THE CHICO RIVER-BASIN DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
A SITUATION REPORT

Joanna Cariño, Jessica Cariño, and Geoffrey Nettleton*

INTRODUCTION

The present paper is both long and at the same time inadequate. Its purpose is to serve as a basis for present discussion and further research. One of the major constraints that has emerged as part of its preparation is the general inadequacy of available information concerning this project in particular, and development projects in general. Reference is made at several points in the following report to this lack of information. Hopefully, after this dialogue we will be able to fill in some of these gaps to gain a clearer and broader perception of the difficulties of development.

A basic theme of the paper that follows is that this lack of information is a constraint in the comprehension of the problems manifest in this project and in the resolution of said problems. Seeking as it does to pose questions rather than answer them, this paper should be seen by the members of this association as the beginning of a program of inquiry into development within our country. In such a development enquiry, anthropologists should be willing to play an active role because it seems likely from past experiences that in their absence policy formulation and implementation continue unabasked. However, it has to be said that an association like this must perceive any such enquiries within their full social context, and that our orientation to the development along parallel, but not necessarily identical lines, of all the peoples of the Philippines must be that it comes from the people themselves.

The long standing role of the anthropologist has been to interpret different cultures, to make the seemingly strange comprehensible. At this time of rapid changes and with the thrusts of development being as they are, we feel that anthropologists must necessarily convey the perception of the future of the people with whom they have for so long been associated. The writers of this paper see development exactly in terms of comprehension and participation of those directly affected by and therefore involved in development.

The present paper is divided into several sections each, we recognize, with their own limitations.

*Joanna Cariño is from UP Baguio, Jessica Cariño from the Montañosos Social Action Center, and Geoffrey Nettleton from the Baguio-Mt. Province Museum.
We hope that this presentation will at least increase the awareness of those present of the complexity and seriousness of the problems involved and that the inadequacies will serve to inspire those who perceive them to offer their own assistance in future research.

The history of past events is covered only briefly because of constraints of time and space, though we hope through the brief accounts given that it is possible to see the way that time has changed the positions of many in relation to the project. The way that a conference like this might have proceeded 10 years ago cannot be the way that it proceeds today.

Anthropology and its sister Sociology have as one of their main concerns the perception and comprehension of the unintended consequences of actions in society. Surely after a hundred years of trying we have by now made our point sufficiently well to have such an orientation as part of all social programs.

There cannot be any agency (can there?) which thinks that a project planned in specifics can exactly accrue the benefits predicted. Such is a near impossibility even with considerable sociological analysis. Without it, such a suggestion is beyond the bounds of belief. Why then, if we all know these truths, does our development policy proceed with the "as if"? In the case of the Chico River Development Project, the benefits are calculated at 100 percent effectivity. Whatever the success of the project any sociologist can tell you that you will not achieve 100 percent implementation. Even such simple calculations as costs are almost beyond the bounds of accurate prediction with inflation and shortages and many other variables. And these are only materials — how much more when human factors must be included in the calculation. This lesson is everywhere to see. The calculations on the productive, capacity and life span of Ambuklao Dam are a good example. Siltation has occurred at a rate not predicted — the initial costing faults have appeared. This has reduced the effective life span of the dam by more than half and its production capacity by a greater proportion.

Pantabangan is suffering from similar problems (see the NEA studies on rural electrification summarized below).

The time has come for recognition of such human but nonetheless real constraints upon any project and as that professional group that recognizes the central position of social factors in development we must make this reality abundantly clear to all who seek to formulate development policy.

Development proceeds as a historical process whose future is partially determined by both present social environment and past events.

The definition of development that seems at present to dominate the formulation of development policy is that which lays greatest emphasis upon raising the material conditions of the people through investment in infra-
structure. This is where the bulk of time, effort and funds are directed. Such an approach sees development of the people by their government. Often, it looks over its shoulder at the models of development of countries that are further along the single “line of development” than ourselves. Hence, our development projects are comparable with projects of any people in the world. Our damming or hotel construction, the development of the Luzon grid, etc. are all worthy of comparison with projects of many countries more advanced than the Philippines. Are we therefore “catching up” in our chase after development? For large sections of the population we think the answer to that question must be NO.

West Germany, Holland, the United Kingdom — these countries do not have squatter problems like Tondo. Their unemployment figures are counted in thousands rather than millions. Their farmers and farm workers, who form such a small proportion of the nation’s work force live in a kind of affluence that would be inconceivable for many of the small farmer/tenant majority in the Philippines. It is from positions of basic sufficiency that such countries launch their projects. They have education systems that without expense to the student or his family educate all citizens for participation in the society at least to a level attained in our colleges.

For the Philippines there is no such basis. We do not have a sufficiently skilled labor force or industrial base to be able to produce this technological advance from our own resources. Even the construction tools used, we cannot produce. The construction of the Chico dams will involve the use of technically sophisticated equipment both in construction and in the finally installed equipment. What percentage of this will be locally designed and produced?

We suggest that a development defined in those terms fails in the present Philippine context. It fails exactly in the terms laid down by the President in the Philippine Development Plan.

Philippine development is aimed primarily at rectifying grave economic and social inequalities that have accumulated in the course of our ascent to nationhood. It would certainly be a very sad commentary on the nature of our society and of the political, economic, and social leadership if we would only seek to maintain the status quo in the New Society.

In relying upon the inputs of foreign capital and expertise, this project sustains exactly that status quo relationship between this country and the developed world. Within the country, the concentration on aspects of development that have greatest significance in a European or North American reality tends to favor the development and advancement of that sector within the local economy. But in the Philippine situation that is an irrelevance or at best of only marginal significance to the vast majority of the local populace living in the rural areas.
There arises with this present orientation in development what has been termed a dual economy. The orientation of development is that which is best understood by comparison with other countries that have large industrial and urban sectors. In the developing countries, this orientation takes the form of focusing development in all areas upon this sector in the local economy. Thus in the Philippines, the greater proportion of even such essential social services as health care are concentrated in the cities and the majority of the people in the rural areas are relatively neglected.

Is it in fact the final plan of the developers that the Philippine industrial urban and agricultural rural proportions of population eventually fit the model provided by Western Europe? Does such an orientation, if it exists, necessarily mean that we ignore the social needs of the masses where they are at present to be found: in the rural areas including the Mountain Provinces?

This paper defines development somewhat differently from the definitions manifest in present and past implemented policies. What seems to us to have been lost in this concentration in development upon the prestigious project approach is the basic purpose of development; i.e. to make the mass of the people, and therefore the nation, increasingly self-reliant and capable of generating continued growth from its own resources and capabilities.

The feature of central importance in development then is not any particular project, but rather, the capacity of the people to absorb each stage of development, and be prepared as a result of their exposure to that particular advance to move forward in a dynamic progression to further stages. This is in the recognition that especially in the Philippines with its 45,000,000 people the greatest, richest resource for the development of the people is their own human potential. Development is a process that proceeds as an interaction between a people and their social and physical environment. Projects of spectacular and prestigious proportions tend in our present context to be too far removed from the present conditions and perceptions of the people who are seen only as the passive recipients. Much of the benefit is lost because there is the assumption that if the developmental potential exists it will inevitably be adopted. This cannot be assumed. (See the Economic part of this paper.) There may in the first place be economic constraints upon the subjects of development that prevent them from taking up the full options of the development offered; e.g. with reference to Chico, some of the lowland farmers who are assumed to take advantage of the irrigation potential of the project to increase rice production are in marginal farming situations. They are poor. Alleviation of that poverty and the establishment of security is likely to be their primary orientation. This they will not necessarily perceive as achievable through the investment of considerable sums in farm improvements, even in the unlikely case that they have resources available for such investment. Electrification also suffers many of the same constraints.
There is an increasing perception in the field of development economics that the most advanced forms of technology available need not necessarily be those which provide the maximum benefits to a Third World country looking forward to rather than back upon development. Intermediate forms of technological advance which maximize work opportunities rather than production are felt now to have the most lasting and greatest long-term beneficial effects.

President Ferdinand E. Marcos describes development thus:

It is a human and social process, requiring political will, and commitment... We will pursue economic development for social justice. We will engage the initiative and resources of our people, according all citizens a rightful share in benefits and obligations. As both the source and object of development, our people will be provided with adequate economic opportunities and social amenities to attain a dignified existence.

...we will make our environment more conducive to an ideal future by maintaining peace and order...

Clearly, development is centrally a sociopolitical process. The President's argument here is that all else becomes possible if the people can be convinced of the value of development and that it cannot take place unless they are.

Can we ask here in the spirit of self criticism that we must adopt if we are to face successfully the difficult tasks facing our society, how those guidelines of the President's relate to the Chico situation? Are not the Kalingas and Bontocs exactly from that sector of society that being so undeveloped because of the repeated neglect of previous development policies have the greatest need for present and future development and at the same time the greatest potential? The greatest potential because of the depressed state in which they have existed as the result of previous neglects that have left more than half a million Igorots with relatively little share in the benefits of development that have so concentrated on urban and industrial growth. And the greatest need because despite the underprivilege in which they have developed and still live, many Igorots have raised, through their own efforts, their standard of life and aspirations. Clearly through their commitment to education, particularly in the colleges of this city, many Igorots have shown themselves to be far from resistant to development and change. In their increasing investment in cash crops such as coffee, their need and readiness for development of their region is clearly expressed. These are a people who are eagerly seeking out development. When there is a suggestion for the construction of a school, a rural health unit, or a Mission in any part of the region, rarely do the people charge for the labor necessary for the construction or even for the land to be used.

The people are not opposers of development per se. Rather, they are at present rejecting this one project whose benefit, for them, they cannot per-
ceive. Is it a failure in their perception or is it actually the case that they will not be benefited? If they will benefit, how will this be accomplished and what form will it take and what is their perception of this situation? It would seem to any observer that the peoples of the Chico Valley who have already made such great "sacrifices" for the nation through the previous neglect that they have experienced are now to be again the ones to sacrifice and not the ones to benefit. This is certainly the perception of many of the Kalingas themselves.

Do the Kalingas and Bontocs benefit from this project and if so, how? (See the section on the present economic situation of the people of Kal Bon.) How in this project are the "initiative and resources of the people" of the Chico Valley being "engaged", or is it that the human resources referred to by the President are interpreted in terms of the natural resources of the area?

How in this project are the people the "source of development"? What are the indigenous aspects of the Chico River development and what demands of the people of that region do they satisfy?

How can this project that has brought so much strife and the importation of more than one battalion of extra troops into this previously peaceful province with all the unfortunate consequences of that action be equated with making an environment more conducive to an ideal future? Surely the actions of the 60th battalion, described in the enclosed annex and recognized by Secretary Enrile in his statement of replacement which has led to the partial withdrawal of the 60th battalion from the province, are to be seen rather as expressions of coercion. Kalingas, NPC staff and PC have already died for this project and the rift between the people and the government seems to widen almost perceptibly. Certainly an examination of the earlier position of the Kalinga and Bontoc seems like an echo of a period of past naivety and accommodation that may now go beyond recall. (See Annex D) Even the maker of that speech, Mr. Bocalen, is now dead having been the victim of a PANAMIN helicopter crash.

The orientation of the type of development that we seek in this paper is one that says that development moves in line with and upon the level of the people to be developed. Thus, much of the input on the definition of goals and appropriate projects must come from the people themselves. Development is exactly what the word implies, a blossoming of what formerly existed. It is not imposition of alien forms into a local situation that leave the people without any understanding of their participation.

There is, of course, a central role for the government in coordinating, planning and overseeing the implementation of such projects that arise out of the continued dialogue with the people. The government should also be the formulator of policy suggestions, particularly when these go beyond the bounds of any one community or area. For this last, and also for all aspects
of development, government agencies have a crucial role in communicating policy suggestions and potential alternatives in development to the people. (See the section on mass media.)

As development is most accurately described by President Marcos as a social process definable in terms of commitment, the essential feature in any development is making the people aware of its benefits and gaining their support and participation in its planning and implementation. The section on communications and media included here makes detailed reference to certain imbalances that are manifest in the actual coverage of this project; however, there are some more general points that should be made here.

The presentation of most aspects of this paper has suffered from the difficulty of finding suitable available information. The available "research" documents on the Chico project, the NEDA, NIA, NEA, etc. reports are in our opinion insufficient for the formulation of opinions on the project's worth. The economic analysis in this paper brings up some questions that arise basically from the inadequacy of the available materials and hopefully we can be enlightened on some of these factors today. As it stands, the inevitable conclusion of the writers of this paper was that the present available publications are to be seen more as a rationalization of government projects rather than as a basis for decision-making and involvement by the people.

This assessment of inadequacy of information is, however, more serious even than this statement implies. This is the assessment of the group of social scientists who worked on this paper and were able to obtain copies of newspaper articles, government publications, and even question agencies of the government where information seemed lacking. Having obtained such materials, often by purchase, we were able to read and study. But the people we define as most in need of this information are those in the affected areas. To those people, these strategies are not necessarily available. These documents are not available in all or in any part of the affected area and because of previous neglect in the region it cannot be assumed that all those affected by the project have the capacity to read such reports.

The communicating mechanism between the government and the people thus become of utmost importance and yet we feel it necessary to say, in our analysis, subject to abuse by the extension of the rationalization approach of the government reports. Examination of the reports of NPC and communication with NPC and World Bank personnel lead us to understand that the engineering feasibilities alone will not be completed before the end of 1979. In the light of this, however, is the circular of Governor Almasan (Annex B) to be understood as seeking people's participation. It would seem rather that the people are being treated as if incapable of participating. Equally, the threats implied for those unprepared to acquies to the survey of properties has no part in a true development of local potential. Rather than de-
velopment, such policies are liable to lead to either apathy and resignation or resistance and violence neither of which options is seen as desirable within the President's plans.

The circular of Governor Almasan is one manifestation of a disturbing trend in the communications between the government and the people. Through time and as a result of the repeated and firm resistance of the Bontoc and Kalinga people, statements of revision have been made in the original plan for a four-dam system along the length of the Chico: Sabangan, Sadanga, Basao, and Tomiangan.

Could we ask for a clear statement of the present government policy on the construction schedule for these four dams? In statements to the people, it has been suggested that Chico I will not be pushed through. Chico II has been suspended; Chico III cancelled by order of the President. If this is the case, why do all four dams plus one dam on the Tanudan river and one on the Pasil continue to appear in long term government development plans? At best there would seem to be an absolute breakdown of communication within the government agencies concerned with development and in their relation to the people. At worst, there is in this a positive deception of the people: a two-faced policy that makes placatory and/or derisory statements in the face of united opposition from the people of the valley, and yet the plans proceed inexorably along their original course without influence from the stated changes of policy.

The Philippines is a nation of diversity. Many languages are spoken in different regions and a variety of peoples have sustained their cultural heritage down to the present. These different peoples (4.5 million tribal Filipinos) inhabit different environments within the country and successfully exploit these varied environments to support and sustain life where many others would fail. Thus, the maintenance of the ecosystem of these large groups of tribal Filipinos provides support for a considerable proportion of the nation's citizenry almost or completely without the assistance of the central government. Their successful exploitation of their mountain environment prevents the swell of the landless poor of the countryside or the city unemployed.

If the model of development to be adopted for the Philippines is that of Western Europe, then obviously there is no model for such subsistence agriculturalists and such cultural diversity. Such people are far removed from that model of development. But does this mean that they cannot make their own contribution to the growth of the nation and the self-sufficiency of the people? There is a tendency with a certain model of development in mind, to see the minorities as the gravest problem in development; a problem that is to be solved by the most rapid and thorough assimilation of the mountain peoples into the body of the majority. To seek such an assimilation is to fail to appreciate the potential of such cultural diversity. First, the tremendous
potential of their present undeveloped state. Second, their pride in and commitment to their culture and home which provides exactly that impetus for development that the development plans seek. Third, their exploitation of marginal environments to the point of self-sufficiency or even surplus (e.g. the Benguet vegetable farmers).

Their ecological concern is often of the utmost subtlety exactly because the maintenance of ecological balance is often so crucial to their welfare. Here can be found the true guardians of the watersheds of the Philippines.

Destruction or preservation is dependent upon the consideration government gives to such peoples and the protection it affords them in their rights to land. They are then the land of such people — whether titled or because of their lack of sophistication, untitled — and guaranteed, not as some reservation segment of their former lands, which is liable to lead to the road of environmental destruction, but rather in its entirety. The Constitution of the Philippines makes such provisions but loses clarity by making reference to forest reserves and the alienability of all land within the nation at need.

Where material resources are limited, as in any Third World country, there is a temptation through exploitation of existing prejudices for some to be excluded from a share in national development. Such prejudices are manifest towards the minority groups in the Philippines and it is the responsibility of the development agencies and all arms of government to protect these minorities from such exploitation. Otherwise, the situation can arise where instead of being the major beneficiaries, minorities like the Kalingas and Bontocs become rather benefactors — asked to surrender their lands and self-sufficient livelihoods for ₱10,000.00 and a two-hectare relocation.

The prejudiced that sees Igorots as primitive, poor and dull might answer the earlier posed question of do they benefit from this project with an “of course, because now they will have contact with the lowlands and the chance to own lowland farms.” If the sections of this paper that make reference to the economic life of Kalinga communities is not sufficient to dissuade all from such opinions, we feel that we can do no better than to quote a military expert with two years of experience in anti-Kalinga campaigns:

Everything that can be promised them in the lowlands they already have in more abundance in their own villages; why should they leave their fields which are better cared for and richer than those of the [lowland] Christians? Destroying their terraces, or their retaining walls . . . would be no irreparable damage, . . . the work of restoring them would be nothing compared to what they would have to put forth to make them anew in the lowlands. Nor could they transfer the remains of their ancestors there, which for greater respect and veneration, they inter beneath their houses so they cannot be profaned. Without the need of proposing other reasons, the following occurs to us: is it possible with one stroke of the pen to eradicate the customs, religion . . . and independence of a whole people,
even if these people be Igorots? (Commander Evaristo de Liebana y Trin­
cada c. 1881)

The tendency in the development thrusts of the government has been
to contrast the local or minority interest with that of the majority. But
exactly because of the cultural diversity of the Filipino peoples, we would
suggest that this approach itself is flawed. When this argument is used in
Mindanao, Mindoro, Northern Luzon and elsewhere inevitably the question
arises: Who constitutes the majority? The designation of a people as a cul­
tural minority has been seen by some in the past as a license to expropriate
land and use the arguments of minority-majority and primitiveness versus
development. In the Philippines there is no one cultural group that can be
defined as a majority over all others and even if there were, distinct cultures
that form the framework of comprehension and the motivational basis for
action of a whole people cannot be swept aside by so crude an interpretation
of democratic process as asking the majority to vote on the sacrifice of the
minority. This applies at least equally to the present situation where decisions
emanate from the government without recourse to voting. These limitations
are recognized by the United Nations in their charter on Minorities and in
their commitment to oppose all manifestations of genocide.

It is quite possible for government agencies to ride upon existing pre­
judice and indulge in the temptation of exploiting cultural minorities differ­
ence to concentrated development on a smaller total population. The declara­
tion of a cultural minority should not be seen in this light as a charter to ex­
clude them from the fruits of development. Cultural pluralism if it is not
accompanied by an orientation that seeks through the protection of legal
and political rights to recognize the equality of all ethnic groups in the nation
can be an excuse for relying upon traditional self-sufficience of a minority to
disguise the inadequacy of government provisions in their favor.

There is considerable evidence to support this assertion in relation to
the peoples of all parts of the Cordillera.

The perceived development needs of the people of Kalinga are basic:
1) More than one government hospital to serve the five mountain municipali­
ties of the sub-province; 2) Provision of basic water supply services to the
villages; 3) Teachers for the schools, books with which to teach and adequate
classrooms in which to conduct lessons; 4) Reading rooms and reading mate­
rinals for those out of school; 5) Health care in the villages; 6) Basic adequacy
of road and trail provisions; and 7) Work opportunities within the Province.

These are but a few of the basic requirements that have long been in­
adequately catered for according to representatives of the Kalinga communi­
ties.

It is not surprising then to find a certain cynicism to the blooming of a
plethora of development agencies for the area only after the proposal to dis­
locate most of the people and use the area for the generation of hydroelectric power; a cynicism that is not dispelled by the limited area covered by the Kalinga Special Development Region and other recently involved agencies. There would seem to be little basic difference between the economic and social conditions of the people of “Upper Kalinga” and those of any other part of the Mountain Provinces except of course for the imminence of the dam construction and their resistance to it.

If the desire is truly to assist the development of those people from underprivileged areas, there is a need for the reconstitution of something akin to the formerly extant Mountain Provinces Development Authority rather than anything else with a more limited area of concern.

Engineering

The writers of this report do not presume to any engineering expertise and exactly for these reasons we feel the need for a detailed report that will answer the following doubts:

1. Are the shale and sandstone beds on which the dam is constructed ideal materials for dam foundation?
2. The Chico gorge would suggest the presence of a fault line in the area. Is there any truth in this?
3. This whole area is subject to severe earthquakes. What is the built-in capacity of the dam to resist such quakes? What differences do 1 and 2 make to these calculations?
4. What guarantees are there that the cracks in Ambuklao and the suggestion of the same in Pantabangan due to “skimping” on materials will not reoccur on this occasion?
5. Can maximum daily loads of sediment materials at 66,000 tons be regarded with complacency?
6. What will be the watershed protection measures to ensure no increase in siltation rates and how will these affect the people of the upper watershed?
7. What will be the additional rates of siltation from the mines within the watershed; i.e. Batong Buhay and the proposed mines within Mountain Province?
8. The materials produced as wastes from the mines have a toxic quality. What will be the effect of these materials upon the machinery of the dam, the life forms of the lake and most significantly the usefulness of the water for irrigation purposes?
9. The original engineering studies calculate the viability of the project in terms of a four-dam system. According to presently stated policy, only Chico IV will proceed. Therefore, the rates of sedimentation in four dams will not be concentrated in just one. By what factor will this reduce the life span of this one dam?
10. The Angat disaster destroyed lives, homes and other property. Has a disaster calculation been done for the area below the Chico dam to determine what would be the effect of a similar minor disaster or indeed of a major collapse?
11. The dam is only of limited life span. What plans are there to rehabilitate the area after final (projected 50 years) closure?
12. What are the NPC plans for the expansion of alternative sources of energy particularly geothermal energy but also localized water sources, tidal energy wind born and solar energy? What percentage of the total energy needs are projected as being satisfied by these sources within 25 year and what local research is being done?
MASS MEDIA AND THE CHICO RIVER DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

Earlier, we discussed development, laying stress on people's participation and involvement in any development project as central, if development is to take place at all. We also discussed the concept of national integration or development for national cultural minorities, both questions being central to the Chico River Development Project.

We shall now study the role of communication for development, particularly the role that communication has played in the Chico River Development Project.

Communication and Development

What is the role of communication in development? This question can perhaps be answered by delving into the concept of development communication, popular among media practitioners today.

Development is usually defined as an incremental process which starts with the diffusion of new information and technology which stimulates people to bring about a condition in the environment favorable for maximum productivity and general well-being.

Communication is a two-way process whereby a source transmits a message to a receiver directly or via a channel with the intent of changing the knowledge, attitude and/or behavior of the receiver. In this communication process, both the source and the receiver learn from each other.

Development communication is a two-way process whereby a source transmits service-oriented messages through different channels to different sectors so that they may learn to participate more actively in the attainment of sectoral and national goals which will contribute to the human well-being and environmental improvement. In short, development communication is a specialized form of communication primarily concerned with human development for greater participation in national development efforts.

The basic philosophy behind development communications is that information is one of the inputs to development. To coordinate national development efforts, there is a need to inform public officials and private citizens on all levels of the objectives, policies, and priorities in line with national development plans. People should not be merely passive onlookers but should be active participants in development projects; hence, there is a need for communication for education and motivation. Development communication is concerned with meeting this need. Within this context, development communication has also been defined as communication for planned change. It is communication that consciously promotes development. ("The Meaning of Development Communication," by Nora C. Quebral, Associate Professor and Chairman, Development Communication, College of Agriculture, UPLB)
A communication system in order to promote development must accomplish the following tasks:

1. Circulate knowledge that will inform the citizens of events, opportunities, dangers, and changes in their communities, the country and the world.
2. Provide a forum where issues affecting the national life may be aired.
3. Teach those ideas, skills and attitudes that the population needs in order to develop.
4. Create and maintain the consensus that is needed for the stability of the state. ("Communication Problems in National Development")

Note that we are talking here of the normative functions of the communication system, or the tasks that we should like it to perform, which may be quite different from those that it actually performs.

At this point, it becomes necessary to point out that if people are to be involved in development, it is important that communication does not mean information dissemination for policy justification but rather to allow participation in policy formation and implementation, and consequently, development.

Indeed, part of this paper is to assess exactly how well the communication system has promoted the cause of development, in the particular case of the Chico River Development Project.

A Historical Review of Communication Related to the Chico River Basin Development Project

As early as 1965, there was early opposition to survey work in connection with the Chico Dam Project because the people feared the drastic effects of the dam, judging from the experience of Benguet minorities of Binga and Ambuklao. In such a situation where mistrust of government exists, communication is obviously of central importance.

Early in 1974, the government decided to push through with the Chico River Development Project when the higher prices of oil made the prospect of hydroelectric power highly desirable. Without making any efforts to communicate with the people, NPC resumed survey work in Cagaluan in February, 1974.

In March and April 1974, meetings were called with the people of Kalinga by the Pasil Mayor and General Tranquilino Paranis. The people appealed for protection of their interests, but the government was only interested in pushing through with survey plans.

The people then appealed to provincial authorities to make their situation known to the President of the Philippines through proper channels but their appeals were not heeded. The non-response from the provincial officials made the people decide to send delegations to Manila in an effort to gain an audience with the President. Five delegations went to Manila in 1974 to seek the help of the Department of National Defense, the Office of the Assistant
Executive Secretary, Governor Puzon and Commissioner Sinsuat of the CNI in arranging a meeting with the President, all of which were denied.

In the meantime, the local clergy of Kalinga made formal representation at the barracks of the PC in Bulanao to air their grievances against the maltreatment of the people by PC and NPC members. A letter was also written to General Tranquilino Paranis, suggesting that the authorities look for an adequate relocation site and avoid maltreating the people while preparing the project. Under these conditions, the priests of Kalinga promised their support and cooperation. Suggestions were also made by the Apostolic Vicariate of the Mountain Provinces for a socioeconomic survey to be conducted in affected barangays along the Chico River. To facilitate their work, Bishop Brasseur commissioned the Asian Social Institute to carry out Phase I which would provide information on the Philippine government plan regarding the Chico River Basin Development Project and requested his research unit to undertake Phase II, a study of the socioeconomic and cultural implications of the Chico River Development Project for the people along the Chico and Pasil Rivers in the Mountain Province and Kalinga-Apayao.

Phase II never went off the ground because no permit was granted to proceed with the research as requested by the Montañosa Social Action Center.

While the delegations went to Manila, the people of Kalinga at the same time tried to reach the President through petitions forwarded through the Department of Local Government and Community Development. In all these petitions, the people now strongly opposed the construction of the hydroelectric dam along the Chico River.

On September 29 to 30, 1975, the clergy of the Vicariate of the Mountain Provinces took a common stand on the developments related to the Chico River Basin Development Project; Part of their position stated the following:

We, the clergy of the Vicariate of the Mountain Provinces, in no way oppose the Chico and Agno River Basins Development Projects as potential means of bringing progress to the people living along these rivers, to the region and to the nation as a whole.

We strongly protest, however, the manner in which the government has so far tried to push through with the projects with almost total disregard for the people's right to representation and participation in the decision-making process. To our knowledge, there has never been a serious consultation with the people on definite relocation and rehabilitation plans.

We are aware, as our people are too, that the government, in all its projects, including the most recent ones involving the dislocation of the people, has so far failed to show any successful resettlement and rehabilitation of the people affected.

We consider the lack of serious dialogue between the government and the people of the Chico and Agno River Basins, compounded by the lack of credibility on the part of the government, as one of the reasons, if
not the main one, of the people's opposition to the projects. (Social Action Center Report)

The struggle of the Bontocs and Kalingas to fight for their rights was not commented upon by the national media nor had it been brought to the attention of the public-at-large. The Baguio Midland Courier which attempted to air the dispute was ordered to desist. Referring to P.D. 576 the editors were told that a news blackout was ordered by "higher authorities."

The issue of the Chico River Basin Development Project was the subject of an open letter written by Mariflor Parpan, a Filipino anthropologist, to Bishop Claver asking for his assistance on the problem. This letter entitled "The Kalingas" was published in The Communicator on January 15, 1975.

On March 12, 1975 a letter to Father Pacifico Ortiz by Bishop Claver entitled "Little People" was also published in The Communicator. This letter discussed the dilemma of the Bontoc people regarding the Chico River Basin Development Project. Summoned by the Bontoc people after their unsuccessful representation in Manila, Bishop Claver then wrote his open letter to the President on April 25, 1975.

At this point, a conflict situation already existed in the area, wherein the people were thinking of taking up arms to defend their lands.

From May 12 to 13, 1975 the issues brought out by Bishop Claver were taken up in the Vochong Conference for development held in Quezon City under the auspices of the Share and Care Apostolate for Poor Settlers. The conference was attended by some 150 Bontocs and Kalingas.

It was during this conference that the leaders of the Bontoc and Kalina signed a peace pact among themselves enumerating the terms under which they would unite to oppose the construction of the hydroelectric dam along the Chico River.

The conference also decided to forward the letter to Bishop Claver as an expression of the common sentiment of the Bontoc and Kalinga delegations to the Vochong Conference. This was hand-carried by Bishop Gaviola to the President in the presence of Defense Secretary Juan Ponce Enrile on May 15, 1975.

Letters were similarly forwarded to Robert McNamara, President of the World Bank and Filemon Rodriguez, President of the Engineering and Development Company of the Philippines, asking them not to be a party to the virtual genocide of the people of Bontoc and Kalinga.

Reporting to the Bontoc and Kalinga people, Bishop Gaviola said the President recognized the need for consultation with the people on the proposed dam project but due to pressing business he would not be able to meet them at the moment. The President also declared his adherence to the sentiments of the people and his opposition to any move that would destroy the culture and heritage of the cultural communities. Subsequently, Executive Secretary Alejandro Melchor went to Bontoc on May 22, 1975 and told
representatives of the NPC, PC, and the governor's office that instructions had been issued to stop the survey and all other activities related to the Chico River Basin Development Project. A sociological study and an educational campaign to discuss the merits of the hydroelectric plant were ordered. This news was conveyed by Secretary Melchor in a letter to Bishop Claver dated June 3, 1975. The temporary suspension of the Chico River Basin Development Project forced the government to other possible areas such as the Agno River Project. After a few months of drilling at Dalupirip, Itogon, Benguet, the NPC found the rock formation of Taboo too weak to carry the proposed dam. The NPC silently withdrew the equipment and manpower from the scene.

The August 12, 1975 issue of the Times Journal reported that a Human Settlements Committee composed of various government officials had been formed to attend to all Kalinga families to be affected under the Chico IV project. The main aim of this committee was to construct a model community which would cover an area of 100 hectares in Cadaclan. Barrio teams were formed appealing to the people to vacate their lands and give way for the construction of Chico IV. The project called "Mampiyaan Program" was presented as a bright prospect for the building of the dam and received coverage in local and national media. The Kalingas, according to news items, at last agreed to this proposal while awaiting further government plans. This agreement was considered as an indication that earlier opposition was based on distrust of government because of previous acts. This former distrust had seemingly disappeared.

Another article published in the April 1975 issue of Asian Alternatives which attempted a more in-depth analysis of the issue was branded subversive and dangerous and led to the resignation of Professor J. Rocamora as Director of the Academic Instruction Division of the Philippine Center for Advanced Studies.

In a formal letter signed by the President of the Kalinga Municipal Bodong Federation and the Bodong, Inc. dated September 13, 1975, the Kalingas restated their opposition and pointed out that they had always been opposed to the construction of the Chico hydroelectric dams. They further aired their concern over the government-controlled media's continuous dissemination of distorted information concerning the dam project and the people's response to it, over the moves of the provincial and municipal officials to divide the people through persistent campaigns and petitions for reconsideration of the dam project and over the fact that the officials heading the various task forces of the "Mampiyaan" project are known to be proponents of the Chico River Basin Development Project.

During an emergency meeting of the Kalinga Bodong held on October 22, 1975, it was resolved that all Kalingas and Bontocs of the affected areas be prohibited from accepting the offer presented in the "Mampiyaan" project.
that whoever will be identified as an acceptor would be considered a traitor and violator of the "Pagta ti Bodong" and as such will be punished.

On October 29, 1975 PANAMIN arrived in Kalinga and what followed was a series of acts which only succeeded in further alienating the people of Kalinga. Using bribery, deception and force, Secretary Elizalde inveigled pangats and peace pact holders to sign letters and petitions endorsing the PANAMIN as the exclusive authority to deal with their problems including the Chico IV dam. Signatories often had to sign blank sheets accompanied by envelopes of money. Aside from these resolutions, the barangay officials also were made to sign a letter addressed to President Marcos unanimously and unqualifiedly endorsing the construction of the Chico dam. Of the 68 signatories, 52 came from areas not directly affected by the Chico IV. PANAMIN also invited the people of Kalinga to form a delegation to Malacañang, an invitation which caused a divided stand among the people. Some Kalingas decided to go to Manila but a decision was taken for the delegates not to sign anything. Pasil residents decided not to join the delegation to Malacañang.

The national papers of December 14 all carried articles about a Kalinga delegation to Malacañang. According to the stories the President and Mrs. Marcos entertained the Kalinga braves who called on the President in December 12 to pledge their support for the construction of the three dams — Chico III being cancelled — along the Chico River. (December 13 in the Times Journal, Daily Express, and the Tribune; December 14 in The Sunday Express; December 15 in the Evening Post.) Commenting on the support of the Kalingas, the press statement read: "It speaks very greatly of the greatness of the Kalinga people. It was a difficult decision to make, as it involved great sacrifice on their part."

A press release dated December 12, 1975 from the Presidential Press Staff, Malacañang said further:

Formerly strong oppositionists of the NPC project, the Kalinga leaders supported the dam project after being convinced by Secretary Elizalde that the construction of the dam will redound to the good of everyone concerned, the Kalingas, particularly. Accordingly, the leaders unanimously adopted resolutions endorsing the program and pledging their support and cooperation to the administration.

Later, the Kalingas who were part of the delegation had this to say:

The constant pressure kept us up for four or five days and nights ... the question was whether to sign or not and the possible consequences ... these were simple blank sheets, six of them with our names already typed and no texts ... you are not forced to sign ... but if you do not sign you will not go back with the others ...

Elizalde presented us as the recognized Kalinga leaders who came to express their desire to cooperate with the government in the development of Kalinga ... no one dared to protest ...
After these, again a series of petitions were sent to Malacañang restating the people's opposition to the project and inviting President Marcos to Kalinga because previous delegations in the past were not successful. Furthermore, members of the PANAMIN-sponsored delegation to Manila formulated a letter to the President retracting all documents signed in Manila since the signatures attached to said documents either belonged to people from non-affected areas or were obtained under duress. The letter restated the delegates' original opposition to the dam in behalf of and in consultation with their people.

The activities of the PANAMIN in Kalinga aroused the concern of the Church and efforts were made to make the government realize the deteriorating situation. In a fact-finding mission meeting at Camp Aguinaldo, Bishop Brasseur informed Secretary Barbero of PANAMIN activities and he said that NPC or PANAMIN had "really low, low credibility with the people, so far because of the deceit they employ."

What follows is a brief review of major efforts by government to work on a relocation scheme while continuing to pursue additional work:

1. In February 1977, thirty-seven Kalingas were arrested while trying to block the unloading of construction materials for an NPC camp at Cagaluan.
2. By March 1978, thirty housing units had been completed at the Gobgob relocation site, which to date are not yet occupied.
3. In November 1978, Governor Amado Almazan restated the government's intention to push through with the dams. (See Annex B)
4. In December 1978, another peace pact was held at Bugnay, Tinglayan, Kalinga reaffirming opposition to the dam.

In the national newspapers, except for reports from local correspondents, all releases emanated from the government. In the international press, reports were made by correspondents who visited the area and tend to present the government side, the people's opposition and the tense situation prevailing in the area. From this we immediately see a lack of independent coverage of the project and the absence of sufficient links with the people or for the people to have a voice in media. Editorials and columns have mainly dealt with sources of conflict in the Chico River Basin Development Project, tracing this to the clash of tradition and development and later government mishandling of the project through lack of information dissemination, the PANAMIN, and military abuses.

Suggestions call for the following:

1. More effective means of information dissemination.
   The ignorant hill people deserve to be informed on why they have to move elsewhere and make way for the advance of progress. (Bigornia, January 21, 1979)

Only after information has been effectively disseminated can construction proceed without bloodshed.
2. Prudence on the part of the government (Baguio Midland Courier, Dec. 17, 1978)

What is of great interest to the mountain people, however, is how the government shall proceed with the project despite seeming continued opposition and how the administrators of the project propose to overcome this and resolve the matter peacefully and fairly.

How well the situation will be dealt with will eventually tell on the attitude of all mountain residents towards other similar projects the government may wish to undertake in the area. This is why it is of utmost importance that as little mistakes be committed and as few discordant notes be struck on the way towards building the dam.

3. Government sincerity by providing adequate relocation.

All editorials and columns grant that the Chico River Basin Development Project means development and progress in which a minority will have to give way for the needs of the majority.

There is no questioning the validity of the development gains of the project nor the correctness of government policy: Thus the problem is perceived mainly as a problem of implementation.

The unpalatable Chico (June 20, 1976 Rhyme and Reason by Bembo Afable):

1. Giving preference to development or honoring a minority’s traditional rights is a dilemma that has always plagued many well-meaning government plans. Modernization has always been an intrusion into the lifestream of cultural minority groups . . .

   . . . needless to say this project [Chico Dam] will redound to the benefit of millions living in the Luzon area since it will be one of the main sources of electricity for that area. It will also help the national economy by alleviating our dependence on petroleum-fired power generators which, in the face of the present oil crisis, is exacting a monumental financial burden.

2. Progress Comes to K-A (December 14, 1975, by Eduardo Lachica)

*Feature Articles*

The feature articles studied: “Peace Comes to the Chico River” (Panorama, November 13, 1977 by Alfredo T. Daguio); “$800M Worth of Power” (Naomi Balingit-Reyes); “Damming the Chico River” (Edwin Daiwey, WHO?, September 2, 1976); and “Bodong: the Many Uses of Peace” (WHO?, January 20, 1979, by Noel Villalba) while generally covering history, rationale and problems of the project, have sharply different conclusions on its prospects and desirability. Alfredo T. Daguio and Naomi Balingit-Reyes view the project as highly desirable and having the people’s support, while Edwin Daiwey and Noel Villalba question the desirability of the project and present the people’s opposition.
A Study of the Coverage of Commercial Media on the Chico River Development Project

In the previous section, we tried to trace the history of the implementation of the project to illustrate the serious breakdown in communication between the government and the people. We shall now try to assess the actual media coverage of the Chico River Development Project.

The study was done on commercial print media—locally the Gold Ore and the Baguio Midland Courier, nationally the Times Journal, Daily Express, and Bulletin Today, and the national magazines Panorama and WHO? and some international publications for the period 1975 to early 1979. Studies were also made on institutional media including church, school and institutional publications of agencies concerned with development.

In the Baguio Midland Courier, there were 46 articles directly dealing with the Chico River Project during the period covered. Of this total, 42 were news articles concentrated on the KSDR, PANAMIN, relocation, and efforts of the government to standardize the Bodong, making it compatible with national law particularly to endorse the Chico Project and oppose the NPA; and four were on the people's opposition. Six editorial columns and one feature story underlined the seriousness of the problem and called for sincerity and dialogue. The importance of adequate relocation was also stressed.

In the Gold Ore, there were a total of 11 articles on the Chico River Development Project out of a total 21 articles dealing with K-A. Of the 6 news articles, one was on the arrest of 37 Kalinga oppositionists; one on the relocation plans of the government; one on the people's petition to President Marcos; one on the Bodong held in December 1979; and two on the government's intentions to push through with the Project.

The five feature articles were distributed as follows: two on the Bodong; two on the sources of conflict; and one on KSDR (Government Report).

In the national newspapers, based on incomplete files, notable news items covered the following topics:

1. People's opposition to the project
2. Resettlement moves
3. People's meeting with President Marcos
4. NPA activities
5. Pull-out of the 60th Batallion
6. KSDR-PANAMIN leadership

In the international publications studied were articles on: "Dam War on the Chico River" (Time, January, 1979); and "The Battle for Chico River" (Far Eastern Economic Review).

With regards to the sources of the articles, in the Baguio Midland Courier, all 5 news articles were based on interviews or press releases of the
government, which corresponds to the number of stories dealing with the people's opposition. These articles were:

1. "Petition for Discipline of Military men" (November 12, 1978)
2. "PC Soldier Ambushed in Kalinga" (June 5, 1977)
3. "In K-A: Hold PC Civilian Talks" (October 10, 1977)
4. "Kalingas Still Opposed to River Dam Project" (October 30, 1977)
5. "Chico Development Project Oppositors Persist" (January 14, 1979)

In the Gold Ore, of the seven news articles, four were from independent sources and three were from the government:

1. "Largest Relocation Lot Lubuagan Damsite Dwellers"
2. "Tribesmen Ask FM to Visit People in Damsite Areas"
3. "Kalinga Damsite Opposition Arrested"
4. "Lubuagan Tribesmen Still Oppose Dams"
5. "Tabuk Residents Protest Mauling of Parish Priest"
6. "Government to Push Soonest Construction of Chico River Dam"
7. "Tribal Leaders Firm up Peace Pact Against Chico Dam"

Such divergent reporting can only reflect different viewpoints on development and the source of information. In terms of adequacy in the quantity of the articles, it can be noted that there is a discrepancy in number of articles published between the local publications, and between the local and national publications. Between the BMC and the Gold Ore, there is a discrepancy of more than 400 percent in terms of coverage. Eleven versus 48 for the period covered.

This may be accounted for by the fact that the BMC has a Cordillera Page and a Cordillera Editor, while the Gold Ore does not. However, most of the BMC reports are from press releases and interviews with government and military officials. The five news articles dealing with the people's opposition were those emanating from independent sources. Thus we see a whole area for independent coverage of the project which is virtually untapped or unused.

There is also a difference in the frequency of coverage between the local and national publications. Similarly, most reports are from government sources, while a few dealing with the opposition are from local correspondents of the newspapers.

But again, adequacy is not only a matter of getting enough coverage in mass media. Development communication as purposive communication for planned change requires going beyond facts and reporting them (if indeed we have the facts straight), interpreting them and advocating recommended solutions.

When there exists such divergent reporting on a situation, there obviously is a need to define the problem in order to provide a wide enough base for consensus to be reached. In the special case of development for national cultural minorities, there already exists some bias and misinformation, and problems towards integration. It is easy enough to see how this
lack of understanding and bias may be used not towards unification but towards fragmentation. And this would go against the goals we have set for national unity and development.

Effectivity of Mass Media in Communication for Development

It needs to be pointed out that mass media is not necessarily committed to development communications. Its traditional role is to inform and educate a mass audience on all matters of public interest as its publishers and editors see fit. In the Philippine situation today, as promulgated by the Philippine Council for Print Media, "The publisher has the responsibility of enforcing self-discipline among his staff. In other words, the government expects media to exercise self-censorship. The standards for excellence will be drawn up and enforced by the publications themselves." This would partly explain the difference in treatment of the various publications among commercial media, and between commercial media and institutional media.

Also, institutional media are more closely linked with the research system of development communication, rather than with the linkage system of which mass media is a part. Obviously, there has to be a close relationship between the two if media is to come up with more effective communication for development. It is in this way also, that the products of research can best be utilized for development. However, it is one thing to come up with meaningful messages and it is another thing to get the messages across.

Who have the mass media reached with their coverage on the Chico River Basin Development Project? A study of Philippine mass media will show that what exists is a city-based media catering to the upper income brackets of the urban population. In such a situation, the rural populace is not only unreached by the media message, but is also voiceless in the supposed dialogue or forum which media is supposed to provide in the formation of public opinion.

Decision-makers or the government, in turn, does not learn anything new from the people, but only reads its own press releases to confirm the correctness of its policy.

In a situation where there has been a breakdown in the communication channels using government or traditional structures, there is now no way to achieve the communication necessary for development. It is clear that one prerequisite factor for development communications is the availability of channels going out to and feeding all segments of the population. In the case of the Chico River Basin Development Project, we have seen the grave problem existing in this area. The channels of communication have to be reopened and strengthened to reach a consensus on the problem. Another need is for a pool of communicators who understand what development is and who can competently and responsibly communicate the information that will support the process. Even in this area, there is still much to be done.
What Might Be Done to Help in Communication for Development

1. The government should uphold a policy of full dissemination of information on development plans not only for policy dissemination and justification but to allow participation in policy-formation.

2. The government and media should thresh out broad guidelines on questions of “national security” to help towards solving problems related to censorship. Without such guidelines “self-censorship” of the press will lead to a timid press.

3. The publishers and editors of mass media should define their commitment to development and development communication as part of their editorial policy.

4. The mass media should broaden coverage of provincial development in terms of correspondents and pages devoted to provincial news.

5. Journalists oriented towards development should be well-informed on development and should be in close touch with the people affected by development.

6. The research system or social science research should be closely linked with mass media in the formulation of development messages.

THE RELOCATION SCHEME OF THE GOVERNMENT

The Chico River Basin Development Project is a national developmental program that will dispossess at least 15,000 Kalinga and Bontoc families, or approximately 100,000 individuals, from their ancestral landholdings. When construction starts, what will happen to these countless Igorot families who have never been truly integrated into the mainstream of our national life?

The government asserts that before the construction should commence, provisions shall be made for the relocation of these affected families to environs that will permit the least difficult adjustment to the new surroundings. It has promised that it shall make available facilities and services so as to ensure that the relocated families shall not all break down in mass social disorientation and trauma.

On the other hand, affected Kalinga and Bontoc families have time and again rejected relocation offers of the government. They accuse the government of insincerity, pointing at the latter’s absolute failure to consult them, the people most affected by the project. They charge that if the government were truly taking the interests of the Kalingas and Bontocs at heart, it should have made some attempt to seek the participation of the people in the program planning and implementation. But this, the government has failed to do. From the very start, the government has not initiated a real dialogue with the people because plans already made should not be offset by what they have termed the stubborn refusal of a handful of unwieldy Igorots to sacrifice in the name of national development and economic progress.
And who can blame the Kalingas and the Bontocs? They are well aware of the sad cases of Ambuklao, Binga, and Pantabangan — huge man-made lakes which dispossessed countless of laboring Filipino families from their small landholdings. Today, years after the dam constructions, many dispossessed are drifting with no permanent homes and lands to till.

**The Ambuklao and Binga Relocation**

Indeed the experience of Ambuklao and Binga families, themselves Igorot people, is one that bears heavily on the minds of the Chico-affected Kalingas and Bontocs. Built during the mid-forties, the Ambuklao and Binga dams of the National Power Corporation (NPC) displaced more than 700 families from their landholdings with many promises for relocation. Today, more than 20 years after the construction of the dams, 728 dislocated families are still landless, demanding for the promised and long-overdue resettlement.

Much talk but no action has characterized the fight of the dislocated families to win relocation. It is to be recalled that the crusade of the Ambuklao and Binga people for decent resettlement started as early as 1948. It was only in 1975 that Presidential Proclamation 1498 was issued allotting 40,000 hectares of land within the municipalities of Dupax and Maddela in Nueva Vizcaya and Quirino provinces (widely known as the Conwap Valley) for the resettlement of the displaced families.

However, in the resettlement conference of June 1977, Ambuklao and Binga families were only listed as third priority in the disposition of Conwap Valley. The original Ilongot settlers in the area, and the landless migrants within the territory were given first and second priorities, respectively. Compounding this problem of long overdue relocation is also that of unpaid compensation for properties submerged by the dams. Appraised at a very low rate of ₱0.10 per square meter of agricultural land, ₱0.25 per square meter of rice land, and ₱0.50 per square meter of residential lot, former residents claim that even these meagre sums are still partially unpaid.

With no land to till, many of them put up temporary shacks in the mountainsides to cultivate small camote plots, or above the lakes to fish what little catch they can get. Because of the long delay in resettling the displaced families, the provincial government of Benguet cannot even determine the exact number of families entitled to relocation. Meantime, while all the talk goes on, the displaced families of Ambuklao and Binga are suffering the consequences of unfulfilled government promises.

**Pantabangan Experience**

A similar sad experience is repeated in Pantabangan, Nueva Ecija. In 1969, the Pantabangan dam was constructed to generate 100 megawatts of
hydroelectric power. With its construction, the Pantabangan dam was projected to contribute considerably to the country's import savings especially with the rising cost of crude oil from the oil-producing countries. With its construction, however, several barrios covering a total of 7,000 hectares, 2,600 of which were lowland rice farms, were submerged, thereby displacing more than 2,100 families.

Prior to the dam construction, promises were abundant. The people would be duly compensated for properties lost. They would also be provided with a prepared resettlement site complete with housing and community facilities like a concrete municipal hall, school buildings, a public market, etc. Skills training would also be administered to help them adjust to the change in the mode of livelihood. Besides, plenty of work opportunities would be available to them once the construction started.

The Human Settlements Development Plan for Pantabangan conceived in November 1974 laid down a complete resettlement program designed to meet adjustment problems that would emerge. Sponsored by the Development Academy of the Philippines, it brought together government agencies involved in the problem of resettlement — the National Irrigation Administration (NIA), Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), Bureau of Forest Development (BFD), Bureau of Fisheries, U.P. Institute of Planning, and the Integrated Development Program of Nueva Ecija. The people of Pantabangan were represented by heads of various sectors with Fr. Cornillo van der Aar acting as the overall head. The interagency approach to resettlement was employed to answer "the need for an integrated action to necessarily lessen if not entirely solve" the problems of resettlement.

The plan called for the compensation of damaged properties of Pantabangan residents, the construction of town facilities and infrastructure (including roads, schools, a municipal building, markets, warehouses, barrio and training centers, cemetery, water system, electric power system, and low cost core houses), and the development of sources of livelihood of the people, primarily through the distribution of farm lots with an area of 2.5 to 3.5 hectares each.

The attendant problems to successful resettlement were identified by the interagency body as the following: physical problems covering low domestic water supply, erosion in some selected sites, inadequate number of farm lots, transportation shortage attributed to bad roads, lack of public buildings, rehabilitation of watershed areas, and reforestation of the main reservoir; economic problems covering agriculture, manufacturing, commerce, both internal and external; public services and finance, in the form of loans and dole-outs; and social problems, major among which was the preservation of individual and community identity.

It is indeed ironic that the resettlement of the displaced families in New Pantabangan was carried out. As early as November 1974, the lack of wisdom
in tapping New Pantabangan for long-range development that can yield a viable and economically stable community was already pointed out by the participating government agencies.

_The Human Settlements Development Plan for Pantabangan_ states:

Based on our assessment of the physical characteristics of the area, particularly the new town site, we have come to the conclusion that any effort to fully develop the area will be very costly and will produce limited results. The area is not suited for extensive agriculture. It is mountainous and its topsoil has been scraped. Erosion is an ever present danger. Industries have to be limited because the surrounding areas are watershed areas and must be as protected from pollution. The elevation of the present site is so high that a water pumping system will cause a huge drain on the electricity generated by the Pantabangan dam, not to mention the cost to be incurred. At best the development that can be achieved can only be subsistent.

In this connection, we feel that it will be best for the government to utilize its resources in developing an alternative site for long-range development that can yield a viable and economically stable community that can absorb settlers who will later on discover that living in the resettlement site is unrewarding... To develop an alternative site is to provide the answer to an inevitable problem in the future.

What happened after construction had started and promises had been given? The advance closure of the dam tunnels, precipitated the early demolition of the houses and the disorganized ferrying of properties to the resettlement site, which had not been adequately prepared for the influx of the displaced people. The Pantabangan residents were rendered homeless while clearing and levelling of lots in portions of the resettlement area were still being worked out. Families discovered that lots designated for them were unfit for occupancy. Most were forced to settle in hastily-built bunkhouses in the new town site.

Today, more than four years after the actual transfer in 1974, various problems of adjustment to the unfamiliar environment have already become recurrent. Many of the houses which were only partially completed at the time of occupancy collapsed when a typhoon struck shortly after the transfer of the affected population. Those built on sloping ground and weak earth likewise gave way. During the typhoons that hit this area, the market building was utilized as an evacuation center. Roads are still unasphalted and are stony and dusty during the dry season. When the rains come, they become muddy and impassable. Consequently, the people have concluded that the relocation site is not suitable for residential as well as agricultural purposes. Farming which used to be the main source of income of the Pantabangan residents proved to be unproductive in the new environment. An important point here is that when the area was bulldozed to level the relocation site, the minerals and nutrients of the soil necessary to nourish and sustain plant life, were like-
wise bulldozed away. There is also an acute lack of water for agricultural purposes.

Promises for job opportunities were fulfilled only during the actual construction of the dam. Now that the dam is finished, the people face the problem of uncertain sources of income.

Reluctantly, the people of old Pantabangan sacrificed their lot in the name of national progress. For the sake of massive irrigation and electrification and other energy needs, they left their homes and landholdings. And how have they been repaid?

One of the fears expressed by the Chico dam oppositionists is that the experience of those relocated from Ambuklao, Binga and Pantabangan will be replayed for those relocated from the Chico. While we cannot assume off-hand that what has happened elsewhere will happen again, neither can we find concrete evidence that the lessons have been learned and that a guarantee is extended against such a repetition. All we know is that to this day, resettlement areas are severely deprived of basic resources and options to improve their situation.

For the relocatees, relocation did not mean a temporary trauma while adjusting to the new environment but a long-term and continuing struggle to regain a capacity for at least subsistence, a control which the people formerly had within the limits of their traditional situation.

The Early Promises for Relocation

The first talk of relocation for the Chico affected people came in October 1975, more than two years after Lahmeyer International had submitted to the Philippine government its pre-feasibility study on the energy potentials of the Chico River. By this time, Lahmeyer International had already accomplished the definite design for Chico II and IV, financing the costs thereof.

Project "Mampiya-an" was launched in October 1975 "to assure the villagers of proper and humane relocation." This project involved a multi-agency task force for relocation which announced that survey work should be started soon on the first 150-hectare pilot site that will accommodate 75 families (2 has. per family). For this pilot site, a cost schedule amounting to a total of ₱5,020,750 was approved, with a work schedule that would see completion of the project after two years. Like previous relocation programs elsewhere in the country, project "Mampiya-an" promised the construction of a school, market, health center, water works system, barangay hall, recreation center, parks, and flood control and drainage systems.

It is interesting to note that project "Mampiya-an" was announced at a time that the Bontoc and Kalinga dam oppositionists were celebrating what they thought was a "victory" over the dam project that would dispossess them of their homes and landholdings. In June 1975, then Executive Secretary Alejandro Melchor ordered the suspension of all operations at the dam sites and
the withdrawal of NPC personnel and equipment from the area. This followed the public statement of President Ferdinand E. Marcos that he “would not allow the destruction of the culture and traditions of cultural communities.”

Suspension of operations in the dam site was an offshoot of the significant Vochong (Bodong) Conference held in Quezon City from May 10 to 12, 1975. Here, 150 Bontoc and Kalinga leaders met with various support groups, and declared a consolidated stand of opposition against the Chico River Basin Development Project.

After the suspension of NPC activities in Bontoc and Kalinga, the announcement of project “Mampiya-an” showed the affected people that the dam issue was far from shelved.

In November, a month after the announcement of project “Mampiya-an”, PANAMIN entered Kalinga charged with the task of minimizing opposition to the Chico 4 Project.

Even at the late date of November 1975, it was clear that NPC had, as yet, not conducted a thorough count of the affected population. In like manner, they had not yet mapped out a program for relocation designed to meet problems of adjustment that would undoubtedly arise. They later stated that the total relocation of some 554 families affected by the dam project was expected to be completed in 10 years. This would involve a total relocation area of about 650 hectares. The sites of some, however, were still to be determined. Statements like this made in 1975 contradict later statements made by the NPC and PANAMIN regarding the same matter of relocation, particularly the number of affected families and the total relocation area needed to accommodate them.

Naturally, the Kalingas and Bontocs, opposed as they were to the construction of the dams in their area, in like manner opposed the very idea of relocation.

It was in March 1976 that a more defined relocation plan came into the picture. On March 16, 1976, President Marcos issued a memorandum creating the Kalinga Inter-Agency Commission (KIAC) in order to “evolve an integrated and total approach for the development of the Chico River Project with the end in view of achieving with the least possible delay the development objectives of the Government in that area.”

With PANAMIN as coordinating agency, the participating agencies included the Department of Public Highways, the National Irrigation Administration, the Bureau of Forest Development, Bureau of Lands, National Power Corporation, Department of National Defense, Provincial Government of Kalinga-Apayao, Commission on Audit, Department of Local Government and Community Development, Department of Education and Culture, Department of Social Services and Development, Department of Public Works, Transportation and Communication, Department of Health, Department of
Public Information, Human Settlements Commission, National Electrification Administration, and the Kalinga Special Development Region.

Concerning resettlement, these agencies were assigned their individual responsibilities which were spelled out in the memorandum in line with the development of a relocation site to serve as a show window of the sincerity of the government. The procurement of relocation areas, including residential and farm lots, and the construction of residential houses, was the main responsibility of the NPC. The KIAC would implement the government's Total Integrated Development and Resettlement Program (TIDAR) which would actualize the directive of President Marcos that "before the dam is built, the Kalingas to be displaced are first properly resettled and contented with the land given them; that in all steps affecting the selection, choice and development of relocation sites, the people of the affected areas, or their leaders, should be made to participate."

The Bulletin Today dated April 14, 1976, reported that this integrated resettlement program would ensure the affected families resettlement of their own choice, adequate housing, adequate agricultural land (3 has. of farm land each and at least 10 has. of communal pasture land for each community), adequate water, roads and basic utilities, and social, cultural and economic development programs necessary to effectively bring about growth and development.

In July 1976, NPC announced the purchase of a 183-hectare lot in Gobgob, Tabuk owned by the Dangwa enterprises at P1.5M, more or less. The area was designated for 60 families, out of a total of at least 141 affected families, from Tanglag. To date, other sites have been selected for relocation, but negotiations with their owners are still going on.

Table 1 shows the distribution of the relocation sites. It will be noted that the total area of all the sites does not suffice to fulfill the promised three hectares per family. The Table also shows the type of activities that have been done in each site.

On August 8, 1976 PANAMIN Director J. Guerrero reported in the Bulletin Today that only 655 Kalinga families will be directly affected by the construction of the Chico dam and no Kalinga family will be moved until relocation sites are ready for habitation and productive community life. Note that the number of affected families according to Guerrero is way below the figures released by the provincial government of Kalinga in 1976. (See Table 1) He also reported that 92 percent of the Kalinga families directly affected by the dam construction had already signed up with PANAMIN for relocation. This statement has been refuted by the local inhabitants.

In November 1976 KSDR Administrator Tanding R. Odiem stated that the construction being undertaken in the relocation sites in Gobgob were already 90 percent completed, and that occupation by relocated families from
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AFFECTED BARRIOS</th>
<th>Number of Households</th>
<th>Relocation Sites</th>
<th>Number of Hectares</th>
<th>Activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Tanglag, Tabuk</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>Dangwa Ranch in Gobgob, &amp; Pilando Farm</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>Gobgob – selected, negotiated and under development Pilando farm – scouting and negotiation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Mabontot, Lubuagan</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>Dangwa Farm in Agbannawag, &amp; other farm lots in Agbannawag</td>
<td>660</td>
<td>scouting and negotiation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Dognac, Lubuagan</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>Pilando Farm, Ipil</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>scouting and negotiation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Dangoy, Lubuagan</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>Farm lots in Calagdao, Bulanao</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>scouting and negotiation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Dupag (Tomiangan), Lubuagan</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>Nambaran Airport Reservation</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>scouting and negotiation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Mabileng, Lubuagan</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>scouting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Poblacion, Lubuagan</td>
<td>354</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>scouting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Ableg, Lubuagan</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>Magsilay, Tucol</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>scouting and negotiation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Cagaluan, Pasil</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>scouting and negotiation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,572</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>1,210 has.</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Provincial Government of Kalinga-Apayao*
Tanglag could be done by April 1978. At about the same time, however, an independent news reporter who visited the relocation site reported:

Visible accomplishments are a one-storey school building which could probably house three rooms, and a far from finished residential mountain site with only crisscrossing bulldozed sections to show. The promised farm roads, residential roads, R.C. pipes, riprapping are yet to be seen. The finished accomplishments seem to have been done rather hastily and in a disorganized manner.

Resolution No. 77-32 of the National Power Board, dated February 25, 1977, contained the specific provisions of the government's original relocation scheme. Among others, it provided that families adversely affected by the project are entitled to:

- residential house and lot in a selected relocation site plus three (3) hectares of irrigated farm land or five (5) hectares of unirrigated farm land. Optionally, they could receive the money value of the farm lot and residential house and lot; and
- additionally, real properties such as land and its improvements, except residential houses and/or chattels that will be submerged or damaged by the construction shall be paid for.

This relocation offer was not accepted by the people.

Reviewing the relocation offer, however, an NPC memorandum report, dated July 11, 1978, stated that the provisions of said offer "indicate double compensation and is worth looking into for consideration if still possible." The memorandum further stated:

Relocation is a necessary part of project implementation. Relocation is, however, normally undertaken as part of project construction, that is, after the "GO" decision and funds have been made available for project implementation. Relocation work must be deferred until after a firm "GO" decision has been made.

Thus, what is the status of relocation at present?

On November 12, 1978 NPC President Itchon announced some changes in the relocation offer. The existing offer now provides that affected families will be awarded only two hectares of irrigated rice land plus ₱10,000 in cash with which to construct a house on the awarded residential lot, and to purchase farm implements. What is the basis for such an offer? Were studies conducted on the average Kalinga family income from its present landholdings, using such computation as a basis for the relocation offer? And why the reduction? (These questions are further discussed in the section on the social implications or relocation.)

If we look today at the Gobgob relocation site, the showcase of the government's sincerity to relocate the affected Kalinga families, we will note that the completed 32 housing units have been awarded only this year to various families — only a few of which are from Tanglag for which Gobgob was originally designated. A vast majority of the Tanglag families have stayed on
in their community, reaffirming their no-dam position, and refusing all offers for relocation.

With the history of Ambuklao, Binga and Pantabangan, and with their own difficult experiences regarding relocation, who can blame the Kalingas for being wary of the government’s relocation scheme?

RELOCATION AND ITS SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS

It would seem that often relocation is seen more as a solution to a political problem than as one oriented towards accommodating and facilitating the transfer of the people.

There are two elements of problems in a relocation that seeks to accommodate the people:

1. Those problems perceived by the local population; and
2. Those that can be perceived by an understanding of the relationship between the people, their culture and the physical environment.

A perusal of the report on events in 1974 shows that at that time the people were primarily concerned with the terms and conditions for relocation. At that time the report also suggested that the government agencies involved failed to satisfy the demands of the people. Furthermore, the people affected by the proposed construction of the dams seemed to have doubts regarding the credibility of the government agencies. Such doubts resulted from the knowledge of the sorry plight of people affected by the construction of similar dams in Ambuklao, Binga and Pantabangan. The validity of these doubts is touched upon elsewhere in this paper. The point here is that if we are in the “development business,” if we seek better lives for our citizens, we should do this through recognizing and dealing sympathetically with such suspicions. The people of Kalinga are aware of the experiences of people who have been affected by the dam projects in Ambuklao, Binga, and Pantabangan. As a consequence, they have become wary of the present plans for the development of the Chico River Basin. That is a very natural and human reaction. The best thing that can be done about this situation is to bring out all the doubts in the open, so that the people would be assured that the government is really aware of the mistakes made in the past and will try its best to prevent the same mistakes from being committed again. The Ambuklao and Pantabangan experience can be of value to future affected communities and the NPC and other implementing agencies.

In 1974, the people were awaiting relocation. The agencies were not ready. By 1976 a relocation site had been acquired, but the people’s resistance had also hardened. They saw the provision of only 32 units of housing for the more than 1000 families directly affected by the Chico 4 project. Such an inadequacy was interpreted as a move to scare the people into cutting their losses and surrendering to the pressures exerted by the agencies of
implementation. Visions of future dislocation for those who delay in accepting the government's offers made pragmatists of many.

Perhaps the reason why the Kalingas have in the most part responded so negatively to the relocation offers is NPC's failure to fill the pragmatist's minimum requirements. This failure, we feel, is a result of inadequate research into socially significant factors in relation to the project.

The Lahmeyer pre-feasibility engineering study referred to the need for a social feasibility study of the Chico project. Has this been done? If it has, how long did it take and who were the people involved in it? From our knowledge, no research of this kind has been done by any of the members of this professional body. Is it possible that there is another relevant body of professionals that has been involved in this project? Members of this group have had talks with the NPC on the possibility of doing such research, but nothing has materialized from these talks. Mr. Itchon has been the head of NPC for the past five years and we believe that had he approved a socioeconomic study of the project area, the present situation in the Mountain Provinces might be somewhat less tense than it is today. However, we are here to deal with the realities of this situation and not with what might have been. We have differed with Mr. Itchon in the perception of the importance of the relationship between an engineering and a social feasibility study. The suggestion of President Itchon was that research on the social aspect can go hand in hand with the actual construction stage of the project, thus giving primacy to engineering over social considerations. Such an orientation, we feel, reveals something rather disturbing about the general orientation of development manifest in this project.

Elsewhere in this paper some questions are raised regarding the overall economic gains claimed for this project and the way benefits are assumed and cost occasionally omitted from the calculations. We see what is happening in those cases as understandable within a certain perceptual framework, where benefit is estimated in terms of capital inputs, increase in GNP and rates of investment—a development that seeks to manifest itself in terms of the truly tangible, clearly calculable, prestigious and highly profitable benefits of massive infrastructure projects. Such a development thrust sees people, if at all, as recipients of development or frequently as a problem restricting and opposing development. Hence, the recognition of the need for engineering feasibilities but the suggestion that social feasibility studies while perhaps desirable in facilitating implementation can be dispensed with at need.

When President Itchon assumed office, he made it clear that he was interested in gaining knowledge of the social background of this situation. Materials were gathered and read and brief visits were made to the project area. It was at this point that the discussions with some anthropologists who have previously studied the area were conducted. Unfortunately, as mentioned earlier, these seemed to be fruitless, no doubt to both sides. The prob-
lem, as far as NPC was concerned, was how to make relocation acceptable without escalating the cost beyond the predefined budget. On the other hand, the anthropologists were more concerned with the people who would be affected and with the question of whether such a project should and could be implemented especially in the light of the existing mistrust of the people that has stemmed from previous unpleasant experiences.

In spite of the absence of a socioeconomic study of the region, however, President Itchon was still able to come up with the present revised offer of ₱10,000 and two hectares of land which once allocated cannot be resold within the lifetime of a tenant. Now this is a very precise offer, with a specific amount of cash and a specific amount of land. If this is based on an assessment of the present resources of the Kalingas and is an attempt to provide a just compensation for those affected, then NPC should bring this basis out for discussion during this conference. Sad to say, however, we cannot help but entertain doubts regarding this matter. The two hectares, presumably, is felt to be minimally the area of land capable of supporting a family without deprivations. But what is the real situation in the Mountain Provinces? At present, we find that the people have a self-supporting system. Some extra rice is purchased but this is mainly supplied by relatives who, having previously moved into the marginal lowland areas, produce surplus rice on plots considerably larger than two hectares. Almost all of the protein intake of the people is derived from the domestic animals or from beans produced in the kaingins. The kaingins are also able to supply the basic food requirements for the major domestic animal, the pig, which in turn can yield a whole range of food products.

The "kaingin system" itself, is in need of some discussion because too often, it is assumed that this is one single form of agriculture, exploitative and destructive of the environment in which it operates. This is not a necessary limitation of kaingin agriculture as can be seen from an examination of the U.N. report on the Hanunoo of Mindoro by Dr. H.C. Conklin. The two basic factors that centrally effect the productive and indefinite sustaining capacity of swiddens are the pressure on land and the ability supplied by the environment for that land to recover its fertility after use. In effect, these are aspects of the same point, if we assume that land with diminishing fertility will not be repeatedly used by farmers dependent upon its yields for their basic survival unless access to alternate areas is restricted in some way. It is also necessary, therefore, to make some general distinction between farmers who depend for their basic subsistence upon kaingin farming and those whose orientation may be more short-term and commercial, and possibly exploitative. Subsistence farmers are of course not necessarily exempt from the excesses of kaingin farming especially today where land within traditional swidden zones may be reduced in overall area by the actions of loggers, settlers, and dam builders but the assumption that this type of agriculture is
necessarily destructive is simple-minded and misguided and corollary argu-
ment that such types of agriculture are inefficient in comparison with more
settled farming is itself brought into question by Conklin and other recent
studies.

Where rainfall is heavy, topsoil is subject to erosion, leached soils com-
mon and dry seasons severe, kaingins can provide an attractive alternative to
settled farming. The soils are protected from the excessive force of the rains
by the overhead cover of remaining large trees and from erosion by the root
system. Moisture is held in the topsoil in such root systems and surrounding
uncleared forest. The kaingin through a correctly operated cycle of rotations
can sustain its fertility over long periods without expenditure other than
labor. The settled plot tends to demand increasing inputs of commercial fer-
tilizers to sustain, let alone increase, yields. With every oil increase and every
associated increase in the overall cost of living, these fertilizers are perceived
by the poor farmer as moving beyond his means. Pushed by such increase
into an evermore marginal position, expenses on fertilizers are one of the first
economies. Without such inputs, yields and soil fertility are both reduced.
Sometimes the reduction in soil fertility is even irreparable. Kaingin farming,
it is true, can never be intensive cultivation, and yields never reach record
proportions; but in some areas, they do provide a viable means of bringing
marginal land into production and sustaining it in that productivity.

Without detailed study, it is difficult to draw specific conclusions on
the areas affected by the Chico River Project but evidence suggests that the
areas of Pasil and Lubuagan are exactly and classically that kind of area where
such statements as the above may have validity. Pasil and Lybuagan, like much
of the eastern Cordillera, is subject to heavy rainfall. A marked dry season ex-
tends only for two months of the year and rainfall is present throughout the
rest of the year with noticeable peaks from August to September and from
December to January. Under these conditions, the regeneration rate of vege-
tation cover is rapid. Such an environment with careful management can
certainly remain productive and non-destructive of the local ecosystem. A
study of the exact nature of that management, for this and many other areas
of the country, is badly needed; but from the distance from which we observe,
there is no particular basis for assuming that the Kalingas of Pasil and Lubua-
gan, who have operated their present systems of farming in their present loca-
tions for a number of generations and who have defined specific rights and
boundaries in kaingin farming, are congenitally incapable of managing their
lands.

Beyond and around the kaingins, the Kalingas have extensive holdings
of fruit trees. These trees are of several kinds, and for the most part, supple-
ment the local diet. Whilst such fruits as orange and mango, that grow well
in the area, have a commercial value, alas for the people of Kalinga, they can-
not be fully exploited to this end because of their distance from major mar-
kets and most significantly because of the inadequacy and poor quality of the road links.

However, coffee is one exceptional fruit that defies these limitations and has, as a result, brought considerable benefit and private development to the sub-province. It thrives on the combination of rich soils and cool climate under the unskilled, but nonetheless considerable, care of their mountaineer cultivators. Income from coffee is now of major importance to many of the barrios directly affected by the Chico 4 project. In recent years, partly in response to the government’s green revolution program and partly out of a perception of self-interest, considerable areas of mountain land have been planted to coffee. Incomes up to ₱30,000 a year can be made by individual planters and agents.

The people now have a confidence in their own economic stability even within the modern economy and they can see the potential for further development. With the aid of agricultural advice on the care of their trees and the cooperative marketing of their produce, they could make great strides in development. It is exactly at this moment that they are being asked to subordinate their development to the needs of the dam project. They are being asked to relocate in an area where their valuable cash crop has been seen not to thrive and where even if it will grow, for five to ten crucial years of transition, they will be deprived of its income.

The provisions of relocation are also somewhat hard to correlate with a real concern for providing a viable alternative livelihood and development for the affected peoples. If it were, surely the original relocation offer would have been based on close and long consultation with the people. However, the original plans were formulated and land “purchased” through PANAMIN in early 1976. As PANAMIN only entered Kalinga in October 1975, any consultations cannot have been going on for long. Equally, the revised, that is, reduced offer of NPC was also formulated independently of the people. This offer has, as a basis for discussion, some points to warrant comment and consideration. However, to decide arbitrarily upon a certain amount of compensation without thorough research and dialogue is not to engage in development. It is a form of paternalism or dictatorship which can never be acceptable exactly because it seeks imposition rather than acceptance.

Beyond the purely economic, there are further factors that must be recognized as valid bases for the people’s reticence concerning relocation. Much has been made of previous reports and appeals of the people’s attachment to the home and final resting place of their ancestors. The people of the Mountain Provinces and Kalinga are known to engage in varying degrees and types of ancestor worship. It is therefore of utmost importance to sustain the links of the people to that homeland which is also the home of their ancestors. In this connection, it should be noted that Igorots go through great lengths to recover the bodies of those who die away from home. Many who
have died in the service of the Philippine government as members of the AFP have been recovered even at great expense and/or personal risk to close companions or relatives in order that they may be buried in their former mountain homes. This is not just sentiment. It is religion. What a project like this amounts to is a desecration. Neither is this a desecration at the same level as flooding a church would be in Christian belief. In localized belief of this kind, the whole religious complex is connected to the land which is the home of men, ancestors, spirits and gods. The present responsibility for maintaining all of these lies with the present live generation who have inherited this trust. The people further believe that all those who die become ancestors worthy of honor, respect and worship. If they are not afforded this respect, the consequences are dire for those alive.

Under traditional conditions, ancestors and other spirits occasionally bring sickness or premonitions of sickness to the living. Dreaming is particularly significant in this respect. It is often interpreted to mean contact with the spirit world and even without manifestations of sickness it forms sufficient basis for a feasting in honor of the ancestors. The relationship between the dreaming and waking states is complex and even after three generations of psychoanalysis it is still a subject of fierce debate. Equally, the relationship between physical illness and mental disorientation has become increasingly recognized as important in diagnosis and cure. In fact, anthropologists, through their studies of traditional curing practices, have played a leading part in the recognition of the importance of these mental states in curing.

Without detailed study, the full ramifications of a relocation of this kind cannot be fully calculated, but we believe that the following generalizations have a degree of validity recognizable to all here. People moved away from their traditional homes will feel some disorientation and apprehension. Under these conditions, people are likely to dream about their former homes and other subjects interpretable as signs of manipulation of the dreaming mind by the ancestors. One consequence of such dreams is the perceived need to sacrifice animals and perform feasting by which the spirits and ancestors can be appeased. Such feasts often lead to considerable expenses — more than one animal, pig or carabao often being sacrificed at one time.

This is liable to be the case among a random group of individuals from the affected areas living in the relocation sites. If there should be any manifestations of sickness or any other marginal states — pregnancy, etc., the need for feasting for the purpose of appeasement is liable to increase. Manifestations of sickness during relocation are almost inevitable due to: a) mental disorientation and physical sickness; and b) change in the environment of the relocatees and high incidence of malaria in the relocation areas.

Mental disorientation is liable to be particularly disruptive among the older members of society, i.e. those most committed to their traditional homes and the traditional values of those homes.
Sickness among people of this category is often interpreted as a demand from the ancestors for the performance of posipos. (A "posipos" performance involves the butchering of several animals, preparation of special rice cakes, feasting on meat, rice and basi, and visiting of the whole kin group at the house of the celebrant over a period of weeks.)

These expenses will be a direct and inevitable outcome of the transfer of people from their traditional homes. Any thoroughly planned program of relocation would have to take these elements into account, especially because feelings of disorientation and dissatisfaction are liable to be at their height during the early years of any relocation, coinciding exactly with those times when the new rice lands will be at their least productive, and when the labor inputs on this land will be at their height, and therefore exactly the times when inputs into the growing of food for domestic animals for sacrifice will be at a minimum. This is also liable to be the time when men must require the assistance of extra carabaos in plowing, and yet the same time when there will be the greatest perceived need for butchering such animals.

Nor can an anthropologist's study then provide instant solutions to such problems. It is unlikely that there is any instant mechanism for diverting these perceived needs for animal sacrifice. Nor can NPC or the government legislate such problems out of existence. Religious beliefs and practices cannot be prevented by decree, even if legislation were desirable. (Evidence of Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia would seem sufficient to prove this point both as to possibility and desirability. Only a long period of sympathetic interaction - oriented towards study, discussion and reform - between agencies of change and the local population is liable to make any inroads into this problem area. Under the conditions that have developed in the past five years in Kalinga that "long period" of several years can be extended to "very long."

Another problem of the people is the relocation of those from the affected areas across widely dispersed sites on the Tabuk Plateau. This they perceive as particularly problematic for their peace pact institution which at present offers them some degree of personal security. With the disruption of peace pact relationships as a result of relocation, what could guarantee that quarrels between Kalinga community members and neighbors from surrounding villages would not extend to community-wide violence? The existence of legislation or the presence of the military cannot be a sufficient guarantee. The legislation currently exists and the military increasingly sees itself as controlling the disputes between Kalinga communities through direct show of force. They have, however, been singularly unsuccessful in preventing outbreaks of dispute and in settling them. (The Butbut Sadanga dispute is a classic example of this failure, for it has been lengthened rather than shortened by military interference.)
Problems on the reorientation of the peace pact system are not really insurmountable if prior discussions regarding the matter are held well in advance of relocation. The formal establishment of good relations between such communities will again involve relocatees in expenses above and beyond those that form any part of the compensation spoken of to date.

One final concern that this association of anthropologists as a group must necessarily discuss is that the Philippines is composed of many ethnic groups, not all of which are popularly perceived as of equal status. There are degrees of discrimination in interaction between the groups. The Igorot groups of Northern Luzon have long been the victims of such discrimination. Indeed there are those in the North who say that an appreciation of the existence of prejudice and discrimination towards Igorots affords an insight into many aspects of this project's formulation and implementation.

As anthropologists and others concerned in development, we must face such discrimination as a reality and oppose, not ignore or condone it.

To sum up, the following arguments can be advanced against the relocation offers of the government:

1. The offers are at a low level of compensation;
2. Relocation sites are in areas where many, for health and social reasons, would prefer not to relocate.
3. The land allocated cannot support the same potential for self-sufficiency as do their existing properties, which include both orchards and forests.
4. Only those "directly" affected are to be considered for relocation.
5. The total number of sites available appears to be inadequate in area for the families involved.
6. The supportive kinship network will be dispersed all over the relocation areas.

Unless the areas purchased for relocation are to be expanded, some degree of selection of those to be relocated seems inevitable. Indeed this selection process can already be seen in the allocations at Gobgob (New Tanglag) where a number of the people relocated are not from Tanglag) or even the affected area. There is evidence to suggest that the major criterion for assignment in the relocation sites will not be need, but compliance with government policy. (See Annex B) Any who might presume to speak up negatively or, in the case of Governor Almazan's communication, even resist with apathy, are subjected to harassment.

THE ECONOMICS OF THE CHICO RIVER DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

This section will attempt to raise several questions on the economic criterion which today seems to be the most important aspect in the decision-making of government when it comes to super-projects such as the Chico River Basin Development Project. Government technocrats never tire of bringing the issue down to its economic viability whenever questions against
the project are raised, and often, even people who should know better are
cowed when faced with the seemingly scientific precision of quantitative cost-
benefit economic analysis to reason away the imperativeness of building the
Chico and other hydroelectric dams if the Philippines is to make any headway
in its national development efforts. It is about time that more serious queries
be raised against the very economic foundations on which national develop­
ment policy is based, and the CRBDP is certainly a good case study for con­
ferences of this sort to go into deeper with the hope that a professional group
of social scientists such as this will be able to recommend to the government
that decision-making cannot be founded on economics as the primary cri­
teron, or, even that the economic criterion itself is not as scientific as its
proponents claim it to be.

As far back as 1962, a preliminary study was made by the NPC on the
hydropotentials of the Chico River, which was supplemented by a study of
the US Bureau of Reclamation on the Cagayan River Basin Resources in
1965. However, the Philippine government did not then consider the dam
feasible because of high construction costs. In 1973, the increased price of
oil revised the cost-benefit equation in favor of the dams. The project, at
once, became not only economically sound but a seemingly imperative one
since the Philippines which imports 97 percent of its oil requirements, would
save around P39M per annum if Chico 4 were made operational.

The 1973 pre-feasibility study of Lahmeyer International (Frankfurt,
Germany), in association with the Engineering and Development Corporation
of the Philippines, found the proposed hydroelectric plants of Chico 2, Chico
3, and Chico 4 economically feasible when compared with similar projects
elsewhere. Because of the people’s opposition from the start, Chico 2 and 3
were discontinued, so that presently, the government’s efforts are centered
on the construction of Chico 4.

A Critique of the Economic Criterion

E.F. Schumacher in his book, Small is Beautiful, gives a good critique
on the role of economics in present-day affairs and he is liberally quoted in
this section.

Economics plays a central role in shaping the activities of the modern
world inasmuch as it supplies the criteria of what is “economic” and what is
“uneconomic” and there is no other set of criteria that exercises a greater
influence over the actions of governments. With increasing affluence, eco­
nomics has moved into the very center of public concern, and economic
performance, economic growth, etc. have become the abiding interest, if not
the obsession, of all modern societies.

What meaning does the method of economics give to the words “eco­
nomic” vs. “uneconomic”? The criterion is whether or not something suc­
cceeds or fails in earning an adequate profit in terms of money. Society may
decide to hang on to an activity for non-economic reasons—social, aesthetic, moral, or political—but this does not alter its uneconomic character. The judgment of economics, in other works, is an extremely fragmentary judgment. Out of the large number of aspects which in real life have to be seen and judged together before a decision can be taken, economics supplies only one—whether a thing yields a money profit to those who undertake it or not.

Even within the narrow compass of economic calculus, economic judgment is necessarily and methodically narrow. For one thing, it gives vastly more weight to the short than to the long term, because in the long term, if the present pace and direction of modern economic development patterned after the West continues, which is towards the spread of nuclear power even without sufficient defenses, then we are all dead. And then, second, they are based on a definition of costs which excludes all “free goods”; that is, the entire natural environment except for those parts of it that have been privately appropriated. The entire natural environment is taken as given, as permanent and indestructible. This means that an activity can be economic although it plays hell with the environment, and that a competing activity, if at some cost it conserves and protects the environment, will be uneconomic.

A good case in point is the building of superdams such as the CRBDP. In the 50’s everybody thought that big dams meant instant progress, and Third World countries were easily persuaded that there was nothing like a big dam for a fast economic take-off. Dozens of big dams went up from Pakistan to Ghana, Egypt to Brazil. Few people worried about aftershocks. In the past few years, however, dam owners the world over have begun to compare notes and discover that when a dam backs up water behind it, everything changes: the water’s chemistry, the kinds and numbers of indigenous flora and fauna, the fertility and salinity of the soil downstream, the pressures on the earth’s crusts and the tendency, therefore, to earthquakes and landslides, aside from the many changes in the way of life for all the people who lived on the land before the dam came. Moreover, whereas the promised progress is usually a lot less than expected, these changes produce problems that are real and proliferating. (Jimoh Omo-Fadaka, Superdams: The Dreams That Failed). With the opportunity for hindsight that we presently have, it would be doubly sad if we refuse to learn from the experiences of earlier superdams and rush headlong into building one which does not, after all, really provide the solution to economic development.

To press non-economic values into the framework of economic calculus, economists use the method of cost-benefit analysis. This method puts a market value on everything, in order to be able to equate everything with everything else. To equate things means to give them a price and thus make them exchangeable. All goods are treated as the same, with distinctions only on a
quantifiable basis, and **without the necessary recognition that there are numerous qualitative differences among things**, qualitative differences which are very difficult if not downright impossible to quantify. Most of the conspicuous developments of economics in the last quarter of the century are in the direction of quantification, at the expense of the understanding of qualitative differences. Indeed, we can make the observation that economics has become increasingly intolerant of qualitative differences, because they do not fit into its method and they make demands on the practical understanding and the power of insight of the economists.

A purely quantitative analysis is beguiling, because its concreteness gives it an appearance of scientific precision, behind which decision-makers can take the easy way out to explain away why projects such as the CRBDP are economic, and therefore, suited to the goals of national development. The appearance of scientific precision of such analysis, however, has been purchased at the expense of vital differences of quality, and acts as a most effective barrier against the understanding of deeper problems and the real nature of things. To illustrate, it would clearly be an error of grave misjudgment if we would impute a market value to the traditional burial grounds of the Kalingas equal to the current market value of a similar patch of land, but which does not hold the deep religious and cultural content that the Kalingas believe their land carries, as a separate section of this paper discusses further.

Cost-benefit analysis is a procedure by which the higher is reduced to the lower and the priceless is given a price. It therefore never serve to clarify the situation and lead to an enlightened decision. In fact, it leads to self-deception or deception of others since it isolates the decision-making process from more important social, political and cultural considerations by making the economic criterion the overriding one. To undertake to measure the immeasurable is absurd and constitutes but an elaborate method of moving from pre-conceived notions to foregone conclusions, for all one has to do to obtain desired results is to impute suitable values to immeasurable costs and benefits. Worse is the pretense that everything has a price or that money is the highest of values.

Cost-benefit analysis is usually used to illustrate the path of economic growth, in that a positive benefit/cost-ration would lead to a growth in GNP. But measuring growth by purely quantitative methods does not allow for the idea that there may be pathological growth, unhealthy growth, disruptive or destructive growth such as that currently faced by the world's most industrialized powers. And it is perhaps towards the solution of the pressing problems of the times which misguided economic growth has brought — the adverse effects on the environment, and the very human-ness of man — that the study of economics must develop.
In the preface to the five-year and ten-year Philippine Development Plan prepared by the NEDA, President F. Marcos stated:

In the past, development was considered simply as the movement towards economic progress and growth, measured in terms of sustained increases in per capita income and gross national product (GNP).

In the New Society, development does not imply economic advance. It also means the improvement in the well-being of the broad masses of our people.

Towards the end of his statement, he said:

Thus, the underlying current that binds all the various components of our plans is social justice. In our drive for development, we must at the same time correct social injustices, for no development is meaningful without social justice.

But how is social justice to be defined for the Kalinga masses? Is the relocation offer of P10,000 and 2 hectares of irrigated agricultural land in exchange for the submersion of age-old ancestral grounds and the disruption of a viable natural self-sufficient economy social justice? The Kalingas’ opposition to the construction of the dams speak for itself.

It certainly appears that even with the best-sounding of intentions the economic criterion is still the principal concern of the Philippine’s development efforts.

_A Look at the Application of the Cost-Benefit Analysis to the Chico River Basin Development Project and the Chico River Irrigation Project_

At this point, it is perhaps proper to point out that NPC has never made public the details of its preliminary economic analysis on the viability of Chico 4 and all that we have been able to find have been the totals of its projections for annual cost and benefits along with some other general figures gathered from development plans and a few NPC documents. May we, therefore, reiterate the request of some other groups that the NPC make available its economic analysis and other related documents in order that we may be able to study all necessary materials toward the formulation of a more all-rounded study. For the projection on irrigation, the National Irrigation Administration has brought out its feasibility study for the Chico River Irrigation Project (CRIP) which is tied up with the NPC proposal. The CRIP’s economic analysis is based on the assumption that Chico 4 will be built.

A. _Sociocultural Factors to be Considered_

By the very nature of cost-benefit analysis, many human and social factors are not considered in imputing values to certain goods and resources
which hold a sacred meaning for the affected people. Take their lands and homes, for example. The relocation offer for the families to be dislocated is ₱10,000 and two hectares of irrigated rice lands in exchange for the submersion of their land — the specific territory under which the Kalinga ancestors are buried; the defined area over which the budong, or the peace pact system prevails, the entire environment to which the health and state of mind of the people is intimately linked. For the Kalingas, allowing their land to be submerged by the dam would mean the displeasure of ancestral spirits who would forever haunt them in revenge. Leaving would mean the destruction of the budong and system of laws which govern the people’s relations with each other. Their transfer to unknown areas would mean sickness, mental derangement, death. (For details see section on culture).

For the Kalinga, the value of their ancestral lands is immeasurable. It certainly cannot be computed at ₱10,000 and two hectares of land.

B. Costs

The NPC’s Memorandum Report on the Chico 4 Hydroelectric Project (July 11, 1978) lists ₱2,915M as the total cost for Chico 4, with annual costs amounting to ₱1,884M and annual benefits amounting to ₱2,628M (which is further broken down to ₱2,263M from power and ₱365M from irrigation) for a B/C ratio of 1.39:1.

The NIA CRIP report estimates a total cost of ₱574M (broken down into ₱421M for Stage I and ₱153M for Stage II) with a benefit/cost ratio of 1.7:1 after discounting for a 50-year period, which is the projected life span for Chico 4, to arrive at the present worth of benefits and costs.

Nowhere in the cost computations do the following relevant items come into the picture:

1) **Destruction to the Environment and Ecological Balance.** A reservoir such as the proposed NIA storage dam (Chico 4) or the ongoing NIA diversion dam (to be discussed further below under irrigation) is in itself an ecological and a pollution problem. Whereas diversion dams are of optimum use in small-scale systems, expansion to larger proportions usually bring bigger problems. The NIA diversion dam and the NPC storage dam are both large-scale projects.

The NEDA Annex to the five-year (1978-1982) and ten-year (1978-1987) Philippine Development Plan gives the following description:

a) Chico Diversion Dam (Phase I)
   a.1 Concrete Overflow Section
      max. height 12 m.
      crest length 480 m.
   a.2 Earth and Rockfill Section
      max. height 12 m.
      crest length 300 m.
b) Main Dam and Reservoir (Phase II) — Chico 4

b.1 Dam
- type: zone rockfill
- height above river bed: 160 m.
- crest length: 885 m.
- length of base: 970 m.
- spillway capacity: 9,000 CMS

b.2 Reservoir
- gross storage capacity: 650 MCM
- surface area at max. water level: 11.25 sg. km.

c) Power Plant (Phase III)
- installed capacity: 450 MW

A consultation on the dam projects of the national government was held in Davao City last year and among the papers discussed was that of Dr. Robert Hackenburg, anthropologist, on the costs and consequences of irrigation development in the tropics. The major points are summarized here along with some relevant criticisms against superdams.

Among the problems generated by large-scale reservoirs is that lower areas become swampy while other parts of the land are dry. Drainage problems arise when there is more water in the dam than is needed. Poor drainage may cause a rise in underground water levels and a consequent accumulation of soil salts.

The water-logged ground will then be more liable to collapse and erosion may result. Water that is gathered becomes stagnant and the higher saline content encourages stink, disease-bearing organisms and noxious plants and substances which bring an explosion of waterborne diseases.

However, when drainage for excess water is provided back to the river, this tailwater poisons the river and also, therefore, the farms downstream because of its chemical and salt pollution.

Floods, because of the barrier across the channel, pose another problem. The dams may get washed away and the flood eats up land as it flushes the topsoil from the farms.

The danger of the river changing its course because of the barrier is also another possibility, aside from the greater tendency to earthquakes and landslides because of increase pressures on the earth's crusts.

Another problem that must be contended with is the fact that the soil level in Asia is thin and shallow. The chemical contents are low and easily leached out. If floods occur, the fertility of the land is drained, while at the same time it is carried by seepage into bottomlands. Siltation is rapid due to the nature of the soil in the watershed areas and, as the experience with superdams all over the world will attest to, their projected life spans are not usually met because there is still no sure-fire formula to solve the problem of siltation.

All of these problems are likely to arise when the native ecological balance is interfered with by the construction of huge artificial dams. Even
with a tinge of optimism for the economic benefits that may be brought about by the building of a dam, is it wise to expect that the Chico project will be exempt from such deleterious consequences? Certainly not. If not, has the government considered the social costs that may arise from pushing through with Chico 4?

2) **Opportunity Low Cost.** The assumption underlying the NPC offer of relocation is that the Kalinga natives, when relocated, would be afforded the opportunity for greater productivity. If the relocation experience of the people dislocated by the Ambuklao and Pantabangan dams is anything to judge by, however, there is no guarantee for the prospects of greater productivity.

Not that the Kalinga natural and self-sufficient economy is anything to scoff at. Far from it, in fact. And for the Kalinga people, it might just be the height of folly to exchange a completely self-reliant and independent lifestyle for a rapid and ill-prepared transition to the cash economy, which will surely be a consequence of relocation.

Despite centuries of high intensity food production, the rice terraces of the Mountain Provinces, among them the Kalingas', show no signs of exhaustion. Year after year, generation after generation, the rice terraces produce consistently abundant harvests, so much so that a single hectare of rice-fields affords a family of five almost all the staple foods they will consume in an entire year— without chemical fertilizers, herbicides, insecticides, and elaborate farm machinery in a form of ecosystem that is stable, self-perpetuating, inherently conservative and nearly indestructible. (Charles B. Drucker, *The Price of Progress in the Philippines*)

Aside from their terraced fields, the Kalingas, like most minority groups, also practice swidden farming to supplement their rice production. A separate section of this composite paper discusses kaingin farming in more detail. Suffice it to say that the Kalinga kaingins provide coffee, sugar, fruit, root crops, legumes, vegetables, garlic, etc. which, together with whatever surplus rice there is, serve as cash crops to pay for clothing and other family needs.

Kalinga's abundant forests also provide the Kalingas with materials for building homes and free firewood for fuel, and many traditional medicinal herbs and plants. The hunting grounds provide game for meat, and the rivers are rich in fish and eel.

The benefits the Kalingas enjoy from their forests and rivers have not (or cannot) be quantified. Some attempts have been made, however, to quantify the other resources and output mentioned above which may serve as some indication of a part of the opportunity-lost-cost if the lands are submerged and the people relocated.

The *Bulletin Today* (May 26, 1975) stated that Chico 4 would flood ₱31,500,000 worth of fertile rice lands. (It would be impossible to include...
in any computation of this sort the tremendous and sustained work of construction that went into the building of the rice terraces, given the simple tools the people had at hand and the steep, easily eroded terrain. For every rice terrace, huge volumes of earth had to be redistributed so that a precipitous patch of mountain might yield a level terrace some few meters inside. For each retaining wall, tons of smooth stones had to be carried up from the river bed, hundreds of feet below; to provide irrigation water; canals from reliable water sources five or ten kilometers distant had to be cut through solid rock in some places. With digging sticks, crude wooden spades and woven carrying baskets as their only tools, how many generations of Igorot farmer builders worked to sculpt whole mountainsides into precisely stepped, watery tiers? (Drucker, *The Price of Progress in the Philippines*)

The Asian Social Institute’s study of the CRBDP (July 1975) quotes the people on the economic costs involved: “The area affected by the dam produces P13M worth of fruit, vegetables, and grain yearly. Flooding will destroy this produce.”

The dam will also destroy two steel bridges and 10 km. of national road. New roads will eat up 1,833 ha. of fertile land.

The *Bulletin Today* (April 11, 1979) stated that in 1978 “600,000 bags of clean coffee beans were produced in nine towns of Kalinga-Apayao which the areas to be affected by the dam contributed a major share, with coffee that year selling at P36.50 a kilo. Farmers in the area have estimated that the average number of coffee trees planted yearly since 1972 ranges from 300,000 to 500,000 or over 4 million for seven years.”

Add to these values all the unquantifiable benefits which the Kalinga derive from their lands, their forests, rivers, and streams, and it becomes clear that the opportunity-lost-cost from the lands to be submerged and the areas to be designated as watersheds amounts to a pretty steep total. We still cannot compute at this point what the productivity of the displaced Kalingas will be in the relocation sites since, aside from Gobgob, other definite sites have still not been pinpointed by the NPC. One conclusion that can be made, however, is that the relocation offer cannot even begin to approximate the productive and other opportunities to be lost if Chico 4 will be built. True, the NPC and the NIA have quantified projections for benefits to be derived from power and irrigation over a wide area, hopefully even in the projected areas for relocation (Gobgob is cited as one irrigation service area), but this does not discount from the fact that so many items under opportunity-lost have not been included in the cost computations of the government.

3) **Unplanned (and Uncalled For?) Costs.** To date, a number of big expenditure items have arisen in relation to the CRBDP which, we are sure, were not planned for and, therefore, were not considered in the pre-feasibility cost-benefit analysis for Chico 4. Many of these costs will redound to added expenditures on the part of the national government because of the tense
situation in the province created by the prospect of dam construction and the people's violent opposition to the project. It is then perhaps relevant to question whether or not these costs are uncalled for, especially if the government's efforts for national development were directed toward less controversial projects.

a) The many and long delays not only in construction but even in the field investigations, survey work and preparation of the feasibility study caused by the people's opposition to the project have certainly upped the planned expenditures for these items. The contract with Lahmeyer for the definite design of Chico 4 and financing thereof was signed as early as September 1974. Consequently, NPC personnel and equipment were brought into the area but they had to be withdrawn in May 1975 on verbal directive of higher authorities who were alarmed by the people's resort to violence to stop all activity towards the construction of the dam.

The Chico 4 contract had to be amended twice: first in July 1975 suspending the work of Lahmeyer; and again in February 1976 for resumption of work on the project. The AFP Engineering Construction Battalion was sent in to assist in the NPC's move-in. The NPC's Memorandum Report of July 1978 states: "However, all their works were aborted due to show of force of the inhabitants." The same report continues that in December 1976 "waterline survey going on and off due to opposition of the natives." Since then "the pace of field investigations have been very slow" although as of June 1978 there has been "ongoing drilling and survey of Chico 4 under PC security.

Every single day of delay adds to costs, and since the project has not really gone very far since 1974, we can imagine that millions have been added to surveys, geology, complementary services and pre-construction work. Further added to this are the costs of campsites, materials and equipment destroyed by the Kalingas since the entry of the NPC into the area.

b) There has been increasing militarization in the area since the dam project was first proposed and the peace and order situation in the provinces has deteriorated into almost unmanageable proportions. Kalinga-Apayao used to be a peaceful province, its peace pact system setting the laws and sanctions to govern the people's relationships with each other. The Chico project has changed the situation radically. The people's opposition has resulted in the bringing in of more and more AFP troops and military hardware into the once peaceful province. In 1976, the dissident New People's Army entered the picture, and accounts point to the fact that they have united with the Kalinga people in their opposition to the dam. The government has reacted by concentrating still more troops in the area such that presently there is a whole PC battalion (55th) assigned to the dam area aside from a host of civic action teams, engineering brigades, PC rangers, etc. Civilians have also been armed and recruited into the Civilian Home Defense Forces (CHDF).
Since the militarization of the province came only because of the Chico 4 project, we feel that the expenditures to finance this militarization are among the additional costs that should be considered in the cost-benefit analysis for the project. In fact, in the NPC Memorandum Report quoted above, there is a section which lists expenditures to date as of June 30, 1978 for Field Investigations, and one item here is Security Arrangements *Continuing* which amounts to P750,000.00. This probably went to the 51st Engineering Brigade with whom the NPC signed a Memorandum Agreement for Assistance in Field Investigation in March 1977. It appears that the NPC recognizes the validity of the costs for security, but is this item included in their economic analysis? What about the millions spent by the AFP to finance the 55th PC Battalion in the area where previously there was no need for such a high concentration of military troop?

c) Another valid item of added costs is the appropriation for the creation and/or involvement of various government agencies in the campaign to convince the Kalinga natives to accept the dam or otherwise “minimize opposition to the Chico 4 Project,” in the words of NPC. In December 1975 the Kalinga Special Development Region (KSDR) was created under PD 848. Necessarily, there had to be budget appropriation for this new body — for salaries, offices, supplies, etc.

Also in 1975 the PANAMIN and Manuel Elizalde arrived in the province to aid in bringing the people around to see the problem from the perspective of national development. NPC’s contribution to PANAMIN amounts to P2,100,000 as of June 30, 1978.

In March 1976, the Kalinga Inter-Agency Committee (KIAC) was formed per memorandum of the President of the Philippines “to evolve an integrated and total approach for the development of the Chico River Project with the end in view of achieving with the least possible delay the development objectives of the Government in that area and to enhance the interests of the people, especially the natives affected by the Project.” With PANAMIN as the coordinating agency, other members of the KIAC are the Department of Public Highways, National Irrigation Administration, Bureau of Forest Development, Bureau of Lands, and the National Power Corporation, with the participation of 13 other government departments, commissions and bureaus.

Whereas expenses for the operations of all the above-mentioned agencies in the dam-affected areas will be borne by the national government through additional budget appropriations, and whereas these additional expenses were unnecessary if there were no need to convince the people to accept the dam, then, whatever amounts are spent for such public relations and propaganda activities are surely relevant additional costs.

If all the additional costs discussed in this section are to be considered in the cost-benefit analysis for Chico 4, the question may be raised whether the project is still economically feasible or not.
C. *Benefits*

The national development goals outlined in the five-year and ten-year Philippine Development Plan gives top priority to the attainment of self-sufficiency in food and greater self-reliance in energy. Towards these ends, the government proposes to build several multipurpose hydroelectric dams to expand both irrigation and power facilities: irrigation — to increase the productivity, and therefore, also the incomes of the majority who are in agricultural production; and power — for rural electrification and industrial development.

The annex to the Philippine Development Plan lists a profile of selected Development Projects, particularly those which would require foreign assistance. To quote from the introduction:

A major portion of the investment requirements for proposed foreign-assisted projects is intended for infrastructure support. The largest share of the total requirement will be absorbed by the power and electrification sector (34%). The water resources sector, which includes flood control, sewerage, and irrigation projects, among others, will require about 24 percent. Likewise, ports, airports, and other transport infrastructures (15%) are given due emphasis.

The other sectors and their respective shares of investment requirements are: industry (13%), social (5%), integrated area development (4%), agriculture (3%), and telecommunication (2%). The agriculture sector includes agrarian reform, fisheries, forestry, and livestock development.

Clearly, the construction of large-scale dams, of which the Chico Project ranks high in priority, is central to the government’s drive towards national development. The first two sectors alone, under which the construction of the dams fall, account for 58 percent of all proposed major investments for the next ten years, at least.

The strategy for development provides for balanced growth among sectors and among regions which are mutually reinforcing. (N.B. The use of the word *sector* here is different from that defined in the preceding paragraphs). Industrial development will be pursued to complement agricultural development. At the same time, the service sector will be oriented toward improved efficiency and competitiveness in supporting the rural sector and providing the necessary push to the economy.

Support to rural and regional development will not be limited to agricultural production but will include tenurial improvement, institutional building, and industrial dispersal. The integrated area development scheme will be implemented. This approach which involves a comprehensive planning and development of complimentary projects will lead to a more balanced regional growth. (Philippine Development Plan).

Let us look at the application of this strategy for development to the Chico Project and study the projected benefits.
1) **Provisions for Irrigation.** The early NPC proposals for the Chico River were basically for the construction of hydroelectric dams to meet the expanding energy requirements of the country and to cut down our dependence on imported oil. In 1973, Lahmeyer International completed a technical pre-feasibility study of the hydroelectric development of the Chico River. Among its recommendations was the exploration of multi-purpose development, particularly irrigation, in order to make the proposed Chico dams economically more attractive. Accordingly, the National Irrigation Administration (NIA) prepared a feasibility study for the Chico River Irrigation Project (CRIP).

Implementation of the project would be in two stages and would be influenced by the planned construction of reservoir and hydroelectric projects on the Chico River by the NPC. Stage I would consist of the construction of the diversion dam (for description, refer to the section on Costs), designed as afterbay regulator and irrigation facilities for 25,000 hectares. Under Stage I, irrigation coverage would be controlled by direct diversion of the unregulated flows of the Chico River.

Stage II includes the construction of irrigation facilities for an additional 15,000 hectares. In Stage II, the estimated daily peaking discharges from the proposed NPC storage dam and power plant (Chico 4) would be re-regulated at the diversion dam and released for irrigation.

The CRIP is envisioned to irrigate a total of 40,000 hectares a year round. At full development, projected at 10 years after the start of project construction (Phase I is ongoing with IBRD financial assistance and is scheduled to be workable by 1980), the annual production of palay from the project area is expected to reach about 323,600 tons compared to the present production of 89,000 tons. This increase in production would contribute considerably to the national effort to achieve self-sufficiency in rice, the country's staple food and would save in foreign exchange because of the reduction in rice importation. The NIA projection in forex savings, NET, is around 158,255,000 per year. We are using the NIA CRIP projections here, which are somewhat different from those in the NEDA Philippine Development Plan Annex.

The project is also envisioned to increase the annual per capita income of people living within the influence area, (based on a two-hectare farm) from P400 to P2,000 at full agricultural development in 1986. (Philippine Development Plan Annex). NPC estimates annual benefits from irrigation at P365M. (Memorandum Report).

These projections for benefits are certainly impressive. But they are based on too many uncertain assumptions. The weakness of the benefits projections is that if even one of the major assumptions crumbles, all else crumbles with it.
For one, the success of the CRJP is intimately tied up with the government’s land reform program. Irrigation by itself does not lead to an automatic increase in productivity. As conceived in the government’s program for agricultural development, irrigation has to work hand in hand with more scientific farming methods and technology, the use of high yielding varieties (HYV) of seed, the application of fertilizers, insecticides, herbicides, etc. (all important so far), the shift to better tools and agricultural inputs such as credit, extension work, marketing facilities and infrastructure should be made available to the population in the irrigation service areas.

Unless there are specific provisions to allow the farmers to avail themselves of these necessary inputs, the proposals for benefits from irrigation will not be met.

The whole point in this effort to raise the productivity of the rural population is to raise the incomes of the majority sector in the population towards a more equitable distribution of wealth. The Philippine Development Plan states:

Limitations in the purchasing power of most Filipinos exist in spite of the market growth of the country’s economy. These indicate the personal and geographical maldistribution of income and wealth in the country. Preliminary data on family income distribution in 1975 revealed that the top 30% of income recipients in the country account for 63.9% of total income. The middle 40 and lowest 30% of families receive only 26.4% and 9.7% of income, respectively.

Even with the best of irrigation and provisions for other extension facilities the rural mobilization program still rests on whether or not the Agrarian Reform Program can really rectify monopoly patterns of land ownership in order that the fruits of greater productivity accrue to the peasant cultivators and not to idle landowners. The contradiction in development policy, however, seems not to brook a bright future for the small peasants to own the lands they till in the future. Whereas 93 percent of all projected major investment projects for the next ten years are set for all kinds of infrastructures (top three priorities in Annex), only 3 percent has been defined for agricultural or a total of P4,093.5M. How does the government hope to expropriate the many landed estates for redistribution to tenants if the greater part of its investment budget is proposed for infrastructure projects instead of agrarian reform?

The Philippines has traditionally been a backward agrarian economy where the majority of the rural population have been tenant-farmers who turn over a big part of their produce to the landlords. The landlords do not take kindly to expropriation and redistribution. Without the necessary funds to buy up these large tracts of land “at fair market value,” how does the government expect its Land Reform Program to succeed? In which case, even if large-scale irrigation projects like the CRJP are built, is there any guarantee
that these will benefit the poor farmers to whom these are directed if the Land Reform Program fails to keep pace with the offer of irrigation?

The bewildering thing about the CRIP is that its basic assumption for the projected benefits from the irrigation of 40,000 additional ha. is that Chico 4 will be built. Its economic analysis was prepared using the benefits and costs of Stage I and Stage II together.

From the NIA CRIP report: No attempt was made to prepare a separate economic analysis for Stage I and Stage II as it becomes obvious that for Stage I, the project is not economically attractive due to a smaller command area and a lower cropping intensity while having high cost due to incorporation of future Stage II requirements in the design of facilities. On the other hand, Stage II would become very economically attractive as it would have greater benefits due to the 200 percent cropping intensity but with small additional investment, as some of the costs are likely sunk in Stage I.

Construction work is already ongoing for CRIP Stage I although there is still no go-signal for the construction of Chico 4 and the NPC still has not completed even 50 percent of its feasibility study for the power dam (as of June 30, 1978). The feasibility study is to be completed by December of this year and only then can a definite GO or NO GO order for construction be given.

It is rather incomprehensible why a project such as the NIA diversion dam which, if built to include the specifications as an afterbay regulator, as it is being built, is not economically attractive on its own, why is it still being built? In which case, even if CRIP Stage I is completed, but Chico 4 construction is not yet a certainty, or is otherwise delayed because of the people's opposition, the projections for irrigation benefits are not founded on firm ground.

Another assumption, that of fulfilling the projected life span for the power dam is again of no certainty, as an earlier part of this section discusses.

We believe then that the above are valid grounds for questioning the projections for irrigation of the CRIP.

2. Provisions for Power. The NPC actually expects a lot more in annual benefits from power than for irrigation. Their projection is ₱2,263M annually from the power to be generated for rural electrification, the decentralization of industrial development from the Metro Manila Area because of the impetus given for medium small-scale and cottage industries in the rural areas and the creation of employment opportunities in the rural areas. The following summary of a study of the impact of electrification in the rural areas will serve as a refutation of the government's claim that the availability of electricity automatically produces economic development.
The Relevance of Rural Electrification

One of the possible benefits of increased hydroelectric power is for the massive rural electrification program presently underway. However, this rural electrification drive is questionable, both as a national priority and in terms of its intended economic effects (results of a survey in La Union conducted by UPCB through the auspices of the NEA and USAID).

The priority status of a massive rural electrification program in the face of an alleged shortage of power is immediately illogical. Justifications for the continued extension of electrical power — not only to rural areas per se but to farming households — range from the sublime, the anticipated, apparently automatic increase of income to occur when the deus ex machina of light is introduced, to the ridiculous, the supposed effect which household lighting will have upon the fertility rates of rural populations.

The La Union survey has, in fact, established that there is a relationship between income increase and the availability of electricity. Areas which have had longer periods of access to electricity also tend to have higher incomes. However, the relationship itself is not established either as to direction or as to the effects of intervening variables. To begin with, the barrios of La Union’s LUELCO area which yielded the favorable relationship between electricity use and income increase were all, from the period prior to energization advantaged in a sense. They were accessible to transportation, to communication, and were privy to some economic plus factor — a special product, or a particular set of already established commercial relations. Thus, the relationship between electricity and income may well read: that when there exists income above and beyond subsistence needs electricity is utilized.

Certainly there are very few so naive as to believe that electricity by itself is a factor for production and therefore a means to increase incomes. Even in urban settings, a primary function of electricity is not productive (unless the urban area is also an industrial area). Electricity is rather a consumer item — power for the convenience of instant light, and heat for running of appliances. In the rural areas, where the level of surplus income tends to be low (as it certainly is in La Union and Cagayan), scarce income would have to be utilized for the purchase of appliances if any purpose other than lighting is to be achieved from the presence of electricity.

Let us assume that everyone is entitled to the convenience of clear, clean and instantly available light at night. Let us also assume that the income levels of the rural areas similar to La Union do not permit a large number of small-holder agriculturists, lessees, tenants, or migrant farmers to purchase electricity-consuming appliances. much less pay the bills for their electrical availability in the rural farm livelihood. One respondent in the survey gave a singular and noteworthy response. He would, he said, install lights in his rice-field so that he could plow at night. Searching the deepest reaches of their imaginations, the researches of the field teams for the survey could not bring other productive uses to light for the technoeconomic level of such areas as
the farming municipalities of La Union, areas where little or no post-harvest productive activity exists and where little income is available to begin such electricity-dependent productive activities.

Electrical pump-powered irrigation is perhaps the most potentially fruitful productive applications of electricity to a rural area, as irrigation increases productivity of the single farm and the area of agriculturally productive land. Yet in La Union, farmers have been reported by extension workers as being unable to pay the P5.00 monthly charge for the communal irrigation pumping systems, aside from difficulties encountered due to frequent breakdowns of the pumping systems themselves.

Another beneficial effect anticipated from the extension of electricity availability, as mentioned by personnel of the electric cooperative, is the extension of labor hours for the farm household. The provisions of night lighting was expected to make it possible for the farm household to engage in small cottage industry, or such activities as dressmaking or food processing which would increase the income of the household. Despite the presence of electricity in many barrios, few small industries were found and few such extra activities. An initial response to the issue of extended labor hours might be doubt as to how long a farmer, who awakes at dawn or earlier, might extend his working day, or whether extra hours of work are not already present in the day as it exists for him. The argument of extension of labor hours is in some respects a rather inhuman one since it ignores the limits of an individual's labor elasticity, particularly if given poor dietary conditions.

One issue, then, is whether the farmer needs electricity for productive purposes. Another is whether he can handle the extra work which electricity might make possible. And a final issue is whether the farmer can afford electricity. Most households to which electricity had been made available could only afford one or two light bulbs at a minimum rate of P4.50 a month (1977 figures). Many other households could not raise the money for the costs of housewiring, or the costs of house repair to meet the standards for minimum safety before wiring for electricity. Although the number of electricity users steadily and rapidly grew during the 16-month period of field survey, there was also a large number of disconnections for non-payment of electrical bills.

Is electricity a felt need of the farm population? Is it a real need in economic terms and in terms other than those of convenience? Is it a priority need — even nationally considering that farm populations are in the majority throughout this nation.
APPENDIX A

November 17, 1978, Tabuk
Province of Kalinga-Apayao

President Ferdinand E. Marcos
Malacañang Palace, Manila

Dear Mr. President,

We most respectfully submit to you the various atrocities committed by the soldiers of the 60th P.C. Strike Force Battalion enumerated below, and in like vein, we most respectfully petition that the 60th P.C. be withdrawn and reassigned away from the Province of Kalinga-Apayao.

And because of this petition and report, we write in great fear that the members of the 60th P.C. will be more oppressive; defenseless as we are your little people, we are those who have suffered the violent acts and indignities perpetrated by the very people you have commissioned to protect our persons, rights and integrity.

Mr. President, the climate of fear had become engrained in the collective feelings and ethos of the people of Kalinga-Apayao that the mere mention of the word “60th” evokes morbid apprehensions corrosive of our human dignity and finer virtues. It is even said that retributive justice could not be attained by complaining of their acts and this is said not without foundation — illustrative of this are the cases against the two soldiers (Bulan and Villanueva) who mauled Ireneo Uyam, the provincial Agriculturist, and who disrupted official functions and created great panic by their belligerent acts of threats and intimidation at the Provincial Capitol of Kalinga-Apayao — The Provincial Officials submitted affidavits and sworn testimonies upon which were based criminal charges of Slight Physical Injuries and Alarm and Scandal and this filing of criminal cases coupled by the righteous indignation of Kalinga officialdom was acclaimed and greeted with approval by the long suffering public. However, not very long after, the dismaying news, later confirmed by the Court records, reports that the cases against the two soldiers were dismissed on affidavits of desistance filed and submitted by the very Public Officials who initiated its filing mainly due to suggestions made by the Military and for fear of reprisals, they withdrew their complaints against the soldiers.

Mr. President, we supplicate your presidential ire and appeal that you order the immediate withdrawal of the 60th PC Battalion far from Kalinga-Apayao; we ask that you direct the prosecution of all erring soldiers triable in the Civil Courts; we implore you not to send any Task Force of PC Battalion in our beleaguered Province, but instead, the local Provincial Com-
mand, the 114th PC be augmented under the unified command of the present Provincial Commander, Lt. Col. Pablo Cacanindin.

And although we are in fear, we sign encouraged that this petition, submitted with intense warmth and fervent hopes, will merit your attention and that you will grant most desired relief, coming as it does from your little people of Kalinga-Apayao.

SOME INCIDENTS SUPPORTING THE PEOPLE OF KALINGA IN THEIR BRIEF AGAINST THE 60th PC STRIKE FORCE BATTALION

1. RUBEN TA-ILAN, alias “Liwanag”, a young farmer from Barlig, Mountain Province, then residing at Bulanao, Tabuk, Kalinga-Apayao, known to be off-his-rockers now and then, hiked from Tabuk to Tomiangan, Pasil, where he was stopped by elements of the 60th PC Battalion and delivered to the PC barracks at Lubuagan, which was done, by entrusting the live body of said Ta-ilan to Lt. Osias, Lt. Macatangay, and a certain Mangolabnan. According to informants, he was taken into custodial interrogation as an NPA suspect. In the early morning of January 12, 1978, his dead body was found sprawled and dumped on the roadside some kilometers away from the Lubuagan Poblacion, with multiple stab wounds. The dead corpse created widespread sensation because it remained unidentified for 10 days and more. In the meantime that people from all over the Mountain Provinces made attempts to identify the dead corpse, speculations and wild rumors flew around and centered on past misdeeds of the 60th PC — Thus was born the people’s dread for the 60th PC soldiers

2. ABRA TINGUIANS — Within the wake of the Ta-ilan case, some Abra tribemen came to Lubuagan for the precise purpose of renewing the terms of the Pagta and warming the peace pact bonds with people of Lubuagan; also, they came to make identification whether the corpse was one among their members, and if so, to claim the same. These same people were detained and manhandled by soldiers of the 60th P.C. on suspicion of being NPA and were brought to Bulanao where they were eventually released. This matter reached higher AFP authorities and although a full dress investigation was ordered, none was even conducted because these Abra tribemen never came back for fear of reprisal.

3. ERNESTO GUEVARA, a blind singer of the Kowloon Restaurant at Poblacion Tabuk, was mauled by drunken men of the 60th PC on April 3, 1978 and the man pointed out as the assailant was pointed out and identified as L. Bernie Manangbao who was charged in the Municipal Court of Tabuk for Slight Physical Injuries.
4. FEDERICO JAVIER, a municipal employee assigned in the Mayor's Office, on May 2, 1978, was kidnapped by soldiers and his dear body was found 3 days after several kilometers away from Tabuk Poblacion. His mangled body showed tell-tale marks and evidence of torture before he was shot and killed. A case of kidnapping with murder was filed against the prime suspects, 2nd Lt. Clodualdo Tusi and Dionisio Mercado, both of the 60th PC and a certain Alex Paraiso, an NPC employee, which case is now pending preliminary investigation with the Municipal Court of Tabuk.

5. MAYOR RICARTE S. QUINSAAT, on June 2, 1978, was harassed and threatened by members of the 60th PC inside Virginia Restaurant. A great panic resulted but according to the Police, the incident was amicably settled.

6. BASILIO SALIBAD, a resident of Poblacion, Tabuk, was a near victim of kidnapping and, possibly, murder, on the night of July 9, 1978, when he was grabbed by elements of the 60th PC led by a certain Captain Guillano who said to Salibad in Tagalog: "Bata ka ni Mayor Quinsaat, ano? Uubusin namin kayo lahat, pati ang Mayor na 'yan!" (Rio Chico F & A.M.P. Lodge's Petition to President Marcos, July 22nd, 1978, for withdrawal of the 60th battalion from Kalinga-Apayao).

7. THE LIFE SIZE STATUE OF JOSE RIZAL, erected on the stage in front of the Municipal Hall of Tabuk, awaiting to be placed on its permanent pedestal was badly destroyed by drunken elements of the 60th P.C. Both arms were battered and removed from the body. That act was witnessed by Pat N. Dapasen who was on guard that night but was afraid to prevent the destruction because he was alone and the soldiers were many (Rio Chico Lodge Petition, supra).

8. PAGAT GA·AY, a balsahero ferrying people for a fee going to and from Balawag, Tabuk, at the Chico River, was shot on the face on July 15, 1978, causing a penetrating wound going through one cheek to the other, by a member of the 60th battalion who refused to pay his fare.

9. EDWARD MALIDOM, while on his way from Bulanao to his home at Appas, Tabuk, was met and mauled by members of the 60th P.C. on July 16, 1978. He suffered multiple contused wounds.

10. RICARDO OLIDAN, a Minister of the Church of Christ at Pobla­cion, Tabuk, was spanked, threatened and subjected to other indignities by soldiers of the 60th P.C. when he tried to collect payment for pictures taken by him and which incident is reported in the Police Blotter, dated July 18, 1978.

11. EMILIO TAMAYO, a driver, who on July 19, 1978, was mauled and pistol whipped for refusing to be commandeered to ferry some soldiers
of the 60th P.C. from Poblacion to Bulanao as it was already very late in the evening, out of the usual time for making trips to Bulanao.

12. IVAN CARIÑO, a son of Provincial Fiscal Cariño was harassed and threatened by drunken soldiers of the 60th P.C., inside Zeny's Restaurant on July 21, 1978.

13. INP FERNANDO POLIG, a policeman on duty in the Municipal Presidencia, attempted to pacify the above drunken soldiers at Zeny's place when more members of the 60th P.C. in civilian attire appeared and the leader, identified as Major Cabigas, ordered his men to disarm Polig. The latter, who was in uniform and armed with an armalite stood his ground and warned any against coming near him. None dared and the timely arrival of the Provincial Commander, Col. P. Cacanindin, thwarted what could have been a bloody confrontation. This incident happened right at the back of the Presidencia and in full view of many people on July 21, 1978, a Friday and a market day.

14. FISCAL DIONISIO FALGUI, in the evening of July 30, 1978, while his workers were resting after having piled the day's harvest, soldiers of the 60th P.C. entered into the Falgui compound and started pummeling them with fist blows and threatened to kill them. To back their words, they fired several shots in the air. Fiscal Falgui was called and he tried to appease them and despite having identified himself, the soldiers became more mischievous and enraged; they poked their guns several times on his body saying that he will be killed. Early the next morning, Fiscal Falgui reported the incident to the Battalion Commander (Col. Solomon), and while there, the same soldiers came back and repeated their atrocious acts the night previous. One of the victims was even sick, but this did not exempt him. All were taken to the 60th P.C. camp at Bulanao; three soldiers were identified as Sgts. Mendoza, Gaddi, and Medina. Fiscal Falgui's complaint and investigation was taken by Col. Sarmiento of the Inspector General's Office.

15. ANTONIO ODIEM, a son of Governor Tanding Odiem, in the afternoon of August 18, 1978, was mauled and given rifle butt strokes and these punishments were administered because he had no Driver's license in his possession as he forgot it at home. He was forced at the point of guns to take the soldiers to Tomiangan; only three were identified, Coronado (First name only), Dingli, and Fabillar — the two others could not be ascertained, but — all are members of the 60th P.C. Battalion.

16. CAPTAIN ROGELIO JARAMILLA, On August 26, 1978, P/Major Ricardo G. Mayangao, Deputy Police Superintendent for administration and Concurrent Officer-in-Charge went to verify and investigate a reported incident that occurred at the Kowloon Restaurant on the evening of August
25, 1978, and found out that two P.C. Soldiers of the 60th P.C. Battalion in the persons of Sgt. Vicente (Cabanaoan) and C2C Severino Jodloman of the 60th P.C. and members of the 114th P.C. Command and other civilians were having a drinking spree inside the establishment where the incident took place and as a result thereof a gun was fired. However, no one was hurt except 22C Jodloman who was hurt on the face due to fist blows during the incident and Capt. Rogelio Jaramilla, Asst. Provincial Commander was hurt on his mouth. Case now under investigation at 114th P.C. and under Preliminary Investigation by the Provincial Fiscal filed by said Capt. Jaramilla against Sgt. Cabanaoan and C2C Jodloman for Assault on an agent of a Person in Authority (Certification Report of Major Ricardo G. Mayangao, dated September 1, 1978).

17. IRENEO UYAM, provincial Agriculturist of the Province of Kalinga-Apayao, for no apparent reason, was mauled by two drunken troopers of the 60th P.C., in front of the Provincial Capitol of Kalinga-Apayao in the afternoon of July 31, 1978. Irate bystanders repelled the two soldiers who retreated and left the scene.

18. THE CAPITOL STAMPEDE. The two (2) soldiers cited above, later came back to the provincial Capitol in search of Mr. Uyam and his defenders, and they were back in full battle gear regalia. These two, identified as Roger Bulan and Roman Villanueva, through threats and by brandishing their long arms and aiming it at anyone on sight, created a pandemonium of fear, panic, anxiety and people running and scampering for safety. Criminal charges of Slight Physical Injuries and Alarm and Scandal had been filed against them in the Municipal Court of Tabuk.

19. RUBEN GAVYAD, a farmer, while waiting for a ride at the waiting shed at Poblacion, Tabuk, on September 3, 1978, mistook a passing vehicle for a passenger Fiera, by flagging it to stop; the vehicle obliged and took him in and to his surprise and regrets, it was the 60th P.C. Fiera and was full of soldiers who took turns hitting him for having the temerity to ride with them. They dropped him at Bulanao, only after having divested him of the ₱80.00 which was his week’s earning working the land of Mrs. A. Claver.

20. GREGORIO KIBAD, a professional driver operating the truck of Atty. Warren E. Luyaben, was mauled by two (2) members of the 60th P.C., who claimed to be bodyguards of Col. Solomon. These two were enraged when Mr. Kibad demonstrated and made clear his intent of not taking them as riders in his truck fully loaded with cement because it was dangerous having soldiers in uniform riding his truck as it might attract NPA’s who may ambush them. The truck was about to leave the compound of the Rock and Dirt Co. where Col. Solomon, the 60th P.C. Bn. Commander, stays and resides; this truck was on its way to Batong Buhay and the two soldiers were
going to Tomiangan, Pasil. Mr. Kibad was permitted to leave but then they again followed and intercepted it and brought it back to the compound where they subjected said Mr. Kibad to further punishment. The truck of Atty. Luyaben was impounded and released only after a week when said Atty. Luyaben went to claim it. The truck's battery was changed with an inferior battery.

21. BAWINTA KO-AN was forced at gun point to part with his hen that was hatching eggs by a 60th P.C.

22. PEDRO BANGEG reports that soldiers of the 60th P.C. took his pregnant carabao, brought it to the fields and shot it, taking the carcass to their camps.

23. SUMA-IL OF GAOGAO reports that his herd had been systematically shot at by soldiers of the 60th P.C. and says that at least 37 heads are now missing. He further alleged that when a member of the 60th P.C. got married, some soldiers just went to his pasture, shot one and brought same to their camps.

24. FATHER GAVINO MADRIAGA, CICM on November 3, 1978, was then wearing his cassock and stole, as Parish Priest of Tabuk, going to Goodwill Hospital, to administer confession when he was accosted by soldiers of the 60th P.C., and when he identified himself as a priest, one of the soldiers hit him twice on the head with his open palm and the other, identified as 2nd Lt. Clodualdo Tusi, walloped him with a .45 calibre pistol with which the said Lt. Tusi threatened to shoot him. Father Madriaga had to plead for his life and his having been pistol whipped was witnessed by several students who were then coming out from a nearby protestant school. It will be noticed that said 2nd Lt. Tusi is the same officer who is involved in the Javier case of Kidnapping with Murder and who is supposed to be in the Military Stockade.

25. EDWARD M. BELANDRES, alias “Buster”, was manhandled and mauled by drunken elements of the 60th P.C. at the Kowloon Restaurant on the night of the 3rd of November, 1978. His only fault was that he was at the counter when these soldiers were forcing a reduction of the beer they drunk.

26. A NIA DRIVER was mauled and kicked, right at the NIA Office’s gate at Bulanao, on November 6, Monday morning, by members of the 60th P.C., in full view of other co-employee of the NIA.

27. MAYOR JADSAC of Pudtol, Apayao reports that members of the 60th P.C. are creating alarm and scandal in his municipality by indiscriminate firing and show of force against the civilian populace. When report was made
to the Provincial Commander, the latter impressed that he is unaware of the presence of 60th P.C. soldiers in Apayao. It was explained that they are their augmentation security for NAPOCOR People.

28. INP ANDY SANTIAGO of Pudtol Police Sub-Station was disarmed and detained while escorting prisoners to Kabugao Municipality by soldiers of the 60th P.C., and despite exhibition by said Andy Santiago of his Memorandum Receipt for the Carbine rifle and his Mission Order, his rifle was confiscated. It is also reported that this same Unit of 60th P.C. soldiers are interfering with police functions and disrupting the peace and order of Pudtol.

29. CYRIL KOTOKEN, a son of Sangguniang Panlalawigan Kagawad Carlos Kotoken, was arbitrarily detained from November 6 through 9, 1978 and which case is under investigation.

30. INP LAFREDO OSWAY, of the Pasil INP Sub-Station, was disarmed by Major Amparo Cabigas at Tomiangan, Tabuk, on November 14, 1978.

Done this 17th day of November, 1978, at Tabuk, Kalinga-Apayao, Philippines.
GREETINGS

TO THE PEOPLE OF UPPER KALINGA:

The Government is definitely going to construct Chico Dam 4. Its realization would surely up-grade our socio-economic condition. Along this line, each and everyone of us is expected to extend our wholehearted support to facilitate the implementation of said project.

The government is obliged to protect and help your persons and properties, hence, a survey team will be in your place to identify the families, properties and landholdings that would be affected in the construction of the aforementioned project.

For your information and guidance, three (3) survey teams had been organized with representatives from the national, provincial and military. These teams will start in places and dates indicated hereunder.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>TEAM</th>
<th>PLACE</th>
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<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>a. Ableg</td>
<td>Nov. 28-30, 1978</td>
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<td>b. Tanglag</td>
<td>Dec. 1-6, 1978</td>
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<td>II</td>
<td>a. Cagaluan</td>
<td>Nov. 28-Dec. 5, 1978</td>
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<td>b. Mabileng</td>
<td>Dec. 6-11, 1978</td>
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<td>b. Lubaigan Poblacion</td>
<td>Dec. 3-14, 1978</td>
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Non-appearance in the areas on the dates above scheduled or lack of cooperation on your part may result in inaccurate disclosure and/or assessment of your affected properties.

(SGD.) IGMEIDO S. GARDOSE
Colonel, (MNSA) PC
RC RECOM 2 PC/INP and
OIC, TASK FORCE HYDRA ALFA

(SGD.) AMADO B. ALMAZAN
Provincial Governor and
Actg Administrator, KSDR
PAGTA TI BODONG
Disiembre 29, 1978
Bugnay, Tinglayan
Kalinga-Apayao

1. Amin nga tattao ti Bontoc ken Kalinga a maapektaran ti proyekto nga dam ket maiparitda nga makipag trabaho iti dam project.

2. No adda man taga-Bontoc wenna Kalinga nga matay iti damsite gapu ta makitrab trabaho iti projecto ket awan biang ti oppositionists.

3. Ti partidos dagiti naganak a Kalinga wenno Bontoc nga sumrek nga soldado ti gobierno ket bagbagaan da koma ida ta saanda koma a mangparigat kadagiti mangsupsup pirat ti dam.

4. Amin a barbarios nga maapektaran ti proyekto a dam ket maiparitda nga nga aglaco iti produktoda wenno mangpak a kadagiti trabahador ti National Power Corporation (NPC).

5. Asinoman a maduktalan nga agtraitor wenno masairuan maikontra iti panggep dagiti oposer wenno isuda ket tumulongda iti NPC ket madusada agraman ti patay.

6. Ti naitakderen a bodong iti beet ti dua bario ket saan a maapektaran uray adda man maysa nga tao ti maysa a bario a matay maipanggep ti makipag trabahuhanna iti NPC.

7. No adda agpanggep nga agibalos nga partidos ti natayan gapu iti daytoy nga dam project ket abgalin a kalaban dagiti oppositionists.

Pinirmaan dagiti mangibagi kadagiti il-il i ti:

1. TINGLAYAN — Jose Angsoy
   Mateo Edas
   John Appi
   Bommonos Ayyang
   Bonifacio Eplay
   Ngo-oc Wac-ad
   Lewor Masungat

2. LUPLUPA — Victor Bacali
   Alexander Tiggangay
   Juan Masi
   Osngal
Diego Fad-ang
Vicente Donal
Juan Alocod
Lino Goygoy
Samuel Langngag

3. NGIBAT
- Yag-ao Gamang
  Lumbaya Gayondan
  R. Edpis

4. BUGNAY
- Mario Yag-ao
  Juan Sagwil
  Marngo
  Joseph Ammatong
  George Dabauway
  Bernard Baydon
  William Alunday
  Antonio Panao
  Jose Alunday
  Robert Jeprox
  Martin
  Arthur Aban
  Pa-ot Sixto
  Alexander Comed
  Julio Baggas
  Talla Baluga

5. DOGNAC
- Malapni Banaang
  Jimmy Domaging
  Scout Cawi

6. TANGLAG
- Miguel Paccoy
  Lito Cawilan
  Lorenzo Bageao
  Daniel Ngaya-an
  Francisco Damagon
  Constancio Balicao

7. CAGALUAN
- Nicasio Gayaman
  Morales Angbao

8. ABLEC
- Jose Palangdeo
  Roman Santos
  Narcisa Guinapan
  Emilio Wayyag
  Jose Awan
  Jaime Dayugan
9. ANABEL
   - F Ayao-an
   - M Chengebongan

10. BARLIG
    - Lingayo Lakisen
    - Agustin Dotorfe
    - Amnawang Balutan

11. BANGAD
    - Leonardo Dagaon
    - Henry Tangalag
    - Sulio Wongao
    - Candido Mamma
    - Juan Garagan
    - Bulao Fernando
    - Pedro Abbacan
Let us smile while we are here in Manila because in our place we have been sad. Let us have tears of happiness here in Manila because in our place we have been sad. Let us have tears of happiness here because in our place we shed tears of sorrow.

Since February and up to December, 1974, we have spent thousands of pesos in sending delegations to Manila to bring our problem to the attention of Malacañang. In the affected area, the people have suffered a lot. We cannot sleep at night thinking of our death as a people. We cannot work in the farm. We cannot continue with our green revolution. One has died of high blood pressure. We have been pre-occupied with our problem. In 1974, we applied all ways and means to let the government hear us. Our pleadings fell on deaf ears. If they saw us, they pretended not to see us. And as delegates, we got the curse of our people who expected us to come home with good results.

Our prayers in 1974 have been heard in 1975. We are here now. We can relate our problems and aspirations. Other people when they see Igorots think that we have tails and this is perhaps one reason why they look at us as animals. But there are people like you who sympathize with us; support and understand us. Now we can work better during the day and can sleep better at night.

Our request in 1975 was to meet more friends, national and international. We still want to have a dialogue with the President for our talks with the PANAMIN, DLGCD and others were failures. We hope to seek an audience with the President before we go home.

We thank our sympathizers in Manila and look upon you to help us because we cannot go any further. We look upon you to get involved and share with us your sacrifices and if possible, see the President for an audience.