An Analysis of Steinberg's Use of *Walang Hiya* to Explain Filipino Elite Collaboration in World War II

AURELIO B. CALDERON

De La Salle College
Manila

I. Introduction

It is easy enough to say that most historians aim at an intelligent reconstruction of the past. But there is really more to this statement than meets the eye. What, for instance, is the historian seeking? Is he merely after an exact description of what happened? Or is his objective that which transcends plain narrative of past events with the view of explaining what happened?

The ideal, of course, is to reconstruct the past in a manner which is both intelligent and intelligible. But to achieve this high level of historical writing, the historian needs the evidence and the insight for an adequate reconstruction, not to mention the substantial body of facts needed to produce a coherent picture. Such an objective is by no means easy to achieve.

It was W. H. Walsh, a Fellow and Tutor of Merton College, Oxford, who said:

> What every historian seeks for is not a bare recital of unconnected facts, but a smooth narrative in which every event falls as it were into its natural place and belongs to an intelligible whole.

In this respect the ideal of the historian is in principle identical with that of the novelist or the dramatist. Just as a good novel or a good play appears to consist not in a series of isolated episodes, but in the orderly development of the complex situation from which it starts, so a good history possesses a certain unity of theme or plot. And where we fail to find such a unity we experience a feeling of dissatisfaction; we believe we have not understood the facts we set out to investigate so well as we should.¹

Reconstruction, however, though it be characterized by scientific exactitude and the thematic unity of art, is not an end in itself. History, to put the matter plainly, aims to teach. To the question what history is for, Father Horacio de la Costa, S. J., in an article published by the *Historical Bulletin* (Philippine Historical Association) said:

> One answer is, that history teaches certain lessons, certain valuable lessons which will help us in the conduct of our present life. Both as individuals and as communities we are today confronted by certain problems. These problems are not new. They confronted men in the past. And the men of the past came up with certain answers. Some of these answers turned out to be fairly successful. Others turned out to be simply wrong. In either case, we learn something of great value. We learn to deal with our present simi-

lar problems, or at least we learn how not to deal with them.  

Precisely because of the role historians are expected to play in providing present generations with guidelines for contemporary as well as future actions, the responsibility of historians is indeed great. Thus, although the historian has permission to be compared to the novelist or dramatist, it must be admitted that he must submit to a stricter and more rigorous set of rules. No historian, for example, ought merely to put together whatever pieces of historical information he may find lying around. Nor should he merely order them to his heart's desire. “Above all,” as George F. Kennan once said, “he cannot fashion out of his raw material nice clean beginnings and endings to frame the burden of his tale.”

It is with the above points in mind that this paper will attempt to criticize an aspect of David Joel Steinberg’s book, Philippine Collaboration in World War II. Dr. Steinberg is assistant professor of Southeast Asian History at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor.

II. The Problem

It is the purpose of this paper to show the impermissible generalization used by Dr. Steinberg of the term walang hiya to explain the Filipino elite collaboration in World War II. It must be stated at the outset, however, that in criticizing Steinberg’s misuse of the term walang hiya, this paper does not wish to detract from the over-all value of his book. Much, indeed, has been written of that crucial period in Philippine history, but few, if any, of the published works on wartime Philippines show as much evidence of scholarship as the Steinberg opus. To avail himself of the primary documents, for example, Dr. Steinberg told this writer in an interview that he studied Japanese at Harvard for a period of four years.

It is the view of this paper that Philippine Collaboration in World War II is a searing and brilliant exposition of political collaboration in the Philippines. Documentation, however, no matter how impressive, is not much in itself. Facts must still be interpreted in order to be meaningful. This Steinberg does in his book. And it is also on this point that this paper takes issue with him.

The points at issue, in other words, are the following: (1) How valid is the walang hiya interpretation of Filipino elite collaboration in World War II? (2) On what sociological theory did Steinberg base his thesis? (3) What alternative explanation might there be for Philippine collaboration in World War II?

Before an attempt is made to discuss the above points, perhaps it would be best to analyze the meaning of walang hiya as used by Steinberg in his book.

III. Walang Hiya

It will be noted that Steinberg carefully ties up the concept of walang hiya with utang na loob, which means an internal debt of gratitude. “No Filipino,” Steinberg declares, “dares to ignore this social obligation, called utang na loob, for

4 The term walang hiya (shamelessness) is explained by Steinberg to mean a severe social slur. He derives his definition from Jaime C. Bulatao’s “Hiya,” Philippine Studies, XII: 3. (July, 1964), 428 and 437.
fear of being liable to the accusation of *walang hiya* (shamelessness).

In his section on Notes which appears toward the end of his book, Steinberg states that "the concept of *hiya* transcends simple shame since it also means embarrassment, awkwardness, and shy mortification. It is a painful emotion arising from a relationship with an authority figure or with society, inhibiting self-assertion in a situation which is perceived as dangerous to one’s ego. It is ‘a kind of anxiety, a fear of being left exposed, unprotected, and unaccepted. *Hiya* is the inner form of respect due to the group." 6

Thus, in the case of Jorge Vargas, former secretary of President Quezon and later chairman of the Executive Commission under the Japanese regime, Steinberg theorized that "in the conflict between his obligation to Quezon and his faith in himself he apostatized; in Philippine terms he was walang *hiya*." 7

In another section in his book, Steinberg pointed out that President Quezon wanted to return to Manila from Corregidor rather than escape to Australia with his family. General MacArthur, on the other hand, according to Steinberg, knew only too well that President Quezon was an extremely sensitive and proud man. To prevent President Quezon from giving himself up to the Japanese, MacArthur revealed to the ailing Filipino President a cabled instruction sent him by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt. The message empowered MacArthur to surrender Filipino troops to the Japanese; however, it did not grant the same concession to American soldiers, since it stated that they could fight “so long as there remains any possibility of resistance.”

IV. Philippine Collaboration

An equally difficult term to define is the word collaboration, yet it would seem necessary to do so if one is to relate the concept of *walang hiya* to the act of political collaboration with the Japanese. Steinberg, for one thing, does recognize the fact that collaboration can be viewed from three separate angles, namely, as a political issue, as a judicial issue, and as a moral issue.

In terms of a broad definition, however, almost to the point where one could not indeed classify it as a definition, one is tempted to recall Jose P. Laurel’s position that “forced collaboration is not collaboration.” Moreover, there were those who said that they collaborated with the Japanese only because they wanted to use the power of their office to effect reforms which they considered essential to the growth of Filipino society.

Finally, one is reminded of Teodoro Agoncillo’s thesis in his book *The Fateful Years: Japan’s Adventure in the Philippines, 1941-1945*, that those who did a proper job collaborating were admirable in the way they played the game of “make-believe.” Agoncillo, in fact, described such individuals as patriots, dedicating his two-volume work to no less than Jose P. Laurel, whom he described as “a nationalist, statesman, jurist, educator and patriot whose invincible courage and dedication to his country and people, during a time of crisis, saved the Philippines from complete destruction.” 8

For purposes of this paper, an attempt will be made to examine the issue of collaboration on the political, judicial, and moral planes. As a political issue, it is clear on the basis of historical documents that immediately after the liberation of

---

7 Ibid., p. 41.

the Philippines, a national board of inquiry was set up to investigate charges of disloyalty to the governments of the Philippines and the United States of America.

In addition to this, there was created the so-called People's Court the purpose of which was to try political prisoners. This judicial body it will be recalled, tried some 5,603 cases of which 156 were duly sentenced. In the end, however, the court became sympathetic to the issues of "duress," "justifying circumstances" and "exempting circumstances." The election of Roxas to the presidency eventually hastened the view that "collaboration has divided the people of the Philippines in a manner which threatened the unity of the nation at a time when public welfare requires that said unity be safeguarded and preserved."

As a judicial issue, collaboration was based on Article 114 which stated that "any person who, owing allegiance to the United States or the Government of the Philippine Islands, not being a foreigner, levies war against them or adheres to their enemies, giving them aid or comfort within the Philippine Islands or elsewhere" shall be punished with either life imprisonment or death penalty.

As a moral issue, it is the view of Steinberg that collaboration "is at least a partial contributor to the disturbing symptoms of social malaise in contemporary Philippine social life." In other words, collaboration did constitute a transgression of Philippine society's own norms. Collaborators, in a word, were guilty of walang hiya not only to Quezon, MacArthur, and America, but also to the articulated values of Philippine nationalism.

It is the view of Steinberg that the Filipino elite who collaborated with the Japanese committed a breach of allegiance "by opposing the national decision as it had been proclaimed at the outbreak of the war and articulated at that time by the elite itself."

V. Walang Hiya Validity

Steinberg's book, as was previously mentioned, analyzes the behavior of the Filipino wartime elite. The principal reason for this elite focus would seem to be Steinberg's thesis that the Filipino masses, as distinguished from the elite, remained loyal to the concept of nationalism which, at that time, meant unswerving loyalty to the United States and the wartime activities of the Philippine government in exile.

In short, the masses had hiya while elite members were walang hiya. The dichotomy is neat but extremely simplistic in its approach. For in essence, Steinberg seems to be suggesting that the Filipino elite violated utang na loob from which an acute sense of anxiety might have resulted from their having been exposed, unprotected, and unaccepted.

There is, of course, no way of determining at this time whether or not Filipino elite collaborators did experience the above type of anxiety. But even if they did, it seems an impermissible conclusion to say that the reason for their feeling of alienation could be attributed to the after-effect of walang hiya.

Anxiety, in other words, is by no means the product only of a hiya violation which springs from the failure to observe utang na loob expectations. It could, for instance, be the result of plain insecurity, a common enough feeling among those trying hard to succeed in their new status in life.

12 Steinberg, op. cit., p. 165.

14 Ibid., p. 174.
Status consciousness, George M. Guthrie explains in *The Filipino Child and Philippine Society*, is one of the dominant characteristics of the Filipino. The fact that the fortunes of war could reverse the favorable position enjoyed by Filipino collaborators was reason enough for them to be stricken with anxiety. Yet this type of insecurity is certainly different from the type associated with failure to observe *utang na loob*. One is *benefactor-directed* while the other is *self-directed*.

Hence, it is this paper's contention that given the precarious conditions of wartime Philippines, the Filipino collaborator's anxiety cannot possibly be explained solely in terms of the narrow and deterministic *walang hiya* theory.

Moreover, it seems altogether preposterous for Steinberg even to mention in his book that the United States launched the Philippine campaign ahead of the invasion of the Japanese mainland because MacArthur felt that failure to do so would mean that "the United States would be *uiang hiya*." Obviously, such an assertion could not possibly have been based on unimpeachable empirical data. In fact, it appears to be entirely bereft of any persuasive effect as to make it good propaganda.

In the above example, Steinberg seems to have engaged himself in a kind of cross-cultural conceptualization. Not content with explaining Filipino elite behavior according to what he describes as a deviation from the expected *utang na loob* behavior, Steinberg now applies, indiscriminately it seems, the same cultural norm to explain MacArthur's military decision to liberate the Philippines.

Are we to believe that it was the affective element rather than pragmatic factors which led MacArthur to keeping his famous word—"I shall return?" The place of the affective element in *utang na loob*, not to mention self-presentation, is explained by Mary R. Hollnsteiner in her paper, "Reciprocity in the Lowland Philippines."

Incidentally, Hollnsteiner distinguishes *hiya* from *utang na loob*. "Hiya," says Hollnsteiner, "is not necessarily accompanied by utang na loob, but utang na loob is always reinforced by hiya." In the case of MacArthur, an authority symbol, the *hiya* would stem not from a sense of *utang na loob* from Filipinos. It would appear that he was simply a man who, among other things, wanted to keep his word.

**VI. The Filipino Elite**

What do Filipinos know about its own elite? Except for a number of broad general conceptions, very little really. There simply are not enough empirical data available. The Philippines still has to come up with social scientists like Seymour M. Lipset and Aldo Solari, who did a study of the elites in Latin America, or Dwaine Marvick who is at present conducting a survey on the political decision-makers in England, or C. Wright Mills who evolved his own theory about the power elite in the United States.

Most Philippine sociology texts contain data of an admittedly general nature. Consider, for instance, this material which appears in the most recent sociology text published in the Philippines:

---

---

The elite are of two general types: the new rich and the traditional upper class. The new rich are those who have within their lifetime amassed enough wealth to enable them to afford the style of life of the traditional upper class, without, however, acquiring the attitudes and behavior patterns of this class nor gaining the social acceptance it enjoys.

The traditional upper class is made up of descendants of elite members. They may still be wealthy or no longer so; what counts is that their families have been the elite for one or more generations. They are socially recognized and accepted by other members of the traditional upper class as approximate equals. The descendants of the new rich are eventually absorbed into the traditional upper class when they acquire the attitudes and behavior patterns of this group.

Although a few lead in 'social justice' activities, the majority often assume the role of vested interest. A vested interest is an individual, group, or an institution in a superior position who will resist any threat to the security of its social position and, through economic and/or political power, will work for the preservation of the status quo.

Thus, little is really known about such things as the composition of the Filipino elite, its circulation and mobility, its functional division into such areas as economics, politics, industry, government, mass media, and the intellectual plane. If indeed theories are already being evolved about the Filipino elite without basic knowledge of its structural framework, might this not indeed be considered anomalous and misleading?

Some note of caution, it would seem, is in order. The Philippines is an extremely complex society that defies easy generalization. Moreover, studies on Philippine value orientation have more or less concentrated on the non-elite segment of the population.

Mary R. Hollnsteiner's study on the concept of *hiya* as related to reciprocity was based on data gathered in Tulayan, Bulacan, a locality peopled mostly by non-elite Filipinos some 21 kilometers from Manila. Jaime Bulatao's research on "The Manileño's Mainsprings" was conducted on some 50 men and 40 women applicants for jobs in four Manila factories. Even Frank Lynch's "Social Acceptance" theory is vague on the matter of sample description. Even more disturbing is the contention of F. Landa-Jocano then of the National Museum that his own field data from central Panay and from the slums of Sta. Ana in urban Manila do not support the smooth-interpersonal-relations thesis of Lynch.

"We feel that the proponents of the SIR thesis," said Dr. Jocano, "have not only generalized too much out of meagre empirical data but have described the relationship between norms and actions rather 'tightly'—i.e., they view the congruence in a manner that the occurrence of one positively explains the presence of the other and this relationship is universal for all occasions."

VII. No Alternative?

Steinberg, it is true, made no attempt to shirk or dodge, as best he could, this tricky business of putting the fuse of sociology to the powder of history. Whether he succeeded or not, however, is an en-

---


tirely different thing. Heavy theoretical dependence on the Philippine value theories of Bulatao, Hollnsteiner, and Lynch seems plainly evident in the Steinberg book. The result is that the author has produced a neat and well-argued theory of the wartime Filipino elite, but one whose cogency depends entirely on the validity of the premises provided him by his sources.

Steinberg’s whole opus, as it were, is like a pyramid standing on its tip. Nearly everything seems to depend on the accurate use of the term—walang hiya. Somewhat to this writer’s surprise, Steinberg’s book failed to explore the effects of the fatalistic (also non-manipulative) bahala na attitude in so far as it had considerable influence on both the elite and the masses.

True, Jorge Vargas was diagnosed as having been stricken with it, but Steinberg fails to as much as hint whether or not other elite collaborators were influenced by the bahala na attitude of fatalism. Although this paper cannot claim empirical data to support the contention, it seems altogether reasonable to assume that the bahala na element could have been utilized by another historian to define Philippine wartime behavior in terms of a particular value judgement.

What would seem then as most objectionable to the Steinberg book is its failure to explore alternative explanations for Filipino elite collaboration during World War II. No doubt, elite collaboration could partly have been explained in terms of the deviant behavior associated with walang hiya. The crucial question, however, remains: Was this the only explanation?

It is also interesting to note that other sociologists have pointed out Filipino ethical rules place the family above all other value orientation. If this is true, then the hiya which one would normally expect from the Filipino elite collaborator would be nullified by this dominant family-directed value of the Filipino. In other words, the Filipino collaborator would justify the act of political collaboration with the Japanese as a means to satisfy his duty to seek the welfare of his own family. In fact, if indeed he refused to collaborate, assuming that such an act would result in material benefits and other forms of security for his kin, might he not be bothered by the thought that his family might regard him as shirking his primary responsibility?

In this case, the so-called loyalty crisis would actually involve the relationship of the Filipino collaborator with his family rather than the impersonal and abstract ties which he may be presumed to have had with Uncle Sam. What would, to be sure, constitute nakakahiya (shameful) would be the seeming betrayal of the welfare of his family rather than the notion of sustained and continuing allegiance to the United States.

VIII. Problems of Comparison

The problem which plagued Steinberg’s book is really quite understandable. He accepted a formulated theory about Philippine value orientations and applied it to a given condition (wartime collaboration). The result was a heavy-handed insistence that collaboration violated the refined sense of reciprocity in the Filipino without regard to other possible dimensions such a term might have in relation to the Filipino family.

Collaboration, in so far as it is related to treason, would understandably be an important concept to the American to whom such values as loyalty to the nation and the people have a long and pronounced history which affirms its positive aspects. But Philippine history seems to have colored the meaning of collaboration quite differently.
It will be recalled that the datus and rajahs were indeed persuaded to collaborate with the early Spaniards who, lacking in manpower, had to work with the then existing political, social, and cultural structure. The datu elite group did collaborate with Spain. The coming of the Americans in 1898 saw the pattern being repeated. This time, a larger body of Filipinos, namely, the ilustrados, was utilized by the Americans to set up their new regime. Collaboration was, to be sure, equated with the common task of nation-building. The Japanese occupation then was a mere repetition of the two previous historical and social phenomena. The Japanese, like their Spanish and American predecessors, sought the active collaboration of the elite on the pretext that such action on their part would pave the way for independence.

The Steinberg book, it will be recalled, insisted that "the collaboration dilemma revealed a schism between what the elite considered to be its obligation and the expectations of other groups." Further, Steinberg declared that "at the outbreak of the war this gap was not apparent. Both the elite and the people made a clear commitment to fight against the Japanese." 22

In short, Steinberg theorized that at the outbreak of the war, the elite and the people were one, that a unity existed between the two, the commitment to fight with the United States being the bond of unity. This, of course, is a mere hypothesis. The only trouble is that Steinberg does not identify the hypothesis as such, but so states it in the book as if it were an empirically verified truth.

Another theorist, however, could have come up with an entirely opposite hypothesis. For instance, the view could very well have been presented that the gap between the elite and the masses actually goes back to the first collaboration of the datus with the Spaniards and, except for the relatively brief period in Philippine history which witnessed the revolution against Spain, had never really been restored up to the present time. This, such a theorist might explain, is the reason why to this day the Filipino elite continue to experience a feeling of impatient condescension when dealing with the masses.

Thus, following such a line of thinking, might it not be reasonable to assume that no new gap really existed between the elite and the masses during the Japanese occupation, that the Filipino elite were simply thinking of themselves and their families while the masses, on the whole, simply fell back on their old bahala na attitude, and that the loyalty crisis which Steinberg feels should have been felt both by the elite and non-elite Filipinos for America did not actually exist?

Admittedly, such a theory could be wrong. To insist that it is the correct diagnosis of the wartime behavior of the Filipinos would, as it were, be as wrong as the Steinberg thesis. In other words, one would be just as guilty by insisting that there is no alternative explanation other than the one being presented.

IX. Conclusion

For the historian to aim at a bare recital of unconnected facts, it was pointed out at the beginning of this paper, would be for him to record what merely happened. History, written by such a man, may indeed attain the goal of objectivity, but it is to be doubted whether it can succeed in providing guidelines which future generations of readers might follow.

On the other hand, for history to achieve a much higher goal, namely, that of providing an adequate reconstruction of past events so that history might be both written intelligently and intelligibly

---

22 Steinberg, op. cit., p. 173.
for contemporary and future readers, such a goal requires the necessary evidence and insight for an adequate reconstruction, not to mention scientific exactitude and the thematic unity of art.

Steinberg, as a historian, nearly had all the makings of a historian who could have provided the present generation of Filipinos an adequate understanding of what transpired among the Filipino elite during the Japanese occupation of the Philippines. No other historian, Filipino or foreigner, for instance, has come up with as much documentary evidence about the period than him.

Having studied Japanese for four years to be able to read Japanese documents in the original, Steinberg made extensive use of sources particularly those classified under Selected Archives of the Japanese Army, Navy, and Other Government Agencies, 1868-1945.

Credit, too, must be given to the immense range of the author's sources. He had access to American Counter-Intelligence materials on Philippine wartime officials, extracts from monitored shortwave radio broadcasts of Japanese radio programs in the Philippines during the war, the speeches delivered by ranking Filipino and Japanese officials, not to mention 198 books and articles which he listed under secondary sources.

Moreover, Steinberg does give ample evidence that wherever gaps appeared in his documented data, he took pains to cover them with insights drawn from interviews with highly knowledgeable Filipinos whose names appear in his bibliography.

But the Achilles Heel in the Steinberg opus had to do with the certitude he gave to the preliminary studies on Philippine value orientations, using them at times with the force of dogma, and failing to warn readers of the possibility of their being in error. Steinberg, it cannot be denied, did adhere to the strict and rigorous rules of historical documentation. On this there can be little doubt. But when it came to an area which, one might suppose, was not familiar to him, namely, social psychology in particular and sociology in general, his seemingly blind reliance on the theories of Bulatao, Hollinsheimer, and Lynch did unwittingly trip him into fashioning out of his documented materials “nice clean beginnings and endings to frame the burden of his tale.”

It was Edward T. Hall who said that a fault among Americans is that they are apt to be guilty of great ethnocentrism. He said Americans “insist that everyone else do things our way,” explaining that such an attitude stems not so much from malice as from ignorance of the cultures of other people. Might it not be possible to add to what Hall has said that not only do many Americans insist that everyone else do things their way, but are prone to judge the behavior of other people in terms only of their own?

The term cultural relativism, at this point, might be worth considering if only to insist on Robert Redfield’s view that “the values expressed in any culture are to be both understood and themselves valued only according to the way people who carry that culture see things.” This, needless to say, does require, at the very least, a sympathetic valuation of other ways of life than one’s own.

At any rate, and this to raise the last and final question, might the subject matter which Steinberg chose to write about, namely, Philippine Collaboration In World War II, have been of such a nature as to

intensify the problem of maintaining ob­
jectivity? Steinberg, it will be noted, did
come to the Philippines to write his book.
He saw with his own eyes how a great
many of the Filipino collaborators in World
War II continue to enjoy prestige and in­
fluence, not to mention their success in
business, industry, and government, ins­
stead of being repudiated and scorned by
the very people whom they "betrayed" dur­
ing the war?

The objectivity claimed by historians
must certainly admit of difficulties and
qualifications. Value judgements, for ins­
stance, as shaped by determinate cultures
—in the case of Steinberg, American valua­
tions—may indeed be difficult to prevent
from intruding into a historico-sociological
work such as the one Steinberg undertook.

To make allowances for such a flaw
would seem to be the first requisite to
profiting from the painstaking research
which Steinberg gave to the writing of
Philippine Collaboration In World War II.
Without such foresight, the Filipino reader
may find himself either accepting the
Steinberg thesis without reservation or re­
jecting whatever the book has to offer on
the ground that Steinberg, having allowed
himself a number of sweeping generaliza­
tions, does not deserve to be read at all.

It would indeed be most unfortunate if
the two-fold possibilities described here
were true. For Steinberg, despite his gla­
ing misuse of the waling hiya concept,
did come up with a book thinking Filipi­
nos deserve to read.

Bibliography

Agoncillo, Teodoro A., The Fateful Years: Japan's Adventure in the Philippines, 1941-1945 (Quezon City: R. P. Gar­

Bulatao, Jaime C., "The Manileño's Man­
springs," Four Readings on Philippine Val­

PHILIPPINE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

Cordero, Felicidad V. and Panopio, Isa­
bel S., General Sociology: Focus on
the Philippines (Manila: College Pro­
fessors Publishing Corporation, 1967),
465 pp.

De La Costa, Horacio, “Three Lectures on
History,” Historical Bulletin, IV: 3
(September, 1960).

Grossholtz, Jean, Politics: The Philippines
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company,
1964), 293 pp.

Guthrie, George M. The Filipino Child
and Philippine Society (Manila: Phil­
ippine Normal College Press, 1961),
223 pp.

Hall, Edward T. The Silent Language

Hollnsteiner, Mary R. “Reciprocity in the
Lowland Filipinos,” Four Readings
On Philippine Values Frank Lynch,
S.J., ed. (Quezon City: Ateneo de Ma­

Hunt, Chester and others. Sociology in the
Philippine Setting (Quezon City:
Phoenix Publishing House, 1963), 373
pp.

Kennan, George F., “History as Literature”
Encounter (April, 1959). Also, New
York Times Book Review (April 26,
1959).

Lipset Seymour M. and Solari, Aldo. Elites
in Latin America (New York: Oxford

Marvick, Dwaine (ed.). Political Decision­
Makers (Glencoe: The Fress Press,

Lynch, Frank, “Social Acceptance,” Four
Readings on Philippine Values, Frank
Lynch, S.J., ed. (Quezon City: Ate­
eo de Manila University Press, 1964),
113 pp.

Mills, C. Wright. The Power Elite (New

Redfield, Robert. “Cultural Relativism
and Social Values,” Society Today and
Tomorrow. Elgin F. Hunt and Jules
Karlin (New York: Macmillan Co.,
1965), 507 pp.

Steinberg, David J. Philippine Collabora­
tion In World War II. (Manila Soli­
ardidad Publishing House, Inc., 1967),
235 pp.

Walsh, W. H. Philosophy of History (New
York: Harper & Brothers Publishers,
1960), 175 pp.