not later than 280 calendar days before the day of the elections. In accordance with this provision of the law, the prescribed period for the filing of applications for the May 2004 elections was from 1 August 2003 to 30 September 2003. For succeeding elections, the COMELEC shall provide for a period during which applications to register must be filed.

b. The law prescribes a procedure, albeit cumbersome, for contesting disapproved applications for registration and application to vote in absentia. For disapproved applications for registration, a verified petition may be filed with the proper Municipal or Metropolitan Trial Court. In the case of a disapproved application to vote in absentia, a motion for reconsideration may be filed with the Committee on Absentee Voting at the central office of the COMELEC.
c. The law also prescribes the period and manner for the casting of votes. Absentee voters may cast their votes within 30 days before the day of the election. Special consideration is given to seafarers who may cast their votes within 60 days before election day. Unless otherwise authorized by the COMELEC, absentee voters should cast their votes in person only at designated voting areas within the premises of the Philippine embassy or other foreign service establishments that have jurisdiction over the country where the absentee voter temporarily resides. For practical considerations, absentee voters will vote only for president, vice president, senators and party-list representatives.

d. For the May 2004 elections, the COMELEC authorized the casting of votes by mail in only three countries: Canada, the United Kingdom and Japan. Thereafter, voting by mail in any country may be allowed, subject to the approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee taking into account the following criteria: 1) where the mailing system is fairly well-developed and secure to prevent occasion of fraud; 2) where there exists a technically established identification system; and 3) where the system of reception and custody of mailed ballots is adequate and well-secured (Section 17.1).

e. Possibly the most controversial aspect of the law is the provision that disqualifies an immigrant or a permanent resident from voting unless he/she executes an affidavit declaring that he/she shall resume actual physical residence in the Philippines not later than three (3) years from the approval of his/her registration, and that he/she did not apply for citizenship in another country. Failure to return to the Philippines shall be cause for the removal of his/her name from the National Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her permanent disqualification to vote in absentia. It is important to observe that by a ruling of the COMELEC, overseas Filipinos who have reacquired Philippine citizenship by virtue of the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003 are not qualified to vote in the May 2004 elections. The reason for this ruling is that the law was passed barely fifteen (15) days before the close of the absentee voter registration period on 30 September 2003 (see Section 5-d).

Initial response and performance

In the context of the spirited lobby and worldwide campaign by overseas Filipinos for the passage of the absentee voting law, the initial response in terms of voter registration and turnout is somewhat disappointing. But in the light of various constraints and conditions
set forth in the law, and the start-up problems encountered in its implementation, many observers characterized the initial experience as a reasonably good beginning.

The response of overseas Filipinos to the new law in terms of registration performance and voter turnout is summarized in Table 2. To provide context to the data presented in Table 2, a number of observations may usefully be highlighted.³

As shown, the “maximum” projection for voter registration was 975,000, inclusive of 75,000 “service workers.” On surface the projection appears to be low. As explained by key informants from the OAVS, however, the projection is reasonable and realistic, given various restrictions and constraints imposed by the law, as follows:

Table 2. Registration Performance and Voter Turn Out

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Official Projection of Registration Based</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>on Condition of the Law</td>
<td>975,000ᵃ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tally of Post/Registration Figures</td>
<td>364,187</td>
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<tr>
<td>(37%)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Voter Turn Out Estimate</td>
<td>230,000ᵇ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(About 65%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

³ Inclusive of around 75,000 service workers
ᵇ Based on interview of OAVS representatives on 23 May 2004

a. Although stock estimates of the Commission on Filipinos Overseas (CFO) placed the number of Filipinos overseas in 2001 at over 7.4 million, it was estimated that roughly one-half of this total have acquired citizenship in their respective host countries and are not qualified to vote, at least in the May 2004 elections.

b. Further, close to an estimated 1 million overseas Filipinos or so are immigrants or permanent residents, many of whom will probably have serious reservations about executing an affidavit promising to resume physical residence in the Philippines within three years from the period of registration.

c. Of the remaining balance of about 2.5 million prospective absentee voters, a large percentage are not within convenient travel distance to a Philippine embassy or consulate where the votes will be cast. For purposes of projecting voter registration performance, a travel distance of around 130 kilometers to a voting venue was considered convenient. In other words, the assumption is that it is not likely
that a prospective voter would cast his/her vote if he/she is beyond a 130-kilometer distance to a voting place.

d. There are difficulties associated with the participation of seafarers and “service providers” in the electoral process. Despite the longer 60-day period within which seafarers could vote, it is difficult for them to anticipate the place where they would cast their votes, an information that is sought during voter registration. Indeed, some of them may not be on shore on election day. Service providers, on the other hand, are hardly given a day-off to enable them to register and to vote.

It should be noted that in an effort to enhance voter registration performance, “field registrations” were conducted in a number of places. Voter registration was literally brought closer to the people—in work places and even on board ships in some cases. As noted by Catherine Maceda of the Overseas Absentee Voting Secretariat, these activities are not provided for in the law, but neither are they prohibited.

However, despite all these efforts and considerations, registration performance was well below official projections which certainly is not reflective of the concerted worldwide campaign for the passage of the law. Data presented in Table 2 show that total voter registration was only 364,187 which is about 37 percent of the projected number. As explained by OAVS personnel, however, the official projection of 975,000 voter registration is a long-term goal and was probably not an attainable figure in the first year of implementation. Official voter turn out figures were not yet available at the time of writing, although OAVS estimates around 230,000, or about 65 percent of total registered absentee voters would cast their votes.

Factors influencing response and performance

There are obviously numerous factors that may have influenced the response of overseas Filipinos to the initial implementation of the absentee voting law. Some of the key issues and problems will be briefly discussed in the sections that follow.

a. Residency requirement

Probably the most critical issue in so far as the absentee voting law is concerned has to do with the residency requirement which affects overseas Filipinos who have become naturalized citizens, or are otherwise immigrants or permanent residents in the host country. The
1987 Philippine Constitution specifically provides that suffrage may be exercised by Filipino citizens who are residents of the Philippines for at least one year and in the place where they propose to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the election. Such a Constitutional requirement literally disenfranchises overseas Filipinos naturalized as U.S. citizens, at least in respect to the May 2003 elections. Although some of these Filipino-Americans may have re-acquired their Philippine citizenship by virtue of the provisions of the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003, the COMELEC has declared it a policy that these individuals can not exercise their right to vote in the May 2004 elections for lack of residence. It will be recalled that the citizenship retention law took effect only in September 2003.

In the case of immigrants and permanent residents, the law is somewhat less restrictive. As observed earlier, the law allows immigrants and permanent residents to vote for as long as they execute an affidavit declaring their intention to resume actual physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three (3) years after approval of their registration as overseas absentee voter. It is important to note that this particular provision of the absentee voting law was likewise controversial and was the subject of debate during deliberations in Congress. However, the Supreme Court, in a very liberal interpretation of the residency requirement, subsequently declared that such a provision in the absentee voting law is an exception to the “one-year-six month” requirement since the Constitution specifically mandates the passage of a law that enables qualified Filipinos abroad to register and vote.

Apparently, however, the overwhelming majority of Filipino immigrants and permanent residents abroad still considered the promise to return home in three years as too high a price to pay for the right of suffrage. The OAVS estimates that only about 8,000 Filipino immigrants and permanent residents elsewhere voted in the last elections. For this reason, the law is viewed by many as still restrictive and effectively enfranchises only the temporary migrant workers which represent a much smaller segment of the Filipino community abroad.

b. Lack of voting venues

As previously observed, the casting of votes had to be done in person in authorized venues (Philippine embassies, consulates and foreign service establishments) with the exception of three countries.
where votes may be cast by mail. In this connection, there are obviously not enough voting venues especially in geographically large countries where the Filipino population is thinly dispersed in the countryside. As shown in Table 3, among the top ten “posts” with high registration performance are those located in geographically small, compact island countries (e.g., Hong Kong, Singapore, Brunei), or otherwise cities with known high concentrations of overseas Filipino workers.

On the other hand, voter registration performance in geographically large permanent settlement countries like the United States, Canada and Australia which house large Filipino populations was relatively low (data not shown). Such a pattern can obviously be attributed not only to the large numbers of Filipinos in these countries who are immigrants or permanent residents, but also to the fact that voting venues in these countries are relatively few and geographically far between.

Table 3. Top Ten Posts with Highest Registration Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Posts</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>90,233</td>
<td>24.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riyadh</td>
<td>64,325</td>
<td>17.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jeddah</td>
<td>33,217</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>24,009</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abu-Dhabi</td>
<td>21,501</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>15,622</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rome</td>
<td>14,542</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>11,620</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brunei</td>
<td>9,697</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milan</td>
<td>7,232</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>71,916</td>
<td>19.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>363,914</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source of Basic Data: Overseas Absentee Voting Secretariat, DFA

Voting by mail is obviously the ultimate solution to this problem, and the COM ELEC must move in that direction in the shortest possible time. However, if for various reasons voting by mail is not found feasible in some countries in the near future, alternative approaches (e.g., expanded efforts in field registrations) must be identified to ensure a wider participation of overseas Filipinos in the electoral exercise.
c. Other administrative problems

There were other, perhaps inevitable, problems that were encountered in the initial implementation of the absentee voting law which, for reasons of time and resources, cannot be fully documented in this paper. These include cumbersome voter registration requirements and procedures, difficulties associated with finalizing the registry of absentee voters, and problems faced in coping with the logistical and manpower requirements to implement the law. These problems must obviously be dealt with in future electoral exercises. Special attention should probably be given to the needs of seafarers to enable them to vote with less obstacles in the future.

Lessons learned and future prospects

The response of overseas Filipinos to the absentee voting law is probably less than expected especially in the context of the spirited world-wide campaign that was conducted for its passage. But the low response can in part be attributed to various issues and problems that were admittedly encountered in the conduct of the country’s first absentee voting exercise. And such problems are probably to be expected in the initial implementation of the law. In the words of informants in the OAVS, coping with these problems should be viewed as part of the “maturation process.” Significantly, despite initial skepticism about the country’s capacity to implement the law for the May 2004 elections, the country somehow managed to launch the exercise. Especially in the context of claims made by many sectors that the conduct of the regular electoral exercise in the country has been less than “credible,” the experience in the initial implementation of the absentee voting law is useful.

In fact, there are probably lessons to be learned from the first year implementation of the absentee voting law, not only for the conduct of absentee voting, but for the electoral exercise in the country as a whole. It has been observed, for instance, that absentee votes were immediately counted on site and the results were electronically transmitted to the Philippines within a period of two days. As gathered by the OAVS, the reaction and comment of an absentee voter provide useful insights on the initial conduct of absentee voting:

I am greatly impressed by the procedure followed and the conduct of the embassy personnel manning the polling precinct at the embassy. The embassy personnel were not only organized and
systematic, but were also more pleasant looking. I hope that the procedure adopted for overseas Filipinos voting abroad could be replicated in the Philippines. The procedure being utilized for overseas absentee voting is more systematized, organized and controlled.

More significantly, the passage of the absentee voting law is a well-appreciated landmark policy, at least by a large segment of the Filipino community abroad—a long delayed response to a clamor for the basic right of suffrage. Additional quotations from overseas absentee voters seem to reveal this sentiment:

When saying that the youth have a legitimate voice in shaping the future of the Philippines, I believe that by this act, I am answering the call of our national hero, Dr. Jose Rizal, to be the fair hope of our Inang Bayan.

Christopher van Opstal, 18 years old
Student, Sydney, Australia

I am happy about the enactment of the absentee voting law, as it gives us migrant workers the opportunity to participate in the electoral process. This is the first time that I will be able to cast my vote since I began working in the CNMI nine years ago.

Zenaida Mirasol
Saipan, CNMI

I did not mind carrying a baby on my left arm while writing down the names of the President, Vice-President, 12 Senators and a party list representative. This was our chance as OFWs to have a say in our government by participating in the elections.

Maria Teresa Javier
Dubai, UAE

The above reactions are encouraging. Although they probably do not represent the mood and sentiment of all Filipinos abroad, the challenge for the future is to sustain the process of expanding opportunities for overseas Filipinos to exercise their fundamental right to vote.
NOTES


2. The author wishes to extend his thanks to Ambassador Leonides Caday and to Ms. Catherine Maceda and Pat Rodolfo of the Overseas Absentee Voting Secretariat of the DFA for providing data, and for generously sharing their views on the subject of the paper.

3. For these observations, exact numbers were not available to the author at the time of writing, and based mainly on information collected during an interview of OAVS representatives.

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Annex A

AN ACT MAKING THE CITIZENSHIP OF
PHILIPPINE CITIZENS WHO ACQUIRE FOREIGN
CITIZENSHIP PERMANENT.
(Amending for the Purpose Commonwealth Act. No. 63,
as A mended and for other Purposes)

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines
in Congress assembled:

Section 1. Short Title - this act shall be known as the “Citizenship
Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003.”

Section 2. Declaration of Policy - It is hereby declared the policy
of the State that all Philippine citizens of another country shall be
deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions
of this Act.

Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship - Any provision of
law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizenship by reason
of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed
to have re-acquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following
oath of allegiance to the Republic:

“I _____________________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will
support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the
duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby declare
that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines
and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose
this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation
or purpose of evasion.”

Natural born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of
this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine
citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.
Section 4. Derivative Citizenship - The unmarried child, whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted, below eighteen (18) years of age, of those who re-acquire Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of this Act shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.

Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities - Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:

(1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet the requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as “The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003” and other existing laws;

(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath;

(3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear to an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and its duly constituted authorities prior to their assumption of office: Provided, That they renounce their oath of allegiance to the country where they took that oath;

(4) Those intending to practice their profession in the Philippines shall apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice; and

(5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the Philippines cannot be exercised by, or extended to, those who:

   (a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of which they are naturalized citizens; and/ or

   (b) are in active service as commissioned or non-commissioned officers in the armed forces of the country of which they are naturalized citizens.

Section 6. Separability Clause - If any section or provision of this Act is held unconstitutional or invalid, any other section or provision not affected thereby shall remain valid and effective.
Section 7. Repealing Clause - All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

Section 8. Effectivity Clause - This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Official Gazette or two (2) newspapers of general circulation.

Approved,
(Sgd.) FRANKLIN DRILON    (Sgd.) JOSE DE VENECIA JR.
President of the Senate    Speaker of the House of Representatives

This Act, which is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 2130 and House Bill No. 4720 was finally passed by the House of Representatives and Senate on August 25, 2003 and August 26, 2003, respectively.

(Sgd.) OSCAR G. YABES    (Sgd.) ROBERTO P. NAZARENO
Secretary of Senate    Secretary General
House of Representatives

Approved: August 29, 2003
(Sgd.) GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
President of the Philippines
Annex B

AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A SYSTEM OF OVERSEAS ABSENTEE VOTING BY QUALIFIED CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES ABROAD, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFORE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:

Section 1. Short Title. – This Act shall be known as “The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003.”

Section 2. Declaration of Policy. – It is the prime duty of the State to provide a system of honest and orderly overseas absentee voting that upholds the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot. Towards this end, the State ensures equal opportunity to all qualified citizens of the Philippines abroad in the exercise of this fundamental right.

Section 3. Definition of Terms. – For purposes of this Act:

a. “Absentee Voting” refers to the process by which qualified citizens of the Philippines abroad exercise their right to vote;

b. “Commission” refers to the Commission on Elections;

c. “Certified List of Overseas Absentee Voters” refers to the list of registered overseas absentee voters whose applications to vote in absentia have been approved by the Commission, said list to be prepared by the Committee on Absentee Voting of the Commission, on a country-by-country basis. This list shall be approved by the Commission in an en banc resolution;

d. “Day of Election” refers to the actual date of elections in the Philippines;

e. “National Registry of Absentee Voters” refers to the consolidated list prepared, approved and maintained by the Commission, of overseas absentee voters whose applications for registration as absentee voters, including those registered voters who have applied to be certified as absentee voters, have been approved by the Election Registration Board;

f. “Overseas Absentee Voter” refers to a citizen of the Philippines who is qualified to register and vote under this Act, not
otherwise disqualified by law, who is abroad on the day of elections.

Section 4. Coverage. - All citizens of the Philippines abroad, who are not otherwise disqualified by law, at least eighteen (18) years of age on the day of elections, may vote for president, vice-president, senators and party-list representatives.

Section 5. Disqualifications. - The following shall be disqualified from voting under this Act:

1. Those who have lost their Filipino citizenship in accordance with Philippine laws;
2. Those who have expressly renounced their Philippine citizenship and who have pledged allegiance to a foreign country;
3. Those who have committed and are convicted in a final judgment by a court or tribunal of an offense punishable by imprisonment of not less than one (1) year, including those who have committed and been found guilty of Disloyalty as defined under Article 137 of the Revised Penal Code, such disability not having been removed by plenary pardon or amnesty; Provided, however, That any person disqualified to vote under this subsection shall automatically acquire the right to vote upon expiration of five (5) years after service of sentence; Provided, further, That the Commission may take cognizance of final judgments issued by foreign courts or tribunals only on the basis of reciprocity and subject to the formalities and processes prescribed by the Rules of Court on execution of judgments;
4. An immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host country, unless he/ she executes, upon registration, an affidavit prepared for the purpose by the Commission declaring that he/ she shall resume actual physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three (3) years from approval of his/ her registration under this Act. Such affidavit shall also state that he/ she has not applied for citizenship in another country. Failure to return shall be the cause for the removal of the name of the immigrant or permanent resident from the National Registry ofAbsentee Voters and his/ her permanent disqualification to vote in absentia.
5. Any citizen of the Philippines abroad previously declared insane or incompetent by competent authority in the Philippines or abroad, as verified by the Philippine embassies, consulates
or foreign service establishments concerned, unless such competent authority subsequently certifies that such person is no longer insane or incompetent.

**Section 6.** Personal Overseas Absentee Registration. – Registration as an overseas absentee voter shall be done in person.

Qualified citizens of the Philippines abroad who failed to register under Republic Act No. 8189, otherwise known as “The Voters Registration Act of 1996”, may personally apply for registration with the Election Registration Board of the city or municipality where they were domiciled immediately prior to their departure from the Philippines, or with the representative of the Commission at the Philippine embassies, consulates and other foreign service establishments that have jurisdiction over the locality where they temporarily reside. Subject to the specific guidelines herein provided, the Commission is hereby authorized to prescribe additional procedures for overseas absentee registration pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 8189, whenever applicable, taking into strict consideration the time zones and the various periods and processes herein provided for the proper implementation of this Act. The embassies, consulates and other foreign service establishments shall transmit within (5) days from receipt the accomplished registration forms to the Commission, after which the Commission shall coordinate with the Election Officer of the city or municipality of the applicant’s stated residence for verification, hearing and annotation in the permanent list of voters.

All applications for the May, 2004 elections shall be filed with the Commission not later than two hundred eighty (280) calendar days before the day of elections. For succeeding elections, the Commission shall provide for the period within which applications to register must be filed.

In the case of seafarers, the Commission shall provide a special mechanism for the time and manner of personal registration taking into consideration the nature of their work.

6.1. Upon receipt of the application for registration, the Election Officer shall immediately set the application for hearing, the notice of which shall be posted in a conspicuous place in the premises of the city or municipal building of the applicant’s stated residence for at least one (1) week before the date of the hearing. The Election Officer shall immediately furnish a copy
of the application to the designated representatives of political parties and other accredited groups.

6.2. If no verified objection to the application is filed, the Election Officer shall immediately forward the application to the Election Registration Board, which shall decide on the application within one (1) week from the date of hearing without waiting for the quarterly meeting of the Board. The applicant shall be notified of the approval or disapproval of his/her application by registered mail.

6.3. In the event that an objection to the application is filed prior to or on the date of hearing, the Election Officer shall notify the applicant of said objection by registered mail, enclosing therein copies of affidavits or documents submitted in support of the objection filed with the said Election Officer, if any. The applicant shall have the right to file his counter-affidavit by registered mail, clearly stating therein facts and defenses sworn before any officer in the host country authorized to administer oaths.

6.4. The application shall be approved or disapproved based on the merits of the objection, counter-affidavit and documents submitted by the party objecting and those of the applicant.

6.5. A Certificate of Registration as an overseas absentee voter shall be issued by the Commission to all applicants whose applications have been approved, including those certified as registered voters. The Commission shall include the approved applications in the National Registry of Absentee Voters.

6.6. If the application has been approved, any interested party may file a petition for exclusion not later than two hundred ten (210) days before the day of elections with the proper municipal or metropolitan trial court. The petition shall be decided within fifteen (15) days after its filing on the basis of the documents submitted in connection therewith. Should the court fail to render a decision within the prescribed period, the ruling of the Election Registration Board shall be considered affirmed.

6.7. If the application has been disapproved, the applicant or his authorized representative shall, within a period of five (5) days from receipt of the notice of disapproval, have the right to file a petition for inclusion with the proper municipal or metropolitan trial court. The petition shall be decided within five (5) days after its filing on the basis of documents submitted in connection therewith.
Qualified citizens of the Philippines abroad, who have previously registered as voters pursuant to Republic Act No. 8189 shall apply for certification as absentee voters and for inclusion in the National Registry of Overseas Absentee Voters, with a corresponding annotation in the Certified Voters’ List.

Section 7. System of Continuing Registration. – The Commission shall ensure that the benefits of the system of continuing registration are extended to qualified overseas absentee voters. Towards this end, the Commission shall optimize the use of existing facilities, personnel and mechanisms of the various government agencies for purposes of data gathering, data validation, information dissemination and facilitation of the registration process.

Predeparture programs, services and mechanisms offered and administered by the Department of Foreign Affairs, Department of Labor and Employment, Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, Overseas Workers’ Welfare Administration, Commission on Filipinos Overseas and other appropriate agencies of the government shall be utilized for purposes of supporting the overseas absentee registration and voting processes, subject to limitations imposed by law.

Section 8. Requirements for Registration. – Every Filipino registrant shall be required to furnish the following documents:

a. A valid Philippine passport. In the absence of a valid passport, a certification of the Department of Foreign Affairs that it has reviewed the appropriate documents submitted by the applicant and found them sufficient to warrant the issuance of a passport, or that the applicant is a holder of a valid passport but is unable to produce the same for a valid reason;

b. A accomplished registration form prescribed by the Commission containing the following mandatory information:
   i. Last known residence of the applicant in the Philippines before leaving for abroad;
   ii. Address of applicant abroad, or forwarding address in the case of seafarers;
   iii. Where voting by mail is allowed, the applicant’s mailing address outside the Philippines where the ballot for absentee voters will be sent, in proper cases; and;
iv. Name and address of applicant’s authorized representative in the Philippines for purposes of Section 6.7 and Section 12 hereof.

c. In the case of immigrants and permanent residents not otherwise disqualified to vote under this Act, an affidavit declaring the intention to resume actual physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three (3) years after approval of his/her registration as an overseas absentee voter under this Act. Such affidavit shall also state that he/she has not applied for citizenship in another country.

The Commission may also require additional data to facilitate registration and recording. No information other than those necessary to establish the identity and qualification of the applicant shall be required.

Section 9. National Registry of Overseas Absentee Voters. – The Commission shall maintain a National Registry of Overseas Absentee Voters. Approved applications of overseas absentee registrants shall also be included in the permanent list of voters of the city or municipality where the registrant is domiciled, with the corresponding annotation that such person has been registered or will be voting as an overseas absentee voter. The registry shall also include those registered under Republic Act No. 8189 and who have been issued certifications as overseas absentee voters. The entries in the National Registry of Overseas Absentee Voters and the annotations as overseas absentee voters in the Certified Voters’ List shall be permanent, and cannot be cancelled or amended except in any of the following cases:

9.1. When the overseas absentee voter files a letter under oath addressed to the Commission that he/she wishes to be removed from the Registry of Overseas Absentee Voters, or that his/her name be transferred to the regular registry of voters; or,

9.2. When an overseas absentee voter’s name was ordered removed by the Commission from the Registry of Overseas Absentee Voters for his/her failure to exercise his/her right to vote under this Act for two (2) consecutive national elections.

Section 10. Notice of Registration and Election. – The Commission shall, through the embassies, consulates and other foreign service establishments, cause the publication in a newspaper of general circulation of the place, date and time of the holding of a regular or special national election and the requirements for the participation of
qualified citizens of the Philippines abroad, at least six (6) months before the date set for the filing of applications for registration.

The Commission shall determine the countries where publication shall be made, and the frequency thereof, taking into consideration the number of overseas Filipinos present in such countries. Likewise, the Commission and the Department of Foreign Affairs shall post the same in their respective websites.

Section 11. Procedure for Application to Vote in Absentia. –

11.1. Every qualified citizen of the Philippines abroad whose application for registration has been approved, including those previously registered under Republic Act No. 8189, shall, in every national election, file with the officer of the embassy, consulate or other foreign service establishment authorized by the Commission, a sworn written application to vote in a form prescribed by the Commission. The authorized officer of such embassy, consulate or other foreign service establishment shall transmit to the Commission the said application to vote within five (5) days from receipt thereof. The application form shall be accomplished in triplicate and submitted together with the photocopy of his/ her overseas absentee voter certificate of registration.

11.2. Every application to vote in absentia may be done personally at, or by mail to, the embassy, consulate or foreign service establishment, which has jurisdiction over the country where he/ she has indicated his/ her address for purposes of the elections.

11.3. Consular and diplomatic services rendered in connection with the overseas absentee voting processes shall be made available at no cost to the overseas absentee voter.

Section 12. Verification and Approval of Application to Vote. – All applications shall be acted upon by the Commission upon receipt thereof, but in no case later than one hundred fifty (150) days before the day of elections. In the event of disapproval of the application, the voter or his authorized representative may file a Motion for Reconsideration with the Commission personally, or by registered mail, within ten (10) days from receipt of the notice of disapproval. The Commission shall act within five (5) days from receipt of such Motion for Reconsideration and shall immediately notify the voter of its decision. The decision of the Commission shall be final and executory.
The Commission shall issue an overseas absentee voter identification card to those whose applications to vote have been approved.

Section 13. Preparation and Posting of Certified List of Overseas Absentee Voters. – The Commission shall prepare the Certified List of Overseas Absentee Voters within one hundred twenty (120) days before every election, and furnish within the same period copies thereof to the appropriate embassies, consulates and other foreign service establishments, which shall post the same in their bulletin boards within ten (10) days from receipt thereof.

Subject to reasonable regulation and the payment of fees in such amounts as may be fixed by the Commission, the candidates, political parties, accredited citizens’ arms, interested persons and all embassies, consulates and other foreign service establishments shall be furnished copies thereof.

Section 14. Printing and Transmittal of Ballots, Voting Instructions, Election Forms and Paraphernalia. –

14.1. The Commission shall cause the printing of ballots for overseas absentee voters, voting instructions, and election forms in such number as may be necessary, but in no case shall it exceed the total number of approved applications. Security markings shall be used in the printing of ballots for overseas absentee voters.

14.2. The Commission shall present to the authorized representatives of the Department of Foreign Affairs and the accredited major political parties the ballots for overseas absentee voters, voting instructions, election forms and other election paraphernalia for scrutiny and inspection prior to their transmittal to the embassies, consulates and other foreign service establishments concerned.

14.3. The Commission shall, not later than seventy-five (75) days before the day of elections, transmit by special pouch to the embassies, consulates and other foreign service establishments, the exact number of ballots for overseas absentee voters corresponding to the number of approved applications, along with such materials and election paraphernalia necessary to ensure the secrecy and integrity of the election.

14.4. The authorized representatives of accredited major political parties shall have the right to be present in all phases of printing, transmittal, and casting of ballots abroad. Unclaimed ballots
properly marked as such, shall be cancelled and shipped to the Commission by the least costly method.

**Section 15.** Regulation on Campaigning Abroad. - The use of campaign materials, as well as the limits on campaign spending shall be governed by the laws and regulations applicable in the Philippines.

**Section 16.** Casting and Submission of Ballots. -

16.1. Upon receipt by the designated officer of the embassy, consulate and other foreign service establishments of the ballots for overseas absentee voters, voting instructions, election forms and other paraphernalia, he/she shall make them available on the premises to the qualified overseas absentee voters in their respective jurisdictions during the thirty (30) days before the day of elections when overseas absentee voters may cast their vote. Immediately upon receiving it, the overseas absentee voter must fill-out his/her ballot personally, in secret, without leaving the premises of the embassies, consulates and other foreign service establishments concerned.

16.2. The overseas absentee voter shall personally accomplish his/her ballot at the embassy, consulate or other foreign service establishment that has jurisdiction over the country where he/she temporarily resides or at any polling place designated and accredited by the Commission.

16.3. The overseas absentee voter shall cast his ballot, upon presentation of the absentee voter identification card issued by the Commission, within thirty (30) days before the day of elections. In the case of seafarers, they shall cast their ballots anytime within sixty (60) days before the day of elections as prescribed in the Implementing Rules and Guidelines.

16.4. All accomplished ballots received shall be placed unopened inside sealed containers and kept in a secure place designated by the Commission.

16.5. The embassies, consulates and other foreign service establishments concerned shall keep a complete record of the ballots for overseas absentee voters, specifically indicating the number of ballots they actually received, and in cases where voting by mail is allowed under Section 17 hereof, the names and addresses of the voters to whom these ballots were sent, including proof of receipt thereof. In addition, the embassies, consulates and other foreign service establishments shall submit a formal report to the Commission and the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created under this Act within thirty (30)
days from the day of elections. Such report shall contain data on the number of ballots cast and received by the offices, the number of invalid and unclaimed ballots and other pertinent data.

16.6. The overseas absentee voter shall be instructed that his/her ballot shall not be counted if it is not inside the special envelope furnished him/her when it is cast.

16.7. Ballots not claimed by the overseas absentee voters at the embassies, consulates and other foreign service establishments, in case of personal voting, and ballots returned to the embassies, consulates and other foreign service establishments concerned, in the case of voting by mail, shall be cancelled and shipped to the Commission by the least costly method within six (6) months from the day of elections.

16.8. Only ballots cast, and mailed ballots received by the Philippine embassies, consulates and other foreign service establishments concerned in accordance with Section 17 hereof before the close of voting on the day of elections shall be counted in accordance with Section 18 hereof. All envelopes containing the ballots received by the embassies, consulates and other foreign service establishments after the prescribed period shall not be opened, and shall be cancelled and shipped to the Commission by the least costly method within six (6) months from the day of elections.

16.9. A Special Ballot Reception and Custody Group composed of three (3) members shall be constituted by the Commission from among the staff of the embassies, consulates and other foreign service establishments concerned, including their attached agencies, and citizens of the Philippines abroad, who will be deputized to receive ballots and take custody of the same preparatory to their transmittal to the Special Board of Election Inspectors.

16.10. During this phase of the election process, the authorized representatives of the political parties, candidates, and accredited citizens’ arms of the Commission shall be notified in writing thereof and shall have the right to witness the proceedings.

16.11. The Commission shall study the use of electronic mail, Internet, or other secured networks in the casting of votes, and submit a report thereon to the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee.
Section 17. Voting by Mail. –

17.1. For the May, 2004 elections, the Commission shall authorize voting by mail in not more than three (3) countries, subject to the approval of the Congressional Oversight Committee. Voting by mail may be allowed in countries that satisfy the following conditions:

a. Where the mailing system is fairly well-developed and secure to prevent the occasion of fraud;

b. Where there exists a technically established identification system that would preclude multiple or proxy voting; and,

c. Where the system of reception and custody of mailed ballots in the embassies, consulates and other foreign service establishments concerned are adequate and well-secured.

Thereafter, voting by mail in any country shall be allowed only upon review and approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee.

17.2. The overseas absentee voter shall send his/her accomplished ballot to the corresponding embassy, consular or other foreign service establishment that has jurisdiction over the country where he/she temporarily resides. He/She shall be entitled to cast his/her ballot at any time upon his/her receipt thereof, provided that the same is received before the close of voting on the day of elections. The overseas absentee voter shall be instructed that his/her ballot shall not be counted if not transmitted in the special envelope furnished him/her.

17.3. Only mailed ballots received by the Philippine embassy, consulate and other foreign service establishments before the close of voting on the day of elections shall be counted in accordance with Section 18 hereof. All envelopes containing the ballots received by the embassies, consulates and other foreign service establishments after the prescribed period shall not be opened, and shall be cancelled and disposed of appropriately, with a corresponding report thereon submitted to the Commission not later than thirty (30) days from the day of elections.

Section 18. On-Site Counting and Canvassing. –

18.1. The counting and canvassing of votes shall be conducted on site in the country where the votes were actually cast. The opening of the specially-marked envelopes containing the ballots and the counting and canvassing of votes shall be conducted within the premises of the embassies, consulates and
other foreign service establishments or in such other places as may be designated by the Commission pursuant to the Implementing Rules and Regulations. The Commission shall ensure that the start of counting in all polling places abroad shall be synchronized with the start of counting in the Philippines.

18.2. For these purposes, the Commission shall constitute as many Special Board of Election Inspectors as may be necessary to conduct and supervise the counting of votes as provided in Section 18.2 hereof. The Special Board of Election Inspectors to be constituted herein shall be composed of a Chairman and two (2) members, one (1) of whom shall be designated as poll clerk. The ambassador or consul-general, or any career public officer posted abroad designated by the Commission, as the case may be, shall act as the chairman; in the absence of other government officers, the two (2) other members shall be citizens of the Philippines who are qualified to vote under this act and deputized by the Commission not later than sixty (60) days before the day of elections. All resolutions of the Special Board of Election Inspectors on issues brought before it during the conduct of its proceedings shall be valid only when they carry the approval of the chairman.

Immediately upon the completion of the counting, the Special Board of Election Inspectors shall transmit via facsimile and/or electronic mail the results to the Commission in Manila and the accredited major political parties.

18.3. Only ballots cast on, or received by the embassies, consulates and other foreign service establishments before the close of voting on the day of elections shall be included in the counting of votes. Those received afterwards shall not be counted.

18.4. A Special Board of Canvassers composed of a lawyer preferably of the Commission as chairman, a senior career officer from any of the government agencies maintaining a post abroad and, in the absence of another government officer, a citizen of the Philippines qualified to vote under this Act deputized by the Commission, as vice-chairman and member-secretary, respectively, shall be constituted to canvass the election returns submitted to it by the Special Board of Election Inspectors. Immediately upon the completion of the canvass, the chairman of the Special Board of Canvassers shall transmit via facsimile, electronic mail, or any other means of transmission equally safe and reliable the Certificates of Canvass and the Statements of Votes to the Commission, and shall cause to
preserve the same immediately after the conclusion of the canvass, and make it available upon instructions of the Commission. The Special Board of Canvassers shall also furnish the accredited major political parties and accredited citizens’ arms with copies thereof via facsimile, electronic mail and any other means of transmission equally safe, secure and reliable. The Certificates of Canvass and the accompanying Statements of Votes as transmitted via facsimile, electronic mail and any other means of transmission equally safe, secure and reliable shall be the primary basis for the national canvass.

18.5. The canvass of votes shall not cause the delay of the proclamation of a winning candidate if the outcome of the election will not be affected by the results thereof. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Commission is empowered to order the proclamation of winning candidates despite the fact that the scheduled election has not taken place in a particular country or countries, if the holding of elections therein has been rendered impossible by events, factors and circumstances peculiar to such country or countries, and which events, factors and circumstances are beyond the control or influence of the Commission.

18.6. In the preparation of the final tally of votes on the results of the national elections, the Commission shall ensure that the votes canvassed by each and every country shall be reflected as a separate item from the tally of national votes. For purposes of this Act, the returns of every election for president and vice-president prepared by the Special Board of Canvassers shall be deemed a certificate of canvass of a city or province.

18.7. Where feasible, the counting and canvassing of votes shall be automated. Towards this end, the Commission is hereby authorized to borrow, rent, lease or acquire automated voting machines for purposes of canvassing and counting of votes pursuant to the provisions of this Act, and in accordance with the Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Commission.

Section 19. Authority of the Commission to Promulgate Rules. - The Commission shall issue the necessary rules and regulations to effectively implement the provisions of this Act within sixty (60) days from the effectivity of this Act. The Implementing Rules and Regulations shall be submitted to the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created by virtue of this Act for prior approval.
In the formulation of the rules and regulations, the Commission shall coordinate with the Department of Foreign Affairs, Department of Labor and Employment, Philippine Overseas and Employment Administration, Overseas Workers’ Welfare Administration and the Commission on Filipinos Overseas. Non-government organizations and accredited Filipino organizations or associations abroad shall be consulted.

Section 20. Information Campaign. - The Commission, in coordination with agencies concerned, shall undertake an information campaign to educate the public on the manner of absentee voting for qualified overseas absentee voters. It may require the support and assistance of the Department of Foreign Affairs, through the embassies, consulates and other foreign service establishments, Department of Labor and Employment, Department of Transportation and Communications, Philippine Postal Corporation, Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, Overseas Workers’ Welfare Administration and the Commission on Filipinos Overseas. The Commission may deputize Filipino organizations/associations overseas for the same purpose: Provided, That any such deputized organization/association shall be prohibited from participating in the elections by campaigning for or fielding candidates; Provided, further, That if any such deputized organization/association is discovered to have a member who is not a qualified overseas absentee voter as herein defined, such deputized organization/association shall be banned from participating in any manner, and at any stage, in the Philippine political process abroad.

Such information campaign shall educate the Filipino public, within and outside the Philippines, on the rights of overseas absentee voters, absentee voting processes and other related concerns. Information materials shall be developed by the Commission for distribution, through the said government agencies and private organizations. No government agency or accredited private organizations shall prepare, print, distribute or post in websites any information material without the prior approval of the Commission.

Section 21. Access to Official Records and Documents. - Subject to the pertinent provisions of this Act, any person shall have the right to access and/or copy at his expense all registration records, voters lists and other official records and documents, subject to reasonable regulations as may be imposed by the Commission.
Section 22. Assistance from Government Agencies. - All government officers, particularly from the Department of Foreign Affairs, Department of Labor and Employment, Department of Transportation and Communications, Philippine Postal Corporation, Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, Overseas Workers’ Welfare Administration, Commission on Filipinos Overseas and other government offices concerned with the welfare of the Filipinos overseas shall, to the extent compatible with their primary responsibilities, assist the Commission in carrying out the provisions of this Act. All such agencies or officers thereof shall take reasonable measures to expedite all election activities, which the Commission shall require of them. When necessary, the Commission may send supervisory teams headed by career officers to assist the embassies, consulates and other foreign service establishment concerned.

Section 23. Security Measures to Safeguard the Secrecy and Sanctity of Ballots. - At all stages of the electoral process, the Commission shall ensure that the secrecy and integrity of the ballots are preserved. The Committee on Absentee Voting of the Commission shall be responsible for ensuring the secrecy and sanctity of the absentee voting process. In the interest of transparency, all necessary and practicable measures shall be adopted to allow representation of the candidates, accredited major political parties, accredited citizens’ arms and non-government organizations to assist, and intervene in appropriate cases, in all stages of the electoral exercise and to prevent any and all forms of fraud and coercion.

No officer or member of the foreign service corps, including those belonging to attached agencies shall be transferred, promoted, extended, recalled or otherwise moved from his current post or position one (1) year before and three (3) months after the day of elections, except upon the approval of the Commission.

Section 24. Prohibited Acts. - In addition to the prohibited acts provided by law, it shall be unlawful:

24.1. For any officer or employee of the Philippine government to influence or attempt to influence any person covered by this Act to vote, or not to vote, for a particular candidate. Nothing in this Act shall be deemed to prohibit free discussion regarding politics or candidates for public office.

24.2. For any person to deprive any person of any right secured in this Act, or to give false information as to his/her name, address,
or period of residence for the purposes of establishing his/ her eligibility or ineligibility to register or vote under this Act; or to conspire with another person for the purpose of encouraging the giving of false information in order to establish the eligibility or ineligibility of any individual to register or vote under this Act; or, to pay, or offer to pay, or to accept payment either for application to vote in absentia or for voting;

24.3. For any person to tamper with the ballot, the mail containing the ballots for overseas absentee voters, the election returns, including the destruction, mutilation and manipulation thereof;

24.4. For any person to steal, destroy, conceal, mutilate or alter any record, document or paper as required for purposes of this Act;

24.5. For any deputized agent to refuse without justifiable ground, to serve or continue serving, or to comply with his/ her sworn duties after acceptance of his/ her appointment;

24.6. For any public officer or employee who shall cause the preparation, printing, distribution of information material, or post the same in websites without the prior approval of the Commission;

24.7. For any public officer or employee to cause the transfer, promotion, extension, recall of any member of the foreign service corps, including members of the attached agencies, or otherwise cause the movement of any such member from his current post or position one (1) year before and three (3) months after the day of elections, without securing the prior approval of the Commission;

24.8. For any person who, after being deputized by the Commission to undertake activities in connection with the implementation of this Act, shall campaign for or assist, in whatever manner, candidates in the elections;

24.9. For any person who is not a citizen of the Philippines to participate, by word or deed, directly or indirectly through qualified organizations/ associations, in any manner and at any stage of the Philippine political process abroad, including participation in the campaign and elections.

The provision of existing laws to the contrary notwithstanding, and with due regard to the Principle of Double Criminality, the prohibited acts described in this section are electoral offenses and punishable in the Philippines.

The penalties imposed under Section 264 of the Omnibus Election Code, as amended, shall be imposed on any person found guilty of committing any of the prohibited acts as defined.
in this section: Provided, That the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed upon any person found guilty of Section 24.3 hereof without the benefit of the operation of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. If the offender is a public officer or a candidate, the penalty shall be prision mayor in its maximum period. In addition, the offender shall be sentenced to suffer perpetual disqualification to hold public office and deprivation of the right to vote.

Immigrants and permanent residents who do not resume residence in the Philippines as stipulated in their affidavit under Section 5(d) within three (3) years after approval of his/her registration under this Act and yet vote in the next elections contrary to the said section, shall be penalized by imprisonment of not less than one (1) year, and shall be deemed disqualified as provided in Section 5(c) of this Act. His/her passport shall be stamped “not allowed to vote.”

**Section 25.** Joint Congressional Oversight Committee. – A Joint Congressional Oversight Committee is hereby created, composed of the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Constitutional Amendments, Revision of Codes and Laws, and seven (7) other Senators designated by the Senate President, and the Chairman of the House Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms, and seven (7) other Members of the House of Representatives designated by the Speaker of the House of Representatives: Provided, That, of the seven (7) members to be designated by each House of Congress, four (4) should come from the majority and the remaining three (3) from the minority.

The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee shall have the power to monitor and evaluate the implementation of this Act. It shall review, revise, amend and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Commission.

**Section 26.** Applicability of Other Election Laws. – The pertinent provisions of the Omnibus Election Code, as amended, and other election laws, which are not in conflict with the provisions of this Act shall remain in full force and shall have suppletory application to this Act.

**Section 27.** Enforcement and Administration by the Commission. – The Commission shall, for the purpose of ensuring honest, orderly, peaceful and free elections abroad, have exclusive charge of the enforcement, administration and implementation of this Act.

Initial Assessment of the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act and the Absentee Voting Act: Policy Issues and Problems
Section 28. Mandatory Review. - Congress shall complete a mandatory review of this Act within two (2) years following the May, 2004 elections for the purpose of amending it to expand or restrict its coverage, scope and application, as well as improve its procedures and institute measures and safeguards, taking into account the experience of the previous election, technological advances and structural political changes.

Section 29. Appropriations. - The amount necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act shall be provided in a supplemental budget or included in the General Appropriations Act of the year of its enactment into law. Thereafter, the expenses for its continued implementation shall be included in the subsequent General Appropriations Act.

Section 30. Separability Clause. - If any part or provision of this Act shall be declared unconstitutional or invalid, other provisions hereof which are not affected thereby shall continue to be in full force and effect.

Section 31. Repealing Clause. - All laws, presidential decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations, other issuances, and parts thereof, which are inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

Section 32. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days following its publication in three (3) newspapers of general circulation.

Approved,

(sgd.) JOSE DE VENECIA JR. (sgd.) FRANKLIN DRILON
Speaker of the House of Representatives President of the Senate

This Act which is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 2104 and House Bill No. 3570 was finally passed by the Senate and House of Representatives on February 4, 2003 and February 11, 2003, respectively.

(sgd.) ROBERTO P. NAZARENO (sgd.) OSCAR G. YABES
Secretary General Secretary of Senate
House of Representatives

Approved: February 13, 2003

(sgd.) GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
President of the Philippines
Political Transnationalism and the State’s Reincorporation of Overseas Filipinos

FILOMENO V. AGUILAR JR.

Since the establishment in 1973 of the Balikbayan Program by the legitimacy-seeking martial law regime of then President Ferdinand E. Marcos and the launch of a labor-export policy with the adoption of a new labor code in 1974, the Philippine state has moved gradually but steadily toward the political reincorporation of its citizens who emigrate, many of whom, particularly those in the United States, are naturalized in their countries of settlement. As John Torpey (2000) argues, states seek to “embrace”—grasp, take hold of, and register for purposes of surveillance, administration, and regulation—their subject populations through the monopolization of the legitimate means of movement. The Philippine state’s reincorporation of its citizens and former citizens domiciled temporarily or permanently outside of its territorial boundaries can be seen as a process of re-embracement, which reached its height in the twin legislative acts of absentee voting and dual citizenship.

In October 2002 both chambers of the Philippine Congress passed separate versions of an absentee voting bill, which belatedly conformed to a provision of the constitution that had come into effect nearly three decades earlier. Signed by President Gloria M. Arroyo into law on 13 February 2003, the legislation allows the overseas Filipino electorate to cast votes for president, vice-president, senators, and party-list representatives in national elections. It was first implemented in 2004, and again this year 2007. Also in October 2002, the Philippine Senate
passed a bill on dual citizenship rights, although strictly speaking the law does not use the term dual citizenship but rather the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by natural-born Filipinos who have since become naturalized in another state. This unprecedented bill was signed into law on 29 August 2003, the delayed signing indicative of its controversial character, compared with absentee voting, as a radical recasting of the terms of national belonging based on transnationalism (Basch, Schiller, and Blanc 1994; cf. Aguilar 2004).

What could explain, despite many objections, the passage of the dual citizenship law? It would appear to have been the outcome of a convergence of interests by the Philippine state and transnational elites. Evidently, the state did not only wish to assert the Filipinoness of its former citizens but it was also eager to capitalize on this identity to attract capital inflows from wealthy emigrants, who for their part desired to secure their investments through the entitlements afforded by citizenship. The right to vote would be an integral component of dual citizenship, but in the scheme of things it appeared secondary to the economic consideration. The Philippine state thus espoused what elsewhere I have referred to as instrumental citizenship (Aguilar 1999), while key migrants were eager to seize the opportunity to their own advantage. Exercising its own brand of political transnationalism, groups such as the National Federation of Filipino American Associations (NaFAA) lobbied hard for the acceptance of dual citizenship. Cristina Szanton Blanc (1996) anticipated this development by arguing that, after having been treated by the Philippine state as quasi-citizens, emigrants desired the full complement of citizenship rights, particularly in a situation where migrant rights in the United States were “slipping away.” It would appear that regaining citizenship rights in the country of origin would compensate for the relative decline in the bundle of rights enjoyed by emigrants in the country of destination. However, the sentiments of transnational elites represented by groups like the NaFAA were not representative, that is, the transnational lobby did not speak for the majority of emigrants—which would be confirmed by the rather very low rate of application to reacquire Filipino citizenship as well as the very low rate of participation in the absentee ballot.

On a somewhat different front, the campaign to enfranchise overseas Filipinos to participate in national elections was premised on the fact that not only should they not be deprived of their right to vote
but they constituted a force for changing the outcome of Philippine elections. Overseas Filipinos were said to be “intelligent voters” (Lacuarta and Marfil 2003). The not-too-hidden script was that migrants, by living outside the homeland, had observed other political systems and in the process had been enlightened. They would be a modernizing force. As an official of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) tasked to implement the law in 2004 claimed, the overseas vote would lead to “the expansion of the democratic space” in the country (Uy 2003). Overseas Filipinos would “make a significant difference.” A migrant selling her or his overseas vote was unthinkable. Migrant groups claimed, and continue to claim, that for every “enlightened” overseas vote, there would be three more votes in the Philippines the migrant could influence directly. Fully aware of goings on “back home” made possible by modern telecommunications technologies, migrants would no longer be just “heroes” but would serve as the final arbiters in deciding the country’s political leadership.

But how have migrants responded to the absentee voting law? In 2004 the registration of overseas voters was held in eighty-five Philippine consulates worldwide. Of the estimated 7.5 million overseas Filipinos (a figure that itself requires investigation), 2.5 million were originally expected to register. But the requirement that the migrant should register in person and sign a certificate of eventual return to the country within three years was a powerful disincentive. The expected number of registrants began to dwindle. The target was lowered to 1.7 million, then 800,000 before going down to the 200,000 to 400,000 range. Finally, at the end of the registration period in September 2003, the actual number stood at 364,187 only (Cariño this volume).

The geographic distribution is very telling. Perhaps because of its small size and proximity to the homeland, Hong Kong had the most number of registered voters at 85,576. Overall the registered voters in 2004 were distributed as follows: 141,414 (46.8 percent) in the Asia-Pacific region, 124,862 (41.3 percent) in the Middle East and Africa, 24,851 (8.2 percent) in Europe, and 10,376 (3.4 percent) in North and South America. Overall, only 4 percent of the estimated 7.5 million overseas Filipinos registered to vote in the May 2004 elections. The figures for 2007 are slightly but not much higher, with a total of 504,110 registered overseas voters—despite a budget of P248 million and thirteen months to attract voters (Labog-Javellana and Cabacungan 2007). Excluding 18,404 seafarers who registered, the distribution of
overseas voter registration is as follows: 218,260 (44.9 percent) in the Middle East; 191,760 (39.5 percent) in the Asia-Pacific region; 48,446 (10 percent) in Europe; and 27240 (5.6 percent) in the Americas (Pazzibugan 2007). Although in 2007 the Gulf States have more registered voters than the Asia-Pacific region in 2004, Hong Kong remains as having the most number of registered voters at 96,505; followed by Saudi Arabia, 58,245; United Arab Emirates, 35,304; and Singapore, 26,835 (ibid.).

Labor migrants, who are largely contractual and “temporary” migrants, constitute the majority of overseas voters. Immigrants in the United States have been the least keen to participate in Philippine elections. Registration results there in 2004 were described as “low, dismal and glacial” (Andrei 2003). Some responses reported in the news (ibid.) are indicative of prevailing political attitudes:

“I’m not going to jeopardize my stay here for the sake of participating in an election I don’t have any stake of [sic],” said a newcomer [in the Chicago area], an accountant who had just arrived from the Philippines. “For practical purposes, would I really care about elections in the Philippines? Would it impact on me and my family, now that we’re already here? No.”

“They’re out to screw us, that’s what,” said a father whose two children are still in grammar school. “I don’t think they know what they’re after. I don’t think they’re sincere.”

“I have a word for absentee voting,” said an old-timer who never bothered to be naturalized: “Kahibangan (It’s crazy).”

By income standards and access to telecommunications technologies, middle class Filipino immigrants in the U.S. are potentially the “most connected” to the homeland. As it turns out, they are the least likely to get involved in Philippine elections. The disinterest in Philippine politics appears to be the result of a deliberate shunning of the kind of politics that migrants hold in their memory about the homeland, a memory of “dirty” politics and ineffectual governance—even by emigrants who affirm their Filipino identity, such as the man who never bothered to become a naturalized U.S. citizen yet considered absentee voting as nonsensical (kahibangan). The distrust of Philippine political institutions is most palpable. Thus, although most overseas Filipinos maintain social ties across time and space, the forging and cultivation of transnational social fields do not extend to political transnationalism. Theirs is largely a familial transnationalism, even an
ethnic and national one that takes pride in being Filipino, but it is also
decidedly anti-Philippine state.

Moreover, contrary to the hopes of those who campaigned for the
absentee ballot, the largest numbers of registered voters are found in
countries with far from the type of liberal democracy these proponents
had in mind. Rather than re-embracing former citizens and emigrants,
absentee voting has turned out to be a gesture to solidify the state’s
hold on those that are within the fold of the nation-state: labor migrants
whose tenures overseas are generally less secure, and by and large less
remunerative, than those who have settled permanently in countries
such as those in North America.

Perhaps the law itself is faulty, as even the currently sitting
president said in explaining the very low overseas voter turnout: of the
500,000 or so registered voters, a miserable 735 had cast their ballots
(Labog-Javellana and Cabacungan 2007). Perhaps the law’s
implementation is seriously defective. However, despite the pitfalls
experienced thus far, the absentee ballot should be strengthened for
the long term as an aspect of the bundle of rights and duties of
citizenship. There is no turning back on this constitutional provision,
but it will require not only government campaigns to attract overseas
Filipinos to participate in the electoral process but the evolution as well
of transnational political networks and institutions, which will generate
its own pitfalls and contradictions (cf. Itzigsohn 2000 for Latin American
experiences).

Finally, despite the apparent lack of interest in dual citizenship
except by a few, the existence of this law is a powerful reminder that
the legal concept of “citizenship” is a social construct, rather than an
absolute principle. During the American colonial period, Filipino
citizens in the United States were “American nationals,” and for a time
jus soli was the operative norm here (Aguilar 2003). In this light, allow
me to end by connecting our concern for fellow Filipinos overseas with
the citizenship status of long-resident aliens in the Philippines, such as
the Vietnamese (see Evangelista and Evangelista this volume), many
of whom are now witnessing the rise of a second and perhaps a third
generation in our midst. Their unsettled political status deprives them
of even denizenship rights. A truly egalitarian, rather than simply
liberal, approach would espouse the extension of the same internal
citizenship rights of Filipinos to a population group that until now has
been treated as alien, when in reality they are denizens of the Philippines.
Embracing so-called aliens in our midst may be double-edged, but it may be necessary to settle their statelessness. If we are able to extend political kindness to resident groups like the Vietnamese, then our concern for the welfare of Filipinos in foreign lands will have high moral ascendancy arising from practicing at home the very same political virtues we would like foreign states to accord to Filipinos who are foreigners in their midst. It will also demonstrate that transnational elites need not dominate the Philippine agenda of political transnationalism.

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Keynote Speech of

HONORABLE DELIA DOMINGO ALBERT
Secretary of Foreign Affairs

Allow me first to congratulate you for blazing the trail by convening this conference on transnational communities in the Philippines. I am privileged to keynote this very important conference as the culminating activity of the Philippine Migration Research Network for this year. As the Chair of the UNESCO National Commission, I am honored to participate in the activities being supported by the UNESCO Participation Programme in Paris through the Social and Human Sciences Committee of the UNESCO National Commission of the Philippines. It is an opportunity for me to touch base with the academe, research organizations and migrant-focused NGOs, whose inputs and policy recommendations we at the Department of Foreign Affairs highly value.

This conference is the first of its kind in the Philippines. Much has already been said and written about the Philippine diaspora. We are all aware that the Philippines has emerged as the largest migrant nation in the world today, with roughly 7.4 million of our people tucked in every corner of the world. But perhaps not everyone is aware that the Philippines is at the same time, a destination country.

While material on Philippine out-migration abound, there seems to be a dearth of research and authoritative work on foreign nationals in the Philippines. This gap in the knowledge base needs to be addressed, if we are to formulate strategic and proactive policies that will affect not only these foreign nationals, but also more so and in the
longer term, the communities where they may be found. And because this knowledge gap exists, we cannot say forthrightly that we do have a clear policy on transnational communities that have considered the Philippines their second home.

The growing influx of foreign nationals in the Philippines is but a manifestation of globalization. Whether we treat globalization with disdain or praise, or both, it is a reality that we have to face head-on. Our shrinking global village has made it possible for peoples around the world to traverse the globe in a matter of hours. The advancement in communication and information technology has made it possible for us to get in touch with our friends and kin on the other side of the planet.

These revolutions have also made it easier for people to move, albeit to a lesser degree than goods and services, from one continent to another. The tragedy of 11 September 2001 has made us realize that not a single country is isolated from the tentacles of terrorist cells. The ripples of the shock can still be felt in our shores and has to this day determined the paths of our national security considerations.

There is always a downside to the purported benefits of globalization. Trafficking of persons is considered one of the black marks of this century. Next to drugs and arms, the trafficking of human beings is the third highest source of income for transnational criminal syndicates. Traffickers and people smugglers have become increasingly brazen and their networks have grown in sophistication and reach. Human trafficking is a modern form of slavery that has no rightful place in this day and age.

The freedom of movement of people has also been associated with international terrorist networks. The entry of foreigners has been linked to the entry of terrorists. There were times in the past when we had been caught flatfooted, as demonstrated by the Rizal Day LRT bombings in Manila. And also note that the Al Qaeda is funding their operations in the Philippines from the outside.

The image of the Philippines before the international community has of late been suffering a bad press. There are travel advisories issued by foreign governments, which have raised concerns about the peace and order situation and the overall stability of our country. Ironically, these are the same countries that have the most number of nationals in our shores, whether as experts, workers or tourists. And despite the
bad publicity we are receiving, there is an increasing influx of foreigners, mostly from East Asia, who still choose to come, either temporarily or on a permanent basis.

What does the Philippines have to offer to these people? What attracts them to our shores? Why do they choose to remain while others do not? I believe that when we have definite answers to these questions, we will begin to see our country in a new light. We have for so long indulged in self-criticism and self-flagellation that we do not appreciate that there are so many things to love about our own country.

As an example, the Japanese have established many businesses in the National Capital Region and Region IV, mostly in manufacturing and industry. A lot of them have also opted to retire here permanently. Recent news report that the Japanese are planning to establish a retirement community in the Philippines.

South Korean businesses have also sprouted in the metropolis. And Korean missionaries have established many churches here, mostly in Region VII, in particular in Cebu, Dumaguete and Bohol. Some of our best schools have offered Special English Programs for South Korean students. Every year, they keep coming back in droves.

Our experience in Palawan with the Vietnamese refugees is an example of successful integration. Some of the people in Vietville have chosen to stay permanently by availing themselves of avenues to legalize their stay in the Philippines while other RVNs (Remaining Vietnamese Nationals) are awaiting their migration to a third country. Our experience with the Vietnamese refugees has often been cited in international human rights circles as a model for refugee protection and integration.

The aforesaid cases are but a sampling of the many foreigners who choose to come here and eventually adopt the Philippines as their own home. That the Philippines is actually a destination country for some of the world’s peoples is a novel fact that, hitherto, has largely been ignored and unexplored. It is about time that we take advantage of this truth by harnessing our gifts as a country and a people. These cases only demonstrate that the Philippines has something to offer to the world as much as it can learn and benefit from it.

Let me digress a little from the main topic. Towards the latter portion of this conference, there will be a special session on two vital
legislations affecting overseas Filipinos, one on absentee voting and the other, on dual citizenship. As you very well know, our overseas Filipinos have recently exercised their right to suffrage during the May 10, 2004 elections. The exercise of their right is long overdue and, thus, has been welcomed by them especially in Hong Kong, Singapore and the Middle East.

The implementation and impact of the dual citizenship law, on the other hand, is yet to be studied as the implementing rules and regulations have been published only recently. Thus, the Department of Foreign Affairs strongly encourages the members of the academe and research organizations to help us in this regard. Your invaluable inputs can form the basis of any future amendment of the law or its implementing rules.

The value of these two laws cannot be quantified in terms of how many had registered and actually voted, in the case of the absentee voting law, or how many have applied, in the case of the dual citizenship law. What is more important is the spirit behind these laws. Over and above just rendering assistance and protection to our overseas Filipinos, it is imperative that government creates opportunities to empower them and take advantage of their worldwide presence by consolidating them into the national body politic. These two laws will make sure that their voices will be pitched high on the national agenda.

At this point, I wish to reiterate the need for a coherent and proactive policy on foreign nationals entering the Philippines. This plan should be also to reflect a clear picture of our experience and be able to anticipate new issues in the light of the forces of globalization. This plan should also strike a balance between our twin concerns of opening our borders and upholding our national security and sovereignty. On the one hand, we recognize the contributions of foreigners to the national economy and in the enrichment of our culture. But, on the other hand, we need to be able to manage our borders properly in the sense that “undesirable” aliens are kept out. We will not allow our country to serve as a haven for terrorists and transnational criminal syndicates.

With that, I hope that this conference will bear fruit towards that direction. Thank you very much.

LORNA P. MAKIL

The Philippine Migration Research Network (PMRN) was organized under the auspices of the Philippine Social Science Council (PSSC) to advance knowledge and understanding of national and international migration trends and developments. Globalization had become the order of the world, and with it a vigorous interest in more information and deeper understanding of the migration process and its concomitants.

The direct impetus for PMRN was UNESCO’s major program in the Social and Human Sciences, the Management of Social Transformation (MOST) Programme, which aimed to promote “international, comparative and policy-relevant research on contemporary social transformations and issues of global importance.” UNESCO-MOST implemented one of its programs through the Asia-Pacific Migration Research Network (APMRN) with members from 11 countries in the region.

PMRN was organized in February 1996 as a partner organization of APMRN. In line with APMRN’s program focus, the general objective of PMRN was to undertake and produce authoritative work on how the Philippines is responding to and being transformed by the increasing migrations and ethnocultural diversity within and across its borders, and with the end view of informing ongoing public discussions and policy-formulation on these issues.
Since its beginnings, PMRN has operated as a loose network of individuals (with some representing their institutions), mostly social scientists and other professionals working in academe, government and the private and non-government sectors. They met as a body in a first general assembly when PMRN was launched on 24 February 1996 at the Philippine Social Science Center.

PMRN has conducted enough activities to engage its members and keep them relatively active in the network. This has been made possible largely by the commitment of PMRN’s Executive Committee members. The Executive Committee has 9 members, some of whom are among the country’s leading scholars on migration. They are from different disciplines (political science, sociology, demography, urban planning, gender studies) and different universities and institutions. This diversity of the Executive Committee members’ disciplinal and organizational/institutional backgrounds has enabled the network to reach a wider audience.

PMRN’s general membership counts some 50 individuals coming from 20 institutions.

PMRN GENERAL ASSEMBLIES AND RESEARCH DISSEMINATION FORUMS

Through the PMRN general assemblies, the network established its presence among migration scholars and practitioners. These well-attended gatherings have been held regularly since 1996 and are opportunities for social and professional interaction and the mounting of forums to disseminate research findings.

Understandably, the public forums during the first three years of PMRN involved Filipino researchers only. But by the time of the 4th general assembly in February 2000, foreign-based researchers began participating in PMRN public forums. These include scholars from South Korea, Australia, Japan, Taiwan and the U.S. To date, the public forums conducted by PMRN are as follows:

6 February 1997 – Forum on skills inventory of migrant workers; violence against women migrant workers; and the Migrant Workers Act

4 February 2000 – Symposium on Filipino female entertainers abroad; returning migrant workers and their families; foreign nationals in the Philippines; and international migration and the nation-state in Asia

22 March 2001 – Symposium on transnational communities and diasporic connections of overseas Filipinos in Asia and the U.S.A.


5 January 2006 – Colloquium on the Filipino youth in Rome, Italy

18 March 2006 – Forum on the globalization of households in Pacific Asia and Filipino Migration

**PMRN PARTICIPATION IN REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES**

Up to 2004, PMRN regularly attended APMRN’s international conferences.

The first APMRN international conference in Bangkok in March 1996 was attended by PMRN Executive Committee members, Benjamin Cariño and Aurora E. Perez. Dr. Perez presented a paper on migration research in the Philippines, while Dr. Cariño was chosen to serve as the first Chairman of the APMRN Governing Council for 1996-1997.

PMRN sent Dr. Cariño, Dr. Perez and lawyer Joseph Sedfrey S. Santiago to the second international conference of APMRN in Hong Kong in February 1998. Atty. Santiago read a paper on the protection of Filipino migrant workers’ rights.

The third APMRN international conference was hosted in Tokyo in September 1999. PMRN was represented by Dr. Cariño and Maruja M.B. Asis. Dr. Asis presented a paper discussing the future of migration and families in Asia.

PMRN hosted the 4th APMRN international conference in March 2001. This was held at Richmonde Hotel in Pasig City with the theme “Migrations, Economic Changes and Multi-culturalism in Asia-Pacific Countries.” A total of 79 participants attended, 35 of whom were foreign-based migration scholars from 15 countries.
In addition to the APMRN gatherings, PMRN has also actively participated in other international conferences, as the following:

**Philippine Studies Conference, July 2000**

PMRN organized a panel presentation on transnational communities in the Philippines as part of the Philippine Studies Conference at the Philippine Social Science Center, Quezon City. Research papers were presented on the Chinese and Indian immigrants to the Philippines, and a Russian refugee camp in Central Philippines that existed briefly in the early 1950s. An exploratory paper was also featured giving demographic data on foreign nationals in the country.

**Conference on Filipino Migration to Hawaii, December 2006**

PMRN took active part in the lecture series of the 2006 centennial celebration of Filipino migration to Hawaii. Upon the invitation of the Commission on Filipinos Overseas (CFO), PMRN sent Benjamin Cariño, Stella Go, and Virginia Miralao as resource persons/discussants in the lecture series that was held in selected Philippine cities and in Honolulu.

The culminating Honolulu conference in December saw the participation of Ma. Cecilia Conaco, Stella Go, Virginia Miralao and Emma Porio as paper presentors in a panel discussion.

**PMRN PUBLICATIONS**

With support from the UNESCO-MOST Programme and the Social and Human Sciences Committee of the UNESCO National Commission of the Philippines, PMRN has published the following books:


*Filipino Workers on the Move: Trends, Dilemmas and Policy Options*. Edited by Benjamin V. Cariño (1998)

ACHIEVEMENTS OF PMRN

PMRN, in the past 10 years of its operations, has achieved the following:

• It has enlivened the existing body of research on Filipino migration through its publications and papers presented by PMRN members at conferences and other public forums.

• Through its research and publications, it has contributed to the analysis and understanding of Philippine migration-related phenomena, offering fresh insights and new perspectives for looking at the Philippine diaspora.

• It has facilitated/strengthened collaboration and networking ties between Filipino researchers and PMRN members on the one hand, and foreign-based scholars similarly interested in Filipino migration issues on the other.

• PMRN’s research, publications and forums have helped raised the quality of public discussion and debates over the different aspects of overseas labor migration and the Filipino diaspora, which in turn should impact on the nature and quality of migration policies and programs over the longer term.

• PMRN, too, has prompted the examination, use and analysis of government data on migration.

• PMRN has been able to forge communication links and cordial relationships not only among social science researchers/scholars of different disciplinal backgrounds and ideological persuasions but between them (researchers) and government officials and policymakers, and NGOs engaged in migration-related work.

SUSTAINABILITY OF PMRN

PMRN presents an interesting case of having sustained its network in a country where many groups are known to organize easily and dissolve after a few months or years.

In addition to the presence of a hardworking and committed PMRN Executive Committee mentioned earlier, PMRN’s sustainability is also due to the support lent by the PSSC which serves as PMRN’s institutional base and as the UNESCO-MOST National Liaison Committee in the Philippines. PSSC thus has been instrumental in endorsing PMRN project proposals to the UNESCO National Commission of the Philippines and which in turn has always supported
PMRN project proposals for Participation Programme funding. PMRN’s own ability to formulate and prepare project proposals and to deliver on project outcomes has gained for the Network small but continuing funding support from the UNESCO National Commission and the Participation Programme. Additionally, PMRN’s work has also been well received by the UNESCO Regional Offices in Bangkok and Jakarta as well as by the local offices of the Ford Foundation and UNFPA which contribute funds to cover some of the Network’s expenses for conferences and research dissemination activities. Last but not the least, PMRN members are encouraged to pay annual membership dues and to buy for themselves and sell to others copies of PMRN’s books/publications to help keep the Network financially viable.

PMRN EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

The following are currently serving/ have served on the PMRN Executive Committee: Maruja M.B. Asis, Benjamin V. Cariño, Aurora J. de Dios, Elizabeth Go, Stella P. Go, Lorna P. Makil, Virginia A. Miralao, Aurora E. Perez and Jorge Tigno.
CONTRIBUTORS

Filomeno V. Aguilar Jr., Chair of the PSSC for 2006-2008, is a professor in the Department of History, Ateneo de Manila University, where he is also the editor of Philippine Studies. He put together the volume Filipinos in Global Migrations: At Home in the World? (2002) for the Philippine Migration Research Network or PMRN. He is the author of Clash of Spirits: The History of Power and Sugar Planter Hegemony on a Visayan Island (1998). His research interest on migration include citizenship, historical change, and family configurations.

Arnold Molina Azurin was a research fellow of the University of the Philippines Center for Integrative Studies. He is the author of the book Re-inventing the Filipino Sense of Being and Becoming (1995) which was well received by scholars and students in the region. His research interest lies in the area of Philippine studies, culture and nationhood.

Benjamin V. Cariño is a retired professor of the University of the Philippines School of Urban and Regional Planning. His expertise is on internal migration in the Philippines and Asian migration to the United States. Among his published works are Pacific Bridges: The New Immigration from Asia and the Pacific (1987), The New Filipino Immigrants to the United States: Increasing Diversity and Change (1990) and the PMRN volume on Filipino Workers on the Move: Trends, Dilemmas and Policy Options (1998). He is a member of the PMRN Executive Committee and was Chair of PMRN in 1996-1998, and of the Asia-Pacific Migration Research Network in 1996-1997.

Oscar L. Evangelista, retired history professor of the University of the Philippines-Diliman is now based in Palawan where he serves as a consultant with the Palawan State University. His latest works include Annotations of Selected Works and Publications on Philippine-Japan Exchanges and Relations (2006), and Building the National Community: Problems and Prospects and other Historical Essays (2002).

Susan Evangelista continues to teach and write in Puerto Princesa, Palawan after retiring from the Ateneo de Manila University in 2000. Her recent publications include Growing into Asia and other Essays (UP Press 2001) and Creative Juices: Works of the Ateneo Faculty (Diwa 2001).

Kanako Kutsumi is a professor at the Osaka University of Foreign Studies. Her works focus on Korean businesses as well as Korean nationals in the Philippines. A recent paper, “A Study of South Korean

**Lorna P. Makil** taught Sociology at Silliman University, Dumaguete City before moving to Manila and working with the PSSC Secretariat for 17 years. She retired in 2002 and has returned to Dumaguete where writing is part of her retirement joys.

**Virginia A. Miralao**, the Executive Director of PSSC since 1996, is a sociologist who has written on the social components of education and curriculum reform; evaluation and social development; gender, family, youth; and migration. One of her recent publications is a chapter in *Asian New Democracies: The Philippines, South Korea and Taiwan Compared*, edited by Michael Hsiao and published by the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy in Taipei in 2006, and entitled “The Changing Character of Local Government Officials: Implications to Clientilism and Traditional Politics in the Philippines.”
Exploring Transnational Communities in the Philippines

Edited by

VIRGINIA A. MIRALAO
and
LORNA P. MAKIL
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