RESEARCH STUDIES ON THE CHINESE MINORITY IN THE PHILIPPINES: A SELECTED SURVEY

TERESITA ANG

The multiplicity of questions posed by scholars and academicians seeking to find answers to the Chinese problem in the Philippines has generated a fair amount of research and studies, and widely differing levels of analysis. Most are confined to the walls of the academe and clearly show the need for sustained, systematic or coordinated effort. According to the author, the studies surveyed have barely scratched the surface "when we talk of actively changing attitudes." Calling for positive action, the writer points out the need to promote visible and active work that will bring the minority and majority groups together, specially in this critical period in Southeast Asian political development. The selected works provide a representative view of the nature and extent of research done by foreign scholars, Filipinos, and Philippine-Chinese. It was found that "the weightier and more scientific" studies were made mainly by American scholars.


Scholars and academicians have sought and are seeking to find the answers to the above multiplicity of problems. On the whole, there has been a fair amount of research and studies done, but of widely different quality. The most popular field at present is sociology- anthropology — dealing with ethnic relations, ethnic attitudes/images, ethnic tensions, and others. From the proliferation of available materials, we can say that interest on this study of the Chinese minority has heightened in recent years.

In this year 1974, a new interest is focused on the Chinese community in the Philippines. The changing political scene in the whole of Southeast Asia has again thrown the limelight on the pockets of overseas Chinese communities in this area. Thus, Malaysian recognition of Peking has given impetus to a new rush of articles and commentaries assessing its impact on the three million Chinese in that country. The Philippines, there are reasons to believe, will soon take this step. Hence, studies on the Chinese in the Philippines hopefully will be accorded special attention in this critical period.

The government has not, until recently, shown much positive concern for serious research in this field. It has set up structures and allocated funds for studies of the Muslim and Mountain (tribal) minorities, but apparently felt the Chinese could care for themselves. Lately, the government has sought to organize data on the economic participation of both the alien and non-alien Chinese in trade, finance, import-export, and industry. Likewise, discovering its own lack of statistics on the number
of resident and naturalized Chinese, the government recently came to life on the demographic level.

Political parties are not known to have promoted any research on the Chinese here except for listing contributors to campaign funds.

Substantial research has largely been confined to the walls of the academe, but not in any sustained, systematic or coordinated way. The University of the Philippines, Ateneo de Manila University (particularly its Institute of Philippine Culture), Philippine Women's University, and other schools have encouraged individual students to write theses or term papers on the subject; Asian Studies and the Philippine Sociological Review occasionally publish the findings of such research.

The weightier and more scientific work done, however, is in the names of foreign (mainly American) scholars — Wickberg, Weightmann, McBeath, Tilman, Amyot, Blaker, Doeppers and Omohundro. Only recently is substantial work being done by Filipinos or Philippine-Chinese. Dr. Antonio Tan authored an important history book of the Chinese here from 1898 to 1935, and is working on the period of Japanese occupation. Dr. Rodolfo Bulatao has just completed a study of ethnic attitudes in five Philippine cities, which hopefully is a break-through to scholarship in this field. The Boy Scouts of the Philippines' Committee on National Solidarity has compiled data on two minority groups: the Chinese and the Muslim in the Philippines.

A number of graduate students are currently undertaking studies of specific aspects of the Chinese problem. One at the University of the East (M.B.A. program) is writing on the Facts and Myths about Chinese businesses in the Philippines. One in the University of Sto. Tomas (Psychology) is writing on choice of career and motivations for Chinese students; another at the Adamson University (Education Department) is writing on the problems of Chinese schools. We expect more such studies to come up.

Such research as has been initiated locally has generally been done in response to crises events: the Retail Trade Act, the Constitutional Convention, the Chinese schools legislation, and possible recognition of Mainland China.

A private group, the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce, keeps files of newspaper clippings (both in English and in Chinese) on topics concerning the Chinese community. But it has not promoted or sustained any credible research — at least, not for public reference.

Another private organization, Pagkakaisa Sa Pag-unlad, Inc. or Unity for Progress, has for the three years since its organization, maintained a small research library on overseas Chinese. Pagkakaisa keeps files of documentation of newspaper, magazine, and review articles that bear on Sino-Filipino relations. It has compiled data and published articles intended for popular reference and has a collection of useful books and reference materials bearing on this special field. It has published so far two monographs: No. 1 is a Bibliography of the Chinese in the Philippines by Professor Chinben See and No. 2 is Fr. Charles McCarthy's book on Philippine-Chinese Integration. Monograph No. 3: The Philippine-Chinese Profile, Essays and Studies is currently in the press. The achievements of this organization have been useful, better than most other materials available, but not scientific or complete. Professors, graduate, and undergraduate students writing on the Philippine-Chinese have made extensive use of this library.

This present paper has made a survey of selected work which has been done in the field. The survey is not exhaustive; but it aims to give a representative view of the nature and extent of the research which has been done so far. The work of Dr. Rodolfo Bulatao and the survey undertaken by Boy Scouts of the Philippines are the most recent works published on ethnic relations. Dr. Bulatao's work especially stands out as one of the most creative works accomplished in this field. Father Amyot and Dr. Weightmann's studies give a historical-descriptive background account of the Chinese in the 1950s. Dr. Blaker's work is a valuable contribution on political dynamics in the Chinese community.
Two very important works, Dr. Robert Tilman's *Ethnicity and Politics in Philippine Chinese Youth* and Dr. Gerald McBeath's *Political Integration of the Philippine Chinese*, are mentioned only in passing. Copies of their work are not yet available at the time of writing; however, a number of articles on their studies have been published in widely circulated magazines in the Philippines.

Two other valuable contributions which, unfortunately, cannot be given exhaustive treatment are Dr. Doepper's and Dr. Omohundro's. Dr. Daniel Doepper's work is on *Ethnicity and Class Structure in Philippine Cities* (Syracuse University, 1971). The only copy of his dissertation is at present with the Ateneo de Naga in Southern Bicol Province. Dr. John Omohundro writes on *The Chinese Business Community in Iloilo City* (University of Michigan, 1973).

A description of Prof. Chin ben See's bibliography is given because it serves as a useful tool in the research on this field. Another description is given of the ongoing research of Prof. See on village and family associations in the Philippines. He is at present connected with the Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica.

There is a proliferation of M.A. theses on the Chinese Minority submitted to the different universities in Greater Manila. As representative we mention here Co Bin's study on Chinese Schools.

As we mentioned in the beginning, a fair amount of research has been done but not in a systematic way. How far these works help towards the solution of the Chinese problem in the Philippines, perhaps, should be the subject of another research.

It seems that the proliferation of completed research has barely scratched the surface when we talk of actively changing ethnic attitudes. The results and findings of the various researches show obviously that prejudices and unjust stereotypes do exist but, unless positive action is taken, these attitudes may remain with us for a long time to come. Dr. Bulatao's conclusion in his study mentioned here should be taken into account. He commented that the Muslim and the Chinese problems in the Philippines, even at this time, are viewed with "benign neglect" and the complacency of the majority people's attitudes towards these problems is quite disturbing.

A study of Lorna Lippman in *The Aim is Understanding* (1973) points out that "Dissemination of facts about minority groups in itself cannot be counted on to change unfavorable attitudes." The most important thing to do, perhaps, is through visible active work that will bring the minority-majority groups together. In this, I foresee the role of such integrative organizations as Pagkakaisa Sa Pag-unlad or Unity for Progress to be of great significance.

**Abstracts of Principal Studies**

*The Philippine-Chinese, a Cultural History of a Marginal Trading Community* by George H. Weightmann (Ithaca, Cornell University, 1960), 460 pp.

Fearful and resentful of the dominant economic role of the Chinese, the Filipinos have long sought through legislative actions and judicial interpretations to restrict the economic activity of the immigrant community. The implementation of such legislation and court decisions has but served as another complicating factor in a situation already characterized by cultural conflicts, social exclusiveness, and the modern political problem of dual loyalties.

These are the words of the author in presenting this investigation of the nature and problems of the Philippine-Chinese trading community in the late 1950s.

**Objectives**

This 460-page dissertation tries to consider the following questions and to stimulate further research on such questions as:

1. What was the nature of the Philippine Chinese community in the past and how did Spanish and American colonialism affect it?

2. What is meant by assimilation of an alien marginal trading community, and to what
extent was such an assimilation achieved in the past?

3. What is the state of the present Sino-Philippine tensions, and what are the dimensions of Philippine anti-Sinicism?

4. Conversely, to what extent does anti-foreign, particularly anti-Filipino, feelings among the Philippine Chinese affect the problems of socioeconomic interaction in the present political framework?

5. In what ways are the problems complicated by the impact of communism in East Asia?

6. How does the societal organization of the Philippine Chinese promote or lessen communal tension?

7. Can the Philippine democratic system cope with the problems without destroying itself in the process?

Methods

The writer spent 38 months (1951-52; 1955-57) in the Philippines to do this research study. In the 18-months during which the writer was connected with the Department of Sociology at the University of the Philippines, Diliman and Baguio campus, he collected 300 or more students' papers on Filipinos' contact with and evaluation of the various members of resident foreign communities. These papers provided the author with insights into various themes of prejudice in the Philippine context. Another tool he used extensively was the survey conducted by Filipino students in the first term of sociology courses at the State University in 1955. This survey had an original sample of 672 of which 654 were Filipino citizens. This sociopsychological study was meant to gather the Filipino students' attitudes towards the Indian, Spanish, American, Chinese, and Moro community in the Philippines.

Data

Chapter I constitutes a general introduction to the theoretical problems of assimilation and its relation to the role theory. The causes, demographic significance, and the changing nature of the Chinese emigration are presented.

Chapter II gives a historic background from the early years of contacts up to the end of World War II.

Chapter III traces the economic role of the Philippine Chinese, their business practices as contrasted with the less successful business methods of the Filipino, and the concept of the overseas Chinese as an "economic man."

Chapter IV turns to the political implications of the Chinese presence, the various attempts at economic nationalism, particularly the nationalization measures, the history and present status of immigration and naturalization, and also an assessment of the implication of the Nationalist-Communist struggle in the Philippine Chinese.

Chapter V discusses the sociopsychological milieu in which the Philippine Chinese find themselves. Origins of anti-Sinicism and various attitudes of Filipinos towards aliens are discussed.

Chapter VI gives special attention to the role of various institutional agencies of the group, including clan associations, schools, chambers of commerce, etc.

Chapter VII. Summary conclusions on the several questions brought up in previous chapters and a comparative study of Philippine Chinese with others in Southeast Asia.

Summary of Pertinent Findings

1. Throughout the survey runs the expected Filipino preference for peoples and things of the West. Interaction with Westerners of various governments is persistently perceived as less distasteful than with other orientals. For instance:

   69.3 percent find it distasteful for a relative to marry an Indian, 63.5 percent a Chinese and only 48.5 percent a Spaniard and 37.9 percent an American.

   68.0 percent will not go a-partying with a Japanese, 64.4 percent with a Chinese, 64.4 percent with an Indian, 57.0 percent with a Spaniard, 64.1 percent with a Moro, 43.9 percent with an American.

2. It is not those who are in competition with the Chinese nor those who are dependent
Economically on the Chinese who are most critical of the Philippine Chinese; rather, antipathy is most marked among middle class families.

3. More people prefer to patronize Chinese stores. Things are a little cheaper and there is more casualness in dealings between seller and customer.

4. Problems of illicit entry, material smuggling, and overstaying persistently plague Philippine administrations and are a constant source of embarrassment.

5. The institutionalized practice of offering bribes produces ill feelings. The entire bribery and extortion pattern becomes one of the major sources of tension.

6. It is questionable whether either group at this time actually desires assimilation of the marginal trading community. Chinese do not want to abandon their culture which they consider superior to Hwana (Filipinos) and many Filipinos, particularly the middle class, do not seem to desire that eventuality.

7. Majority of Chinese pay lip-service to the Kuomintang (KMT) government but a greater majority are politically uncommitted or indifferent. The increasingly precarious nature of the political-economic position of the Chinese causes many to look toward the People's Republic as possible protector.

8. There has long been an undercurrent of anti-Chinese feeling. Filipinos accuse Chinese of: a) bribery, b) hoarding, c) monopolistic handling and distribution of certain items, d) misrepresentation of goods, e) arson, and f) tax evasion. While these charges have validity in the case of Chinese business, they are equally valid in the case of many non-Chinese aliens and even Filipino businessmen.

9. The Chinese family system functions more effectively as an economic unit than the relatively more unstable Filipino system of bilateral kinship.

10. Although Chinese society is characterized by autonomy and segmentation, it is able to maintain a considerable amount of unity when dealing with politically and socially dominant groups.

11. Leadership patterns in the Chinese community evolve from adaptation of traditional social institutions to the new environment.

12. Because of long contact and of a pronounced economic role, the Chinese have been able to exert considerable influence on Philippine society. In turn, Filipinos have also influenced the pattern of life of the alien community although often through a mechanism resembling "antagonistic acculturation."

Conclusion

More than 15 years have elapsed from the time this dissertation was presented and more than 20 years have passed since the author first gathered his impressions on the Philippine Chinese. Nevertheless, Dr. Weightmann's work is significant as one of the earliest scholarly attempts to understand the Philippine Chinese situation thoroughly. The comprehensive study on the historical, political, sociocultural, and economic life of this minority group gives valuable background information on the Chinese in that period. From the author's analysis, we can have comparative conclusions as to whether the situation has improved in this past decade. Compared with the present indicators of assimilation, we can find that we have moved forward in the line. For instance, the data show that there is an increasing tolerance in attitudes towards intermarriage and social contacts with the ethnic minority.

Some of the data included, especially those referring to economic role, are definitely outdated and cannot apply to the present. This, in some way, urges us to make the study on this field a continuing one. The Philippine Chinese scene is definitely changing even if not as rapidly as the national scene. Measures and policies drawn up concerning the Philippine-Chinese problem should consider the Chinese of the present and of the future and not of the past.

This dissertation of Jacques Amyot, S.J. is the product of 13 months field research from March 1958 to May 1959 on the overseas Chinese community of Manila. It has been in preparation since 1951. The Chinese described in this work are those people in the Philippines who identify themselves with a group that is culturally Chinese and which is distinguishable by social behavior, speech values, and to a lesser extent, dress from the general indigenous population. The author set out in his work to inquire into the social organization of the Manila Chinese community particularly on relationships based on kinship and lineage affiliation.

Methods

The author undertook several categories of research in his work. To better understand Chinese familism, he explored their home tradition: What part do lineage affiliation and kinship relations play in the functioning of their home communities? What specific forms do they take? The second broad category related to the Philippine environment: What elements in the new environment were similar to and what elements different from the home communities? What problems do immigrants face in adjusting to Philippine society and in making a livelihood in the new environment? The third and most important category was the Manila Chinese community itself as an emergent society, the culture of which was derived from the mainland heritage of its population but transformed, presumably, under the influence of new contacts and a new situation. What, in particular, had become of the traditional kin-oriented institutions — the lineage organization, the “circle of mourning relatives,” the extended family, and the conjugal family? To what extent did kinship relationships continue to be important in the functioning of the whole community? Which functions were not met, and what was taking their place?

Data

The work started with the initial hypothesis that local factors affect social behavior of the Chinese in Manila. These factors are: social and administrative measures, change from rural to urban way of life, unequal sex ratio, economic factors, impact of Philippine and Western values, and Chinese politics.

Before the actual fieldwork, the author pre-tested his hypothesis by consulting with persons familiar with the overall situation of the Manila Chinese community and generally aware of the requirements of scientific inquiry. The fieldwork itself centered on two related projects; a) systematic coverage of all clan and regional associations, b) compilation of family histories using the genealogical method.

Summary

It is the contention of the author that the dimensions of the Manila Chinese community, that is, its origin and development, are ultimately related to the population and traditions of its home communities in the China Mainland. To prove this, the author made a detailed analysis of lineage organization and distribution of the Philippine Chinese centers of emigration.

He described in Chapter III the home country and kinship tradition of the Chinese. He analyzed the social cohesion among Manila Chinese as a result of coming from a similar social grouping. In this case, it is the different levels of the lineage organization, the only political organization in the village group.

In Chapter IV, reasons for emigrating are discussed. In all, the primary purpose for emigration was to improve the economic status (70.0 percent). A combination of other minor factors such as natural calamities, previous connection with the Nan Yang, local disturbances, etc. added to the lure. We were shown here that there is no abject poverty in the Manila Chinese population. Of the 152 China emigrants interviewed, only one case showed actual deterioration of financial condition in coming to the Philippines, six cases remained
about the same, — neither better nor worse, and 145 cases showed an improvement in their situation in the Philippines. The pattern of emigration and the relationship of the dependence of the Manila Chinese community on its home communities in China recruitment was considered.

In Chapter V the author gave an account of the ecology of the Manila Chinese community. The spatial distribution in relation to social differentiations, mainly along socioeconomic class, was explained.

The proverbial success of the Chinese in the Philippines which had given rise to the myths and prejudices against them was touched on in Chapter VI. This success had been attributed partly, to in-group cooperation: business alliances, trade associations, chambers of commerce. The rise of Philippine nationalism and the response of the Chinese to economic restrictions were also described. Cultural and religious syncretism was mentioned, with the author taking the view that, for the vast majority of the Chinese in Manila, contact with non-Chinese culture had never amounted to anything like an impact, given the structure of the Chinese community and its attitudes.

Chapter VII dealt with clan associations. In 1959, there were 31 Fukienese and 16 Cantonese associations listed. Clan affairs, leadership in the association, expectations of loyalty, membership, rituals and functions of these associations are described thoroughly.

The underlying principles of the Chinese kinship are lineage, generation, sex, and seniority. The basis is patrilinear. Agnatic relatives are considered nearest to one another. This circle or pattern of close relatives was the subject of Chapter VIII. The mourning customs of these relatives, the composition of the household, the interaction with nonkinsmen were also part of the discussions in this Chapter.

The last chapter turned to the conjugal family and its functions the prime purpose of which is the perpetuation of a line of ancestors. Traditionally, husband-wife relationship is subordinate to father-son relationship but the emancipation of women in Manila is more advanced than in China. The remaining half of the chapter described traditional attitudes of the Chinese family.

Conclusion

Father Amyot showed a profound knowledge and a deep understanding of the Chinese and their values. This study defined Chinese familism which expresses the conception of the nature of the kin group, the relationship of its members, and the obligations that follow them. The object was to show its function in relation to the Manila Chinese community.

The account of the lineage organization in Southeastern China is very informative. This is also the first attempt at scientifically probing into the workings of kinship relations as it exists in China and as it functions in the Manila Chinese community.

On the whole, this study has opened up new areas for further exploration. It could have been of great significance had it been published the year it was written. As of now, the study has more value as a historical-descriptive account of Chinese familism. The fifteen-year gap from the time it was finished (1959) to the time it was released (1974) is a period of vast change in China, in the Philippines, in the local Chinese community. Hence, many of the points brought out in this study no longer hold true. The impact of Chinese familism can no longer be considered significant. As the young generation comes up, they become more and more self-sufficient. The clan associations can no longer afford the protection and security they need. In fact, the raison d’être for its existence can hardly be found at present.


At the outset, the author presents four hypotheses in this study. They are:

1. The greater the cohesion of the overseas Chinese community, the greater the power the community is able to wield.
2. The greater the cohesion of the community, the greater the political orientation toward China.

3. The greater the political orientation on the part of the overseas community toward China, the more the community seeks to use its power for the benefit of China.

4. The more the power of the community is directed to Chinese purposes, the greater the danger the community poses to the economic and political integrity of the host nation.

Objectives

The purpose of this study is to test the validity of the first two hypotheses and to offer some tentative judgments regarding the latter two. The author, in short, attempts to better identify the relationships between community cohesion and political orientation and to better elucidate the factors and forces which appear to lead to greater cohesion and increased political orientation toward China on the part of overseas Chinese communities. Three interrelated factors: cohesion, political loyalty, and economic power, are the bases of suspicion and sensitivity towards overseas Chinese.

More specifically, the author seeks to answer these two related questions:

First, are periods of cohesion within the Chinese community accompanied by an increased political orientation toward China? Second, does increased cohesion within the community lead to a greater political orientation toward China?

Methods

The approach used is essentially historical. Extensive references were made to studies of previous scholars like Purcell, Wilmott, Skinner, Pye, Amyot, Murray, and especially Wickberg (China in Philippine Life). Aside from this use of available literature on Chinese in Southeast Asia, the author also conducted several case studies based on data derived from interviews.

The interview data were drawn over a period of approximately one year (1964-1965) with respondents coming mostly from older generation Chinese business community. Appendix A has brief biographical sketches of the individuals from whom interview data were derived.

At first, an attempt was made to adopt attitudinal survey techniques but the response was disappointing due to lack of cooperation from respondents. Most Chinese would understandably be wary about subjects touching on their political orientation and activity.

To measure political orientation and cohesion, therefore, the author confined himself to gauging the activity and strength of organizations most closely associated with community cohesion and political loyalty toward China. His assumption is that the political orientation of individuals can be reflected in the organizations they are involved in.

As such, the author's analysis centered on two active organizations in the Chinese community: the Chamber of Commerce and the Kuomintang; the Chamber because of its close relationship functionally to community cohesion, the Kuomintang because of its efforts to solicit political loyalty toward the Republic of China.

The important premises presented by the author were: a) cohesion can be said to be high when the Chamber (or its equivalent) is strong, that is, when the Chamber's leadership exercises broad influence on the activity of other community institutions and does, in fact, provide a framework or means whereby the vertical cleavages of the community are reconciled and coordinated and speaks for the Chinese community vis-a-vis the surrounding political system; b) a political orientation toward China can be said to have increased when Kuomintang leaders exercise broad influence on the activity of other community institutions and are able to channel increasing financial resources toward China.

Data

The author described first the general setting within which the entire overseas Chinese community found itself, the salient aspects of community organization, and the manner in
which the community interacted with its political surroundings. The historical overview was employed in presenting this. Thus, first discussed is the Spanish period, then the American era, followed by Japanese occupation, and lastly, the postwar Republic period.

Summary

The author showed in this study that the entire history of the Chinese community is characterized by unity and fragmentation:

1. Unity characterized the end of the 19th century fostered by the presence of the capitán structure. This structure provided an arena, within which interests of community sub-groupings were reconciled, and a main channel for communication between the Chinese community and the Spanish authority. Until the establishment of the Chinese consulate in the Philippines, political and cultural contact with China was, for the most part, channeled through this capitán structure.

2. In the American era, the old structure of power eroded. The capitán structure lost formal sanction as the single mediator between the community and the surrounding political system. The Americans dealt with the Chinese through a multiplicity of channels. The Chinese consulate was recognized and Chinese journalism and political parties were allowed to grow. Thus, for nearly two decades the overseas community was characterized by internal competition and conflict. This period saw the establishment of the General Chamber of Commerce as the center of decision-making in almost all aspects of Chinese life throughout the archipelago.

3. The period in the early 1930s saw the revitalization of the Kuomintang. For the community, the 1920s and early 1930s were a period of stability and unity, prompted again by the presence of a single multifunctional structure led by individuals who sought to maintain the community's distinctiveness from both the Philippines and China. In the 1930s unity and stability were increasingly replaced by fragmentation and change. The Chamber's dominance eroded and its system of coordination, initiated during the Bookkeeping Law fight, fell into disuse. Schools sponsored by the Kuomintang were renewed and the chamber's influence on education weakened. Chinese journalism, dominated through the 1920s by the China Commercial News and Fookien Times, entered a period of new growth and diversity.

4. The Japanese interregnum demonstrated the deep conflicts and internal fragmentation in the community. This continued to characterize the community until the formation of the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce, nearly a decade after the Japanese had been ousted. Factors that account for the formation of the Federation were given, among which was continued antagonism between the pre-war leadership of the Chamber and the Kuomintang. The Federation reasserted the structural precedents established by the 19th century capitán system and the Chinese Chamber of Commerce of the 1920s. By the mid-1960s, the Federation's authority stretched from one end of the archipelago to the other and was to be found in nearly all aspects of community life including education, journalism, marriage, and inter-clan relations.

From the history of the Chinese community as presented by the author, we were given the answer to the four hypotheses presented in the introduction. The overall conclusions were:

1. If power means the ability of an actor to participate in the making of decisions, and more specifically, to bring about or prevent a governmental policy which otherwise would not have occurred or have been prevented, then it would appear that, so far as the overseas Chinese in the Philippines are concerned, the connection between the community cohesion and the exercise of power is tenuous.

From the cases presented such as the Bookkeeping Law, the Retail Trade Nationalization Act, and the Barrio School Project, we find that there does not appear to be a clear correlation between cohesion and the successful exercise of power.
On the contrary, according to the author, an opposite relationship with cohesion might be made; that is, cohesion on the part of the Chinese community may lead indirectly to a decreasing Chinese ability to affect policy. Also cohesion may facilitate the mobilization of community resources, but at the same time, tend to aid the mobilization of anti-Chinese sentiment.

2. The second hypothesis, from the author’s conclusion, is equally suspect. There appears to be little positive correlation between cohesion and the ascendency of Chinese nationalists. On the contrary, some cases tend to show that at the period of strong cohesion in the community (in the 19th century, for instance) the Chinese nationalists were unsuccessful in establishing roots in the community while in the period of fragmentation (as in 1900 and 1915) nationalism fervor was in evidence.

However, as the author explained further, it might be argued that this seeming lack of correlation is misleading in that, actually, community leaders during periods of cohesion are also the strong nationalists and both the Chamber and the Federation were, in effect, only fronts for such institutions as the Kuomintang. Consequently, in periods when the Chamber or Federation are both strong, there is no need for the dynamism and growth of the Kuomintang. This fact is further proven by the biographical sketches of the Chamber or Federation leaders which demonstrated their commitment to Chinese nationalism.

Yet, the author commented, for every bit of evidence in support of the view that Chamber leaders were strong nationalists during the periods of cohesion, counter evidence can be provided. The conflict between Palanca and the first Chinese consul-general in the Philippines was one case in point, where some schools and newspapers sponsored by the Chamber in the 1920s competed against those sponsored by the Kuomintang. The biographical data themselves are no strong proofs since many would profess loyalty to China and concern with Chinese political events merely to gain power within the community. The author concludes that this study gives an indication of how cohesion in the community, has been more closely tied to activity oriented toward the Philippines than with efforts to orient the community toward China politically.

3. The two remaining hypotheses cannot be tested on the basis of evidence provided by this study. As the author explained, the history of the Chinese community in the Philippines does suggest that the community has diverted larger financial resources toward China during high tides of nationalistic fervor, but statistical verification of this is extremely difficult. In the absence of such evidence, the hypothesis that identifies Chinese nationalism with benefit to China appears valid. Similarly, the author cannot find support to the argument that to the extent that the community is directed to Chinese purposes, the economic and political integrity of the host nation is threatened.

In brief, the author claimed that the Philippine overseas Chinese experience cannot refute either the contention that a political orientation toward China by the overseas community is to China’s benefit so far as community resources are concerned, or that Chinese nationalism constitutes at least a potential threat to the economic and political viability of the host nation. It does indicate, however, that the actual relationship between cohesion and nationalism is more complex and perhaps the reverse of what is often assumed.

Conclusions

Dr. Blaker’s insights and observations on “politics” in the Chinese community come as a surprise. This survey of the history of the Chinese community, especially the Japanese period, is a welcome addition to the number of historical writings on the subject. His political interpretations and analysis of the dynamics of political power in the Chinese community can be considered an authoritative account. His study brought out and put on record a number of significant historical incidents which throw light on the political structure of this overseas Chinese community.

A word of caution should be taken in that, while this is an excellent historical account, it
RESEARCH STUDIES ON THE CHINESE MINORITY IN THE PHILIPPINES: A SELECTED SURVEY

has not gone further into relating Chinese leadership to the community as a whole. In other words, the study has not proven the scope or extent of actual influence this political structure has on the entire community. For all we know, the Chinese leadership, especially at present, is confined to a minimal group of first and second generation Chinese. We can perhaps predict that further fragmentation will be the rule as the need for "leadership" dwindles and as the group of potential leaders look more towards the host country's government for guidance and protection. This, perhaps, can be the subject of further study. Meanwhile, more changes are happening and the Chinese community five years after Blaker's work has not remained static. Ten years from now, it is again a different story.


**Objectives**

This study was conducted from August to November, 1973, under the auspices of the Boy Scouts of the Philippines' Committee on National Solidarity on the occasion of the Golden Jubilee of Philippine Scouting. The results of the study were published in a 343-page monograph and limited copies were circulated early in 1974. The Boy Scouts of the Philippines (BSP), in conducting the survey, had in mind the following objectives:

1. to examine the attitudes of the different ethnic groups toward one another and identify problems relevant to majority-minority relations;
2. to provide a better understanding of the ethnic Chinese;
3. to lay the groundwork for a general and intensive in-depth study on ethnic relations and attitudes;
4. to recommend some lines of action that may be undertaken to promote unity.

**Methods**

The survey made use of three sets of questionnaires as main instruments in gathering data about the two ethnic groups under study: the Chinese and the Muslim minority. In the final analysis of the data on the Chinese minority group, secondary information materials, i.e., studies and findings of other scholars, were widely utilized.

The three sets of questionnaires or interview schedules were administered to 1,215 respondents divided as follows: Greater Manila Filipinos, 500 respondents; Mindanao Area Filipinos, 600 respondents, and Chinese, 115 respondents. The questionnaires made use of checklist items, open-ended questions, and five-point rating scales. The questions were originally framed in English and translated into the dialects when necessary.

**Data**

The report gave a background sketch of the Chinese in the Philippines, covering historical, sociocultural, and economic aspects of the problem. Also discussed were reasons or roots of prejudices and antagonism.

The main survey on the Chinese minority was covered in two parts. One part covered the attitudes of the Chinese respondents on several areas of discussion like (a) language, (b) food, (c) admired traits, (d) attitude of the ethnic Chinese towards Filipinos — as employer, employee, business partner, friend, relative, etc., (e) parental attitude towards Filipinos, (f) comparison of attitudes between Muslim and non-Muslim Filipinos, (g) leisure, (h) comparison of Filipinos to the Chinese, and (i) values.

The second part covered the self-image of the Filipinos — how they perceive the Chinese as an ethnic minority in the Philippines. Areas explored include: (a) similarities between Filipinos and Chinese in terms of physical characteristics, customs, language, religion, social status, and race or nationality; (b) comparison of Chinese to Filipinos in terms of
economic position, educational attainment, political standing, and general standing; (c) attitudes and perceived relationship between Filipinos and Chinese.

Summary

Part I

1. 72 percent of the Chinese ate Filipino food and 40 percent served Filipino dishes regularly in their households.

2. Over 91 percent of the Chinese were able to speak Tagalog; about 71 percent used this language at home at least occasionally and 41 percent used it regularly.

3. Chinese as a language was not found to be spoken by all of the respondents interviewed, in spite of the fact that all of those who served as subjects were ethnic Chinese who identified themselves to be either Chinese (53 percent), Chinese mestizos (31 percent) or naturalized Filipinos (16 percent). Eighty-six percent claimed the ability to speak a Chinese language regularly in the household, and with other language combinations, mainly Tagalog.

4. More Chinese respondents (79 percent) were found capable of writing in English than in Chinese (53 percent).

5. In relation to attitudes, it appeared that a substantial majority had favorable attitudes toward the Filipinos as employees (70 percent), neighbors (74 percent), and friends (86 percent); however, more reservations were indicated towards the concept of having Filipino as employers or business partners.

6. Among the unmarried subjects, more favorable attitudes were expressed towards marriage with a Chinese-mestizo (78 percent) than with a Filipino (65 percent). In both instances, however, attitudes were generally positive.

7. Among the married subjects, there were some reservations toward the idea of a daughter marrying a Filipino, with 44 percent indicating positive attitudes and 41 percent expressing indifference. However, a 53 percent majority expressed a liking for the idea of a son marrying a Filipina.

8. Apparently intermarriage with Filipinos was something to which most Chinese were at least resigned. The young Chinese, particularly if he was a mestizo, did not seem to adhere to the traditional expectations that he should confine his choice of a mate with his own ethnic group. Despite parental objections, he was willing to marry a foreigner, provided mutual attraction and compatibility exist.

Part II

1. More differences than similarities between Filipinos and Chinese were observed and cited by the Filipino respondents.

2. A comparative evaluation of the Chinese in the Philippines using a seven criteria and five-point semantic differential scale, gave the following results:

   a. A substantial 64 percent majority of greater Manila residents rated the Chinese as superior to the Filipinos in terms of economic position. In Mindanao, however, a 57 percent majority rated the Chinese as equal to the Filipinos.

   b. In terms of educational attainment, majority proportions (Greater Manila, 55 percent; Mindanao, 73 percent) rated the Chinese as equal to the Filipinos. However, a markedly greater proportion of residents in greater Manila (24 percent) than Mindanao (5 percent) evaluated the Chinese to be educationally subordinate.

   c. Relative to political standing, a difference was observed between the Greater Manila and Mindanao regions. In Greater Manila, 50 percent assessed the Chinese as “lower” in terms of political status; in Mindanao, subordinate ratings totalled only 31 percent. Over 48 percent of the Mindanao sample evaluated the Chinese as equal to the Filipinos while more than 18 percent gave superior ratings. The upper economic class tended to give a lower evaluation.

   d. Majority proportions in both survey regions (Greater Manila, 57 percent; Mindanao, 61 percent) rated the Chinese as socially equal to the Filipinos. A difference in
the responses is given in that in Mindanao, only 5 percent gave lower ratings to the Chinese while in Manila, a greater percentage (21 percent) of respondents evaluated the Chinese lower in social status.

e. In terms of religion, majority proportions rated the Chinese as “the same” as Filipinos (Greater Manila, 58 percent; Mindanao, 69 percent). A substantially higher percentage of Muslims (12 percent) than non-Muslims (3 percent) rated the Chinese as subordinate by this criterion.

f. Morally, the Chinese were considered on par with the Filipinos. It is important to note that 59 percent and 69 percent of the Greater Manila and Mindanao samplings gave the Chinese an “equal” rating.

g. Overall, the Chinese were rated by majority proportions (59 percent and 70 percent) as equal to the Filipinos.

3. An evaluation of Filipinos’ general attitudes toward the Chinese gave the following results:

a. Fifty-six percent of Greater Manila respondents described the Chinese in positive terms while 43 percent of those in Mindanao gave neutral descriptions.

b. Substantial majority proportions did not object to the presence of Chinese in the country. Percentage of objection was markedly lower in Mindanao (34 percent) than in Greater Manila and among the upper socioeconomic classes.

c. About 48 percent of Filipino respondents in Greater Manila regarded the Chinese attitude toward Filipinos to be negative; only 27 percent seem inclined to see it as favorable. In Mindanao, a high percentage (54 percent) of non-response and “don’t know” answers were elicited, preventing a comparison between the two regions.

d. In Greater Manila, the Chinese were rated as “good” by the Filipinos by 49 percent of the respondents; 13 percent rated them as “better,” while 37 percent gave “not as good” evaluations. In Mindanao, a notably higher proportion of favorable assessments were given with 60 percent rating the Chinese as equal to the Filipinos and only 18 percent giving subordinate ratings.

e. Seventy-three percent in Greater Manila were aware of the contributions of the Chinese to the Philippines, mainly with developing economic opportunities and business promotions (46 percent), the giving of employment (22 percent) and charitable contributions (13 percent). In Mindanao, a lower proportion (43 percent) were found to be aware of the contributions. Among those who expressed awareness, 70 percent mentioned business as the main contribution of the Chinese.

4. An evaluation of the Filipinos’ attitude toward the Chinese using a modification of the Bogardus social distance scale resulted in the following observations:

a. As a boss. Only 18 percent in Greater Manila and 8 percent in Mindanao area reported having had a Chinese employer. Generally, the attitude towards the Chinese employer was unfavorable in Greater Manila (43 percent). The reasons given were that Chinese were low-paying and stingy employers and that they were not “Filipinos.” In Mindanao, only one-fifth (20 percent) of the sample population expressed unfavorable attitudes toward the Chinese as employer because they are “difficult to get along with.” Forty-three percent were non-committal and 14 percent were indifferent or unconcerned.

b. As an employee. Manilans prefer the Chinese as employees than employers. But 34 percent still regard them with disfavor mainly because of the Filipinos’ preference for their own kind. Mindanao respondents were largely non-committal, with 44 percent giving uncertain responses or none at all. There was a tendency for unfavorable attitudes to increase as socioeconomic level declined and as age level rose.

c. As a business partner. An important 36 percent majority proportion of Greater Manila respondents expressed favorable attitudes toward the Chinese as business partner; 36 percent were against, and 20 percent
were indifferent. In Mindanao, about 26 percent revealed favorable attitudes. However, the majority (41 percent) were either uncertain or non-committal.

d. As neighbors. Over one-third (35 percent) of Manila residents expressed favorable reactions; 20 percent were negative and 22 percent indifferent. In Mindanao, most (46 percent) refused to commit themselves; 30 percent were favorable and 13 percent were unfavorable. It should be noted that the proportion of those who reacted favorably more than doubled among those who were actually residing with members of this ethnic group in the neighborhood. In Greater Manila, only about 37 percent of the respondents with “no Chinese neighbors” expressed favorable attitudes toward them. A contrasting picture is presented by Manilans with Chinese neighbors in that 77 percent reflected positive attitudes. This group generally described their Chinese neighbors as being good and kind and having “pakikisama” or good public relations. In Mindanao, only about 30 percent of the respondents with no Chinese neighbors expressed favorable attitudes toward them, as contrasted with 90 percent of the respondents with Chinese neighbors who expressed positive attitudes toward them. This group mentioned the Chinese as being “good and kind” as well as “friendly.”

e. As friends. A majority (68 percent) in Greater Manila reported having Chinese friends. In Mindanao, only 45 percent had Chinese friends as against 54 percent who had none. The proportion of those with Chinese friends tended to increase as socioeconomic level rose. In contrast 50 percent of the respondents in Manila and 32 percent of those in Mindanao reported that their parents had Chinese friends. Moreover, respondents reporting their parents as having Chinese friends tended to decrease as the age level of the subjects increased.

f. As marriage partner. In Greater Manila, 29 percent of subjects interviewed anticipated that their parents and friends would react favorably if they married someone belonging to another race. In Mindanao, majority proportions were uncertain: 74 percent were not able to describe how their parents and friends would react to the situation although in both instances, 13 percent anticipated a favorable reaction. Parents and friends were regarded as resistant to the idea of racial intermarriage because they were perceived as disliking foreigners and other racial groups and prejudiced toward people whose customs, traits, religion, and traditions differed basically from their own.

Majority proportions of the unmarried Filipino subjects in Greater Manila (59 percent) and non-Muslim respondents in Mindanao (78 percent) said it is possible that they might marry someone belonging to another race. The unfavorable attitudes of the Manilans and non-Muslims of Mindanao centered on their preference for Filipinos and their apparent wish to avoid marrying persons with unfamiliar ways whose traits differed basically from their own. On the other hand, the Muslim Filipino’s main objection is the language barrier.

There seemed to be less anticipated resistance on the part of parents and friends to the respondent’s marrying a Chinese-mestizo.

As for the children of the respondents themselves marrying someone from another race, the following were observed: in both survey regions, notable proportions (Greater Manila, 65 percent; Mindanao; 42 percent) showed indifference. In Manila, 17 percent expressed disapproval for the following reasons: 1) preference for one’s own kind, 2) the thinking that it might be difficult to get along with someone from another race, 3) the fear that the children may be brought to another country, and 4) differences in customs and traditions. In Mindanao, 20 percent disapproved principally because of a strong preference to see their children marry their “own kind.”

5. Opinion on future Chinese-Filipino relationship was generally favorable. 68 percent of the Greater Manila sampling and 57 percent of
the Mindanao sampling described the relations in positive terms. On a three-point scale, respondents were asked to rate future relationships: majority proportions both in Greater Manila (52 percent) and Mindanao (62 percent) hoped that future Chinese-Filipino relationships would “change for the better.”

Comments

This research project is one of the most recent studies on Chinese minorities undertaken. While the findings and analysis of the results of the survey may prove useful to researchers concerned with this particular problem, the research project in itself suffers from various limitations:

1. The population is too small to be representative. 115 respondents out of 600,000 ethnic Chinese is less than .02 percent. 1,100 Filipino respondents out of 40,000,000 is less than .003 percent.

2. The area is too narrow and can, in no way, be projective of the true image of the Chinese. No Chinese respondents from the Mindanao area or in provinces outside Greater Manila were interviewed at all. According to the report, the Chinese respondents are distributed spatially between “Chinatown” and areas outside Chinatown. To use the dichotomy Chinatown and non-Chinatown area is of little significance if we cannot pinpoint or make sure that the area where they were interviewed is really the area where they reside. One will find, for instance, a great discrepancy in the attitudes of the Chinese who have always lived in the Chinatown area with constant contacts with Chinese and one who has always lived, let’s say in San Lorenzo village, with contacts only with Filipinos and Americans, and limited at that.

3. Some of the areas of discussion included in the interview schedule are already too familiar to those who have done research on the problem. A run-down of the questionnaire asked will show a pattern similar to that used by McBeath and Tilman. In particular, the modification of the Bogardus Social Distance scale, where statements were selected on an a priori basis to elicit responses indicative of the subject’s degree of acceptance of any nationality group, showed several weaknesses. The statements provided seem to be intended to prove or disprove an idea previously existing in the interviewer’s mind. As such, the data appeared to be merely impressionistic and meaningful inferences hardly could be drawn. For instance:

Main reasons for not liking the Chinese as neighbors —

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Greater Manila</th>
<th>Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. They tend to be troublesome/to fight</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. They have different character traits</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. They don’t know how to get along with others</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. They are snobs/look down on others</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Mindanao</th>
<th>Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Language</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Hard to get along with</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. They are foreigners</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Those in Greater Manila who expressed unfavorable attitudes towards Chinese as neighbors gave the reason that they tend to be troublesome and have different character traits, while in Mindanao, the reasons given were the language barrier and the difficulty in getting along with them.

The seven answers given tend to prove only one thing: they are difficult to get along with because they are foreigners with a different language and with different character traits. It doesn’t elicit a response that is indicative of the subject’s reason for acceptance or non-acceptance of this particular minority group.

On the questions of perceived similarities and perceived differences between Chinese and Filipinos, we find that there are more differences indicated than similarities. In Greater Manila, 98 percent, and in Mindanao, 93 percent indicated that there are differences between Chinese and Filipinos as against 68 per-
cent in Manila and 71 percent in Mindanao who indicated there are similarities. However, there is an apparent inconsistency in that in seven categories of differences and similarities given, both differences and similarities are ranked in nearly the same manner, i.e. the differences perceived are also similarities perceived:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Similarities</th>
<th>Differences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greater Manila</td>
<td>Mindanao</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Traits and habits</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Physical characteristics</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Customs</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Language</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Religion</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Status</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g. Race/Nationality</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Conclusion**

In the introduction, the report mentioned one of its objectives: to lay the groundwork for a general and intensive in-depth study on ethnic relations and attitudes. Taken as such, the BSP survey will prove valuable because it has opened several areas which need further exploration. The inherent shortcomings and limitations found in the survey will warn other researchers away from the same pitfalls. The staff of the Search Corporation, the agency commissioned to undertake the survey, should be commended in their efforts to bring to the surface the irritants to harmonious ethnic relations between Filipinos and Chinese.

**Ethnic Attitudes in Five Philippine Cities by Rodolfo A. Bulatao (Quezon City, 1973) 212 pp. Mimeo.**

This National Survey Research Project was undertaken as the first of the five research programs of the Philippine Social Science Council under the sponsorship of the Ford Foundation. The general objectives of this research program are: a) to generate new data on significant national development problems; and b) to provide confidence and credibility in the new network of research centers whose staff was trained under another of the Council’s projects (The Research Training Project) as capable research organizations.

This particular survey on interregional ethnic relations was designed by Dr. Rodolfo Bulatao, assistant professor of sociology, University of the Philippines, and carried out from January to March, 1973 in Greater Manila and in the cities of Naga, Tacloban, Cebu, Davao and Cotabato. The results are published in a 212-page monograph by the Social Research Laboratory (Quezon City, 1973).

**Objectives**

1. To determine the images different ethnic groups in the Philippines have of each other.
2. To assess ethnic attitudes and the degree of prejudice and social distance between groups.
3. To measure social and economic variables serving to predict ethnic images and attitudes.

**Methods**

The areas included in the survey were Greater Manila, Naga, Tacloban, Cebu City and Davao City. Each area was assigned a quota of 300 interviews, except Greater Manila which was assigned 500. All interviews were conducted within city limits (in the case of Greater Manila this meant Manila, Caloocan, Quezon City, San Juan, Mandaluyong, Makati, Pasig or Parañaque).
Each city was divided into appropriate areal units and around 10 such units were chosen. The 300 interviews were allocated to the areal units in proportion of households each held. Systematic random sampling of households within each areal unit was conducted and one adult (18 or over) was chosen from each sample household. Interviews took between 40 minutes to 1-1/2 hours. The questionnaire was drafted in English and Tagalog, translated in each city into appropriate dialect and back-translated into English. As indices of ethnic images and ethnic attitudes, it included:

1. open-ended questions about perceived differences among ethnic groups;

2. fourteen semantic differential-type scales (five-point rather than seven-point scales) for rating Chinese, Muslims, and the two major ethnic groups in each area;

3. social distance scale for eight ethnic groups;

4. twenty-six attitude statements regarding interethnic issues, with which Rs could agree or disagree;

5. a question about the use of the national language;

6. questions about the importance of the Chinese and Muslim problems.

In addition, the questionnaire contained items to assess usage of different dialects and ethnic identification; and degree of contact with different ethnic groups.

Several variables used in predicting prejudice were: social status and mobility; religion and religiosity; and authoritarianism and status-concern.

The following are sample characteristics:

1. The combined samples were evenly split between males and females. Except for the Cebu sample, all the others had more females than males.

2. Almost 50 percent of the combined sample was below 35 years old. Cebu sample was again deviant, with 38 percent being 50 or above against 25 percent in other samples and only four percent below 25 years as against 24-34 percent in other samples.

3. Percentages of married ranged from a low of 55 percent in the Manila sample to a high of 87 percent in the Cebu sample which had only 1 percent never married.

4. Thirty-eight percent had, at the least, a college education.

5. Ninety-three percent were Roman Catholics. This forecloses possibility of studying the effect of religion on ethnic attitudes.

6. Majority of households were nuclear. Median household income for the combined sample was just below P400 a month.

Data

Of the ethnic groups of concern in this study, one is distinguished by nationality or national origins and race (Philippine-Chinese), a second primarily by religion (the Filipino Muslim) and the rest by dialect, region, and possibly subcultural themes and customs (Tagalogs, Ilocanos, Bicolanos, Warays, Cebuanos, and Ilonggos).

Summary Findings

Part I

Images of different ethnic groups (obtained from semantic differential type questions) were the following:

1. Ilocanos and Chinese were seen as the most potent, most industrious, serious, thrifty, and similar appellatives. Muslims came out the worst, being seen as hostile, stupid, lazy and almost every other negative adjective. Tagalogs were progressive, Bicolanos and Cebuanos, humble, friendly, warm and peaceful; Waray, lazy but strong; and Ilonggos, proud and extravagant.

2. Behavioral intentions toward different groups, ascertained through social distance ratings, tended to be similar whatever relation-
ship was being considered. Muslims were the most rejected, followed closely by the Chinese.

3. Insofar as national policy was concerned, behavioral intentions in regard to the Chinese and the Muslim problems were ascertained. The majority of respondents did not regard these as important problems or assigned them only low priority.

**Part II**

Ethnic attitudes vis-a-vis social structure (location and type of ethnic community, social status, size of the ethnic groups, etc.) were the following:

1. Ethnicity strongly affected levels of general prejudice. City of residence was an important variable in ethnic attitudes. Residents of Manila were particularly negative toward the Chinese, and residents of Cebu and Tacloban most strongly negative toward Muslims.

2. Education, income, and occupational prestige each contributed to the reduction of prejudice. These affected ethnocentrism and racism, and reduced anti-Muslim prejudice and social distance from most groups with the most important exception of the Chinese.

3. Status concern and authoritarianism were the best predictors of ethnocentrism and also affected threat and racism. These are associated with anti-Muslim prejudice, but not with anti-Chinese prejudice nor with any social distance ratings.

4. The more dialects one knows (or multilingualism) the lower one's ethnocentrism and racism scores, and the less social distance one imposes between oneself and other groups, with the exception of Muslims.

5. The more residentially mobile tended to impose less social distance between themselves and other groups, including Chinese and Muslims. Migration out of one's home region (as with Tagalogs in Naga and Cebuanos in Tacloban and Davao) usually lead to lower levels of prejudice and less rejection of other ethnic groups. Migrants of this type also tended to consider themselves, and to be considered, more dynamic.

6. As expected, contact with Chinese led to better evaluations, reduced social distance, and lower neglect. Contact with Muslims affected evaluations and neglect only. The specific nature of each contact was not analyzed.

7. Older Rs scored higher on ethnocentrism and racism and on anti-Chinese and anti-Muslim prejudice.

8. Social desirability led to lower ethnocentrism, racism, and intermixing, but did not affect other scores not based on attitude statements.

**Conclusion**

The careful attention Dr. Bulatao and his researchers gave to insure systematic gathering and analysis of data made this survey-report on ethnic attitudes and prejudice in five Philippine cities a valuable contribution to the field of ethnic relations.

The author of the survey particularly draws our attention to the low profile respondents gave to Sino-Filipino and Muslim-Christian tensions. Close to half the present sample refused even to recognize the status of Chinese and Muslims as problematic and worth dealing with at the national level. The author finds this complacency disquieting. The question posed was: What priority, in relation to other national problems, should be given to integrating these two groups into the larger society? Of the 2,000 respondents 97 percent answered the question about the Chinese, and 95 percent about the Muslims.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Chinese</th>
<th>Muslims</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High Priority</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium Priority</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Priority</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Priority</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fewer than half of the survey respondents gave concrete suggestions for handling Chinese and Muslim integration. Out of 859 tabulated suggestions about the Chinese and 1,190 about
Muslims, 44 percent and 26 percent respectively were very general proposals to assimilate them, to mix with them in organizations and communities and to exchange ideas and customs with them.

The second most frequent type of suggestion was to treat them as equals and respect their rights (16 and 17 percent). For the Chinese, broader occupational opportunities were recommended by ten percent, for Muslims, better educational facilities, more participation in government, and larger financial aid were suggested by 15, 14, and 12 percent of those who replied.

Suggestions to Improve Ethnic or Minority Relations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Suggestion</th>
<th>Chinese No.</th>
<th>Chinese %</th>
<th>Muslim No.</th>
<th>Muslim %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Assimilate them/Know them well</td>
<td>382</td>
<td>44.5</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>25.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Treat equally/Respect their traditions</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Educate them</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Let them participate in government</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Give them financial aid</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. More occupational opportunities; transact business with them</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Recognize their religious rights</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Provide for their security</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Others</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>859</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>1190</strong></td>
<td><strong>99.8</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Commenting on these replies, Dr. Bulatao notes: “Ethnic problems have not thus far impressed themselves on the national consciousness, although the Muslim problem may be just starting to do so. Talk about national unity may therefore have more the character of exhortations not to make waves rather than expressions of serious interest in the problems of national minorities. The above data reveals a high degree of preference for neglect, benign or otherwise, of the Chinese and Muslim minorities.”

On the whole, this particular study has risen above the previous social distance and ethnic image and attitude surveys.

Chinese Merchant Culture in Iloilo City by John T. Omohundro (University of Michigan, 1972).

Dr. John Omohundro’s doctoral dissertation in anthropology is based on 18 months of fieldwork in Iloilo province under the auspices of the University of Michigan, National Institute of Health, and the Institute of Philippine Culture.

In the course of his work, Dr. Omohundro conducted several attitude surveys of the Iloilo Chinese. The main source of his information is his respondents in extensive interviews he conducted for a year. His facility in speaking the Fukien dialect, native tongue of 90 percent of the Iloilo Chinese, served him in good stead throughout his work.

His contention in this doctoral dissertation is that in Iloilo the business and the household are synonymous. Meaning, that the majority of the Iloilo businesses are family affairs. Why this is so and how viable is this arrangement was clearly presented in this authoritative work.

In his work, the author first gave background information on the Chinese in Iloilo:

1. About 50 percent of the community are Filipino citizens, (percentage is higher among the younger Philippine-born Chinese). Between
10-20 percent of the community are mestizos who still participate in the Chinese community.

2. The downtown business district of the city is the primary residence area of over 50 percent of the community. About 25 percent live in suburban homes in Jaro, Molo, and La Paz and about 20 percent live in the downtown area in apartments separate from the store.

3. Almost all Iloilo Chinese below 35 years old are Philippine born and educated. Twenty-five percent of the young men are marrying Filipino women; and are moving out of the merchant life of their fathers altogether.

4. The wealth and conservatism of the elders in the community with whom the power lies makes it possible for Iloilo Chinese to build and maintain a visibly viable ethnic community with more internal cohesion than other communities.

5. Iloilo's general reputation is that of a conservative, tight-fisted community. Iloilo's Chinese community is slower to borrow from the bank, to speculate, to consume conspicuously, to allow Chinese-Filipino marriages, to move out of residing over stores, to become Catholic, and to give up various old political and cultural factionalism which have cracked its unity from time to time.

The explanations for this conservatism, the author ventured, are Iloilo's Spanish heritage, economic stagnation, and the loss of its mestizos and Ho-san Chinese (Chinese from the more Western-influenced area around Amoy City).

The author then gave some historical highlights. Events from the 1860s to the 1950s were mentioned. This historical account in the Iloilo Chinese community is perhaps the only one on record.

Some of the themes of his dissertation are summarized below:

1. Business Facts

Of the 500-odd businesses operated by the Chinese, 67 percent are retail-wholesale operations, 9 percent are in native products, 11 percent are in manufacturing, and 11 percent are services.

Of these operations, 87 percent are single proprietorship, 6 percent are family partnerships, and 4 percent are partnerships between men not related. Three percent are corporations, mostly family.

Though comprising only 2 percent of Iloilo's population, the Chinese pay 35 percent of the city's business taxes and operate 20 percent of all retail-wholesale stores, clustering mostly in the medium range (with 10-50 employees) and predominantly in the downtown business district.

The Chinese are not represented proportionately in all lines of business. For example, virtually none participate in tailoring, dressmaking, undertakings, tire and battery repair, fresh food sales, or central market operations. But the Chinese operate 50 percent of the town's bakeries, hardware, lumber and furniture stores, over 50 percent of dry goods and shoe stores, 60 percent of rice and corn dealerships, and 80 percent of its glassware store and groceries.

Congruent with its tightfisted image, Iloilo's Chinese community is, for the most part, very conservative in business and other investments. Only since the great fire of 1966 have they begun to invest in any amounts in cars, houses, land, or buildings. Compared to the Chinese in other provincial cities, Iloilo's Chinese tend more to stay out of haciendas and to the diversification of business lines, out-of-town investments, and high finance. The two Chinese banks and a number of Filipino banks in Iloilo are filled with their savings.

2. System of Apprenticeship

Dr. Omohundro describes very well the earlier system of receiving a rural uneducated immigrant boy from China and making a businessman of him through the apprentice system. Here, a relative or professional middleman acquired fictitious papers claiming that a young man was the son of some merchant already in the Philippines. A patron businessman in Iloilo was also acquired so that a receiving party would be present to take charge of the new recruit immediately.
This young apprentice was trained and taught the secrets of merchandising. Sometimes, he received no salary other than room or board and a little to send back to his parents or young wife.

After years of apprenticeship, the young recruit gained a partnership in business or could start on his own, but his obligations to his patron were rarely forgotten. He would try never to come into direct competition with his patron.

This apprentice system is the main reason why the Chinese seem to be distributed in certain lines based on their last names or their home towns. It is the reason why Cantonese are bakers and grocers, and why most of the Chin-kang Yus and Yaps of Iloilo are in the textile lines.

3. Trade Associations

Dr. Omohundro disproved the contention that Chinese economic associations are price-fixing cartels and monopoly organizations restraining free trade. He said that contrary to popular belief, most trade associations are not mutual aid associations in the sense of pooling capital, cooperative buying and selling, making loans, and sharing business secrets. There is admittedly some price manipulation, but association members actively try to undersell one another at those prices. The associations have primarily an emergency and information function. Another major function is protection against political extortion.

Even the oldest and biggest of the trade associations, the sari-sari store association, according to Dr. Omohundro, has minimum control and sanction over its members. A few years ago, a Cantonese salesman to these stores refused to pay his dues to the association and the officers declared a boycott of the salesman. The vast majority of the stores continued as usual and the boycott fizzled. This is not the picture of a tightly run monopolistic cartel that some writers have created, concludes the author.

4. The Family Business

Over nine out of 10 businesses are single proprietorships or partnerships run by families. Among the Chinese themselves, the family and the business are considered virtually the same phenomenon. The head of the business and head of the family are the same person. Therefore, the fate of one entity is inevitably the fate of the other.

According to Dr. Omohundro, to understand family and kinship system among the Philippine Chinese, one has to see the transformation of the economic base from a rural landholding unit to an urban inventory-holding buy-and-sell operation. This to him, is one of the major keys to Chinese social structure.

In terms of personnel, a business is organized in three concentric circles. In the inner circle are the family members: fathers, sons, daughters, occasionally sons-in-law, grandchildren. In the next circle and closed off for all time from the inner circle are the Chinese employees: the trusted managers or accountants, the salesmen, and the poor relatives taken as dependents, as well as the non-family minor partners. In the last circle are the Filipino employees and, in former days, the new recruits from China. Members of this group may move into the trusted confidence circle, but unless they marry a daughter of the boss they are closed to the inner circle. And it is of course the inner circle where all money is held, all decisions made, all responsibility shouldered, and where the profit accumulates.

The Chinese family business is organized in the best corporate tradition of strict hierarchy and a line-and-staff management pattern. Sons are apportioned profit and responsibilities according to their birth order as often as according to their ability. Money is held closely and expenses curtailed by the head of the family: either the father or his widow, or the eldest son. Expansion or branching out of the business is as dependent on family resources as it is on the availability of capital.
5. Role of Filipino Wives

Since the end of World War II, there has been increasing equality of the Filipino wives in business and greater acceptability: a Chinese businessman marries a Filipina. Furthermore, Chinese wives are also increasingly having a place in their husband's enterprises. This is specially true of younger women educated in the Philippines. Today, almost as many Chinese wives and sisters as Filipino wives control, help manage, or run the office of their Chinese husbands and brothers (43 percent of the Chinese women are engaged in the business, compared to 55 percent of the Filipino women). Also, about nine percent of the Chinese wives have pressed their husbands into allowing them to start sidelines for pocket money.

6. Inheritance practices

This part of Dr. Omohundro's dissertation is further developed in a scholarly paper presented at the Central States Anthropological Society's Annual meeting in Chicago, 1974. This paper is discussed below.

Author's note: At the time of writing, a copy of Omohundro's dissertation was not available hence the above report is based merely on an abstract he gave in March, 1973.

Problems in Patrilineal Inheritance for the Philippine Chinese by John Omohundro (Chicago, 1974).

The main theme of this paper is that traditional Chinese ideals of patrilineal partible inheritance of family property by brothers has undergone pressure to change in Philippine Chinese communities. What are the sources of these pressures and how are these at work in five of the most common causes of family conflict concerning inheritance?

The author first, presented inheritance laws and practices in the home country of the overseas Chinese at time Zero (late Imperial and early Republic period 1890-1920) when the large numbers of immigrants who comprise the present day Philippine Chinese community were leaving their tumultuous land for the American-controlled Philippines.

Throughout the years, the customs and practices brought to the Philippines by these immigrants underwent changes due to forces intrinsic to the new situation of the Chinese as an immigrant commercial minority. These forces were: 1) the exigencies of immigration, 2) the urban commercial economic base; and 3) the influence of Filipino customs and laws.

In summary, the findings of Dr. Omohundro show that

Immigration to the Philippines has weakened the traditional Chinese sanctions for inheritance practices. It has also produced large numbers of polygynous geographically split and culturally mixed families, frequently with adopted heirs. Focusing almost exclusively on urban commerce, the Philippine Chinese family became, on the one hand, highly centralized, and on the other hand, vulnerable to individual accumulation within a cash-based chia (family) economy. Filipino custom and law encourage greater power and legal equality of women, anticipatory inheritance, and reliance on the Philippine courts in inheritance disputes. Each of these developments threatens continuation of traditional inheritance and, by extension, the Chinese-style family structure itself.

The last part of the paper touched on cases of conflicts over inheritance and the author's projection of future patterns in inheritance. Some of his assessments were: the trend of anticipatory inheritance will taper off; as more Chinese acquire Philippine citizenship there will be less need to register business properties in the names of the naturalized children; the inheritance rights of women in a Chinese family will gain greater recognition; a trend toward more contractual relations in Chinese business, clarifying partners' duties and rights, will decrease the confusion which has reigned in the past in partnerships when one member died; etc. . . .

In any case, the author concluded, though the Philippine Chinese community will remain a distinct cultural minority in the Philippines within the near future, the Chinese immigrant
practices that surround patrilineal partible inheritance restricted to sons will diminish, if not disappear, within the next few decades.

Conclusion

Dr. Omohundro's dissertation and the paper on patrilineal inheritance will surely be highly commended by scholars who know the Philippine Chinese community. To be able to ferret out all the facts and information about the Chinese family business, the inheritance practices, the conservatism of the elders, the trade associations etc., is indeed quite a difficult task. When Dr. Omohundro was asked how he succeeded in getting these information, he explained that "once you find the vital leak in the gossip line, then everything will just fall into place." As mentioned before, perhaps his facility in the Fukien dialect helped considerably. Moreover, we can perhaps say that the Iloilo Chinese are not as wary and suspicious as the urban Manila Chinese are.

Dr. Omohundro had also done social distance studies while he was in Iloilo but the analysis of his findings is still in progress.


This study examines the political socialization of the youth of the Chinese minority in the Philippines. The author used depth-interview techniques and national survey samples in his study.

Political Integration of the Philippine Chinese, by Gerald McBeath (University of California at Berkeley, 1972)

Dr. McBeath in this study uncovered significant data on Chinese integration in the Philippines. In 1969, he interviewed at length 70 men in influential decision-making positions in the Manila Chinese community and conducted a survey on political socialization of some 3,100 high school seniors of Chinese ancestry in Manila and the provinces.

A comprehensive digest of his findings is published in the Annals of the Philippine-Chinese Historical Association (1970:71-91).

Ethnicity and Class in the Structure of Philippine Cities by Daniel F. Doeppers (Syracuse University, 1971), 521 pp.

Of great interest to scholars on the Chinese minority in the Philippines would be Dr. Doepper's chapter on the Chinese ethnic minority in Philippine provincial cities. Here, Dr. Doeppers described the 1941 migration streams and resultant subgroups within the local Chinese communities. He also explained the hierarchy of institutional and associational forms in use among urban Chinese groups. The bulk of this chapter is concerned with the dynamic pattern of ethnic Chinese residence in the three sample cities in the present century. In the context of this inquiry the nature of central commercial districts and the role of the Chinese in these are examined. The pattern of Japanese occupation in prewar Davao City is also briefly considered and compared to that of the Chinese. Special attention is given to the question of "Chinatowns" and to the decentralization of the pattern of Chinese residence during the last decade.

Note: The researches of Dr. Tilman, Dr. McBeath, and Dr. Doeppers are not available at present.

A Bibliography of the Philippine Chinese by Chinben See (Xavier University, 1970), 97 pp.

This bibliography, with more than a thousand entries, provides a useful guide to existing research studies and articles on the subject of the Philippine Chinese. The 15 divisions of this work point out the main problematic areas in the field of Philippine Chinese Relations. These are: I. General and Miscellaneous Works; II. Arts and Crafts; III. Bibliography; IV. Biography; V. Citizenship, Nationality, and Status; VI. Demography; VII. Economic Conditions and Roles; VIII. Economic Nationalism and Filipinization; IX. Education; X. Filipino-Chinese Relations; XI. His-
The work was carefully compiled by Prof. Chinben See, anthropologist, now an assistant Research Fellow of the Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica. Publications in this compilation included those which appeared in early 1972. It does not pretend to be exhaustive nor selective. It has been published by the research department of the Pagkakaisa Sa Pag-unlad in order to present a timely and indispensable research tool for students and scholars intending to study the Chinese in the Philippines.


This is a study of the family (clan) and village associations in the Philippine Chinese community. It investigates the organization, functions, and role of these associations in the light of the life of the Philippine Chinese at the turn of the 1970's.

**Objectives**

This study is, first of all, of anthropological interest. It throws light on the kinship and locality organizations of the Fukien and Kwangtung Chinese. It also gives an indication of how Chinese principles are adapted to the new situation to cope with changes in the environment where the Chinese now stay.

**Methods**

Basic data was collected through newspapers and documents issued by the associations, and through interviews with personnel of the associations and with other Chinese in the community. Available literature on this subject was also used.

**General Findings**

The author in this study intends to give a background of village and family associations in the Philippines. One of the points brought out is that membership in the associations increased by large numbers in the sixties. As the Chinese community extended its scope, power became centered in five large organizations. Many Chinese felt insecure; pressure from outside did not diminish, while personal protection was not available for them in civic life. The fear that Chinese culture is being lost, and the realization that returning to China has become a mere dream because of long isolation, prompted the reactivation of the village associations in order to bring the younger Chinese to know each other. Prosperity in the 50s and 60s gave rise to a new generation of newly rich, who sought prestige as leaders of these organizations. From these posts, they found a path to power in the family or clan organizations, and from there eventually to leadership in the Federation of the Chambers of Commerce.


This is an updated and well-informed study of the role fulfilled by the Chinese schools in the Philippines. The author is Dean of student affairs at Chiang Kai Shek High School, the largest Chinese school in the Philippines.

**Objectives**

The author seeks to determine the degree of cultural retention among students of these schools, to examine the Chinese schools as possible hindrances to assimilation, to assess the value-formation effect of the Chinese course subjects in the schools, to see whether the 1973 Constitution calls for abolition of Chinese studies in elementary and secondary levels, and to study how the post-1973 schools can serve to integrate younger generation Chinese well into Filipino society.

**Methods**

The writer's documentation of Philippine and Chinese legislation or official guidelines is accurate and useful; his historical chronicle of
the Chinese schools (and their periodization) from 1899 to 1973 is well-organized and illuminating. He draws on interviews with 25 school authorities of both Filipino and Chinese administration. His conclusions are partly based, also, on results of a 55-point questionnaire (given on March 24, 1973), to which 450 high school and college students of both sexes from two Manila schools responded. Fifty-four percent of the respondents are Chinese, 28 percent Chinese-Filipino or mestizo, and 18 percent, Filipino.

Summary of Findings

Fifty-one percent of the students converse with their parents mainly in Chinese; 20 percent use a mix of Chinese and Pilipino; 12 percent use only Pilipino, and only 5 percent converse in English with their parents.

With brothers and sisters, 65 percent use Chinese, 31 percent Pilipino, and 4 percent English. With friends, 61 percent use Chinese, 31 percent Pilipino, and 7 percent English.

As the language most useful for them to learn, 51 percent rated English, 27 percent Pilipino, and 10 percent Chinese. As the language most useful in post-school careers, the ratings were English 75 percent, Chinese 10 percent, and Pilipino 9 percent.

For newspaper and magazine reading, 58 percent preferred English, 24 percent Pilipino, and 16 percent Chinese periodicals. For TV programs the preferences were 62 percent English, 19 percent Chinese, and 19 percent Pilipino.

In language proficiency, the respondents were rated as 38 percent fluent in Chinese, 56 percent semi-fluent, and 6 percent not fluent. In Pilipino they were rated as 55 percent fluent, 44 percent semi-fluent, and 1 percent not fluent; and in English as 19 percent fluent, 76 percent semi-fluent, and 5 percent not fluent. Their fathers were 80 percent fluent in Chinese, 16 percent semi-fluent; and in Pilipino 23 percent fluent and 65 percent semi-fluent; and in English 12 percent fluent and 50 percent semi-fluent. Compared to the fathers, fewer of the mothers (64 percent) were fluent in Chinese, but more (41 percent) were fluent in Pilipino.

Sixty-two percent claimed that they came to study Chinese voluntarily on their part, 28 percent did so because they were compelled by their parents; and 8 percent studied Chinese because the school required it.

A majority replied that they did not find the double curriculum (Pilipino-English in the morning and Chinese in the afternoon) too heavy a burden for them, although it obviously left them without enough time to engage in sports and socializing with friends and neighbors.

A large majority (73 percent) favored the integration of the English and Chinese subjects in one curriculum. Although 88 percent found the English teaching methods appealing and effective, still 65 percent favored the teaching methods of the Chinese teachers (rote recitation, memory work, etc.)

Ninety percent believed it useful to teach subjects on Chinese virtues such as filial piety, harmony, humility, etc. Eighty-two percent thought that Chinese culture should continue to be taught, while 77 percent believed it is not enough to teach Chinese culture and literature. However, to the question as to whether they intend to continue taking Chinese subjects that are optional in the 1973-1974 school year, only 47 percent replied in the affirmative.

Seventy-three percent have close Filipino friends, and 87 percent believe that Filipino friends, boys and girls, are easy to get along with. Sixty-nine percent have Filipino relatives and 46 percent have Filipino godparents; relationships which the students choose themselves (friends) are more positively Filipino-oriented than those from kinship or parental choice.

Sixty-six percent would marry a Filipino, other things being equal. But 61 percent of the parents would be unhappy, 26 percent happy, and 13 percent unconcerned about such a union for their children.

Eighty-five percent admit that they knew more about the history and geography of the Philippines than that of China. Ninety-one percent have a liking for Filipino food. Eighty-
three percent want to make the Philippines their permanent home.

Conclusions

The rationale for the Chinese schools, as hitherto structured, would hold if the Chinese youth in the Philippines expected finally to make their homes in China or Taiwan. But it seems they are here to stay for their lifetime, and this quite by their own choice. Naturalization procedures should be made less restrictive, less costly, and less slow-moving. It would then be apparent that Chinese schools, as they are now organized, have become obsolete. This is not to say that Chinese subjects should be dropped altogether from the Philippine curriculum. If we find it valuable to study Plato, Kant, and Russell, why not Confucius, Lao Tse, and Sun Yat-sen? Filipinization of the schools should not outlaw Chinese studies: residents of the Philippines ought not be made deaf, dumb, and blind in one of the world’s most used languages. China’s cultural heritage is a valuable heirloom, with many values compatible with Filipino loyalty and views.

Assimilation is not a simple cure-all for the problems. There is need, too, for the Filipinos to learn more about the culture of China and the rest of Asia, to understand and appreciate their great oriental heritage. New trade ties will require Philippine competence in Chinese from some. The importance of more communication cannot be overstressed. The teaching or offering of some Chinese-studies courses should be continued, and Filipinos should take the opportunity to follow them the better to understand the Chinese and to know what is going on in this region, while dispelling doubts and suspicions.

In Southeast Asia right now, closer ties are being forged between the Chinese and the peoples of their host countries, and the Chinese communities are assuming their own characteristics and features distinct from those of China. In other words, they are becoming more and more the people of their host countries in appearances, and it is hoped, in their attitudes. Barriers will finally break within these countries and harmony will prevail.

Notes

1. Most cited research and studies in this report have been completed.
2. Monograph No. 3 has been published.

References

Robert Tilman
n.d. Ethnicity and politics in Philippine Chinese youth. Publisher Unknown.

Gerald McBeath
n.d. Political integration of the Philippine Chinese. Publisher Unknown.

Daniel Doepper
1971 Ethnicity and class structure in Philippine cities. Syracuse University.

John Omohundro

Lorna Lippman
1973 The aim is understanding. Australia, Publisher Unknown.